Judgment ( 1. ) IN this writ petition the original relief which was sought was in regard to quashment of orders Annexure P/1 and P/2 dated 19. 1. 2004 and 9. 2. 2004 and to direct the Industrial Court to implead the petitioners as party to the reference case and permit them to cross-examine the Management witnesses and participate in the reference proceedings as a party to the dispute. However, on account of subsequent events, as during the pendency of this writ petition, the Industrial Court passed the final order on 12. 3. 2004 in regard to the reference case referred to it, the petitioner has amended the petition by adding the relief that the order dated 12. 3. 2004 passed by Industrial Court be quashed. ( 2. ) SHRI Rohit Arya, learned senior counsel by inviting my attention to annexure P/5 which Is an order passed by this Court dated 30. 11. 2001 passed in W. P. No. 2043/2001 and also by giving emphasis on Clause (3) has submitted that the authorized representative of the petitioner Union was allowed to remain present on each day of the proceeding in the Industrial Court as a monitor in the reference case. However, on going through the said clause it is gathered that this Court held that the petitioner shall have no authority, except that if the Labour Officer does some thing against the interest of the employees. Shri Kuldeep Bhargava, learned Counsel appearing for the Management (respondent No. 2) submitted that the Industrial Court in all fairness not only has taken into consideration the said direction of this Court, but it has also acted accordingly. ( 3. ) BEFORE dealing with the rival contentions of learned Counsel for the parties, it would be relevant to mention that the first party to the reference case before the Industrial Court, namely, General Secretary, Asbestos Karmachari Sangh Eternit Everest Kymore (respondent No. 2) has not assailed the impugned final order of Industrial Court and the present petitioners are not the parties to the reference case. Though the original petitioner No. 1 was party No. 1 in the reference case at one point of time, however, the State Government on 7. 4. 2001 found and directed that since petitioner No. 1, namely, Asbestos Janata Mazdoor Union is not recognized as Representative Union, directed to join Labour Officer, Katni as the representative of the employees. Though the original petitioner No. 1 was party No. 1 in the reference case at one point of time, however, the State Government on 7. 4. 2001 found and directed that since petitioner No. 1, namely, Asbestos Janata Mazdoor Union is not recognized as Representative Union, directed to join Labour Officer, Katni as the representative of the employees. Thereafter on 16. 7. 2002 another amended order was issued that respondent No. 2 to this petition, has been recognized as the Representative Union, therefore, in place of the name of Labour Officer, Katni, the name of respondent No. 2 be substituted as party No. 1 and accordingly respondent No. 2 was substituted as party No. 1 in the reference case before the Industrial Court. ( 4. ) AS pre the case of petitioners, petitioner No. 1, Asbestos Janta Mazdoor Union is a registered trade Union having Registration No. 4604. An Industrial dispute was raised with the respondent Management in respect of various matters of the workers service condition. The dispute having not been solved at the Management level, the same was followed by conciliation proceedings which ended in its failure, as a result of which the reference for dispute for arbitration before the Industrial Court by the State Government was made in exercise of powers conferred to it under Section 51 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (in short the Act) and the points for reference which were referred to the Industrial Court vide its order dated 22. 3. 1997 are on record as Annexure P/6. As per the case of the petitioners, the Management in collusion with respondent No. 2 prepared an agreement which is prejudicial to the rights and Interest of the workers. Said agreement dated 20. 10. 1999 was under challenge before this Court in W. P. No. 6498/2000. However, during the pendency of that with petition, the representative character of petitioner No. 1 was withdrawn and in its place Labour Officer was substituted in the reference proceedings. This order/action of the State Government was challenged before this Court in W. P. No. 2043/2001 which was disposed of vide order dated 30. 11. 2001. However, during the pendency of that with petition, the representative character of petitioner No. 1 was withdrawn and in its place Labour Officer was substituted in the reference proceedings. This order/action of the State Government was challenged before this Court in W. P. No. 2043/2001 which was disposed of vide order dated 30. 11. 