JUDGMENT Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh, J. 1. This is the unsuccessful reversioners'/plaintiffs' appeal against the judgment dated 13-12-1994 delivered by Shri Ajit Kapur, 3rd Additional Judge to the District Judge, Durg in Civil Suit No. 13-A/ 94 whereby their suit for possession of the properties described in Schedule A and B situated in village Selood, Tahsil and District Durg and for declaring the sale deed executed by the limited owner i.e. Jyotiki Bai in favour of defendant/respondent and for mesne profits was dismissed. 2. It is not disputed that Nangsai was the owner of 33.56 acres of land situated in village Selood. He died in the year 1910. His son Bisram, the last male holder also died in the same year. Jyotiki Bai, widow of Bisram, was thus the limited owner of the suit properties before the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Jyotiki Bai executed a sale deed of 29.33 acres of lands and a house mentioned in schedule-A plaint to one Jeevrakhanlal, for a consideration of Rs. 10,000/- on 24-6-1954 vide Ex. P.1. Bisahin Bai, the daughter of Nangsai, instituted a Civil Suit No. 15-A/54 in the Court of Civil Judge Class-I, Durg to declare the aforesaid sale null and void, being without consideration or for legal necessity. In this suit, a compromise was entered into between the parties whereunder Jyotiki Bai executed a gift deed Ex. P. 6 of 25.33 acres of lands situated in village Selood on 9-2-1955 in favour of Kishanlal, the grandson of Bisahin Bai. Kishanlal was minor at that time. As per compromise entered into between the parties, 4.03 acres of lands described in schedule-B were given to Jyotiki Bai for her maintenance during her life time. This land was sold by Jyotiki Bai to the defendant/respondent by a registered sale deed Ex. P. 7 for a consideration of Rs. 4,000/- on 21-5-1969. Kishanlal died in the year 1962-63. Gangotri Bai, the plaintiff/ appellant No. 1, is the widow of Kishanlal and Shakuntala, the plaintiff/appellant No. 2 is her daughter. 3. This land was sold by Jyotiki Bai to the defendant/respondent by a registered sale deed Ex. P. 7 for a consideration of Rs. 4,000/- on 21-5-1969. Kishanlal died in the year 1962-63. Gangotri Bai, the plaintiff/ appellant No. 1, is the widow of Kishanlal and Shakuntala, the plaintiff/appellant No. 2 is her daughter. 3. Plaintiffs/appellants instituted a Civil Suit No. 13-A/94 against Jeevrakhanlal for possession of the properties i.e. the land and house situated in village Selood, Tahsil and District Durg as mentioned in Schedule-A and B and also for declaring the sale deed executed by Joytiki Bai in favour of Jeevrakhanlal on 24-6-1954 null and void and also for mesne profits on the ground that since they were the presumptive reversioners, Jyotiki Bai, who was a limited owner of the suit properties after the death of Nangsai, had no legal right to sell the lands mentioned in Schedule-A to Jeevrakhanlal. The sale was without consideration as also without legal necessity and did not confer any title on Jeevrakhanlal. It also sought a similar declaration regarding the sale deed dated 21-5-1969 executed by Jyotiki Bai in favour of Jeevrakhanlal, of lands mentioned in Schedule-B. 4. The defendant/respondent contested the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs/ appellant's were bound by the compromise effected between Bisahin Bai and Jyotiki Bai in Civil Suit No. 15-A/54 and were estopped from challenging the sale deed dated 24-6-1954. After coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 on 17-6-1956, Jyotiki Bai, who was a limited owner of the lands mentioned in Schedule-B, became an absolute owner thereof, and therefore, could confer valid title to the defendant/respondent. The defendant/respondent had maintained Jyotiki Bai till her life time and had also performed her last rites. It was also pleaded that the defendant/respondent was in adverse possession of the suit properties mentioned in Schedule-A and the compromise decree effected in Civil Suit No. 15-A/1954 operated as res judicata and the plaintiffs/ appellant's were estopped from challenging the transfer of the lands mentioned in Schedule-A by Jyotiki Bai in favour of the defendant/respondent. 5. The learned Additional District Judge, Durg recorded a finding that sale of lands mentioned in Schedule-A by Jyotiki Bai in favour of Jeevrakhanlal on 24-6-1954 was a genuine sale and for legal necessity. 5. The learned Additional District Judge, Durg recorded a finding that sale of lands mentioned in Schedule-A by Jyotiki Bai in favour of Jeevrakhanlal on 24-6-1954 was a genuine sale and for legal necessity. It further held that the plaintiffs were estopped from challenging the sale deed dated 24-6-1954, in view of the compromise effected between Bisahin Bai and Jyotiki Bai in Civil Suit No. 15-A/54 which operated as res judicata between the parties. It also held that the defendant /respondent had acquired title over the lands mentioned in Schedule-A on the basis of adverse possession. So far as the lands mentioned in Schedule-B i.e. 4.03 acres of lands transferred by Jyotiki Bai on 21-5-1969 in favour of Jeevrakhanlal, it held that Jyotiki Bai had become an absolute owner thereof after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It also held that the suit was within limitation. On these grounds, learned Additional District Judge dismissed the suit. 6. It was urged by the learned Counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs that on the death of Nangsai, Jyotiki Bai was a limited owner in respect of properties mentioned in Schedule-A and B and had only the right of maintenance over those properties. It was also urged that despite the compromise effected between Jyotiki Bai and Bishain Bai, the plaintiffs/appellants who were the presumptive reversioners claiming through Bisahin Bai, had a legal right to challenge the alienation of the suit properties mentioned in Schedule-A by Jyotiki Bai in favour of Jeevrakhanlal and in this view of the matter neither the present suit was barred by limitation nor did the compromise decree effected between Jyotiki Bai and Bisahin Bai in Civil Suit No. 15-A/54 operated as res Judicata or estopped the appellants/plain-tiffs from challenging the alienation. Learned Counsel also urged that it was not proved that sale of the lands mentioned in Schedule-A by Jyotiki Bai in favour of Jeevrakhanlal was for consideration or for legal necessity. 