Judgment :- This application has been filed by the 13 applicants to record the Memorandum of Compromise dated 7.11.2002 and pass a de­cree in O.P. No. 301 of 2001 as per the terms set out in the Memorandum of Compromise dated 7.11.2002. 2. The brief facts as stated in the applica­tion are as under: The applicants herein, entered into an oral agreement of sale with the 1st respondent for conveying 50% undivided share of the prop­erty situated at No. 39, Kasturi Ranga Road, Teynampet, Chennai-18 and assigning the 1st respondent's rights under the development agreement dated 23.11.1994 and the agree­ment of sale dated 23.9.1995 which the 1st respondent had entered into with the owners of the said property. Pursuant to the agree­ment, the 1st respondent put the applicants in possession of the said property and received a consideration of Rs. 4,95,000/-. Thereafter, the 1st respondent chose to terminate the agreement of sale necessitating the applicants to file a specific performance suit in C. S. No. 192 of 2000. By consent, the matter was re­ferred to arbitration and an award was passed by the arbitrator on 31.1.2001, directing the 1st respondent to convey the property in fa­vour of the applicants and aggrieved by the award dated 31.1.2001 the respondents filed O.P. Nos.301 and 302 of 2001. and the same was pending before this Court. 3. When the O. Ps. are pending, the parties settled the dispute and the terms were incorpo­rated in writing in the Memorandum of Com promise dated 7.11.2002. The said Memoran­dum of Compromise was proposed to be filed before this Court within 10 days' from the date of its execution. Due to some reasons it was delayed and the time for filing the Memoran­dum of Compromise was extended from time-to-time. As per Clause 1 of the Memorandum of Compromise, the applicants have to pay a sum of Rs. 90,00,000/- to the respondents. Even though the applicants are ready to pay the same, the respondents are evading to re­ceive the amount. Therefore, the above appli­cation is filed to record the terms of the Memorandum of Compromise dated 7.11.2002 and to pass a decree in terms of the Memorandum of Compromise. 4. 90,00,000/- to the respondents. Even though the applicants are ready to pay the same, the respondents are evading to re­ceive the amount. Therefore, the above appli­cation is filed to record the terms of the Memorandum of Compromise dated 7.11.2002 and to pass a decree in terms of the Memorandum of Compromise. 4. A counter was filed by respondents 1 and 2 herein, wherein it is stated that since the appli­cants did not come forward to make the pay­ments as envisaged in the Memorandum of Compromise, the time period for filing the Memorandum of Compromise before this Court was extended from 17.11.2002 to 25.11.2002 and further extended till 16.12.2002. There-after, as the applicants sought some more time to make the payments, respondents 1 and 2 agreed to extend the time till 31.12.2002 and thereafter it was not at all extended and the Memorandum of Compromise itself lapsed on 31.12.2002. Therefore, according to these re­spondents, the said Memorandum of Compro­mise cannot be acted upon or thrust upon them. 5. A reply statement was filed by the appli­cants for which a rejoinder affidavit was filed by respondents 1 and 2 reiterating their earlier stand. 6. Heard Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan, the learned senior counsel appearing for appli­cants 1 to 12 and Mr. P.S. Raman, the learned senior counsel appearing for the 13th appli­cant and Mr. Arvind P. Datar, the learned senior counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2. I have also gone through the documents filed by them and the judgments referred to in support of their submissions. 7. Both the learned senior counsel appear­ing for the applicants submitted that having entered into a Memorandum of Compromise by duly signing the same and having acted in terms of the Memorandum of Compromise, it is not for the respondents to wriggle out of the same and the same is very much binding on them. Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan, learned senior counsel, relied on an unreported judgment of the Delhi High Court delivered in I.A. No. 1303 of 2006 and O.M.P. No. 196 of 2000 decided on 3.2.2006 Lagan Kala Upvan (Regd.) v. Badhwar Universal Contractors, to submit that parties could file an application under Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C., to pass a decree in a petition filed under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 in terms of the settlement ar­rived at between the parties in the Memoran­dum of Compromise. 