2001. One of the direction (Clause No. III) which was given in the said writ petition reads as under: (iii) The authorized representative of the petitioner/union shall remain present on each day of the proceeding but it shall have no authority except when the Labour Officer does something against the interest of the employee to which the employee is not a party or has no concern. Another direction (Clause No. II) reads as under: (ii) The Labour Officer, respondent No. 3 herein who has been authorized by the State Government to represent the employees of the respondent No. 2 shall not enter into any compromise with the Management unless each workman who is aggrieved seeks justice at the alter of the majesty of law personally appears and gives evidence that he is agreeable for such compromise. The Labour Officer must bear in mind that he has a definite duty to see that the poor employees do not suffer and their conditions do not get worsened because of an attempt to put the controversy to rest in a hurried manner to close the chapter. He should keep in mind that an attempt to do justice in a hurried manner is not anything but to give an independent burial to real cause of justice. ( 5. ) DURING the pendency of the reference proceedings, respondent No. 2 was substituted in place of Labour Officer since it is a "representative Union". According to the petitioners, respondent No. 2 in order to extend the undue benefit to the Management chose not to lead evidence and thereby provided an open field to the Management to have the reference decided in its favour. The action was objected by the petitioner No. 1 as a result of which an application was moved to implead it as party to the reference proceedings. However, the prayer has been rejected by the Industrial Court vide Annexure P/1. According to petitioner, the said application ought to have been allowed since the respondent No. 2 has colluded with the Management. ( 6. However, the prayer has been rejected by the Industrial Court vide Annexure P/1. According to petitioner, the said application ought to have been allowed since the respondent No. 2 has colluded with the Management. ( 6. ) IN the reference proceeding the Management led its evidence by producing the witnesses and the petitioners sought opportunity to cross examine those witnesses, but the same was not allowed by the impugned order Annexure P/2 dated 9. 2. 2004 and the action is again prejudicial to the interest of the workers. ( 7. ) IT has been contended by Shri Arya, learned senior counsel that proper opportunity to lead evidence was not provided to the petitioner No. 1 and the right to adduce evidence was closed. By assailing the order dated 12. 3. 2004 (Annexure P/9) passed by Industrial Court in reference case, it has been contended by learned senior counsel that the impugned final order dated 12. 3. 2004 is arbitrary and unreasonable and dehors to the law as well as facts on record and in violation to the principles of natural justice denying the legitimate right of the workers. In support of his contention, learned senior counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on following decisions: (i) Factory Manager Central India Machinery Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Prakash Singh Rood Singh and Ors. 1996 MPLJ 822 (ii) H. D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India and Ors. (iii)Hindustan Machine Tools and Ors. v. M. Rangareddy and Ors. 2001-I-LLJ 596 (S. C.) (iv) Dhirendra Chamoli and Anr. v. State of U. P. (v) Bijlee Karmachari Sangh. M. P. and Anr. v. M. P. Electricity Board, Jabalpur and Ors. 1986 MPLJ 285 (vi) State of Punjab and Ors. v. Kulwant Singh and Ors. 2005-I-LLJ-329 (Punjab and Haryana) ( 8. ) IN this petition, It has been contended by learned senior counsel for the petitioner that impugned interim orders Annexure P/1 dated 19. 1. 2004, Annexure P/2 dated 9. 2. 2004 and the final order deciding the reference case by the Industrial Court dated 12. 3. 2004 (Annexure P/9) be quashed. ( 9. ) ON the other hand Shri Kuldeep Bhargava, learned Counsel appearing for the Management by inviting my attention to the return has submitted that full opportunity to lead evidence was provided to the petitioner No. 1 and he also availed the said opportunity. 3. 2004 (Annexure P/9) be quashed. ( 9. ) ON the other hand Shri Kuldeep Bhargava, learned Counsel appearing for the Management by inviting my attention to the return has submitted that full opportunity to lead evidence was provided to the petitioner No. 1 and he also availed the said opportunity. The petitioner No. 2 also participated in the proceedings and he was also allowed to give his statement. It has been pointed out that petitioner No. 1 is not a "representative Union" and its character of "representative Union" which was held earlier, was also set aside by the Industrial Court in appeal number 1/99/mpir vide order dated 11. 9. 2003. A copy of the said order has been placed on record as Annexure R/1. On going through this order, it is gathered that this order was passed In between Asbestos Kamgar Union on one side and Asbestos Janata Mazdoor Union (petitioner No. 1) on the other side. Thus, for all practical purposes since there is an order of the Industrial Court holding that petitioner No. 1 is not a "representative Union", he was not enjoying the representative character. It has also been submitted that the directions passed by this Court in W. P. No. 2043/2001 (Annexure P/5) was taken into consideration while passing the impugned interim order Annexure P/1 by the Industrial Court. The said order was passed by this Court when the workers were not represented by Representative Union. During the pendency of the reference case before the Industrial Court, the position was changed and respondent No. 2 Union acquired the status of "representative Union". Thereafter, the State Government in the pending reference case, amended the earlier order of its reference Annexure P/6 dated 22. 