( 1 ) HEARD the Counsel on record. ( 2 ) SRI E. V. Bhagiratha Rao, the learned counsel representing the petitioner had advanced two contentions. The learned counsel would maintain that the learned magistrate in the light of Section 199 (1) of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in short hereinafter referred to as "code", could not have taken cognizance on the strength of a complaint made by some other person other than the person aggrieved of the offence. The learned Counsel also would contend that even otherwise, Exception 9 of Sec. 499 ipc would be attracted and hence in any view of the matter, the proceedings in c. C. No. 439/2003 on the file of Judicial First class Magistrate, Suryapet to be quashed. ( 3 ) ON the contrary, Sri Sesha Sai, the learned Counsel representing the 1st respondent/complainant in C. C. No. 439/2003 would maintain that not only defamatory allegations were made as against the person on whom the notice had been served, the said allegations were made even in relation to the 1st respondent/complainant who is none other than the son of the person to whom the said notice was addressed. The learned Counsel also would maintain that the second ground that Exception 9 of section 499 IPC would be attracted is predominantly a question of fact which may have to be decided at the appropriate stage. ( 4 ) THE learned Public Prosecutor sri Nageswar Rao would maintain that in the light of the language employed in section 199 (1) of the Code, the stand taken by the petitioner/accused may not be sustained and all other aspects are factual aspects and whether the allegations made are defamatory or not and whether the petitioner/accused is entitled to protection under any of the Exceptions or not, are all predominantly questions of fact to be decided at the appropriate stage and hence this is not a fit case to be interfered with at this stage by exercising powers under Section 482 of the code. ( 5 ) THE petitioner/accused in C. C. No. 729/ 2002 is at present working as the Head masterofz. P. H. S. Kamareddygudem village. ( 5 ) THE petitioner/accused in C. C. No. 729/ 2002 is at present working as the Head masterofz. P. H. S. Kamareddygudem village. It is stated that on 17-7-2002 at around 11 a. m. when the petitioner visited his native village Thiramalgiri and was going to the office of the M. D. O. Thiramalgiri for enquiry as to the lapse of his L. I. C. policy, the 1st respondent who is shown as A-2 along with his father Mandadi Padma Reddy, shown as a-1, one Bugga Reddy and two unknown persons came to him and abused him in filthy language and wanted him to pay the suit amount in O. S. No. 104/2002 pending on the file of Junior Civil Judge, Suryapet filed by mandadi Padma Reddy and threatened him with dire consequences. It is stated that they had forcibly taken the petitioner to the house of Mandadi Padma Reddy and made him forcibly to write four promotes and also obtained his signatures on payment receipts even though no payments were made. They had also threatened him with dire consequences if he reports the above incident to anyone. It is also stated that A-1 and A-2 in C. C. No. 729/2002 came to the school along with goondas and created nuisance and obstructed him from discharging his duties. It is also stated that as the Police had not taken any action, the petitioner got issued registered notice on 22-7-2002 only to Mandadi Padma reddy/a-1 i. e. ,the fatherof the 1st respondent herein to stop the illegal acts about suit amount and return the four promissory notes within seven days from the date of receipt of the notice. Subsequent thereto he filed a private complaint under Section 200 of the code in December 2002 against Mandadi padma Reddy/a-1 and Mandadi Venkata reddy/a-2 for offences committed by them on 17-7-2002. The learned Magistrate had taken the complaint on file for the offences under Sections 341, 342, 353, 506, 383 and 384 IPC and issued summons to both A-1 and A-2 respectively in the said C. C. No. 729/ 2002. The learned Magistrate had taken the complaint on file for the offences under Sections 341, 342, 353, 506, 383 and 384 IPC and issued summons to both A-1 and A-2 respectively in the said C. C. No. 729/ 2002. After receipt of summons in c. C. No. 729/2002 filed by the petitioner herein, as a counter blast, the 1st respondent herein Mandadi Venkata Reddy filed private complaint against the petitioner on 8-5-2003 stating that the contents of the legal notice dated 22-7-2002 would constitute offences under Section 499, 500 and 501 IPC. The learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, suryapet had taken the case on file in c. C. No. 439/2003 for the offence under section 5001 PC and issued summons to the petitioner to be present on 6-8-2003. ( 6 ) ON the twin grounds which had been referred to supra, to quash further proceedings in C. C. No. 439/2003 on the file of Judicial First Class Magistrate, Suryapet, the present Criminal Petition is filed. ( 7 ) SECTION 199 of the Code deals with prosecution for defamation and subsection (1) of Section 199 specifies as hereunder:"no Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter 21 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence: provided that where such person is underthe age of eighteen years, or is an idiot or a lunatic, or is from sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint, or is a woman who, according to the local customs and manners, ought not to be compelled to appear in public, some other person may, with the leave of the court, make a complaint on his or her behalf. Emphasis was laid on the words ". . . . except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence". The stand taken by the petitioner/accused is that inasmuch as notice was addressed to the father, the son who had filed the complaint cannot be said to be some person aggrieved by the offence within the meaning of Section 199 (1) of the code. In Ram Swarum v. Mohd. The stand taken by the petitioner/accused is that inasmuch as notice was addressed to the father, the son who had filed the complaint cannot be said to be some person aggrieved by the offence within the meaning of Section 199 (1) of the code. In Ram Swarum v. Mohd. Javed razack the Apex Court while dealing with a similar case observed at paras 2 and 3 as hereunder:"we may notice that a complaint was filed by the respondent before the metropolitan Magistrate complaining that when he had gone to the chambers of the appellant, he had addressed him and his father in abusive language in the presence of several persons. We need not reproduce the words used but it is clear to us on a reading of the complaint that the words used are defamatory perse, particularly, when