Judgment : K. CHANDRU, J. The appellant, aggrieved by the order passed by the learned single judge dated 20. 6. 2006 made in W.P.No.4259 of 1998, has preferred the present writ appeal. 2. When this matter came up for admission on 21.8.2006, notice was ordered to the respondents indicating that the matter may be disposed of at the admission stage itself and interim stay was also granted. Thereafter, the matter was heard on 6.9.2006 and finally today, i. e., on 19.9.2006. 3. The appellant was working in the first respondent Co-operative Agricultural Bank from 1.11.1991 on a daily wage of Rs.24/. The appellant had studied up to +2 and had also undergone co- operative training. The appellant sought for regularization of his service as per the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 as well as payment of minimum wage prescribed for such Co-operative Societies. It is the stand of the appellant that his services were orally terminated with effect from 10.3.1995 and neither any notice nor one month wage was paid to him as provided under Section 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shop and Establishment Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the shop Act) Initially, the appellant raised an Industrial Dispute Under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘ the Act‘) before the Labour Court, Cuddalore, which was taken on file as I.D. No.9 of 1996. However, the appellant withdrew the same as he was pursuing the remedy under the Shop Act. The appellant preferred an appeal before the second respondent appellate authority and the same was taken on file as T.N.S.E.A.A.No.1.of 1996. 4. The first respondent filed a counter statement before the appellate authority wherein they took the objection that the appellant was only a casual employee with no right to claim any permanency and while he was working on 10.3.1995 during the duty hours and inside the premises of the Bank, he assaulted one Revichandran, who was also an employee in the said Bank. A criminal complaint filed against him on the same day, finally, resulted in the appellant being convicted by the Criminal Court. It is also stated that the provision of the Shops Act will not apply to the first respondent establishment and the appeal itself is not maintainable in view the fact the appellant was convicted by the Criminal Court. 5. A criminal complaint filed against him on the same day, finally, resulted in the appellant being convicted by the Criminal Court. It is also stated that the provision of the Shops Act will not apply to the first respondent establishment and the appeal itself is not maintainable in view the fact the appellant was convicted by the Criminal Court. 5. The second respondent appellate authority recorded the statement of the appellant. He was cross- examined by the first respondent Management. The first respondent also examined the then Secretary of the Society, who was accordingly, cross examined. On the basis of the oral and documentary evidence, the second respondent appellate authority set aside the oral order of termination by his order dated 10.7.1997. The second respondent appellant authority found that the provisions of the Shops Act are applicable to the first respondent establishment and that the appellant had worked continuously for a period of six months and, therefore, he is eligible for protection under Section 41 (1) of the Shop Act. Since the two ingredients of Section 41 of the shops Act are not complied with, he had set aside the oral order of termination passed by the first respondent. He also found that the judgment of the Criminal Court was rendered, on the appellant admitting his guilt and had paid fine amount and if there was a disqualification in terms of the said admission and conviction, then the first respondent ought to have conducted an enquiry and imposed a punishment. As against the said order passed by the appellate authority, the first respondent Management preferred writ petition before this Court being W.P.No.4259 of 1998. 6. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, for the first time, the first respondent took up the stand that in view of the conviction by the Criminal Court and in terms of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Society Act 1983, the appellant is not eligible for being continued in service. The appellant filed a Court affidivit stating that no enquiry was conducted against him and that except merely filing the order of the learned Magistrate, no evidence was let in to prove the guilt or otherwise of the appellant. 7. The appellant filed a Court affidivit stating that no enquiry was conducted against him and that except merely filing the order of the learned Magistrate, no evidence was let in to prove the guilt or otherwise of the appellant. 