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2006 DIGILAW 239 (MP)

Triyugi Narayan Shukla v. State of M. P.

2006-02-13

K.K.LAHOTI

body2006
ORDER K.K. Lahoti, J. 1. This petition has been filed assailing order dated 26-12-2005 by the Commissioner, Rewa Division, Rewa in case No. 129/E.P./2004-05 between Mangleshwar and Triyugi Narayan and others, in which the petitioner has raised an interesting question of law that, there is ambiguity between section 66-A of M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972 and Rule 43 of M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi (Adhisuchana Prakashan Riti, Bharsadhak Samiti Tatha Mandi Samiti Gathan) Niyam, 1974, and which provision is to give effect to. 2. To appreciate the controversy involved in this case it is necessary to state facts of the case. The petitioner is a returned candidate in the election held for the office of Chairman, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti,Baikunthpur, District Rewa held on 13-6-2005. The petitioner got 7336 votes, while respondent No. 3 Girish got 6444 votes. The petitioner's election has been challenged by respondent No. 3 by filing an election petition before the Commissioner Rewa under section 66-A of the M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'Adhiniyam' for short). On notice, the petitioner raised preliminary objection that the Commissioner, Rewa has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the election petition and under Rule 43 of M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi (Adhisuchana Prakashan Riti, Bharsadhak Samiti Tatha Mandi Samiti Gathan) Niyam, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as 'Niyam' for short) the Collector is the appropriate authority who should enquire and decide the election petition. 3. Previous to decision on aforesaid objection, the respondent in election petition made a prayer for interim order, on which the Commissioner, issued an interim order of maintaining status-quo on 20-7-2005 in respect of office of the Chairman. This order was subject-matter of a writ petition bearing No. 6599/2005 which was allowed by this Court by order dated 9-11-2005 and the order directing maintenance of status quo was set aside. Thereafter the Commissioner, Rewa decided the aforesaid preliminary objection by the impugned order and found that under section 66A of the Adhiniyam the election petition is to be enquired and decided by him and not by the Collector. This order is under challenge in this petition. 4. Thereafter the Commissioner, Rewa decided the aforesaid preliminary objection by the impugned order and found that under section 66A of the Adhiniyam the election petition is to be enquired and decided by him and not by the Collector. This order is under challenge in this petition. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted following contentions :- (i) That under section 66-A of the Adhiniyam though the election petition is to be filed before the Commissioner of the Division, but sub-section (3) of section 66-A provides that such petition shall be enquired into or disposed of according to such procedure as may be prescribed. (ii) That under section 79 of the Adhiniyam, the State Government is empowered to make rules for carrying out purposes of the Act. Under Clause (c) of sub-section (2), the State Government has framed rules for determination of election dispute and all matters ancillary thereto. (iii) The State Government has framed Rules in respect of election dispute which are called as M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi (Adhisuchana Prakashan Riti, Bharsadhak Samiti Tatha Mandi Samiti Gathan) Niyam, 1974 and under Rule 43 the procedure for enquiry and decision of election petition is envisaged. The Rule 43 provides that the election petition shall be presented to the Collector within 14 days from the date on which the result of the election was published and shall be enquired into by the Collector or any of subordinate officer not below the rank of Deputy Collector. In view of specific rules this petition is to be enquired into by the Collector and not the Commissioner. (iv) In the alternative, if the State Government has not framed any rule under section 66A of the Adhiniyam then the petition ought to have been kept in abeyance, until the procedure is prescribed by framing appropriate rules by the State Government under section 66-A. (v) Under the M.P. General Clauses Act, the Rules as framed by the State Government are to be followed and are to be given effect to until and unless new rules are framed by the State Government. (vi) The petitioner has placed reliance to the Apex Court judgment in Harshad S. Mehta and others vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001)8 SCC 257 and submitted that this petition be allowed and impugned order passed by the Commissioner be set aside and election petition filed by respondent No. 3 be kept pending till framing of new rules or under existing rules, it be remitted to the Collector, Rewa for its enquiry and decision. 5. Learned counsel for State submitted that there is no ambiguity in the Adhiniyam and Niyam. The State Government has framed M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi (Ka Nirvachan) Niyam, 1997, and so far as old Rules of 1970 are repugnant to the Rules of 1997 shall be deemed to be repealed, as provided in Rule 90 of Rules of 1997. 