JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rakesh Tiwari, J.—Heard Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is a company duly incorporated under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and is an existing company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956 and a Division known as M/s Agra Industrial Distributors. The aforesaid division was the marketing division of the petitioner and was engaged in the marketing and sale of electrical appliances manufactured and traded by the petitioner. 3. The dispute in the present writ petition relates to a shop situated in Market Namak Mandi, Chandausi, Moradabad which was given on rent at the rate of Rs.75/- per month by the landlord-respondent to the petitioner. 4. It is submitted that somewhere on or about 1972 the petitioner appointed respondent No. 2 Kishan Lal Khatri as its nominated dealer charged with the sale of products supplied to him by the petitioner. There existed no dispute between the parties till the landlord-respondent issued a notice seeking to terminate the tenancy in question. The ground taken in the said notice was that the petitioner had sub let the premises to Kishan Lal Khatri. 5. Upon the receipt of the said notice a reply was submitted by the petitioner to the respondent No. 1 landlord on 21.6.1997 denying the allegations. 6. Thereafter the respondent No. 1-landlord initiated proceedings under the provisions of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887 for ejectment and recovery of rent w.e.f. 1.5.1997 before Judge Small Causes Court, Chandausi, Moradabad, which was, registered as Case No. 11 of 1997. The following issues were framed by the trial Court in the aforesaid case on basis of the pleadings of the parties : Þi{kdkjksa s vfHkdFkuksa ,oa vf/koDrkx.k dh lgefr ds vk/kkj ij fuEu fcUnq fnukad 14-9-98 dks fojfpr fd;s x;s& ¼1+½ D;k fookfnr nqdku esa izfroknh la0 2 ogSfl;r fkDeh fdjk;snkj dkfct gS\ ¼2½ D;k izuxr uksfVl fnukafdr 27-5-1997 voS/k ,oa kwU; gS\ ¼3½ D;k oknh dk izLrqr okn focU/k ,oa ekSu lgefr ds fl)kUr ls ckaf/kr gS\ ¼4½ vuqrks"k\ß 7. After hearing the parties and appreciation of evidence the Judge Small Causes Court, Chandausi, Moradabad vide order dated 27.7.2004 decreed the claim in favour of the landlord-respondent holding that the relation between the petitioner and his alleged nominated dealer Kishan Lal Khatri have not been clarified. After hearing the parties and appreciation of evidence the Judge Small Causes Court, Chandausi, Moradabad vide order dated 27.7.2004 decreed the claim in favour of the landlord-respondent holding that the relation between the petitioner and his alleged nominated dealer Kishan Lal Khatri have not been clarified. The Court found that the firm of nominated dealer Kishan Lal Khatri was registered under the name of M/s Krishna Store and not as nominated dealer whereas according to the agreements 32-Ga and 33-Ga the firm should have been registered in the Sales Tax Department as nominee of the petitioner. A categorical finding has also been given by the Court after examining the aforesaid agreements that the firm M/s Krishan Store was not nominated dealer of the petitioner on commission basis but was selling the goods after purchasing them from any other business man. Moreover, the water tax etc. was being deposited by the said dealer which is a part of the rent. Since rent was being deposited by Sri Kishan Lal Khatri these factors were sure indication that the petitioner had sub let the shop to Sri Kishan Lal Khatri. 8. The J.S.C.C. Court held that the contract of sub letting is between the petitioner and Sri Kishan Lal Khatri, hence it was within his knowledge as such he has to prove the facts beyond doubt that Sri Kishan Lal Khatri who was running the firm M/s Krishna Store was not his sub-tenant. Ultimately, the Court came to the conclusion on the basis of the circumstances and the evidence available on record that the petitioner had sub let his shop to firm M/s Krishna Store who was not nominated dealer of the petitioner as claimed. 9. Ultimately, the Court came to the conclusion on the basis of the circumstances and the evidence available on record that the petitioner had sub let his shop to firm M/s Krishna Store who was not nominated dealer of the petitioner as claimed. 