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2006 DIGILAW 2375 (PNJ)

Kishan Chand Garg v. Director Public Instructions

2006-05-30

AJAI LAMBA, S.S.NIJJAR

body2006
JUDGMENT S.S. NIJJAR, J. (ORAL) 1. In this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 28.4.1996 by which respondent No. 3 has been appointed as a Head Master. The appointment is said to be contrary to the statutory rules known as Punjab Privately Managed Recognised Schools Employees (Security of Service) Rules, 1981. 2. Mr. Sharma submits that the under the aforesaid rules, it was necessary for the Management to seek the approval of the DPI. He has not been shown any material by the Management to indicate that such an approval has been given. The petitioner had served a legal notice on respondent No. 1 on 2.2.2006 seeking the relief for which prayer has been made in the present writ petition. The respondents have not taken any decision on the legal notice. 3. Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in the writ petition. 4. Respondent No. 3 has been admittedly serving the school since 1972 when he was appointed as a Clerk. Thereafter, during his service as a Clerk, he was appointed as a Social Studies Master on 14.9.1989. However, according to the petitioner, respondent No. 3 at the time of his appointment as Head Master on 28.4.1996, did not possess the necessary experience for being appointed, as such. On 28.4.1996, the petitioner was B.A., B.Ed. Under the 1981 Rules, the minimum qualification for appointment on the post of Head Master is as follows :- “i) In the case of M.A. or M.Sc. with M.Ed Six years; ii) In the case of M.A. or M.Sc with B.T. or B.Ed. Seven years ; iii) In the case of B.A. or B.Sc. with B.T. or B.Ed. Eight years.” Mr. Sharma submits that from the aforesaid, it is obvious that it was necessary for respondent No. 3 to have either years of teaching experience as on the relevant date i.e. 28.4.1996. He was simply B.A. B.Ed., and had only 5 years and 7 months experience. 5. A perusal of the impugned order however shows that respondent No. 3 has better qualifications than even the petitioner. The petitioner is M.A. B.Ed, on the other hand, respondent No. 3 is M.A. B.Ed followed by M.A. M.Ed. He was simply B.A. B.Ed., and had only 5 years and 7 months experience. 5. A perusal of the impugned order however shows that respondent No. 3 has better qualifications than even the petitioner. The petitioner is M.A. B.Ed, on the other hand, respondent No. 3 is M.A. B.Ed followed by M.A. M.Ed. The petitioner claims to be better qualified only on the ground that he has 17 years of teaching experience whereas at the relevant time, respondent No. 4 had only 5 years and 7 months experience. Under the rules, which have been reproduced above, experience for a candidate possessing the qualification of M.A. M.Ed. is only 6 years. So at the relevant time at best, respondent No. 3 was 5 months short of teaching experience. In such circumstances, it would be wholly inequitable to set aside the appointment of respondent No. 3 at this late stage at the instance of the petitioner who did not care to challenge the appointment of respondent No. 3 since 8.4.1996. 6. Faced with this situation, Mr. Sharma submitted that the appointment of respondent No. 3 is void and therefore, can be challenged at any time and the limitation would not be relevant. We are unable to accept such a broad proposition. It is well settled proposition of law that law of limitation and also the principles of delay and laches, are relevant considerations for the Court while granting/declining the relief. This view of ours finds support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of P.S. Sadasivaswami v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 2271. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court has clearly held that an aggrieved party has to move the Court within a period of six months or at best within one year of the date when the cause of action arises. The Supreme Court observed as follows :- “2..... A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 more is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 more is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matter. The petitioner’s petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant’s petition as well as the appeal.” 7. Taking into consideration the aforesaid enunciation of law, we are of the opinion that no relief can be granted to the petitioner at this stage. DISMISSED