6. Learned counsel for respondent No. 3 submitted that:- (i) Section 66-A in the Adhiniyam has been inserted by the Act of 1999 w.e.f. 6-5-1999. Previous to it the election petition procedure was followed as per Rule 43 of the Niyam, but after inserting section 66-A in the Adhiniyam, the Adhiniyam is to be given effect to and the Commissioner of Division is having jurisdiction to entertain, enquire and decide the election petition. (ii) After enactment of section 66-A, Rule 43 so far as it is repugnant or invariance of section 66-A shall be deemed to be repealed and only procedure under Rule 43 is to be followed by the Commissioner, who is having jurisdiction to entertain and decide the election petition. (iii) That the harmonious construction has to be given to both the provisions and intention of Legislature after enacting section 66-A is to be seen that the election petition is to be filed before the Commissioner of the Division and is to be decided by the same authority. (iv) Reliance is placed to the Division Bench decision of this Court in Ramlallu Bais vs. Vishwamitra Pathak and another, 2001(3) MPU 23 : AIR 2002 MP 1 and submitted that this writ petition is without merit and may be dismissed. 6A. At this stage, it will be appropriate to refer the relevant provisions which are necessary for the decision of this case. 6A. At this stage, it will be appropriate to refer the relevant provisions which are necessary for the decision of this case. For ready reference section 66-A of the Adhiniyam reads thus :- 66-A. Election petition - (1) An election under this Act shall be called in question only by a petition presented in the prescribed manner to the Commissioner of the Division. (2) No such petition shall be admitted unless it is presented within thirty days from the date on which the election in question was notified. (3) Such petition shall be enquired into or disposed of according to such procedures as may be prescribed. Before inserting section 66-A w.e.f. 6-5-1999 in the Adhiniyam there was no provision for filing of election petition and the election petitions were filed under Rules 43 and 44 of the Niyam. Rules 43 and 44 read thus :- 43. Election petition - (1) No election of a member shall be called into question except by a petition in writing for determining the validity of the election and claiming any or both of the following reliefs, namely :- (a) a declaration that the election of all or any of the elected candidates is void; (b) a declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected. (2) the petition shall be presented to the Collector within fourteen days from the date on which the result of the election was published under sub-rule (3) of Rule 38. (3) The petition shall be accompanied by deposit of two hundred and fifty rupees as security for the costs of petition. (4) The petition shall - (a) contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies; (b) set forth with sufficient particulars, the ground or grounds on which the election is called in question; (c) be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner prescribed in Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), for verification of pleadings, (5) Such petition may be presented by any candidate at such election or by a voter of the constituency concerned. (6) A petition filed by any person other than those specified in sub-rule (5) shall not be accepted and it shall forthwith be dismissed. (6) A petition filed by any person other than those specified in sub-rule (5) shall not be accepted and it shall forthwith be dismissed. (7) No petition shall be deemed to have been duly made unless such deposit as referred to in sub-rule (3) has been made and the Collector shall dismiss such petitions as are not accompanied by such deposit. (8) The Collector may send the petition to any of his subordinate officers not below the rank of Deputy Collector, for enquiry and disposal. The decision of the Collector or his subordinate officer, as the case may be, shall be final: Provided that before passing final orders by the appellate authority reasonable opportunity to be heard shall duly be given to the party concerned. (9) If a petition filed by any person is rejected after being heard, the deposit, referred to in sub-rule (3), shall be forfeited and credited to the market committee fund. (10) The election petition shall be disposed off within six months from the date of presentation thereof. 44. Declaration of election as void - (1) If after such enquiry as he considers necessary, the Collector or his subordinate officer, as the case may be, is of the opinion that the election complained of has been procured and induced or the result of the election has been materially affected by any corrupt or illegal practice or non-compliance with any rule he may pass an order :- (a) declaring the election of all or any of the elected candidates to be void; or (b) declaring the election of all or any of the elected candidates to be void and the petitioner or any other candidates to have been duly elected. In the event of the election set aside the Collector shall take necessary steps for holding a fresh election. In the event of the election set aside the Collector shall take necessary steps for holding a fresh election. (2) Grounds for declaring election to be void :- (a) that on the date of his election the elected candidate was not qualified or was disqualified to be chosen to fill the seat; or (b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of the elected candidate or his election agent; or (c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected; or (d) that the result of the election insofar as it concerns a elected candidate has been materially affected :- (i) by improper acceptance of any nomination; or (ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the interest of the elected candidate by a person other than that candidate or his election agent or a person acting with the consent of such candidate or his election agent; or (iii) by the improper receipt, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void; or (iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of the Act or any rules or others made thereunder. (3) For the purposes of this rule following shall be deemed to be corrupt and illegal practices. Bribery, undue influence and personation at election, as defined under section 171(B), 171(C) and 171(D) of Chapter IX-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of I860). 