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2006 DIGILAW 2355 (DEL)

J. B. COMPANY v. CHANDER PARKASH

2006-12-18

SANJAY KISHAN KAUL

body2006
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant herein is aggrieved by the grant of benefit under Section 14 (2)of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (herein after referred to as the said Act)to the respondent-tenant in terms of the impugned judgment dated 30. 03. 1987. The tenants had also filed two appeals which have been dismissed by separate orders today in RCSA No 259 and 292/87. The grievance of the present appellant/landlord is only limited. ( 2 ) IT may be noticed that orders were passed for deposit of rent by the additional Rent Controller under Section 15 (4) of the said Act during the pendency of the eviction proceedings as a dispute had been raised about the status of the landlord. The rent was so deposited but once the Additional Rent controller dismissed the eviction petition, the rent was apparently not deposited. ( 3 ) IN this behalf, it is pointed out that there was no stay of the order of the additional Rent Controller nor were any orders passed by the Tribunal under section 15 (4) of the said Act. The principal grievance of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the application filed by the appellant under Section 15 (7) of the said Act ought to have been decided by the Trial Court which was not so decided and the Rent Control Tribunal also brushed aside this aspect. ( 4 ) I am unable to accept the aforesaid plea as the said aspect has been dealt with in the impugned orders. The order of the Tribunal dated 30. 03. 1987 records that an order was passed on 13. 03. 1978 under Section 15 (4) of the said Act by the then Additional Rent Controller. A finding has been reached that there has been substantial compliance of the order under section 15 (4) of the said Act and thus the benefit should be made available to the tenant under Section 14 (2) of the said Act. As stated above, since no orders are stated to have been passed by the Tribunal for interim deposit and because of the dismissal of the eviction petition as also by reason of the matter pending before this Court, no grievance in this behalf can be raised. As stated above, since no orders are stated to have been passed by the Tribunal for interim deposit and because of the dismissal of the eviction petition as also by reason of the matter pending before this Court, no grievance in this behalf can be raised. In fact, on being asked, learned counsel for the appellant has really not been able point out any infirmity or a question of law which is raised in the present appeal. Dismissed.