3. 1997 and further directed that the employees of the respondent No. 1 undertaking will be represented by the "representative Union" i. e. respondent No. 2. This order was passed because under the Act, it is only the "representative Union" which has a right to represent all employees irrespective of whether the workers are members of the said union or not. ( 10. This order was passed because under the Act, it is only the "representative Union" which has a right to represent all employees irrespective of whether the workers are members of the said union or not. ( 10. ) THE petitioner No. 1 itself has stated while filing a reply to the application of the Management in the reference case that it is only the State Government who is empowered to substitute the party before the Court and the Court does not have any power under the Act to substitute any third party In place of the party referred to the dispute by the State Government. In that regard para 3 of Annexure R/2 which is a reply of petitioner No. 1 may be seen. This Court in W. P. No. 2043/2001 allowed petitioner No. 1 to monitor the matter when the employees of the respondent No. 1 were being represented by Government Labour Officer and after the substitution of respondent No. 2 as a Representative Union, it is only the "representative Union" which can take part to the interest of the workers and which has also been substituted by the order of the State Government. The petitioner No. 2 was allowed to participate in the proceedings for the limited purpose only and indeed petitioner No. 2 gave his statement in regard to his claim of permanency. The order sheets in reference case from 15. 12. 2003 till final order was pronounced, have been placed on record as Annexure R/3 to R/7. ( 11. ) BY pointing the order sheet dated 3. 2. 2004 (Annexure R/6) it has been contended that full opportunity was given to lead evidence to petitioner No. 1 and petitioner No. 1 closed its evidence on this date. The petitioner No. 1 submitted list of witnesses but examined only three witnesses and closed its evidence. The petitioner No. 2 was also allowed to give his statement as per the direction of this Court in W. P. No. 2043/2001. After the petitioners closed their evidence the Management adduced its evidence. By pointing out order dated 12. 1. 2004 in M. C. C. No. 24/2004 passed by this Court, it has been contended that a limited period was fixed for the disposal of the reference case and it was further made clear by this Court that no further extension of time shall be granted under any circumstances. By pointing out order dated 12. 1. 2004 in M. C. C. No. 24/2004 passed by this Court, it has been contended that a limited period was fixed for the disposal of the reference case and it was further made clear by this Court that no further extension of time shall be granted under any circumstances. The said order passed by this Court in M. C. C. has been placed on record as Annexure R/8. According to this order, the time was extended till 15th March, 2004. After the passing of the order, extending the time by this Court on 12. 1. 2004, petitioner No. 2 got his statement recorded on 6. 2. 2004 and thereafter only the chance was given to the Management to adduce its evidence. Thus, the major time was exhausted only by the petitioners to adduce their evidence. ( 12. ) ON merit it has been contended that no doubt 29 disputes were referred for adjudication to the Industrial Court but it is wrong to say that the agreement dated 20. 10. 1999 was prejudicial to the interest of the workers. According to respondent No. 1, the petitioner could not demonstrate even a single instance which could suggest that the statutory agreement dated 20. 10. 1999, which was filed on 9/10/2004 along with the application for taking documents on record, is prejudical to the interest of the workers. ( 13. ) IT has been then contended by Shri Bhargava, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 that under the Industrial Jurisprudence statutory agreement arrived under the Act should be preferred then an award passed by any Court with respect to any dispute. If any statutory agreement is arrived at under the Act, then the matter could be disposed of In accordance with the said agreement. However, since there was a direction by this Court in W. P. No. 2043/2001, there was no option left to the Industrial Court, but to record the evidence. Some of the employees, after the order dated 30. 11. 2001 by this Court had stated before the Industrial Court that they do not agree to the terms of the agreement dated 20. 11. Some of the employees, after the order dated 30. 11. 2001 by this Court had stated before the Industrial Court that they do not agree to the terms of the agreement dated 20. 11. 1999, but when an application was moved on behalf of respondent No. 1 that those employees who have stated so should deposit the amount received by them which was given to benefit them by virtue of the said statutory agreement dated 20. 