7. Prior to 6-5-1999, the election of Chairman and Vice Chairman of the market committee was a indirect election by the members of the market committee. The members of the market committee were to be elected under section 11 of the Adhiniyam. After the aforesaid amendment now the election of Chairman is a direct election by the persons qualified to vote for the election of representative of agriculturists and traders and in this regard section 12 of the Adhiniyam has been amended extensively by the Legislature by Act No. 27 of 1997 w.e.f. 30-6-1997. Before it there was provision only for the election of members of the committee and this election of members of the committee was subject to challenge by filing an election petition before the Collector. The language of Rule 43 is apparent which specifically provides that election of a member may be called into question by a petition in writing to the Collector. The language of Rule 43 is apparent which specifically provides that election of a member may be called into question by a petition in writing to the Collector. After amendment in section 12, section 66-A has been inserted in the Adhiniyam which provides that an election under this Adhiniyam shall be called in question only by a petition presented in a prescribed manner to the Commissioner of the Division. This is subsequent development, which has to be taken care of while deciding this petition. 8. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for parties and specifically learned Government Advocate were asked whether there is any amendment in the Niyam or Rule 43 has been amended or not after insertion of section 66-A of the Adhiniyam. A statement at the Bar has been made by all the counsel, that there is no amendment in the Niyam. By caution the recent commentary on Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam and Niyam of Shri Paras Chand Jain 2001 Edition perused and the Extra Ordinary Gazette dated 6-5-1999 also seen by which section 66A was inserted in the Adhiniyam, but it also does not reflect any consequential amendment in the Niyam. In view of aforesaid this petition is being decided on the basis of Rule 43, assuming that it has not been amended till date. 9. Rule 43 specifically provides in respect of filing of an election petition challenging the election of a Member of Krishi Upaj Mandi. Entire Rule 43 does not provide any procedure in respect of election petition to be filed before the Commissioner. These rules were framed in the year 1974 and were published in the Gazette dated 8-2-1974. On the aforesaid date there was no question of considering an election petition challenging the election of Chairman by the Commissioner. The election of Chairman at that time was an indirect election and only election of Member was provided under section 11 of the Adhiniyam. The election of Chairman was by an indirect election to be elected among the elected Members of Krishi Upaj Mandi, but the Legislature has amended section 12 of the Adhiniyam and the election of Chairman and Vice Chairman is to be held by the Member of the Market Committee specifically under section 11 of the Adhiniyam. Section 11 of the Adhimyam provides constitution of market committee by elected members and other members as envisaged in section 11. Section 11 of the Adhimyam provides constitution of market committee by elected members and other members as envisaged in section 11. After insertion of section 66-A in the Adhiniyam, the election under the Adhiniyam shall be called in question by a petition presented in a prescribed manner to the Commissioner of the Division. After insertion of section 66-A, exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the election petition is with the Commissioner of the Division and not before any other authority. Though Legislature has not amended the rules which ought to have been amended or framed after insertion of section 66-A, but the harmonious construction has to be given to both the provisions. In this regard it will be profitable to refer certain paragraphs from the famous book, "the Principles of Statutory Interpretation" (Ninth Edition) by Justice G. P. Singh, a renowned and recognised work on the subject:- No doubt in cases of ambiguity that construction which better serves the ends of fairness and justice will be accepted, but otherwise it is for the Legislature in forming its policy to consider these elements. If no alternative construction is open, the Court cannot ignore a statutory provision "to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation; a statute has to be given effect to whether the Court likes it or not". The function of the Court is to find out what is legal and not what is right. It is presumed that a legislative body intends which is the necessary effect of its enactments; the object, the puipose and the intention of the enactment is the same; it need not be