9. The order of the Small Causes Court is as under : Þvuqrks"k&&bl izdkj i=koyh ij miyC/k ekSf[kd o vfHkys[kh; lk{; ls rFkk fcUnq la0 1 ds fuLrkj.k ls Li"V gS fd izfroknh la0 2 izuxr nqdku esa fkDeh fdjk;snkj dh gSfl;r ls vU; :i ls v/;klhu gSA oknh }kjk fkDeh fdjk;snkjksa ds laca/k esa dksbZ lgefr ugha nh x;h gSA vFkkZr fkDeh fdjk;snkj oknh dh lgefr ls ugha gSA oknh }kjk uksfVl fnukafdr 27-5-1997 }kjk izfroknh la0 1 dh fdjk;snkjh lekIr dh x;h gSA ftlds ipkr fu"dklu dk okn izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA tks fkDeh fdjk;snkj dk vk/kkj gSA fkDeh fdjk;snkj dks fu"dkflr fd;k tk ldrk gSA fdjk;s ds laca/k esa dksbZ fookn ugha gSA vr% oknh dk okn izfroknhx.k ds fo:) csn[kyh gsrq vkKfIr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSA vknsk oknh dk okn izfroknhx.k ds fo:) vkKIr fd;k tkrk gS izfroknhx.k dks vknsk fn;k tkrk gS fd og fo"k;xr nqdku dk n[ky ,d ekg esa oknh dks lkSai nsa rFkk oknh dks izfroknh la0 1 eqo0 187-50 iSls fdjk;k rFkk gtkZ dCtks bLrseky fnukad 1-5-1997 ls rk;he ukfyk rd rFkk nkSjku okn iw.kZ n[ky rd 75 :0 ekfld dh nj ls gtkZ dCtks bLrseky rFkk 1-5-1997 ls rkehe ukfyk rd 10 izfrkr dh nj ls tydj ds 18-75 iSls rFkk nkSjku okn o vk;Unk n[ky feyus rd 10 izfrkr dh nj ls tydj o 1-5-1997 ls rk;he ukfyk rd ds lok N% izfrkr dh nj ls x`gdj ds eqo0 11-70 iSls rFkk nkSjku okn n[ky feyus rd lok N% izfrkr dh nj ls x`gdj vnk djsaA fnukad 27-7-2004 g0 vLi"V ¼xtsUnz dqekj½ y?kqokn U;k;k/khk] pUnkSlh] eqjknkcknAß 10. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 27.7.2004 decreeing the claim of the landlord the petitioner filed Revision No. 43 of 2004 under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887 before the Revisional Court. 11. During the pendency of the revision the eviction of the petitioner from the premises in question was stayed by the Revisional Court vide order dated 9.9.2004 which was extended from time to time. 12. 11. During the pendency of the revision the eviction of the petitioner from the premises in question was stayed by the Revisional Court vide order dated 9.9.2004 which was extended from time to time. 12. Ultimately, the Revisional Court by order dated 4.8.2006 dismissed the revision holding that shop is occupied by Kishan Lal Khatri, respondent No. 2 as sub tenant and not as nominated dealer. As regards notice the Court found that the findings of the trial Court in this regard have not been pressed in the arguments, hence require no interference. The question of estoppel and acquiescence regarding sub letting was also considered and it was held that the said principle is not attracted as no stress has been laid by the Counsel on this point and neither there is any evidence in this regard that the landlord had given any consent to the petitioner to sub let the shop to Kishan Lal Khatri nor he had ever been informed by M/s Usha International about the nominated dealer who had in fact sub let the shop. The relevant extract of the order of the Revisional Court on the findings recorded by the trial Court are as under : ON SUB-LETTING “In view the facts and terms and conditions of the business carried by Kishan Lal Khatri at the shop is quite different from the facts and circumstances and the business carried by the commission agent in the case of Usha Sales Ltd. v. ADJ Bareilly, 1976 ALJ 505. So, this cited case law is not applicable in the instant case due to distinguishable facts. Learned trial Court has thoroughly discussed the oral evidence of both the parties and in the light of the evidence on record, he has discussed the agreement, 32/c and 33/c in detail. Learned trial Court has not over-looked any evidence on record. So, this cited case law is not applicable in the instant case due to distinguishable facts. Learned trial Court has thoroughly discussed the oral evidence of both the parties and in the light of the evidence on record, he has discussed the agreement, 32/c and 33/c in detail. Learned trial Court has not over-looked any evidence on record. Learned Counsel for the revisionists has not drawn my attention to any such document, which is material to decide the controversy and has not been discussed by the learned trial Court..........................On the basis of the evidence on record, learned trial Court has rightly decided that at present, defendant No. 2 has fixed the board showing the name of his company and it is not in the name of defendant No. 1 and he got the registration in Sales Tax in the name of M/s Krishna Store and he did not get it registered as a nominated dealer and there was no arrangement to give the commission to defendant No. 2 as a commission agent and there is a much difference between the profit and the commission and on the basis of the entire discussion of the evidence, he rightly came to the conclusion that defendant No. 2 is not the nominated dealer of the defendant No. 1, but he has been introduced in the disputed shop as a sub-tenant. Learned Counsel for the revisionist has cited AIR 1986 SC 1564 , M/s. Madras Banglore Transport v. Inder Singh and others, AIR 1989 SC 1141 , Gopal Saran v. Satya Narain, AIR 1987 SC 2055 , Dipak Banerjee v. Smt. Lilawati, and argued that Company, defendant No. 1 has put in possession defendant