Judgment :- (Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus, to call for the records relating to the order passed by the first respondent in the proceedings D.Dis.K3.32158/2005, dated 18.10.2005 and quash the same and consequently direct the first respondent to condone the delay of 4 days in preferring the Review Petition.) By consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties, the writ petition itself is taken up for disposal. 2. The challenge in the writ petition is to the order of the first respondent, dated 18.10.2005, holding that the revision petition filed by the petitioner as against the order of the District Revenue Officer, dated 30.6.2005, was not filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order. Since there was a delay of four days, the revision petition was to be rejected as time barred. 3. It is not in dispute that the first respondent had no authority to entertain the revision petition after the prescribed period of 30 days. However, the question that arises for consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act and seek for condonation of delay in filing the revision petition. 4. In this context, it will be worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2000 (3) C.T.C. 552 (P.Sarathy vs. State Bank of India). In that case, the suit came to be filed after the prescribed period of limitation and the appellant therein took a stand that the period during which he was agitating before the appellate authority constituted under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, should be excluded while working out the period of limitation. The Supreme Court accepted the claim of the appellant. The Supreme Court, while construing Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act, where the expression "Court" has been used, held that the said expression would take within its fold all those quasi-judicial authorities who have all the trappings of the Court. Paragraph 13 of the said judgment of the Supreme Court is relevant for our present purpose, which reads as under: "13. In Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Coop. Paragraph 13 of the said judgment of the Supreme Court is relevant for our present purpose, which reads as under: "13. In Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Coop. Bank Ltd. AIR 1967 SC 1494 : 1967 Crl.L.J. 1380 this Court, while considering the question under the Contempt of Courts Act, held that the Registrar under the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act was a court. It was held that the Registrar had not merely the trappings of a court but in many respects he was given the same powers as was given to an ordinary civil court by the Code of Civil Procedure including the powers to summon and examine witnesses on oath, the power to order inspection of documents and to hear the parties. The Court referred to the earlier decisions in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees, AIR 1950 SC 188 : 1950 SCR 459 ; Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 SC 325 : 1953 SCR 730 and Brajnandan Sinha vs. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 SC 66 : 1955 (2) SCR 955 . The Court approved the rule laid down in these cases that in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has Finality and Authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement." 5. If the principles set out in the said paragraph are applied to the facts of this case, it can be safely held that the jurisdiction exercisable by the first respondent as a revisional authority would satisfy all the requirements that have been set out in the above referred to decision of the Supreme Court. Even under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the expression used is only "Court" and not a 'Civil Court'. Therefore, it can be safely held that there is every jurisdiction vested in the first respondent to condone the delay involved in preferring the revision petition by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 6. Even under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the expression used is only "Court" and not a 'Civil Court'. Therefore, it can be safely held that there is every jurisdiction vested in the first respondent to condone the delay involved in preferring the revision petition by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 6. Having regard to the said legal position, it is just and proper that the petitioner is permitted to move the first respondent by way of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking for condonation of the delay in filing the revision petition by adducing the reasons which prevented the petitioner from filing the revision within the prescribed period of 30 days. Accordingly, while setting aside the order impugned in this writ petition, and permitting the petitioner to file appropriate application for condonation of delay, along with the revision petition, the first respondent is directed to dispose of the petitioner's application for condonation of delay, in accordance with law and pass appropriate orders before entertaining the petitioner's revision petition and to decide the same on merits. The petitioner shall re-present the revision petition along with the application for condonation of delay within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 7. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. No costs. W.P.M.P. is closed.