8. Per contra, Mr. 8. Per contra, Mr. Arvind P. Datar, the learned senior counsel appearing for the re­spondents, submitted that the Memorandum of Compromise has lapsed on 31.12.2002 it-self and therefore the applicants cannot com­pel the respondents at this point of time to accept the Memorandum of Compromise. He further submitted that Order 23 Rule 3 of C.P.C., is not at all applicable in a petition filed under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 and therefore the above application is not main­tainable. He relied on the following judgments in support of his submissions: 1) Star Construction and Transport Co. v. India Cements Ltd. AIR 2001 SC 941 : (2001) 3 SCC 351 ; 2) National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Pres­steel & Fabrications (P) Ltd. (2004) 1 SCC 540 ; and 3) Rajasthan SRTC v. Bhik Nath (2005) 2 SCC 367 : 2005-I-LLJ-1139. 9. In the unreported judgment (cites supra), the Delhi High Court passed a decree in terms of the compromise arrived at between the parties as both the counsel appearing for the parties agreed for the same. 10. In Star Construction and Transport Co. v. India Cements Ltd. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "7. In this case, applications are filed under Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C. This Rule is a pro-vision for making a decree on any lawful agreement or compromise between the par-ties during the pendency of the suit by which claim is satisfied or adjusted. The agreement, compromise or satisfaction may relate to the whole of the suit or part of the suit or it may also include matters be­yond the subject-matter of the suit. But Rule 3 clearly envisages a decree being passed in respect of part of subject-matter on a com­promise. Whether in fact there has been compromise or adjustment of the suit claim or any part thereof is itself put in dispute in this case. Unless it is clearly established that such accord or compromise has been en­tered into between the parties, the powers under Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C., could not be exercised. The respondent's case is that the claim made in the suit were never before the arbitrators in any form and even the figures' mentioned in the reconciliation statement also do not pertain to the suit claim and the scope of reference to the arbitrators does not enable them to make an award on that aspect of the matter. The respondent's case is that the claim made in the suit were never before the arbitrators in any form and even the figures' mentioned in the reconciliation statement also do not pertain to the suit claim and the scope of reference to the arbitrators does not enable them to make an award on that aspect of the matter. Those objections have to be dealt with appropriately on full trial. That is the course now adopted by the Divi­sion Bench of the High Court. " 11. In the above decision, the Hon'ble Su­preme Court held that unless it is clearly estab­lished that such accord or compromise has been entered into between the parties, the powers under Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C., could not be exercised. 12. In National Aluminium Co. Ltd v. Pressteel & Fabrications Ltd. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the moment an application challenging the award is filed under Section 34 of the Act 1996, the execu­tion of the award is suspended automatically, leaving no discretion to the Court to put the parties on terms. 13. In Rajasthan SRTC v. Bhik Nath (su­pra) also, following the decision reported in National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Pressteel & Fabrications (P) Ltd. (supra), the Hon'ble Su­preme Court held that once an application un­der Section 34 of the Act, 1996 is filed in respect of an award, the award as a whole cannot be enforced under Section 36 of the Act. 14. I have perused the agreement dated 7.11.2002 and the undated Memorandum of Compromise which were filed along with the application. In the agreement, it was stated that the parties have settled their disputes and terms and conditions agreed to between the parties are set out in the. Annexure, which is, the undated Memorandum of Compromise. It is further stated in the agreement that certain further acts are to be complied with and there-after the details would be filled up in the Memorandum of Compromise which is agreed to be filed before this Court within ten days' from 7.11.2002. 15. It is also mentioned in the agreement that the object of signing the present document and the Annexure is to ensure that all the par-ties will agree to implement the terms and con­ditions mentioned in the Memorandum of Compromise which is agreed to be filed within ten days. 16. 