7. The matter was taken up by the learned single judge, who after hearing the arguments of both sides, allowed the writ petition and quashed the order passed by the second respondent. In doing so, the learned single judge was persuaded by the arguments of the learned counsel for the first respondent Management, who drew attention of the learned single judge to Rule 149 (4) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rule, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rule‘) and also to the judgement of this Court reported in Management of Karungalpalayam Weavers Co-operative Production And sales Society Ltd., Karungalpalayam v. Presiding officer, labour Court Salem Management of Karungalpalayam Weavers Co-operative Production And sales Society Ltd., Karungalpalayam v. Presiding officer, labour Court Salem Management of Karungalpalayam Weavers Co-operative Production And sales Society Ltd., Karungalpalayam v. Presiding officer, labour Court Salem , (2002) 4 LLN 386. The learned judge did not go into the other aspects relating to the application of the provisions of the Shop Act except stating that the payments made by way of interim relief should not be recovered and quashed the order of the appellate authority dated 10.7.1997. The appellant also filed a Review Petition being R.P.No.41 of 2006 before the learned single judge but, however, the same was dismissed on 26.7.2006. It is against this order, the appellant/ workman has preferred the present appeal. 8. Notice was ordered in the writ on 21.8.2006 and interim stay of the order of the learned single Judge was granted. 9. We have heard D. Hari Parathaman assisted by V.Gangadharan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Ms.Narmada Sampath, learned counsel appearing for R.Parthiban, learned counsel for the first respondent Management. 10.1 D.Hari Paranthaman, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that Rule 149(4) of the Rules, which is extracted below, does not apply to the facts of the present case. “No person shall be appointed to the service of any society, if he has been found guilty of any offence involving moral turpitude. 10.1 D.Hari Paranthaman, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that Rule 149(4) of the Rules, which is extracted below, does not apply to the facts of the present case. “No person shall be appointed to the service of any society, if he has been found guilty of any offence involving moral turpitude. An employee shall cease to be as such in a society, if he is found guilt of any such offence.” According to the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, the appellant, was not guilty of any offence involving moral turpitude. 10.2 Insupport of his contention, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana and Another Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana and Another Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana and Another AIR 1996 SC 3300 : (1996) 4 SCC 17 : 1996-II-LLJ-703 and in paragraph 12, the term “Moral Turpitude” is defined as follows at pp. 705 and 706 of LLJ: “ 12. Moral turpitude” is an expression which is used in legal as also society parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity. The Government of Haryana while considering the question of rehabilitation of ex-convicts took a policy decision on 2.2.1973 (Annexure E in the Paper-Book), accepting the recommendations of the Government of India, that ex-convicts who were convicted for offences involving moral turpitude should not however be taken in government service. A list of offence which were considered involving moral turpitude was prepared for information and guidance in that connection. Significantly Section 294 I.P.C. is not found enlisted. in the list of offences constituting moral turpitude. Later, on further consideration, the Government of Haryana on 17/26-3-1975 explained the policy decision of 2-2-1975 explained the policy decision of 2-2-1973 and decided to modify the earlier decision by streaming determination of moral turpitude as follows: “…The following terms should ordinarily be applied in judging whether a certain offence involves moral turpitude or not; (1) Whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general. (2) Whether the motive which led to the act was a base one. (2) Whether the motive which led to the act was a base one. (3) Whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrator could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society. Decision in each case will, however, depend on the circumstances of the case and the competent authority has to exercise its discretion while taking a decision in accordance with the above-mentioned principles. A list of offences which involve moral turpitude is enclosed for your information and guidance. This list, however, cannot be said to be exhaustive and there might be offences which are not included in it but which in certain situations and circumstances may involve moral turpitude.” 10.3 It is also further held that even assuming that there was a conviction, that by itself, will lead to the conclusion that it is involving moral turpitude. The following found in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the judgment are usefully extracted below: “ Para 13. We had required of the respondents to produced before us the copy of the judgment whereby the appellant was convicted for the offence. As was expected only a copy of the institution/summary register maintained by the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani was placed before us showing that the appellant on 4.6.1980 was imposed a fine of Rs 20. A copy of the treasury challan supporting that the fine paid was deposited by the Chief Judicial Magistrate the same day has also been produced. The copy of the summary register neither discloses the substance of the allegations put to the appellant, nor the words in which the plea of guilt was entered. It is of no significance that the appellant treats himself a convict as he had pleaded guilty. Ex facie it only shows that the entry concerns FIR No.231 of 3.6.1980 under Section 294 I.P.C. There from it is difficult to discern the steps taken in the summary trial proceeding and what had the appellant pleaded to as guilty, whether to the allegations in the FIR or to the provision of the I.P.C. or any other particulare Mere payment of fine of Rs. 20 does not go to show that the conviction was validly and legally recorded. 