7. On the other hand, Shri Ravish Chandra Agrawal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of defendant/respondent argued that Jyotiki Bai was a limited owner of the suit properties before the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. She had a legal right to sell the lands mentioned in Schedule-A to Jeevrakhanlal for legal necessity which was borne out from the contents of the sale deed Ex. P. 1. She had a legal right to sell the lands mentioned in Schedule-A to Jeevrakhanlal for legal necessity which was borne out from the contents of the sale deed Ex. P. 1. Bishin having entered into a compromise with Jyotiki Bai in Civil Suit No. 15-A/54, Jyotiki Bai had in terms of the compromise executed a gift deed of 25.33 acres of lands situated in village Selood in favour of Kishanlal, husband of the plaintiff/appellant No. 1 and father of the plaintiff /appellant No. 2. Although Kishanlal, the presumptive reversioner was a minor at the time of execution of the aforesaid gift-deed, he had ratified the transaction and accepted the benefits thereunder after attaining majority. In that view of the matter, the plaintiff/appellants were estopped under Section 115 of the Evidence Act from challenging the alienation by Jyotiki Bai in favour of Jeevrakhan. Learned senior counsel fairly conceded that compromise decree arrived at between Jyotiki Bai and Bisahin Bai in Civil Suit No. 15-A/54 did not operate as res judicata and possession of the defendant/respondent over lands mentioned in Schedule A could not be said to be adverse as against the presumptive reversioners. So far as the sale executed by Jyotiki Bai on 21 -5- 69 in favour of Jeevrakhanlal is concerned, it was urged that after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 on 17-6-1956, Jyotiki Bai had absolute title over the lands mentioned in Schedule-B, and therefore, she had an absolute legal right to sell the lands to Jeevrakhanlal for consideration vide Ex. P. 7. The Civil Suit having been instituted on 18-2-1975 i.e. within 12 years from the date of sale, was thus within limitation. Reliance was placed on S. Shanmugam Pillai and Ors. v. K. Shanmugam Pillai and Ors. , Krishna Beharilal v. Gulabchand and Ors. , Daya Singh and Anr. v. Dhan Kaur AIR 1974 SC 664 and Ravinder Kumar Sharma v. State of Assam and Ors. . 8. Having heard the rival contentions, I have perused the record. The equitable principle of estoppel is not mere technical rules of evidence. It has an important purpose to serve in the administration of justice. The ultimate aim of law is to secure justice. In order to render justice between the parties, the Courts have, in recent times, liberally relied on the principle of estoppel and have refused to narrow down its scope. It has an important purpose to serve in the administration of justice. The ultimate aim of law is to secure justice. In order to render justice between the parties, the Courts have, in recent times, liberally relied on the principle of estoppel and have refused to narrow down its scope. It is not disputed that upon death of Nangsai, Jyotiki Bai was a limited owner of the suit properties. Article 192 of Principles of Hindu Law by Mulla, 17th Edition, provides that where a widow or other limited heir enters into a family arrangement or into a compromise which involves an alienation of the estate, the reversioner who has been a party to and has benefited by the transaction is precluded from questioning the alienation and so are his descendants. In the present case, Bisahin Bai was a presumptive reversioner. A compromise decree was granted upon a family settlement arrived at between the parties whereunder Bisahin Bai gave up the challenge to the sale executed on 24-6-1954 by Jyotiki Bai in favour of Jeevrakhanlal of 29.33 acres of lands and a house mentioned in Schedule-A and accepted a gift deed executed by Jyotiki Bai in favour of Kishanlal, the grand son of Bisahin Bai, for 25.33 acres of lands. At the time of execution of the gift deed, Kishanlal was a minor. He could have refused to accept the benefit or to ratify the family arrangement. However, Rewaram P. W. 2 has clearly admitted in paragraph 5 of his testimony that Gangotri Bai, widow of Kishanlal and Shankuntala, her daughter, were in possession of 25.33 acres of lands gifted by Jyotiki Bai to Kishanlal and were cultivating the same. Not only this, Gangotri sold the entire land given by Jyotiki Bai to Kishanlal through a gift-deed. This clearly goes to show that the presumptive reversioners not only ratified the family arrangement but also accepted the benefits thereunder. In this view of the matter, rule of estoppel under Section 115 of the Evidence Act applies with full force and the plaintiffs/ appellants are estopped from challenging the sale deed executed by Jyotiki Bai in favour of Jeevrakhanlal. 