expressed in any recital or preamble; and it is not competent for any Court judicially to ascribe any part of the legal operation of the statute to inadvertence. The Courts should as far as possible avoid a construction which results in anomalies. In a case arising under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Supreme Court held that if the Returning Officer had rejected a nomination paper of a candidate or one disqualification, it was open for the Election Tribunal to find the rejection proper on some other ground of disqualification which may not have been raised before the Returning Officer. In a case arising under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Supreme Court held that if the Returning Officer had rejected a nomination paper of a candidate or one disqualification, it was open for the Election Tribunal to find the rejection proper on some other ground of disqualification which may not have been raised before the Returning Officer. It was pointed out that if this construction is not placed on section 100(1)(c) of the Act the result will be anomalous in that if the decision under section 36(6) of the Returning Officer on the objection on which he rejected the nomination paper is held to be bad, the Tribunal will have no option but to set aside the election under section 100(1 )(c) even though the candidate was disqualified and his nomination paper was rightly rejected. In holding so Venkatarama Aiyar, J. observed: It is no doubt true that if on its true construction, a statute leads to anomalous results, the Courts have no option but to give effect to it and leave it to the legislature to amend and later the law. But when on a construction of a statute, two views are possible, one which results in an anomaly and the other not, it is our duty to adopt the latter and not the former, seeking consolation in the thought that the law bristles with anomalies (pg. 120-121) But when a statute deals with a subject-matter which is productive of many difficulties, not all of which can be perceived and provided against in advance, anomalies cannot be treated as a satisfactory guide in matters of construction, and the Courts can do no more than look at the language used and give it a fair and reasonable construction. Similarly, when none of the alternative constructions can steer clear of the anomalies, the question cannot be resolved by a balancing of the anomalies and grammatical construction of the provision in question is the only safe guide. Similarly, when none of the alternative constructions can steer clear of the anomalies, the question cannot be resolved by a balancing of the anomalies and grammatical construction of the provision in question is the only safe guide. It must also be remembered that a Court would only be justified in departing from the plain word of the statute when it is satisfied that (1) there is clear and gross balance of anomaly, (2) Parliament, the legislative promoters and the draftsman could not have envisaged such anomaly and could not have been prepared to accept it in the interest of a supervening legislative objection, (3) the anomaly can be obviated without detriment to such a legislative objective, and (4) the language of the statute is susceptible of the modification required to obviate the anomaly. Therefore, the Court cannot decline to give effect to clear and unambiguous language to avoid an anomaly even if it was the result of an omission on the part of the draftsman which went undetected during passage of the Bill through Parliament, (pg. 122) It has already been seen that a statute must be read as a whole and one provision of Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency of repugnancy either within a section or between a section and other parts of the statute. It is the duty of the Courts to avoid "a head on clash" between two sections of the same Act and, "whatever it is possible to do so, to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise". It should not be lightly assumed that "Parliament had given with one hand what it took away with the other". The provisions of one section of a statute cannot be used to defeat those of another "unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them". The same rule applies in regard to sub-sections of a section. In the words of GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. : "The sub-sections must be read as parts of an integral whole and as being interdependent; an attempt should be made in construing them to reconcile them if it is reasonably possible to do so, and to avoid repugnancy". The same rule applies in regard to sub-sections of a section. In the words of GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. : "The sub-sections must be read as parts of an integral whole and as being interdependent; an attempt should be made in construing them to reconcile them if it is reasonably possible to do so, and to avoid repugnancy". As stated by VENKATARAMA AIYAR, J : 'The rule of construction is well settled that when there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. This is what is known as the rule of harmonious construction". That, effect should be given to both, is the very essence of the rule. Thus a construction that reduces one of the provisions is a "useless lumber" or "dead letter" is not harmonious construction. To harmonise is not to destroy. A familiar approach in all such cases is to find out which of the two apparently conflicting provisions is more general and which is more specific and to construe the more general one as to exclude the more specific. The question