20 does not go to show that the conviction was validly and legally recorded. Assuming that the conviction is not open to challenge at the present juncture, we cannot but deprecate the action of the respondents in having proceeded to adversely certify the character and antecedents of the appellant on the basis of the conviction per se, opining to have involved moral turpitude without satisfying the teats laid down in the policy decision of the Government. We are rather unhappy to note that all the three Courts below, even when invited to judge the matter in the said perspective, went on to hold that the act/s involved in conviction under Section 294 I.P.C. per se established moral turpitude. They should have been sensitive to the changing perspectives and concepts of morality to appreciate the effect of standards, and its changing views of obscenity. The matter unfortunately was dealt with casually at all levels. Para 14. Before concluding this judgement we hereby drew the attention of parliament to step in and perceive the large number of cases which per law and public policy are tried summarily, involving thousands and thousands of people throughout the country appearing before summary Courts and paying small amounts of fine, more often than not, as a measure of plea-bargaining. Foremost among them being traffic, municipal and other petty offences under the Indian penal Code, mostly committed by the young and/or the inexperienced. The cruel result of a conviction of that kind and a fine of payment of a paltry sum on plea-bargaining is the end of the career, further or present, as the case may be, of that young and/or inexperienced person, putting a blast to his life and his dreams. Life is too precious to be staked over a petty incident like this. Immediate remedial measure are therefore necessary in raising the toleration limits with regard to petty offences especially when tried summarily. Provision need be made that punishment of fine up to a certain limit, say up to Rs. 2000 or so, on summary/ordinary conviction shall not be treated as conviction at all for any purpose and all the more for entry into and retention in government service. Provision need be made that punishment of fine up to a certain limit, say up to Rs. 2000 or so, on summary/ordinary conviction shall not be treated as conviction at all for any purpose and all the more for entry into and retention in government service. this can brook no delay, whatsoever.” 10.4 The learned counsel also drew our attention to the decision of this Court, which was relied on by the learned Judge, reported in (2002) 4 LLN 386 ( cited supra). In that decision, undoubtedly, this Court held that a person, who was found guilty of an offence and paid fine for the same under Section 408 and 477-A I.L.P.C., will certainly be guilty of committing an offence involving moral turpitude. It is in that factual matrix, the Court came to the conclusion that such a person is not to be retained in the service of the Society and the Society need not conduct any personal enquiry when once there is admission of guilt in a competent Criminal Court. 11.1 We are in complete agreement with the said decision. But, however, in the present case, the question is as to whether the appellant is guilty of committing any offence involving moral turpitude. In this context, it is useful to refer to the decision of the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in Kuldeep Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others Kuldeep Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others Kuldeep Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others AIR 1994 (P & H) 242. IN that case, the Division Bench of Punjab and Hayana high Court Went into question that a provision similar to the one found in the Tamil Nadu Act, which was also found in the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act. In dealing with Rule 14 of the Rules, which disqualifies the members, who are found guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude, in paragraph, 13 of the judgment, the Division Bench observed as follows: “Whether an offence involves moral delinquency is a question of fact depending on the public morals of the time; common sense of community and context and purpose for which the character of offence is to be determined. In common parlance ‘moral turpitude‘ means baseness of character. In common parlance ‘moral turpitude‘ means baseness of character. Concise Oxford Dictionary defines ‘moral‘ - concerned with goodness or badness of character or disposition or with distinction between right and wrong…. virtuous in general conduct….. Turpitude‘ means “baseness, depravity, wickedness”. Thus any act which is contrary to good moral from societys point of view will come within the ambit of ‘moral turpitude‘.” 11.2 By applying the aforesaid principles, by no stretch of imagination, the offence committed by the appellant can said to be an offence which involves ‘moral turpitude‘ so as to come within the wrath of Rule 149(4) of the Rules. 