a vice-President of the Income Tax appellate Tribunal is said to have addressed those words to a practicing lawyer and to the father of the complainant, who was also a member of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. It is argued before us that cognizance taken by the Metropolitan Magistrate of an offence under Section 499 and 503 ipc is not warranted, and in any event, before taking cognizance the Magistrate ought to have referred the matter to the police under Section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for investigation by the Police. We are not impressed by the argument. The Magistrate after examining the complainant on oath came to the conclusion, prima facie, that an offence was made out. We find no fault with the Metropolitan Magistrate so far as this aspect of the matter is concerned. Moreover, since the magistrate has exercised his power to take cognizance, the same cannot be faulted on the ground that he had not referred the matter to the police for investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was submitted before that the imputations respondents mainly against the father of the complainant, and therefore, a complaint ought to have been made by the father of the complainant. Reference was made to provisions of Section 199 of Cr. It was submitted before that the imputations respondents mainly against the father of the complainant, and therefore, a complaint ought to have been made by the father of the complainant. Reference was made to provisions of Section 199 of Cr. P. C. On perusal of the complaint, we find that similar defamatory words were used against the complainant also apart from his father and, therefore, the right of the complainant to move the court and lodge a complaint before the competent Magistrate cannot be challenged. "reliance also was placed on the undernoted decisions in relation to some person aggrieved or aggrieved person within the meaning of the provisions aforesaid: dwijendra Nath Talukdar and another v. Makhon Lai Pramanik2, B. Appanna v. P. Akkanna, Miss Hardevi Malkani v. State and another and Pat Sharpe v. Dwijendra nath Bose5. ( 8 ) THE undernoted decisions in relation to exercise of powers under Section 482 of the code also may be usefully referred to in this context: state of Haryana v. Bhajanla, s. W. Palanikar v. State of Bihar, C. B. I, v. Akhilesh Singh, Zandu Pharmaceutical works Ltd. v. Sharaful Hague, Ahmed noormohmed Bhatti v. State of Gujarat and girish Sarwate v. State of A. P. . ( 9 ) IT is no doubt true that in the present case notice was given to the father only and the son had filed the complaint alleging that the words used in the notice are defamatory. It is needless to say that in the light of the decision referred (1) supra, this Court is of the considered opinion that this ground at this stage cannot be sustained. ( 10 ) IN relation to the yet another ground, i. e. , the applicability of Exception 9 of section 499 IPC, it is predominantly a question of fact. A three Judge Bench of the Apex court in Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab while dealing with this aspect observed at paras 11 and 12 as hereunder:"normally, we would not have examined the correctness of the finding recorded by the High Court in respect of the appellant s plea of good faith, because 2. AIR 1943 Calcutta 564. 3. AIR 1925 Madras 320. 4. AIR 1969 Allahabad 423. 5. 68 Calcutta Weekly Notes 654. 6. 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335. 7. 2002 (1) ALT (Crl.) 219 (SC) = (2002) 1 SCC 241 . 8. AIR 1943 Calcutta 564. 3. AIR 1925 Madras 320. 4. AIR 1969 Allahabad 423. 5. 68 Calcutta Weekly Notes 654. 6. 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335. 7. 2002 (1) ALT (Crl.) 219 (SC) = (2002) 1 SCC 241 . 8. (2005) 1 SCC 478 . 9. (2005) 1 SCC 122 . 10. (2005) 3 SCC 647 . 11. 2004 (6) ALT 757 (F. B. ). 12. AIR 1966 SC 97 . that is a finding made by the High Court on appreciating oral and documentary evidence, and as it happens, the said finding confirms the view taken by the trial Judge himself. Whetheror not good faith has been proved by an accused person who pleads in his defence the ninth Exception to a charge of defamation under Section 500 IPC would be a question of fact and even if it is assumed to be a mixed question of fact and law, if the Courts below made a concurrentfinding on such a question, this Court generally does not re- examination the matter for itself while exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution. But in the present case, we cannot accept the finding of the High Court, because it is plain that in dealing with the question of good faith the High Court has misdirected itself materially on points of law. Section 499 of the Code defines defamation. It is unnecessary to set out the said definition, because it is common ground that the impugned statement published by the appellant is per se defamatory, and so, we must proceed to deal with the present appeal on the basis that the said statement would harm the reputation of the complainant. Exception 9 to Section 499 provides that it is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another, provided the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or for any other person, orfor the public good. In the present case, the ingredient of public good is satisfied, and the only question, which arose for decision in the Courts below and which arises before us, is whether the imputation can be said to have been made in good faith. In the present case, the ingredient of public good is satisfied, and the only question, which arose for decision in the Courts below and which arises before us, is whether the imputation can be said to have been made in good faith. There is no doubt that the requirements of good faith and public good have both to be satisfied, and so, the failure of the appellant to prove good faith would exclude the application of the Ninth Exception in his favour even if the requirement of public good is satisfied. This position is not disputed by Mr. T. R. Bhasin who appears for the appellant. "in the light of the views expressed by the apex Court referred to supra, this Court is of the considered opinion that it cannot be said that merely because the son, against whom also some defamatory allegations had been made, had filed the complaint to whom the notice was not addressed, he would not fall within the meaning of some person aggrieved by the offence under Section 199 (1) of the code. The other ground being predominantly a question of fact the same may have to be decided at the appropriate stage. ( 11 ) VIEWED from any angle, the Criminal petition is devoid of merit and accordingly the same shall stand dismissed.