11. 1999, failing which it would be deemed that they have stated before the Industrial Court under some duress, compulsion, threat or under the undue influence. But, despite the reminders none of the employee came forward to refund the benefit which they obtained under the statutory agreement of the Act. This is because the benefit of the statutory agreement was enjoyed by them and except the two employees, all the employees have impliedly accepted the terms of the benefit of the statutory agreement under the Act. By inviting my attention to para 16 of the return, it has been contended that there are only 16 temporary substitute pool (in short TSP) employees and 143 permanent employees are daily rated and 20 permanent employees are monthly rated and this position has also been admitted by petitioner No. 2 Ravishanker Pandey, as he has stated that number of TSP employees would be 16 to 18 and that of permanent employees would be 120-125. ( 14. ) IT has been submitted by Shri Bhargava, learned Counsel for the Management that the impugned final order passed by the Industrial Court is in accordance to the law and there is no perversity in it. In support of his contention, learned Counsel has placed reliance on the following decisions: (i) Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. S. G. Kotturappa and Anr. AIR2005 SC 1933 , 2005 (2 )AWC1064 (SC ), 2005 (3 )ESC311 , [2005 (3 )JCR21 (SC )], JT2005 (3 )SC 20 , 2005 (3 )Karlj42 , (2005 )II LLJ161 SC , (2005 )3 SCC409 , 2005 (2 )SLJ208 (SC ), (2005 )2 UPLBEC1632 (ii) Prakash Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Rashtriya Mills Mazdoor Sangh (iii) Sukhjit Starch and Chemicals Ltd. v. State Of Punjab and Ors. 1962-II-LLJ-269 (Punjab ). ( 15. ) AFTER having heard learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this petition deserves to be dismissed. ( 16. 1962-II-LLJ-269 (Punjab ). ( 15. ) AFTER having heard learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this petition deserves to be dismissed. ( 16. ) BEFORE dealing with the rival contentions of learned Counsel for the parties, it would be condign to refer certain provisions of the Act. Section 27 of the Act deals with the representation of employees. According to this section, the authorities which are mentioned in Clause I, II and III shall be entitled to act and appear in the order of preference as the representative of employees. For better understanding, it would be germane to quote Section 27 which reads thus: 27. Representation of employees.- The following shall be entitled to act an appear in the order of preference specified below as the representative of employees in an industry in any local area: (i) a Representative Union for such Industry; (ii) any union of which the employee of such industry is a member; (iii) Labour Officer; Provided that where the Labour Officer is the representative of employees he shall not enter into any agreement under Section 33 or settlement under Section 43 on their behalf unless, the terms of such agreement or settlement, as the case may be, are accepted by them in the prescribed manner: Provided further that where in the opinion of the State Government, of the employees of the industry as a whole deemed to be affected under Section 32, the Labour Officer shall not enter into an agreement under this section except with the previous approval in writing of the State Government. On testing the mandate of representation of employees given in the above said section on the touchstone of the present factual scenario, it would reveal that though earlier the petitioner No. 1 was a Representative Union but later on it did not remain as such as there is an order in that regard passed by the Industrial Court (Annexure R/1) in which petitioner No. 1 was arrayed as respondent No. 1 in Appeal 1/99/mpir (Asbestos Kamgar Union v. Asbestos Janta Mazoor Union) decided on 11. 9. 2003. Since the petitioner No. 1 did not remain the "representative Union", eventually, it was rightly directed to protect the interest of the workers of respondent No. 1, to the Labour Officer by the State Government vide its order dated 7. 4. 2001. 9. 2003. Since the petitioner No. 1 did not remain the "representative Union", eventually, it was rightly directed to protect the interest of the workers of respondent No. 1, to the Labour Officer by the State Government vide its order dated 7. 4. 2001. However, since respondent No. 2 became the "representative Union", therefore rightly the State Government on 16. 7. 2002 by amending its order of reference Annexure P/6 dated 22. 3. 1997, directed respondent No. 2 to be substituted in place of petitioner No. 1 since respondent No. 2 is the Representative Union. The order of Industrial Court passed in appeal number 1/99/mpir, holding respondent No. 2 to be the "representative Union" became final, as the petitioner, No. 1 who was party in the said appeal, never challenged the said order of Industrial Court. ( 17. ) AT this juncture, it is quite relevant to go through Section 51 of the Act which speaks about reference of dispute to Labour Court, Industrial Court or Board. On going through this section one can say that it is only the State Government which may refer the dispute for its adjudication. Thus, if the application filed by petitioner No. 1 to be impleaded as party to the reference case has been rejected, it cannot be said that any mistake was committed by the Industrial Court by passing the impugned order annexure P/1 dated 19. 