9. In S. Shanmugam Pillai and Ors. v. K. Shanmugam Pillai and Ors. , it was held as under : (Para 16) There are three classes of estoppels that may arise for consideration in dealing with reversioner's challenge to a widow's alienation. 9. In S. Shanmugam Pillai and Ors. v. K. Shanmugam Pillai and Ors. , it was held as under : (Para 16) There are three classes of estoppels that may arise for consideration in dealing with reversioner's challenge to a widow's alienation. They are : (1) that which is embodied in Section 115 of the Evidence Act, (2) election in the strict sense of the term whereby the per-son electing takes a benefit under the transaction and (3) ratification i.e. agreeing to abide by the transaction. A presumptive reversioner coming under any one of the aforesaid categories is precluded from questioning the transaction, when succession opens and when he becomes the actual reversioner. But if the presumptive reversioner is a minor at the time he has taken a benefit under the transaction, the principle of estoppel will be controlled by another rule governing the law of minors. If after attaining majority he ratifies the transaction and accepts the benefit thereunder, there can not be any difference in the application of the principle of election. The effect would be the same. It may be that on attaining majority he has the option to disown the transaction and disagree the benefit or to accept it and adopt it as his own. Whether after attaining majority the quondam minor accepted the benefit or disowned it, is a question to be decided on the facts of each case. In Krishna Beharilal v. Gulabchand and Ors. , it was held as under : (At PP. 1044-45) If a person having full knowledge of his rights as a possible reversioner enters into a compromise which settles his claim as well as the claim of the opponent at the relevant lime, he cannot be permitted to go back on that arrangement when reversion actually opens. 10. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiffs/appellants are estopped from challenging the validity of the sale deed of lands in Schedule-A executed by Jyotiki Bai in favour of Jeevrakhanlal since they, as presumptive reversioners, had not only ratified the family arrangement arrived at in Civil Suit No. 15-A /54 but had also accepted the benefits thereunder. It is true that Kishanlal who was a minor on the date of execution of the gift-deed by Jyotiki Bai was not bound by the family arrangement or the gift deed executed by Jyotiki Bai in his favour and could have chosen not to stand by it. It was open to him on attaining majority either to stand by family arrangement or to renounce the same. Similarly, it was also open to the plaintiffs/appellants not to stand by the family arrangement arrived at in Civil Suit No. 15-A/54 or the gift deed executed by Jyotiki Bai in favour of Kishanlal. However, the plaintiffs/appellants did not choose to do so. They not only continued enjoying the properties that Kishanlal had got under gift-deed Ex. P. 6 but also went on alienating the entire property received by Kishanlal under the said gift. It is thus clear that the plaintiffs/ appellants ratified the arrangement entered into Civil Suit No. 15-A/54 and elected to stand by the family arrangement and to retain the benefit under the document. 11. The finding recorded by the learned 3rd Additional Judge to the District Judge that the sale deed executed by Jyotiki Bai in favour of Jeevrakhanlal on 24-6-1954 was for consideration and for legal necessity can also not be faulted with. So far as the finding of the trial Court that the decree passed in Civil Suit No. 15-A/54 operates as res judicata is concerned, it must be said that the said judgment and decree did not have the effect of res judicata. The presumptive reversioners had a right, after succession to the estate of Nangsai opened on the death of Jyotiki Bai, to challenge it on the ground that the limited owner did not have a legal right to transfer the land without consideration or legal necessity in favour of Jeevrakhanlal. This right was subject to the condition that the reversioners had not stood by a family arrangement and had not ratified or derived benefit therefrom. However, as said earlier the plaintiffs /appellants are in view of the ratification of the family arrangement by them as also by accepting the benefits thereunder, estopped from challenging the sale deed dated 24-6-1954 of lands mentioned in Schedule-A. 12. However, as said earlier the plaintiffs /appellants are in view of the ratification of the family arrangement by them as also by accepting the benefits thereunder, estopped from challenging the sale deed dated 24-6-1954 of lands mentioned in Schedule-A. 12. So far as the land in Schedule-B is concerned, it is not disputed that before the corning into the force of the Hindu Succession Act, Jyotiki Bai had a limited right of maintenance over the same. However, on 17-6-1956 i. e. coming into the force of Hindu Succession Act, Jyotiki Bai became an absolute owner thereof and had a legal right to transfer the same in favour of Jeevrakhanlal on 21-5-1969. The Civil Suit being instituted by the plaintiffs/appellants within 12 years therefrom, the trial Court rightly held that the suit was within limitation as regards the lands mentioned in Schedule-B. 13. Having thus considered the rival contentions and after perusal of the pleadings, documents and the evidence led by the parties, I am of the considered opinion that this appeal is devoid of any merit. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, it is directed that the parties shall bear their own costs. A decree be drawn accordingly.