as to the relative nature of the provisions general or special has to be determined with reference to the area and extent of their application either generally or specially in particular situations. The principle is expressed in the maxims Generalia specialibus non derogant, and Generalibus specialia derogant. If a special provision is made on a certain matter, that matter is excluded from the general provision. Apart from resolving conflict between two provisions in the Act, the principle can also be used for resolving a conflict between a provision in the Act and a rule made under the Act. (pg.123-124) It is no doubt true that after a statute is amended, the statute thereafter is to be read and construed with reference to the new provisions and not with reference to provisions that originally existed. Further the wisdom of the warning given by LORD WATSON cannot be doubted that it is an "extremely hazardous proceeding to refer to provisions which have been absolutely repealed in order to ascertain which the Legislature meant to enact in their room and stead". Further the wisdom of the warning given by LORD WATSON cannot be doubted that it is an "extremely hazardous proceeding to refer to provisions which have been absolutely repealed in order to ascertain which the Legislature meant to enact in their room and stead". However, "when it is contended that the Legislature intended by any particular amendment to make substantial changes in the pre-existing law, it is impossible to arrive at a conclusion without considering what the law was previously to the particular enactment and to see whether the words used in the statute can be taken to effect the change that is suggested as intended", and similarly, when the terms of the enactment in the new shape are sufficiently difficult and ambiguous, the consideration of its evolution in the statute book is justified as a proper and logical course. It is an example of the application of this principle that the Supreme Court "on historical evolution of section 21 (Penal Code), adopted as an external aid to construction" held that an M.L.A. was not and is not a public servant as defined in that section. Legislative history of separate and distinct provisions giving benefit of total or partial exemption from income-tax to those who were engaged in running poultry business was taken into account in holding that the provisions which provided incentive to industrial undertakings engaged in the business of manufacturing or producing articles or things did not apply to those engaged in the business of hatcheries which in this context could neither be termed industrial undertaking nor engaged in the business of producing articles or things. And in dealing with the expression 'injury to health' in section 79 of the Environmental Protection Act, 1990 used in the context of statutory nuisance the abatement of which can be directed by a local authority, the Court of appeal traced its legislative history beginning from the Public Health Act, 1875 and referred to the decisions under the earlier Acts and came to the conclusion that it had been always understood in the sense of risk of disease or illness, and so it could not be interpreted in section 79 to include risk of physical injury from the state of residential premises. An amending Act is construed in a way which does not result in its misfiring or in denying its efficacy but without straining its language or re-writing or adopting it to cover cases other than those to which it clearly applies. Change in language is not, however, always indicative of a change in construction. The alteration in language in or by a later statute may be the result of many other factors. For instance, words may be omitted in a later statute when they were mere surplusage and the natural and ordinary meaning of the existing words indicates no intention of alteration of meaning. Similarly addition of words may be to make clear a meaning which was already implied. Further, the change in wording may be because the draftsman wanted to improve the style. As aptly stated by LORD UTHWATT, no alteration in meaning by alteration in language can result "unless, (1) the requirements of the English language demand it, (2) those requirements permit it and sense of the section demands it". It must also be remembered that for bringing about fundamental changes such as departure from the general system of the law or imposition of new burdens, a clear intention to that effect is necessary and the Courts will not infer such fundamental changes unless the language used expresses a clear intention to the contrary. (pg.246-249) A change of forum except in pending proceedings is a matter of procedure and, therefore, if a new Act requires certain types of original proceedings to be instituted before a special tribunal constituted under the Act to the exclusion of Civil Courts, all proceedings of that type whether based on old or new causes of action will have to be instituted before the tribunal. (pg.405-406) Delegated legislation permitted by enabling Acts appears under different names, without there being any clear-cut demarcation between all of them. 'Rule' and 'Order' are by far the most common names under which delegated legislation is permitted. Section 3(51) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, contains a definition of 'rule' in the following words: "'rule' shall mean a rule made in exercise of a power conferred by any enactment and shall include a regulation made under any enactment', (pg. 