1. 2004. Apart from this, this type of arrangement in the law has rightly been accepted by the petitioner No. 1 itself by filing a reply dated 15. 1. 2001 to the application filed by the Management dated 20. 11. 2000 in the reference case, a copy of which has been placed on record as Annexure R/ii. In para 3 of the said reply, it has been rightly submitted by petitioner No. 1 that it is only the State Government who is empowered to substitute party before the Court and the Court does not have the power under the Act to substitute a third party in place of the party referred to it in the dispute referred to it by the State Government. As a matter of fact, this position was taken into care by this Court while passing the order Annexure P/5 dated 30. 11. 2001 in Clause (II) and (III ). ( 18. As a matter of fact, this position was taken into care by this Court while passing the order Annexure P/5 dated 30. 11. 2001 in Clause (II) and (III ). ( 18. ) NEITHER the Industrial Court while deciding the reference case nor in this petition the recommendation of respondent No. 2 as a Representative Union can be cancelled because it is the prerogative of the Registrar appointed under Section 16 of the Act wherein a complete procedure is given and against the decision of Registrar, an appeal is provided under Section 22 of the Act which lies to the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court also took care of the powers conferred to it under Section 69 of the Act in regard to the cancellation of recognition of Union and rightly found that there is no material in order to de-recognize respondent No. 2 from its status of Representative Union. No material has been placed even in this writ petition in order to de-recognize respondent No. 2 as a Representative Union. ( 19. ) THE other interim impugned order Annexure P/2 dated 9. 2. 2004 cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal. Petitioner No. 1 wants to cross-examine the witness of the Management which was refused by the Industrial Court on the ground that the petitioner No. 1 is not a party to the reference and since he is not the party to the reference he cannot be allowed to cross-examine. However, on going through the impugned order, it is gathered that on the basis of the suggestions given by the witness of petitioner No. 1 Ravishanker Dubey to the counsel of first party (respondent No. 2) cross-examination was made and the learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 (party No. 1 in the reference case i. e. Representative Union") after consulting with the petitioner No. 2 closed the cross-examination. Thus, I am unable to find any illegality in the order Annexure P/2 passed by the Industrial Court. The petitioner No. 2 was allowed to participate for a limited purpose only as directed by this Court in its order dated 30. 11. 2001 (Annexure P/5 ). The petitioner No. 2 gave his statement also accordingly. On going through Annexure R/6 which is the proceeding of the Industrial Court dated 3. 2. The petitioner No. 2 was allowed to participate for a limited purpose only as directed by this Court in its order dated 30. 11. 2001 (Annexure P/5 ). The petitioner No. 2 gave his statement also accordingly. On going through Annexure R/6 which is the proceeding of the Industrial Court dated 3. 2. 2004 it is gathered that petitioner No. 1 after examining Ravishanker Dubey and one more witness Phoolchand Dubey voluntarily closed the evidence. The statement of petitioner No. 2 Ravishanker Pandey was later on recorded. Thus, full opportunity was provided to the petitioners to adduce the evidence. ( 20. ) ON merit the Industrial Court examined each and every point of the dispute referred to it in the reference case and on the basis of the evidence placed on record gave a finding of fact holding from para 4 onwards. These findings are pure finding of facts, no perversity or arbitrariness has been pointed out and thus the findings of Industrial court in that regard cannot be said to be in any manner to be illegal or erroneous. Moreover the learned senior counsel for the petitioner only argued on the point in regard to the classification of TSP employees as permanent employee. The other points which were referred to the Industrial Court and which were answered by it, were not assailed and no submission assailing the finding of the Industrial Court on those points, has been made. ( 21. ) THE contention of learned senior counsel for the petitioner is that TSP employees are entitled for classification on the permanent post. The Industrial Court in the impugned final order has taken into consideration this aspect of the matter. In the statutory agreement (Ex. D-2) arrived at between the Management and the "representative Union" dated 20. 10. 1999, there is a clause in that regard and the employer should regularise their services in terms of the said agreement Ex. D-2 dated 20. 