15. It is also mentioned in the agreement that the object of signing the present document and the Annexure is to ensure that all the par-ties will agree to implement the terms and con­ditions mentioned in the Memorandum of Compromise which is agreed to be filed within ten days. 16. An endorsement was made on behalf of both the parties on 18.11.2002 extending the period till 25.11.2002 for filing the Memoran­dum of Compromise before this Court and on 25.11.2002, another endorsement was made on behalf of the parties extending the time till 16,12.2002 for filing the Memorandum of Compromise. Again on 16.12.2002, another endorsement was made on behalf of both par-ties extending the time upto 31.12.2002 for filing the Memorandum of Compromise be-fore this Court. The first two endorsements were made on the back side of the agreement dated 7.11.2002 and the last endorsement was made on the back side of the 1st page of the Memorandum of Compromise, which was proposed to be filed before this Court. 17. Thereafter, no endorsement was made, extending the time from 31.12.2002 for filing the Memorandum of Compromise and in such circumstances, as rightly contended by the learned senior counsel appearing for the re­spondents, the agreement and the Memoran­dum of Compromise which are proposed to be filed before this Court have lapsed on 31.12.2002. 18. Originally ten days' time was stipu­lated for the purpose of handing over certain documents, Bank Draft, certified post-dated cheque/Bank Guarantee etc., and as these acts could not be' completed within ten days' time originally stipulated, the time was extended by both parties up to 31.12.2002. Therefore, it is clear that there was delay in acting on the basis of the Memorandum of Compromise resulting in accusation and counter- accusation made by both parties for the failure to act on the basis of the Memorandum of Compromise within the stipulated and extended time. 19. Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C., is a provision for making a decree between the parties dur­ing the pendency of suits on any lawful agree­ment or compromise by which the claim is satisfied or adjusted. But in the case on hand, the very compromise memo itself is ques­tioned and contended that it has lapsed by ef­flux of time. 19. Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C., is a provision for making a decree between the parties dur­ing the pendency of suits on any lawful agree­ment or compromise by which the claim is satisfied or adjusted. But in the case on hand, the very compromise memo itself is ques­tioned and contended that it has lapsed by ef­flux of time. Therefore it is not clearly established that a compromise has been en­tered into between the parties to enable the Court to exercise its power under Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C., even assuming that the provi­sions will apply to a proceeding pending before this Court, under Section 34 of the Act, 1996. 20. It is true that once an award is chal­lenged under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, the execution of the award is suspended automat­ically, leaving no discretion to the Court to put the parties on terms as held by the Supreme Court in National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Pres­steel & Fabrications (P) Ltd. (supra). But this decision was rendered, taking into considera­tion the fact that the Courts are powerless to pass any interim order in a petition filed under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 and the Supreme Court observed that necessary steps would be taken by the authorities concerned at the earli­est to bring about a change in law to empower the Civil Court to pass suitable interim orders in such cases. Passing a compromise decree in terms of a Memorandum of Compromise in an application filed in a pending Section 34 pro­ceeding will not come under the category of interim orders contemplated by the Supreme Court in the above decision. When both the parties consented to compromise the matter by reducing the same in writing and wanted the written memo to be recorded by this Court, the same would reach a finality to Section 34 pro­ceedings. Therefore, filing of a Memorandum of Compromise in a pending setting aside pe­tition under Section 34 of the Act to pass an order in terms of the Memorandum of Com­promise is very well maintainable. 21. Therefore, filing of a Memorandum of Compromise in a pending setting aside pe­tition under Section 34 of the Act to pass an order in terms of the Memorandum of Com­promise is very well maintainable. 21. But in the present case, as the very Memorandum of Compromise is questioned as lapsed due to efflux of time and the same was not filed before this Court within the time stipulated and extended time as agreed be­tween the parties, I am not inclined to record the Memorandum of Compromise and pass a decree in O.P. No. 301 of 2001. 22. In the result, this application does not merit any consideration and the same is dis­missed. No costs. Application dismissed.