'Rule' and 'Order' are by far the most common names under which delegated legislation is permitted. Section 3(51) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, contains a definition of 'rule' in the following words: "'rule' shall mean a rule made in exercise of a power conferred by any enactment and shall include a regulation made under any enactment', (pg. 758) Delegated legislation is open to the scrutiny of Courts and may be declared invalid particularly on two grounds : (a) Violation of the Constitution, and (b) Violation of the enabling Act. The second ground includes within itself not only cases of violation of the substantive provisions of the enabling Act, but also, cases of violation of the mandatory procedure prescribed. It may also be challenged on the ground that it is contrary to other statutory provisions or that it is so arbitrary that it cannot be said to be in conformity with the statute or Article 14 of the Constitution. The limitations which apply to the exercise of administrative or quasi-judicial power conferred by a statute except the requirement of natural justice also apply to the exercise of power of delegated legislation. Compliance with the laying requirement or even approval by a resolution of Parliament does not confer any immunity to the delegated legislation but it may be a circumstance to be taken into account along with other factors to uphold its validity. As earlier seen a laying clause may prevent the enabling Act being declared invalid for excessive delegation. When reasons are required to be stated for making delegated legislation, e.g. grant of exemption from taxation, reasons must be stated and they can be examined for deciding whether the delegate has acted within limits of the power conferred, (pg. 784-785) Rules made under the statute are treated for the purpose of construction as if they were in the enabling Act and are to be of the same effect as if contained in Act. Interpretative notes appended to the Rules by the Rule making authority are part of the Rules and hence statutory. It is a recognised canon of construction that an expression used in a rule, bye-law or form made in exercise of a power conferred by a statute must unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context have the same meaning as is assigned to it under the statute. It is a recognised canon of construction that an expression used in a rule, bye-law or form made in exercise of a power conferred by a statute must unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context have the same meaning as is assigned to it under the statute. But the rules are to be consistent with the provisions of the Act, and if a rule goes beyond what the Act contemplates, the rule must yield to the Act. It was also held in this case that the maxim 'generatia specialibus non derogant' has application also for construction of a general provision in the Act and special provision in the Rules made under the Act. It is doubtful as to how far subordinate legislation can be looked into for the purpose of construction of the enabling Act, but if it is made under 'as if enacted in this Act' formula, it may be referred to for the purpose of resolving any real ambiguity in the Act. The House of Lords' decision in Jakson vs. Hall gave the impression that rules, made in the exercise of a statutory power, which do not have the express approval of Parliament cannot be relied upon as an aid to construction of the statute. Rules will have express approval of Parliament when they are made under a laying clause requiring an affirmative procedure. But this decision has later been explained not to lay down any general proposition that subordinate legislation not having express approval of Parliament can never be used as an aid to statutory interpretation. The House of Lords in this case apparently approved the propositions laid down by LORD LOWRY in Hanlon vs. Law Society indicating the circumstances in which subordinate legislation, in that case regulations, may be used as aid to interpretation of the parent Act. These propositions are : "(1) Subordinate legislation may be used in order to construe the parent Act but only where power is given to amend the Act by regulations or where the meaning of the Act is ambiguous. (2) Regulations made under the Act provide a parliamentary or administrative contemporanea expositio of the Act but do not decide or control its meaning : to allow this would be to substitute the rule making authority for the judges as interpreter and would disregard the possibility that the regulation relied on was misconceived or ultra vires. (2) Regulations made under the Act provide a parliamentary or administrative contemporanea expositio of the Act but do not decide or control its meaning : to allow this would be to substitute the rule making authority for the judges as interpreter and would disregard the possibility that the regulation relied on was misconceived or ultra vires. (3) Regulations of the Act which are consistent with a certain interpretation tend to confirm that interpretation. (4) Where the Act provides a framework built on by contemporaneously prepared regulations, the latter may be a reliable guide to the meaning of the former. (5) The regulations are a clear guide, and may be decisive, when they are made in pursuance of a power to modify the Act, particularly if they come into operation on the same day as the Act which they modify. (6) Clear guidance may also be obtained from regulations which are to have effect as if enacted in the parent Act." The Supreme Court also holds that "rules made under a statute are a legitimate aid to construction of the statute as