10. 1999. ( 22. ) AT this juncture, I would like to discuss in regard to the agreement under Section 33 of the Act. According to this section if any change is proposed under Section 31 (1) or (2) and if an agreement is arrived at, a memorandum of such agreement shall be forwarded to the Registrar constituted under the Act. 1999. ( 22. ) AT this juncture, I would like to discuss in regard to the agreement under Section 33 of the Act. According to this section if any change is proposed under Section 31 (1) or (2) and if an agreement is arrived at, a memorandum of such agreement shall be forwarded to the Registrar constituted under the Act. The Registrar thereafter on the receipt of such memorandum of agreement signed by the parties under Sub-section (1) register the said agreement as provided thereafter under Clauses (a) and (c ). The decision of Registrar ordering or refusing to register the agreement is subjected to appeal to the Industrial Court under Section 22 of the Act. ( 23. ) IN order to understand Section 33 (1) in its stricto sensu, one has to read it in juxtaposition with Section 31 (1) and (2) of the Act wherein under Sub-section (1) if an employer is intending to effect any change in respect of an industrial matter specified in schedule 1 of the Act it shall give notice of such intention in the prescribed form and manner to representative of the employees. And under Sub-section (2) if a representative of the employees desiring a change in respect of an industrial matter which is neither covered by standing order nor specified in schedule II its shall give notice in prescribed manner to the employer. Thus a notice is to be given to the representative of the employees if notice of change is to be given by the employer under Sub-section (1) of Section 31 and by the representative of the employees under Sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Act if the representative of the employees is desiring any change. Thus, it is luminously clear that under both Sub-section (1) and (2) the "representative of employees is in the picture. I will not hesitate at the cost of repetition to see again Section 27 of the Act at this juncture, which speaks about "representation of employees and according to which the authorities mentioned in Clause (i), (ii) and (iii) shall be entitled to act appear in the order of preference, as a representative of employees. The Representative Union is having preference since it is at serial number (i ). The Representative Union is having preference since it is at serial number (i ). Thus the statutory agreement under Section 33 of the Act which has been arrived at between the Representative Union (respondent No. 2) and the Management has to be given its full effect. ( 24. ) THIS Court may also advert at this juncture to see Section 98 of the Act which throws sufficient light in regard to the ambit and scope of statutory agreement arrived at during the pendency of the industrial dispute before the Industrial Court. According to this section the decision of the Industrial Court should be in consonance to the agreement, subject to the exceptions if the agreement is in contravention to any of the provisions under the Act or if the consent of either party to it was caused by mistake, misrepresentation, fraud, undue influence, coercion or threat. There is no such material on record to hold that the present case comes under any of the exception mentioned in this section. Thus the decision of Industrial Court in regard to the industrial dispute referred to it should be guided by the statutory agreement. Indeed, the impugned final order of Industrial Court is in accordance to the statutory agreement dated 20. 10. 1999 which is exhibited as Ex. D. 2 in the record of Industrial Court and a copy of which has been placed on record in this petition. ( 25. ) APART from this, I have gone through the reasonings assigned by the Industrial Court in regard to Point No. 1 of the reference. The reasonings assigned by the Industrial Court are based on the appreciation of evidence. The Industrial Court on the basis of the evidence placed on record came to hold that the TSP workers are not the employees in place of permanent workers and therefore they are not entitled for classification on the post of permanent workers because in absence of the permanent workers, their status is of Badlidar employee. In the case of Prakash Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court in para 15 has held that the Badli workman gets works only in the absence of temporary or otherwise of regular employees and they do not have any guaranteed right of employment. They had no right to claim employment in place of any absentee employee. In the case of Prakash Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court in para 15 has held that the Badli workman gets works only in the absence of temporary or otherwise of regular employees and they do not have any guaranteed right of employment. They had no right to claim employment in place of any absentee employee. Similar is the latest view of the Supreme Court in the case of S. G. Kotturappa (supra ). It would be appropriate to quote para 16 and 20 of this decision which reads thus: 16. The mode of appointment, therefore, postulates appointment in three tiers. The status of a temporary employee is higher than a Badli worker. The names of Badli workers are not to be included in the select list but in the wait list. A select list of selected candidates prepared by the selection authority is required to be equal to the number of existing, vacancies plus vacancies that may arise over a period of one year from the date of publication as may be assessed by the selection authority and only in exceptional cases, the validity thereof can be extended for a period not exceeding six months. The select list or the wait list, as the case may be, therefore, does not have an indefinite life. A bare perusal of the memo dated 13. 