No. 2 as nominated dealer, so the legal possession of the Company, defendant No. 1 should be assumed that it is also argued that change in nature of the business cannot be termed as creating a sub-tenancy. On the basis of these cited case laws, he argued that still, the defendant No. 1 is in possession of the shop in question. I carefully perused the above case laws. The facts of the above cited case laws are quite different from the facts of the present case and being distinguishable facts, these case laws referred to above, are not helpful to the learned Counsel for the revisionist. I carefully perused the above case laws. The facts of the above cited case laws are quite different from the facts of the present case and being distinguishable facts, these case laws referred to above, are not helpful to the learned Counsel for the revisionist. ON VALIDITY OF NOTICE The defendant has agitated before the learned trial Court on the question of legality of the notice of termination of tenancy, but in this revision, they have not raised any argument regarding the legality of the notice. The plaintiff has proved the notice of termination of tenancy. The suit is based on due to subletting by the tenant, so in accordance with the provisions of law, the plaintiff has served the notice under Section 106 of T.P. Act to defendant No. 1. The suit is not based on the default of arrears of rent and learned trial Court has discussed in detail the legality of the notice and has given the correct finding. No illegality has been pointed out by the revisionist’s Counsel in the notice. So, I do not think to interfere in the findings recorded by learned trial Court on this point. ON ESTOPPEL AND ACQUIESCENCE IN SUB LETTING The defendants have also raised one point regarding the estoppel and acquiescence of the plaintiff regarding the creation of sub-letting. On this point also, learned Counsel for the revisionist has not given any stress and more over there is no evidence on record from the side of the defendants that the plaintiff had given his consent to sub-let the shop to defendant No. 2 and there is no evidence on record also that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have informed the plaintiff concerning to nomination of dealership. So, in this way, principle of estoppel and acquiescence will not operate any clog against the plaintiff in bring this suit. CONCLUSION OF REVISIONAL COURT In the light of the foregoing discussions, I am of the view that learned trial Court has recorded its findings on the basis of evidence. Its finding is not in opposition to any evidence on record. Learned trial Court has, thoroughly, discussed in its judgment the entire evidence on record. The finding recorded by the learned trial Court is in accordance with law, so the finding recorded by learned trial Court requires no interference and cannot be disturbed in this revision. Its finding is not in opposition to any evidence on record. Learned trial Court has, thoroughly, discussed in its judgment the entire evidence on record. The finding recorded by the learned trial Court is in accordance with law, so the finding recorded by learned trial Court requires no interference and cannot be disturbed in this revision. Thus, the impugned judgment and decree are liable to be confirmed. Order This JSCC revision is, hereby, dismissed and judgment and decree dated 27.7.2004, passed by the learned trial Court is, hereby, confirmed. Sd. Ashok Kumar 4.8.2006 Special Judge (EC Act)/ADJ Moradabad.” Contentions of Petitioner 13. The Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon clauses 2(b), 8,10 and 13 of the agreement and submits that Kishan Lal was a nominated dealer of the petitioner and he runs the shop under the tenancy of the petitioner in the name and style of Krishna Store in the premises in dispute. It is stated that neither tenancy right of the shop in dispute had been transferred to him by the petitioner nor he has any right vested in him in the premises in dispute. It is submitted that as the rent is paid by the petitioner, hence the findings returned that the petitioner had sub let the shop and Sri Kishan Lal Khatri is not a nominated dealer of the petitioner by the Courts below are clearly contrary to the unambiguous terms of the agreement and evidence between the petitioner and Sri Kishan Lal Khatri, respondent No. 2. 