JUDGMENT : Singh, J. These appeals by special leave are directed against the I common judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in M.A.T. Nos. 1821/2004 and 3029/2004 dated 24th November, 2004 whereby a Division Bench of the High Court modified the order passed by the learned Single Judge and made certain directions as to payment of compensation to the appellants therein, and disposed of the appeals with those directions. 2. The facts, not in dispute, are that a Notification dated December 21, 1998 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1694 was published, in the Official Gazette on January 20, 1999, The Notification was published in the newspapers, and the last such publication was on 24th December, 1998. On 12th August, 1999, the Notification was also displayed at conspicuous places in the locality. The total land sought to be acquired was 2.74 acres out of which the appellants are the owners of land measuring 1.84 acres. 3. The case of the appellants is that they had filed their objections under Section 5 (A) of the Act on 14th January, 1999, which was within one month from the date of publication of the Notification in the newspaper i.e. 24th December, 1998. The declaration under Section 6 of the. Act was made on 4th August, 2000 and thereafter further steps were taken under Section 7 of the Act on 14th March, 2001. 4. The appellants herein filed a writ petition on 18th October, 2001 challenging the acquisition, inter alia, on the ground that the appellants were not given an opportunity of being heard in the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act by the competent authority, nor were their objections, filed in due time, considered by the authority. During the pendency of the writ petition steps were taken under Section 9 of the Act and ultimately an award was made on 2nd August, 2002. It appears from the record that, possession of the land in question was taken on 18th July, 2003. It also appears from the record that a reference has been made under Section 18 of the Act on 24th July, 2003. 5. Learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition by his judgment and order of 9th March, 2004. It also appears from the record that a reference has been made under Section 18 of the Act on 24th July, 2003. 5. Learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition by his judgment and order of 9th March, 2004. He held that the requirement of Section 5 (A) being mandatory, the acquisition which was made in breach thereof was Invalid. Two appeals were preferred against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge which were disposed of by a common judgment on 24th November, 2004, The said judgment is impugned before us in these appeals. 6. It has been contended on behalf of the appellants that Section 5 (A) of the Land Acquisition Act being mandatory, the learned Single Judge was justified in quashing the acquisition on the ground of non-compliance therewith. He has also relied upon judgments of this Court reported in Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors., 1975 (4) SCC 298 , Shri Farid Ahm&d Abdul Samad & Anr v. The Municipal. Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad & Anr., 1976 (3) SCC 719 and Tej Kaur v. State of Punjab, 2003 (4) SCC 485 and U.O.I. v. Mukesh Hans, 2004 (8) SCC 14 . The submission is that since requirements of Section 5 (A) were not met, the entire acquisition is void. In fact, Mr. Ranjit Kumar learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, would contend that even the Section 4 Notification should be quashed in view of the long passage of time. He further submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court was in error in modifying the order passed by the learned Single Judge and enhancing the compensation by 30%. We may, at this stage, refer to the operative part of the order passed by the Division Bench which reads as follows: "8.1. He further submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court was in error in modifying the order passed by the learned Single Judge and enhancing the compensation by 30%. We may, at this stage, refer to the operative part of the order passed by the Division Bench which reads as follows: "8.1. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we modify the order passed on the writ petition to the extent that (1) the writ petitioner shall be entitled to 30% of the compensation awarded as added compensation of account of denial of opportunity of hearing on the basis of the ratio decided in Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 3C 1236, to be included within the amount of the award; (2) it is declared that the date of this order shall be deemed to be the date of the award for the purpose of seeking reference under Section 18 L. A. Act, if not already sought; (3) in case reference is already sought, in that event, this addition shall be taken into consideration by the preference Court as part of the compensation but as an additional compensation which is to be considered at the rate of 30% of the award by the Reference Court in case the award by the Collector is enhanced and the compensation be computed by the Reference Court accordingly by proportionately enhancing the award by 30%; (4) in case the payment of award has not been received by the petitioner, it would be open to it receive such amount together with all interest admissible without prejudice to its rights and contention in the reference, if pending, or the reference to be made hereafter, it not already made; (5) in case the amount is deposited in Court, the writ petitioner shall be entitled to withdraw the amount from the Court and any interest, it any accrued thereon, shall be paid to the writ petitioner." 