12. Though we are in agreement with the decision reported in (2002) 4 LLN 386(supra), we must strike a note of caution that even in case where a person is found guilty of an offence by a Criminal Court and that the Management wants to take advantage of the same, it is unnecessary for them to hold separate enquiry. But when the Management does not conduct an enquiry and solely imposes a punishment based upon the outcome of the judgment in the Criminal Court, without considering the proportionality of the punishment, judicial review is permissible to the High Courts and Tribunals as held in the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Union of India v. Parmananda AIR 1989 SC 1185 : (1989) 2 SCC 177 : 1989-II-LLJ-57. While dealing with the provisions found in Article 311 (2) (a) of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court dealt with the power of the High Court in a matter of this nature. Paragraph 29 of the said decision may be usefully extracted below at p.65 of LLJ: “ 29. We may however, carve out one exception to this proposition. There may be cases where the penalty is imposed under clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. Where the person, without enquiry is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank solely on the basis of conviction by a criminal Court, the Tribunal may examine the adequacy of the penalty imposed in the light of the conviction and sentence inflicted on the person. If the penalty impugned is apparently unreasonable or uncalled for, having regard to the nature of the criminal charge, the Tribunal may step in to render substantial justice. If the penalty impugned is apparently unreasonable or uncalled for, having regard to the nature of the criminal charge, the Tribunal may step in to render substantial justice. The Tribunal may remit the matter to the competent authority for reconsideration or by itself substitute one of the penalties provided under clause (a). This power has been conceded to the Court in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel.” ( Emphasis added) 13. In the light of the above submissions, we find that the order of the learned single Judge is not correct legally and is liable to be interfered with in this appeal. However, Ms. Narmada Sampath, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, took time to make further submissions to convince this Court as to how the conviction of the appellant will be an offence involving moral turpitude. But no authority was found out to that effect. 14. The learned counsel appearing further submitted that even though the order of the learned single Judge is wrong in applying wrong principles of law, yet, the decision of the second respondent appellate authority is also illegal and is liable to be quashed. She further stated that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in United Planters Association of Southern India v. K. G. Sangameswaran and another United Planters Association of Southern India v. K. G. Sangameswaran and another United Planters Association of Southern India v. K. G. Sangameswaran and another , AIR 1997 SC 1300 : (1997) 4 SCC 741 : 1997-I-LLJ-1104 : (1997) 1 MLJ 144 the second respondent, who is an appellate authority under Section 41 of the Shop Act, is entitled to go into the merits of the case and he should have given an opportunity to the first respondent Society to lead evidence in order to prove the guilt or otherwise of the appellant. She also stated that in the light of the said judgment, the matter should be remanded back for enabling the first respondent to lead evidence to prove the guilt or otherwise of the appellant. She also stated that in the light of the said judgment, the matter should be remanded back for enabling the first respondent to lead evidence to prove the guilt or otherwise of the appellant. For this purpose, the learned counsel drew our attention to paragraph 19 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads as follows: “From a perusal of the provisions quoted above, it will be seen that the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority to record evidence and to come to its own conclusion on the questions involved in the appeal is very wide. Even if the evidence is recorded in the domestic enquiry and the order of dismissal is passed thereafter, it will still be open to the Appellate Authority to record, if need be, such evidence as may be produced by the parties. Conversely, also if the domestic enquiry is exparte or no evidence was recorded during those proceedings, the appellate authority would still be justified in taking additional evidence to enable it to come to its own conclusions on the articles of charges framed against the delinquent officer.” ( Emphasis added). 