14. He further submits that the Courts below have failed to consider that the nominated dealer was authorized to use the premises in dispute only in his capacity as a nominated dealer of the company and no other rights had been vested in him. It is urged that the Courts below have also failed to consider the specific terms of the agreement which provided that the leased premises would be used exclusively for the purposes of the sale of products specified under the agreement and that the company alone would remain in legal possession and control of the same. 15. It is urged that the Courts below have also failed to consider the specific terms of the agreement which provided that the leased premises would be used exclusively for the purposes of the sale of products specified under the agreement and that the company alone would remain in legal possession and control of the same. 15. The Counsel also submits that the agreements in question also specifically provided that the premises in dispute would be under the lock and key of the petitioner itself and the nominated dealer would only have a duplicate set of keys; it was also categorically provided that the rent of the aforesaid premises would be paid by the company directly to the landlord and that the aforesaid conditions clearly established that there was no sub letting of the premises in dispute as the nominated dealer appointed by the petitioner was only to act in aid and in furtherance of the business of the petitioner. 16. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment in Usha Sales Ltd., New Delhi v. Additional District Judge, Bareilly and another, wherein it has been considered that the business carried on by the respondent No. 2 was in the capacity of the Agent as in the instant case. Para 7 is as under : "7. …..In the instant case, the respondent No. 3, Sri S.K. Gupta was already an employee of Usha Sales. He was working as the Manager of the concern he was in possession of the said premises on behalf of Usha Sales. His possession continued to remain the same. Only, the modus operandi of his work as altered. Instead of looking after the business as Manager of the concern, he was made a commission agent and entitled to commission on the amount of business secured by him. “ 17. His possession continued to remain the same. Only, the modus operandi of his work as altered. Instead of looking after the business as Manager of the concern, he was made a commission agent and entitled to commission on the amount of business secured by him. “ 17. He next submits that from the reading of the provisions of the agreement it is clear that the petitioner exercised supervisory as well as administrative control over the licence and the agreement did not distance the company from the premises or severe its rights created by the landlord-respondent as such the agreement permitting Kishan Lal Khatri to carry on the business of the sale of products of the petitioner from the premises in question did not amount to an act of sub letting and therefore, impugned orders are clearly arbitrary and unsustainable as Kishan Lal Khatri had no independent right to the property and was at best only a licensee of the petitioner. 18. It is lastly stated that the business carried by respondent No. 2 in the shop of “Krishna Store” was the exclusive business on behalf of the petitioner as his nominated dealer and Sri Kishan Lal Khatri was not selling products of other companies, hence he cannot be said to be a sub-tenant. Reliance in this regard has been placed upon 1976 ALJ 505, Usha Sales Ltd. v. A.D.J. Bareilly, in support of his case. It is then urged that the Revisional Court in its judgment-dated 4.8.2006 has considered the contentions of the petitioner that the trial Court had not properly appreciated the evidence led by the parties. Contentions of Respondents 19. The Counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner-defendant No. 1 has closed its show room in the shop of the plaintiff and has sub let it to defendant No. 2. It is stated that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned orders dated 27.7.2006 and 4.8.2006 passed by both the Courts below and that the tenancy of the petitioner has been rightly terminated on the ground sub-tenancy, hence no interference is required by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 20. It is stated that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned orders dated 27.7.2006 and 4.8.2006 passed by both the Courts below and that the tenancy of the petitioner has been rightly terminated on the ground sub-tenancy, hence no interference is required by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 20. The Counsel further submits that the trial Court has recorded a categorical finding of fact that respondent No. 2 Kishan Lal Khatri proprietor of Krishna Store is in exclusive possession of the disputed shop and his relation with petitioner M/s. Agra Industrial Distributions is not that of principal and nominated dealer. It is urged that the J.S.C.C. Court on the basis of evidence and pleadings came to the conclusion that respondent No. 2 was sub-tenant of the petitioner which was properly and legally terminated by the landlord by serving a legal and valid notice. 