7. It was also pointed out on behalf of the appellants that there was no inordinate delay in filing the writ petition because Section 6 declaration was made on 4th August, 2000 and the writ petition was filed on 18th October, 2001 i.e. after about one year and two months. It was also pointed out on behalf of the appellants that there was no inordinate delay in filing the writ petition because Section 6 declaration was made on 4th August, 2000 and the writ petition was filed on 18th October, 2001 i.e. after about one year and two months. He submitted that in several decisions of this Court where the delay on the part of the claimants was longer, this Court granted relief to the claimants where it found that the acquisition was vitiated by an illegality. He further submitted that having regard to the decisions of this Court, even if this Court is not persuaded to quash the acquisition, or in any event the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, this Court must grant adequate compensation to the appellants by shifting the date of acquisition, meaning thereby the market value should not be determined as on the date of Section 4 Notification but from a later date. In his submission the authorities on the subject would indicate that this Court has normally taken the date of taking over of possession as the appropriate date for determining the market value of the land in question. He has relied upon several judgments of this Court including Ramniklal N. Bhutta & Anr v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 1997(1) SCC 134 and Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory & Ors., 2005 (9) SCALE 493 , which refers to three earlier decisions of this Court reported in Ujjian Vikas Pradhikaran v. Rajkumar Johri & Ors., 1992 (1) SCC 328 , Gauri Shankar Gaur & Ors. v. State of U. P., 1994 (1) SCC 92 and Haji Saeed Khan & Ors. v. State of U. P. & Ors., 2001 (9) SCC 513 . Relying upon these decisions, he submitted that in any event, the compensation be paid to the appellants as if Section 4 Notification was issued on 18th July, 2003, the date on which possession of the land was taken by the respondents. 8. We have considered these authorities. Though it is not possible to lay down any principle of universal application, the facts of each case have to be considered and the equities fairly balanced. In the instant case, as pointed out by Mr. 8. We have considered these authorities. Though it is not possible to lay down any principle of universal application, the facts of each case have to be considered and the equities fairly balanced. In the instant case, as pointed out by Mr. Ghosh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent, the land has been acquired for the development of East Calcutta Area Development Project which is a project to sub-serve the public interest. He further submitted that, having regard to the facts of the case, the impugned judgment works out a fair method of adequately compensating the appellants. The respondents have therefore not appealed against the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. 9. Having heard Counsel for the parties at length and having considered the authorities on the subject, we hold that on a proper balancing of equities, having regard to the fact that the appellants had no opportunity of placing their objections before the competent authority, nor were their objections considered by the said authority, the appellants are entitled to a higher amount by way of compensation, if the acquisition itself is not quashed for non-compliance with Section 5A of the Act. We are informed that writ petition was filed about a year and 2 months after the declaration published under Section 6 of the Act. Possession was handed over on 18th July, 2003. If we deduct the period of one year roughly representing the delay in filing the writ petition and work out the date backward, the date we arrive at is close to the date of declaration of the award i.e. 2nd August, 2000. We are of the view, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, that the impugned judgment and order of the High Court needs to be modified. We, therefore, direct that to the extent the writ petition challenges the validity of the acquisition, it must be dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct that the compensation payable to the appellants shall be the market value of the land as on the date of the declaration of the award (i.e. August 2, 2000) calculated in accordance with the principles laid down in the Act. The appellants shall also be entitled to consequential benefits which flow from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above. The appellants shall also be entitled to consequential benefits which flow from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above. This order will govern the case of the appellants only. 10. It is stated before us that a reference under Section 18 of the Act is pending before the concerned Court. We direct the Land Acquisition Collector to pass a fresh award in accordance with our directions contained in this judgment within a period of three months from today. If the claimants so desire they may seek a reference under Section 18 of the Act. The appeals stand disposed of accordingly. Kabir, J.:- I agree.