contemporanea expositio." There is additional reason to take the assistance of subordinate legislation for clarifying an ambiguity in a taxing Act for "in the matter of fiscal legislation the initiative is in the hands of the executive". Statutory rules subsequently made under Income-tax Act though prospective, have been used to support a meaning given to a statutory provision prior to the making of the rules. But the legislative competence to enact a particular provision is an Act cannot be made to depend upon rules made under the Act which can be deleted, amended, or modified at any time. 10. Under the Rules, there is provision of filing election petition within a period of 14 days while under the Adhiniyam election petition can be filed within a period of 30 days from the date of election in question is notified in the official gazette. As two different limitations were prescribed under the Adhiniyam and the Rules, this Court has considered this aspect in Ramlallu Bais (supra) in which it is held thus : It is trite to say that right to election or to be elected in a democracy, is neither a fundamental right nor a common law right. It is a statutory right. As two different limitations were prescribed under the Adhiniyam and the Rules, this Court has considered this aspect in Ramlallu Bais (supra) in which it is held thus : It is trite to say that right to election or to be elected in a democracy, is neither a fundamental right nor a common law right. It is a statutory right. Similarly, right to challenge election is a statutory right and challenge of election can be made within the four corners of law. Here, section 66-A of the Act in no uncertain terms provides that Election petition shall not be admitted within 30 days from the date on which the election in question is notified. Section 12(9) of the Act obliges the Collector to notify the election of Chairman and Vice-Chairman in the official Gazette. Such a Gazette Notification was published on 8-3- 2000. The Division Bench held that the limitation prescribed in the Adhiniyam has to be given effect to. Though the learned counsel for petitioner has referred section 24 of M.P. General Clauses Act, 1957 to substantiate his contention that the Rules framed by the Legislature under section 79 of the Adhiniyam has not been amended and are to be given effect to by the respondent and procedure envisaged in the Rules has to be followed, but it is apparent that Rule 43 was enacted in respect of election petition to be filed for an election of Member of Krishi Upaj Mandi, but now section 66-A has been enacted in the main Adhiniyam, which provides filing of election petition before the Commissioner so the Rules which are inconsistent with the provisions amended shall be given effect to and Rules shall be deemed to be superseded by the aforesaid enactment. In this regard section 25 of the M.P. General Clauses Act, 1957 may be referred, which reads thus:- 25. In this regard section 25 of the M.P. General Clauses Act, 1957 may be referred, which reads thus:- 25. Continuation of orders etc., issued under enactments repealed and re-enacted - Where any enactment is repealed and re-enacted by a Madhya Pradesh Act with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule, regulation, form or bye-law made or issued under the repealed enactment shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force, and be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted, unless and until it is superseded by any appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule, regulation, form or bye-law made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted. 11. Though the learned counsel for State during the course of arguments has referred to M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi (Ke Nirvachan) Niyam, 1997, but it is apparent that section 66-A was enacted on 6-5-1999 and these rules were enacted in the year 1997 and published in the Gazette dated 19-6-1998. Before the enactment of section 66-A these Rules were published in the Gazettee. In the aforesaid Rules there is no such provision for filing of an election petition, even under Rule 90 of 1997 the previous rules cannot be deemed to be repealed. So the contention of learned Government Advocate has no substance in reference to the controversy involved in this case. 12. The Legislature had done extensive amendment in sections 11 and 12 by which the election of Chairman and Vice Chairman of Krishi Upaj Mandi has been made by direct election. Now the power to deal with the election petition vests with the Commissioner of the Division. This power had been made under the Adhiniyam. The Rule 43 which is apparently inconsistent with section 66-A of the Adhiniyam has to be given a harmonious construction and powers which were previously vested with the Collector shall now be deemed to be vested with the Commissioner of the Division under section 66-A of the Adhiniyam. Though the petitioner has submitted that after filing of election petition before the Commissioner, the matter may be remitted to the Collector for enquiry and decision, but aforesaid contention also cannot be accepted. Section 66-A of the Adhiniyam is very specific which vests power to the Commissioner. Though the petitioner has submitted that after filing of election petition before the Commissioner, the matter may be remitted to the Collector for enquiry and decision, but aforesaid contention also cannot be accepted. Section 66-A of the Adhiniyam is very specific which vests power to the Commissioner. Though the Legislature has not prescribed the procedure for