21. The Counsel for the respondents has drawn the attention of the Court to the decisions 2002(2) ARC 602, Shambhu Nath Mathur v. Dilip Kumar Tandon; 1988 (14) ALR 808, Haridev Mishra v. Vth A.D.J. Gorakhpur; 2001(2) ARC 51, Rauf v. 3rd A.D.J. Deoria; 1992(2) ARC 280, Hari Sharnam and another v. Masood Alam and others and 1989 (2) ARC 195, Nand Lal and others v. 4th A.D.J. Azamgarh, wherein it has been held that Revisional Court has the jurisdiction to point out the legal error and rectify the defect in the findings of facts based on no evidence or opposed to the totality of the evidence. It has been held in the aforesaid cases that where the trial Court after considering the evidence of the parties has recorded findings that tenant has sub let the accommodation and such findings being purely findings of fact cannot be disturbed by the Revisional Court and that if, the trial Court has ignored the material document in recording its finding, then considering such evidence, the Revisional Court can record its own finding and it is not a re-assessment of the evidence. 22. 22. On the basis of the above the Counsel for the respondent submits that the Revisional Court noticed the contention of the petitioner regarding finding of the trial Court not being in accordance with law and held that the findings are not based on mis-reading or mis-appraisal of the evidence, as such the view taken by the trial Court is not perverse and it had jurisdiction in the said circumstances. Conclusions 23. The Counsel for the petitioner has basically raised all the arguments in the writ petition which had been raised by the petitioner before both the Courts below . The arguments have been meted out by the Courts below by detailed orders which are impugned in this writ petition. Before this Court also the petitioner stressed upon the agreements, 32/c and 33/c filed before the trial Court in support of his case that defendant No. 2 Kishan Lal Khatri was appointed as nominated dealer by the petitioner and have also placed the provisions of the agreement dated 18.7.90 appended as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. These provisions provide that “company is desirous of promoting sale to customers from the aforesaid premises by appointing an experienced individual/firm as its nominated dealer and Shri Krishna Lal Khatri of Krishna Store are interested in taking up the said responsibilities set out hereinafter”. From perusal of Clause-2(b) and clause 8 regarding margin of profit of the agreement it appears that the nominated dealer was debarred to make any sale to another dealer from the selling point but was authorized to use the Company’s leased premises for use in his capacity as a nominated dealer of the Company for the sale of the product of the Company only and for no other purpose. The agreement further provides for control and supervision of the Company and its right to inspect the premises and that the rent of the premises is to be paid by the company. Clause-8 provides for Margin of Profit, according to which the nominated dealer is entitled to get the difference between the purchase price and the selling price, which will constitute the margin of profit of the nominated dealer. 24. Clause-8 provides for Margin of Profit, according to which the nominated dealer is entitled to get the difference between the purchase price and the selling price, which will constitute the margin of profit of the nominated dealer. 24. The contention of the Counsel for the petitioner that para-10 of the agreement provides that all supplies will be affected after receipt of payment for the goods by bank draft, or in cash and in para-13, transit delay/losses and that the company’s responsibility shall cease after handing over the goods to the carrier, with regard to any delay, in delivery, or damage, loss in transit on the part of the carrier. In para 8(d) of agreement it is provided that the difference between the purchase- price and selling-price, as described above, will constitute the margin of profit of the nominated dealer. By reading of paras 8(d) and 10 of the agreement it is clear that Sri Kishan Lal Khatri the alleged nominated dealer had to purchase the goods from the company by payment of entire costs of the goods and it was not the duty of the company to supply the goods to him at the selling point. In the circumstances the profit or loss depended upon the sale price. If the sale price is more than the purchase-price, it would result in profit otherwise in the event the dealer had to sell its goods at a lesser price, he suffer loss, hence it cannot be said that there was stipulation under clause 8(d) in providing the commission to Sri Kishan Lal Khatri the alleged nominated dealer on the secured business. As Sri Kishan Lal the alleged nominated dealer was selling the goods at the shop at his own risk after purchasing them from the petitioner he was doing independent business as any other shop-keepers, who purchase their goods from other point and sell it on their shops, hence it cannot be said that he was selling the goods of his principal (petitioner), being its Agent. 