JUDGMENT 1. - Owner and driver of vehicle, the appellants herein, seek to challenge the judgment dated June 26, 2004 of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Fast Track) No.3, Jaipur District whereby the insurance company although was exonerated from the liability, the appellants were directed to pay compensation to the claimant respondents. 2. As many as five claim petitions were filed before the Tribunal with respect of accident occurred on August 25, 1996 while Truck No. RJI4G 2496 met with an accident. In the said truck Prabhu Narain, Babu Lal, Ramji Lal Panchu Ram and Mohan were going to Khatu Shyamji for the purpose of unloading goods of tent house. When the truck reached near Village Hadota, a camel cart came from the opposite side and in order to save it from collision the truck got down of the road and hit a tree resulting in death of Prabhu Narain and Mohan Lal. Dependents of Prabhu Narayan and injured persons approached the Tribunal by way of claim petitions. The appellants submitted reply to the claim petitions stating therein that since the deceased and the injured persons were the labourers, the appellants were not liable for the compensation. The insurance company filed separate reply with the averments that the deceased and injured persons were unauthorised passengers and were going to attend religious function, therefore, liability on the insurance company could not be fastened. On the basis of pleadings as many as five issues were framed. Six witnesses were examined by the claimants but nobody appeared in the witness box on behalf of the appellants and the insurance company. On hearing final submissions the Tribunal decided the petitions as indicated herein above. 3. Assailing the findings of Tribunals, learned counsel for appellants made following submissions: (i) There was no negligence on the part of driver at the time of accident. The accident occurred while a camel cart came from opposite side and in order to save it, the truck got down of the road and dashed against a tree. (ii) The Tribunal has wrongly placed reliance on the statements recorded by police under section 161, Cr.P.C. that there were 40-50 passengers, while none of the witnesses of claimants had stated so. (iii) The deceased and injured persons were labourers and they were travelling in the truck for the purpose of loading and unloading the articles of tent house. (ii) The Tribunal has wrongly placed reliance on the statements recorded by police under section 161, Cr.P.C. that there were 40-50 passengers, while none of the witnesses of claimants had stated so. (iii) The deceased and injured persons were labourers and they were travelling in the truck for the purpose of loading and unloading the articles of tent house. (iv) There was no objection by the insurance company with regard to breach of condition of policy. The insurance company also failed to prove any breach of condition of the policy. (v) The Tribunal failed to consider the fact that the passengers were travelling for the purpose of loading and unloading and it cannot be held that the terms and conditions of the policy of insurance had been will fully violated. 4. Since the accident occurred in the year 1996, it would be appropriate to notice the provisions contained in Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 after being amended by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 which reads as under : "147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability:- (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which (a) x x x (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; (ii) x x x (Underlining is mine) 5. The Apex Court had occasion to consider the Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 1994 in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani (2003)2 SCC 223 : ( AIR 2003 SC 607 ) and it was indicated in para 9 thus: "In Satpal case ( AIR 2000 SC 235 ) the Court assumed that the provisions of Section 95(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 are identical with Section 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as it stood prior to its amendment. But a careful scrutiny of the provisions would make it clear that prior to the amendments of 1994 it was not necessary for the insurer to insure against the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle. On an erroneous impression this Court came to the conclusion that the insurer would be liable to pay compensation in respect of the death or bodily injury caused to either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative when being carried in a goods vehicle the accident occurred. If the Motor Vehicles Amendment Act of 1994 is examined, particularly Section 46, by which the expression "injury to any person" in the original Act stood substituted by the expression "injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle." the conclusion is irresistible that prior to the aforesaid Amendment Act of 1994, even if the widest interpretation is given to the expression for any person it will not cover either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in the vehicle. The objects and reasons of clause 46 also state that it seeks to amend Section 147 to include owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle for the purpose of liability under the insurance policy. It is no doubt true that sometimes the legislature amends the law by way of amplification and clarification of an inherent position which is there in the statute, but a plain meaning being given to the words used in the statute, as it stood prior to its amendment of 1994, and as it stands subsequent to its amendments in 1994 and bearing in mind the object and reasons engrafted in the amended provisions referred to earlier, it is difficult for us to construe that the expression "including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle." which was added to the preexisting expression "injury to any person" is either clarificatory or amplification of the preexisting statute. On the other hand it clearly demonstrates that the legislature wanted to bring within the sweep of Section 147 and making it compulsory for the insurer to insure even in case of a goods vehicle. On the other hand it clearly demonstrates that the legislature wanted to bring within the sweep of Section 147 and making it compulsory for the insurer to insure even in case of a goods vehicle. the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle met with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative either dies or suffers bodily injury. The judgment of this Court in Satpal case therefore must be held to have not been correctly decided and the impugned judgment of the Tribunal as well as that of the High Court accordingly are set aside and these appeals are allowed. It is held that the insurer will not be liable for paying compensation to the owner of the goods or his authorised representative on being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle meets with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative dies or suffers any bodily injury." (Underlining is mine) 6. Three Judge Bench of Apex Court in National Insurance Company Limited v. Baljit Kaur, DNJ (SC) 240 : ( AIR 2004 SC 1340 ), considered the effect of 1994 amendments of Section 147 and indicated as under (para 11 of AIR):- "The effect of the 1994 amendment on Section 147 is unambiguous. Where earlier, the words "any person" could be held not to include the owner of the goods or his authorised representative travelling in the goods vehicle, Parliament has now made it clear that such a construction is no longer possible. The scope of this rationale does not, however, extend to cover the class of cases where gratuitous passengers for whom no insurance policy was envisaged, and for whom no insurance premium was paid, employ the goods vehicle as a medium of conveyance." It was further indicated as under (para 20 of AIR):- "It is, therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorised representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorised representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance as entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people." 7. It is therefore to be adjudged as to whether the deceased and the injured persons who were travelling in the goods vehicle on August 25, 1996 were the authorised representatives of the goods owner or were they gratuitous passengers? 8. Coming to the evidence of claimants, I find that Babu Lal (Aw.3) in his deposition stated that all the six persons sitting in the truck were labourers. Vehicle owner Maheshji employed those labourers at the rate of Rs. 100/- per day. He denied the suggestion that 40-50 passengers were travelling in the truck. He also denied the statement recorded by police under Section 161, Cr.P.C. He also denied the suggestion that they were going to attend Sawamani. Panchu Ram (Aw.4) deposed that he was labourer on truck No.2496 owned by Maheshji. On August 25, 1996 they were carrying 'Tent goods' in the truck and going to Shyamji. Labourers Ramji Lal, Mohan, Babu Lal and Prabhu were also sitting in the truck. He denied his police statement as well as this suggestion that they were going to attend 'Sawamani'. Ramjilal (Aw.5) deposed that in order to save the camel cart the truck got down of the road and dashed against a tree. He was servant of Maheshji, owner of the vehicle. He denied to have stated before the police that 25-30 persons were travelling in the truck. Kalyan Sahai (Aw.6) in his deposition stated that he was going to Khatushyamji on a jeep. The truck 2496 owned by Maheshji met with the accident and labourers sitting on the truck sustained injuries. He admitted that the police got his signature on the FIR but he did not write the same. He disowned his police statement. 9. Kalyan Sahai (Aw.6) in his deposition stated that he was going to Khatushyamji on a jeep. The truck 2496 owned by Maheshji met with the accident and labourers sitting on the truck sustained injuries. He admitted that the police got his signature on the FIR but he did not write the same. He disowned his police statement. 9. Learned Tribunal after having considered Policy cover note (Ex.6) observed that the truck was insured along with seven persons, but relying on the statements recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. held that since 40 passengers were travelling from Bhanpur to Khatushyamji to attend Sawamani, the owner of truck violated the condition of the policy and decided the issue in favour of the insurance company. In the internal page 11 of the impugned judgment, Tribunal observed as under : (Vernacular Matter Omitted) 10. Since learned Tribunal placed reliance on the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C., I deem it appropriate to examine the scope and object of this Section. It is well settled that examination contemplated by Section 161, Cr.P.C. is not of judicial character. The statements of persons made before the police and before the Court on oath cannot be treated as identical and do not stand on the same footing. Section 162(1) contains a mandate to Investigating Police Officer not to obtain signature of the person whose statement is reduced in writing. Thus every valid and lawful case diary is unsigned by the witness. The statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. cannot be used as a substantive piece of evidence. It could only be utilised for the purpose of contradicting the evidence of prosecution witnesses. Statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. cannot be used for any other purpose except specified under Section 162, Cr.P.C. 11. In the instant matters learned Tribunal committed illegality in treating the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. as substantive piece of evidence. From the testimony of Babulal (Aw.3), Panchu Ram (Aw.4) and Ramji Lal (Aw.5) it is established that they were the labourers and only six persons were sitting in the truck at the time of accident. Even Kalyan Sahai (Aw.6) deposed that he did not write FIR but only put his signatures. All these witnesses disowned their police statements. Evidence of these witnesses was not controverted by the insurance company for the reasons best known to it. Even Kalyan Sahai (Aw.6) deposed that he did not write FIR but only put his signatures. All these witnesses disowned their police statements. Evidence of these witnesses was not controverted by the insurance company for the reasons best known to it. In such a situation no option was left with the Tribunal except to place reliance on the un-controverted testimony of afore-quoted witnesses. Since it is established from the materials on record that the deceased and injured persons were authorised representatives of the owner of 'Tent goods' that was carried in the truck, they were covered by the policy of insurance .of the said goods vehicle.CROSS OBJECTION AND MISC. APPLICATION : 12. Having scanned the cross objection No. 114/2004, I Find that in claim application No. 195/2004 learned Tribunal has awarded compensation in the sum of Rs. 2,15,000/- which is sufficient in the facts and circumstances of the cases. The income of the deceased was assessed as Rs. 1500/- per month and after deducting ⅓ amount and applying the multiplier of 17 the compensation was calculated. I see no ground to enhance the compensation. The cross objection stands dismissed. Since the appeals preferred by owner and driver of the vehicle have been allowed the claimants are entitled to receive the claims in accordance with the direction issued by the Tribunal. It is not necessary to pass separate orders on Misc. Application No. 92/2005 and cross objection No. 115/2004. 13. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals are allowed and liability to pay compensation to the claimants is fastened on the respondent United India Insurance Company Misc. Application No. 92/2005 and cross Objection No. 115/2004 stand disposed of and the Cross Objection No. 114/2004 stands modified as indicated above. No costs.Appeals allowed. *******