5. 1982 in terms whereof the respondent was appointed clearly states that he was appointed in the Corporation and did not have any right merely because his services were so utilized on day-to-day basis. The services of a Badli worker may be discontinued, if for any reason he is not found suitable for the job for which is services were utilized as Badli, A Badli worker is eligible for payment of wages only for the number of days his services are utilized. 20. The terms and conditions of employment of a Badli worker may have a statutory flavour but the same would not mean that it is not otherwise contractual. So long as a worker remains a Badli worker, he does not enjoy a status. His services are not protected by reason of any provisions of the statute. He does not hold a civil post. A dispute as regards purported wrongful termination of services can be raised only if such termination takes place in violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute governing the services. His services are not protected by reason of any provisions of the statute. He does not hold a civil post. A dispute as regards purported wrongful termination of services can be raised only if such termination takes place in violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute governing the services. Services of a temporary employee or a Badli worker can be terminated upon compliance with the contractual or statutory requirements. The same principle was taken long back by the Punjab High Court in the case of Sukhjit Starch and Chemicals Ltd. (supra ). ( 26. ) SINCE the Industrial Court itself has directed the management to regularise the services of TS Pool Employees, the numbers of which are between 16-18 In accordance to para 9 of the statutory agreement dated 20. 10. 1999, therefore, the Management is hereby directed to do the needful in that regard since the Management has not assailed that point of the order of the industrial court. ( 27. ) THE decisions placed reliance by learned senior counsel for the petitioners are not applicable in the present factual scenario of the case. In the decision of Prakash Singh Rood Singh (supra) , Prakash Singh was a Badli worker and his services were terminated hence this Court directed to pay compensation to him. In this decision, reliance was also placed to the decision of Prakash Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd. (supra) , which I have referred hereinabove. The decision of H. D. Singh (supra) is not having any bearing in the present facts and circumstances, since this case relates to retrenchment of a workman. The decision of Bijlee Karmachari Sangh, M. P. (supra) is also not applicable because in that case certain employees were employed as daily wage employees but the wages were being paid to them on daily basis though the work of permanent character was being taken from them. In the present case, on the basis of evidence placed on record, the Industrial Court has held that TSP employees, only in the absence of permanent employees, were allowed to work, hence, their status is of a Badlidar. What is the right of the Badlidar employee, it has also been held by the Apex Court in the cases which I have mentioned hereinabove. The decision of Dhirendra Chamoli (supra) is also not applicable in the present case, because it speaks about for equal pay for equal work. What is the right of the Badlidar employee, it has also been held by the Apex Court in the cases which I have mentioned hereinabove. The decision of Dhirendra Chamoli (supra) is also not applicable in the present case, because it speaks about for equal pay for equal work. In the case of M. Rangareddy (supra) the direction was given to the employer to consider the case for regularization. The decision of Kulwant Singh (supra) is distinguishable on facts because the workman worked for more than 10-17 years continuously on regular post and in that situation it was directed to regularise his services. Thus, all the decisions cited by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner are distinguishable. ( 28. ) EXCEPT by assailing the validity of impugned interim order Annexure P/1 dated 19. 1. 2004 and Annexure P/2 dated 9. 2. 2004 of the Industrial Court and about the finding arrived at by Industrial Court in regard to classification of TSP employees, no other point has been pressed on behalf of the petitioner. ( 29. ) RESULTANTLY, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.