25. According to Clause-4 (g) of the agreement paper No. 32/c it is for the nominated dealer to obtain registration under Sales Tax etc. in his name as a nominated dealer of the Company. 25. According to Clause-4 (g) of the agreement paper No. 32/c it is for the nominated dealer to obtain registration under Sales Tax etc. in his name as a nominated dealer of the Company. However, in the instant case Kishan Lal Khatri got his shop registered under Sales Tax Act in the name of “Krishna Store” and not in the name of Krishna Store (a nominated dealer of the petitioner). Thus the Courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that he was doing his independent business in the name of his firm only. 26. There is a major contradiction regarding introduction of respondent No. 2 Sri Kishan Lal Khatri as nominated dealer of the petitioner in the pleading and the agreement appended to the writ petition. The petitioner has also not produced any agreement before the Courts below which establishes or proves that Sri Kishan Lal Khatri was nominated dealer in the year 1965, or in the year 1972 of the petitioner or even continued thereafter in that capacity. 27. The Revisional Court has categorically held that the trial Court has clearly and specifically recorded findings that Sri Kishan Lal Khatri, respondent No. 2 was not a nominated dealer of the petitioner. The findings of the trial Court are based upon the documentary and oral evidence on record and are neither illegal nor perverse as such cannot be up set in revision. 28. From perusal of record and para-7 of the agreement quoted in the body of the judgment earlier it is evident that earlier, Shri S.K. Gupta was an employee of the company. Induction of Sri Kishan Lal Khatri in the shop was only a camouflage to conceal sub tenancy as he was not only selling the goods of the petitioner but also other brands of various company in his own right as independent businessman as has been found by the Courts below. 29. It appears that the goods of the company were sold by Sri Kishan Lal Khatri as the owner and principal of ‘Krishna Store’. His creation as nominated agent for selling the goods of the petitioner has been found by the Courts below on manufactured paper prepared for the purpose of the case only. 29. It appears that the goods of the company were sold by Sri Kishan Lal Khatri as the owner and principal of ‘Krishna Store’. His creation as nominated agent for selling the goods of the petitioner has been found by the Courts below on manufactured paper prepared for the purpose of the case only. This is also apparent from para 8(b) of the agreement which provides that the company shall supply goods to the nominated dealer on out-right sale basis on price in force, from time to time. 30. The Courts below have come to the conclusion that documents submitted by the petitioner alleged to be agreements, 32/c and 33/c are the fabricated documents to give colour of their, defence. The Courts below on examining paras 5 and 14 of written statement of the petitioner in which it has been stated that Sri Kishan Lal Khatri is the nominated dealer of the petitioner since 1965 continuously and the written statement of Sri Kishan Lal Khatri that he is the nominated dealer of the petitioner since 1979 as well as the statements of Sudhir Kulshreshtha on behalf of the petitioner, who in his chief examination, has stated that Sri Kishan Lal Khatri was their nominated dealer since 1972, held it is well-established principle of pleadings and proof that no evidence can be adduced against the pleadings and that no party can be permitted to adduce the evidence, unless it is incorporated in the pleadings. The Courts below also noted that in his cross-examination D.W.1 Sri Sudhir Kulshreshtha stated that he is in the service of defendant No. 1 since June, 1991 and hence the Court concluded that when this witness was not in the service of the petitioner in 1972 then how can he be in a position to prove that respondent No. 2 was the nominated dealer of the petitioner since 1972. 