15. However, it must be seen that in the UPASI case(supra), the appellant sought for, by way of an application to the appellate authority for recording evidence and that was not considered by the appellate authority. The relevant passage from paragraph 26 of the said judgment is quoted below: “ It did not decide the application of the appellant for recording evidence. The Appellate Authority, therefore, committed grave error in the application of the appellant for additional evidence and proceeding to dispose of the appeal on the ground that the order of dismissal having been passed without holding a domestic enquiry, was bad in law.” ( Emphasis added) 16. Once it is accepted that the authority can, if requested, record additional evidence to decide the guilt or otherwise of an employee, the next question naturally will arise as to whether it is incumbent upon the authority to record evidence on his own without there even being an application in this regard by the employer. Once it is accepted that the authority can, if requested, record additional evidence to decide the guilt or otherwise of an employee, the next question naturally will arise as to whether it is incumbent upon the authority to record evidence on his own without there even being an application in this regard by the employer. In fact, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in its judgment reported in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Lakshmidevamma (SMT) and another Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Lakshmidevamma (SMT) and another Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Lakshmidevamma (SMT) and another AIR 2001 SC 2090 : (2001) 5 SCC 433 : 2001-II-LLJ-199 : (2001) 3 MLJ 76 has answered this issue squarely. Paragraph 20 of the said judgment may be usefully extracted below at p.17 of MLJ: “ 17. In the present case, the appellant employer did not seek permission to lead evidence until after the Labour Court had held that its domestic enquiry was vitiated. Applying the aforestated principles to these facts, we are of the opinion that the High Court has rightly dismissed the writ petition of the appellant, hence, this appeal has to fall”. ( Emphasis added) 17. Inorder to find out as to whether the first respondent employer in the present case has made any such request before the authority, we had gone through all the records placed before us and found that no such request was made by the employer in this case. They were rest contented with the conviction of the petitioner before the Criminal Court. Even otherwise, we find that both the appellant and the first respondent have let in oral evidence and have also marked documents in this connection. Therefore, it cannot be said that it is a case where the first respondent was denied opportunity of leading evidence and proving the guilt or otherwise of the appellant. 18. At this juncture, we are told across the bar that the first respondent Society is a Co-operative Society and they should not be mulcted with the liability of paying backwages. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the first respondent that her client had paid monthly salary commensurate with Section 17 (B) of the I.D. Act all along till the disposal of the learned single judge. She also sought for permission to conduct fresh enquiry against the appellant. 19. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the first respondent that her client had paid monthly salary commensurate with Section 17 (B) of the I.D. Act all along till the disposal of the learned single judge. She also sought for permission to conduct fresh enquiry against the appellant. 19. In fact, it must be stated that the Supreme Court judgment in UPASIs case ( cited supra), was an addition to the jurisdiction of the appellate authority under the Shop Act. The Supreme Court has expanded the jurisdiction of the appellate authority to even take fresh evidence even though his power to take additional evidence was not questioned and was also provided under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishment Rules. This was under the premise that the authoritys decision should become final and should not be left uncertain for future battles. 20. If in the present case, the first respondent had not sought for any request to lead any additional evidence as found in the UPASIs case ( cited supra). Hence they must suffer the consequences. In any event, they have already let in evidence. Therefore, a finality attached to the orders cannot be re-opened and this Court cannot grant any permission to conduct any fresh enquiry. 21. We also feel that in the present case, the workman has suffered non- employment for over eleven years and the only ground laid against him was that he was convicted by a Criminal Court for assaulting a co-worker. We have already found that the said conviction will not amount to an offence involving moral turpitude. It is enough punishment if he is denied full backwages. 22. In the light of the above, the writ appeal succeeds and stands allowed. The order passed by the learned single judge dated 20.6.2006 made in W.P.No.4259 of 1998 is hereby set aside and the order of the second respondent appellate authority dated 10.7.1997 made in T.S.E.A.A. No.1 of 1996 shall stated restored. But in view of the appellant having got some interim relief, he will not be paid any wages for the period between 20.3.1995 till 21.8.2006, i. e., the day this Court granted an interim order pending appeal. But however, this period will be treated as continuous service for all other benefits including terminal benefits. But in view of the appellant having got some interim relief, he will not be paid any wages for the period between 20.3.1995 till 21.8.2006, i. e., the day this Court granted an interim order pending appeal. But however, this period will be treated as continuous service for all other benefits including terminal benefits. The first respondent is directed to restore the appellant in service within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. However, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. In view of the same, connected Miscellaneous Petitions stand closed.