enquiry and decision of such petition by amending rules, but reading together section 66-A and Rule 43 it can be deemed that the aforesaid petition shall be enquired and disposed of by the Commissioner in accordance with the procedure envisaged under Rule 43 of Niyam and the power which was previously vested with the Collector shall now be deemed to be excluded and shall vest with the Commissioner of the Division to enquire and decide the election petition, in accordance with the procedure in the rule. 13. This situation has occurred because of amendment in the Adhiniyam in which the entire procedure for election of Chairman and Vice Chairman has been changed and the Legislature has enacted direct election for the aforesaid offices. This is based on the principle of harmonious construction which provides that the effect should be given to all the provisions. The provisions should be construed in such a manner and with reference to other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved. The Apex Court in Anwar Hasan Khan vs. Mohd. Shaft and others, (2001)8 SCC 540 held thus :- It is settled that for interpreting a particular provision of an Act, the import and effect of the meaning of the words and phrases used in the statute have to be gathered from the text, the nature of the subject-matter and the purpose and intention of the statute. It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort should be made in construing its provisions by avoiding a conflict and adopting a harmonious construction. The statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved. The well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "dead letter" is not harmonious construction. The well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "dead letter" is not harmonious construction. With respect to law relating to interpretation of statutes this Court in Union of India vs. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama held: (SCC p. 284, para 16) 16. The paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended. This intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of enactment in question. That does not mean the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its nature or purpose. A statute is neither a literary text nor a divine revelation. "Words are certainly not crystals, transparent and unchanged" as Mr. Justice Holmes has wisely and properly warned. (Towne vs. Eisner) Learned Hand, J., was equally emphatic when he said : 'Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them.' (Lenigh Valley Coal Co. vs. Yensavage) Keeping in mind the object of the Adhiniyam to provide a special forum to file, enquire and decide the election petition by the Commissioner, it will not be appropriate to hold that after filing of election petition the election petition is to be enquired and decided by the Collector. The power is vested with the Commissioner who is having exclusive jurisdiction to receive, enquire and decide the election petition. 14. Though the learned counsel for petitioner has relied upon the Apex Court decision in Harshad S. Mehta (supra) in which the Apex Court held thus : "Mr. Jethmalani also sought to invoke the doctrine of implied repeal. Pointing out that the Code is a general law and the Act - a special later enactment, section 13 whereof shows its predominance and superiority, this Court should not have any reluctance to accept the applicability of doctrine of implied repeal in these matters, was the submission of learned counsel though he, very fairly and rightly, conceded that there is a presumption against a repeal by implication. The reason for the presumption as aforesaid is that the legislature while enacting a law has a complete knowledge of the existing laws on the subject-matter and, therefore, when it does not provide a repealing provision, it gives out an intention not to repeal the existing legislation. The burden to show that there has been a repeal by implication lies on the party asserting it. Relying upon Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion (1984 Edn.) counsel contends that where, as in the present case, the provisions of the later enactment (the Act) are contrary to those of the earlier (the Code), the later by implication repeals the earlier in accordance with the maxim leges posteriores priores contraries abrogant (later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws). This is, however, subject to the exception embodied in the maxim generalia specilibus non derogant (a general provision does not derogate from a special one)." The Apex Court in Harshad S. Mehta (supra) has held that where language of the statute is plain and admits only one construction, that construction must be adopted, whatever be its effect. The statute has very specifically provided forum for filing of election petition with Divisional Commissioner and no interference in this regard can be made even with the aid of rules. 15. In view of aforesaid discussion, it is held that for filing election petition exclusive jurisdiction is vested with the Commissioner of Division and Commissioner of Division shall enquire into and dispose of the election petition as per the procedure envisaged under Rule 43 of the Niyam. Though Rule 43 provides power to send election petition to any of the subordinate officer for enquiry and disposal, but this provision shall not be applicable to the Commissioner, who has been vested with power to enquire and decide the election petition. 16. In view of aforesaid, this petition has no merit and accordingly it is dismissed with no order as to costs.