31. It is evident from the record that in the instant case, agreement, 32/c has been shown to be executed on 15.6.84 and according to the terms of this agreement, it terminated on 14.6.87. Another agreement relied upon by the petitioner in the Court below is paper No. 33/c, which is said to have been executed on 18.7.96 in which it is mentioned that the agreement will be effective for the period 15.6.87 to 31.3.2000 only. Another agreement relied upon by the petitioner in the Court below is paper No. 33/c, which is said to have been executed on 18.7.96 in which it is mentioned that the agreement will be effective for the period 15.6.87 to 31.3.2000 only. This itself proves that there was no subsequent agreement between the parties authorizing thereafter nominating Sri Kishan Lal Khatri as nominated dealer after 14.6.87 in respect of Sri Kishan Lal Khatri to carry on the business as a nominated dealer of the petitioner. 32. The trial Court as well as the Revisional Court have noted the pleadings of the parties. The trial Court after discussing the evidence produced by the parties in detail has given cogent reasons for disbelieving the case of the. petitioner that Sri Kishan Lal Khatri was their nominated dealer and that the petitioner had not sub-let the shop in question to him. 33. Sub-letting comes into existence when tenant gives up possession of the tenanted accommodation, wholly or in part, and puts another person in exclusive possession thereof behind the back of the landlord. In such a situation it is very difficult for landlord to prove by direct evidence, contract or understanding between the tenant and sub-tenant. Payment of rent or monetary consideration between tenant and sub-tenant could be made secretly. In such circumstances, the Court is entitled to draw necessary inferences from the facts and circumstances proved as it has been held by the apex Court in 2005(58) ALR 683, Joginder Singh Sodhi v. Amar Kaur. 34. In the instant case, the Courts below have found that the landlord has successfully made out the ground of sub-letting for eviction as Sri Kishan Lal Khatri the alleged nominated dealer was not a nominated dealer of the petitioner and in fact he was doing his business in his own independent right in the shop sub let to him by the petitioner. The Courts below noted that the change in tenancy was not with the consent of the landlord nor within his knowledge, as such there was no question of limitation or bona fide induction of Sri Kishan Lal Khatri in the garb of nominated dealer, hence the tenant along with sub-tenant must be evicted from the disputed shop as it has been held in M/s K. Ganesh Shet v. A.K. Jayarama Sheka and others, 2004(57) ALR 268. 35. 35. Since the sub-tenancy was created without the consent of the landlord, hence the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. 36. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner regarding delay and in action of the landlord to initiate eviction proceedings for a long time are meaningless has no force in view of the decision rendered in AIR 2002 SC 1003 , G. Singh v. R.K. Aneja and AIR 2002 SC 2057 , P.J, Chandy and others v. J.P. Thomas. 37. The decision rendered in Usha Sales (supra) relied upon by the petitioner in which it has been held that where a change in the status of a tenant has been necessitated due to business consideration it would not amount to sub-letting under the provisions of the Act as this was purely an internal business arrangement between the company and the tenant. 38. The Courts below have distinguished the aforesaid case of Usha Sales (supra) by cogent reasoning that there is a major difference in the agreement relied upon by the petitioner in this case from the case of Usha Sales (supra) and as such it is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. After perusal of the reasoning given by the Courts below I am of the opinion that it does not suffer from any illegality and that the case of Usha Sales (supra) relied upon by the petitioner is not applicable as change in the status of the tenant has not been necessitated due to any business consideration but to give benefit to Sri Kishan Lal Khatri for ulterior motives who was an employee of the petitioner. 39. The concurrent findings recorded by the trial Court affirmed by the Revisional Court in the aforesaid facts and circumstances needs no interference by this Court as no illegality, infirmity or perversity has been demonstrated by the Counsel for the petitioner in the orders impugned. 40. Both the Courts below have given conclusive and detailed findings of facts based on cogent reasons regarding the sub-letting and other issues, which have not been shown to be erroneous. 40. Both the Courts below have given conclusive and detailed findings of facts based on cogent reasons regarding the sub-letting and other issues, which have not been shown to be erroneous. The Courts below have found that the sub-tenant was not a nominated dealer of the petitioner as there is no contract of nominating dealer, hence pleadings of the petitioner are against the record and findings of facts cannot be interfered in the circumstances under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 41. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed with heavy and deterrent cost, as the law does not protect illegal occupation of a building by any person neither in the garb of tenant or nominated dealer or any other member. Costs 42. The Apex Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3353 has held that : “So far as awarding of costs at the time of judgment is concerned, awarding of costs must be treated generally as mandatory inasmuch as the liberal attitude of the Courts in directing the parties to bear their own costs had led the parties to file a number of frivolous cases in the Courts or to raise frivolous and unnecessary issues. Costs should invariably follow the event. Where a party succeeds ultimately on one issue or point but loses on number of other issues or points which were unnecessarily raised. Costs must be appropriately apportioned. Special reasons must be assigned if costs are not being awarded. Costs should be assessed according to rule in force. If any of the parties has unreasonably protracted the proceedings, the judge should consider exercising discretion to impose exemplary costs after taking into account the expense incurred for the purpose of attendance on the adjourned dates.” 43. Thus, from the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid case of Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra) it is apparent that non-payment of cost is an exception for which special reasons have to be given by the Court and that in normal circumstances cost has to be awarded on the party according to the issue decided in favour of the party which were unnecessarily raised. The cost so imposed should be in accordance with rules and if the proceedings are unnecessarily protracted or adjournments have been sought it is upon the discretion of the Judge to impose exemplary cost taking also into account the circumstances etc. for the purpose of adjournment. 44. The aforesaid case has been followed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48752 of 2006, Nizamuddin v. Shakoor Ahmad, in which judgment has been rendered on 5.9.2006 after considering the relevant High Court Rules, 1952 as well as Sections 34, 35, 35-A and 35B of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the judgment it has been held that : “From the aforesaid rule it is evident that the Court can make such order as to costs as it may consider just. It is discretionary power of the Court to impose cost, hence it cannot be said to be illegal or perverse. The Court should award cost for judicious approach taking into consideration the whole set of facts and circumstances and not award cost arbitrarily or capriciously. In my opinion while awarding interest on a party by non-payment of principal amount or any dues should also be considered by the Court and not only interest but penal interest may also be awarded." 45. In the instant case, the induction of Sri Kishan Lal Khatri in the shop was only a camouflage to conceal sub tenancy as he was not only selling the goods of the petitioner but also other brands of various companies in his own right as an independent businessman. His creation as nominated agent for selling the goods of the petitioner has been found by the Courts below on manufactured papers prepared for the purpose of the case only. The concurrent findings recorded by the trial Court affirmed by the Revisional Court in the aforesaid facts and circumstances needs no interference by this Court as no illegality, infirmity or perversity has been shown by the Counsel for the petitioner in the orders impugned. 46. Considering all the facts and circumstances of this case the Court is of considered opinion that petitioner has abused the process of Court. Cost is assessed at Rs. 25,000/-. It shall be deposited by the petitioner before the authority concerned and paid to the landlord within two months from today. 46. Considering all the facts and circumstances of this case the Court is of considered opinion that petitioner has abused the process of Court. Cost is assessed at Rs. 25,000/-. It shall be deposited by the petitioner before the authority concerned and paid to the landlord within two months from today. In case of failure of the petitioner to deposit the cost before the Executing Court, the same shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue from him within a month thereafter and paid forthwith to the landlord. 47. The petition is accordingly dismissed with cost as aforesaid. Petition Dismissed. ———