BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application for leave to prefer an appeal at the instance of a third party to the suit against the judgment and decree dated 30th January, 2006 passed by the learned Judge, 7th Bench, city Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit No. 1459 of 2005 on the basis of compromise of the parties. ( 2 ) THE respondent No. 1, an association represented by the respondent no. 2, its Secretary, filed a suit against the respondent Nos. 3 and 4, two other associations thereby praying for declaration that the plaintiffs were legally entitled to take part in the Annual General Meeting of the respondent no. 3 scheduled to be held on 28th September, 2005 and also in the proceedings for election of the office bearer of the respondent No. 4 for the year 2005-06 with further declaration that the respondent No. l was entitled to carry on its duty and function with its existing office-bearers till its successors are appointed through a General Meeting to be held with the agenda of election of office bearers of the respondent No. l and for permanent injunction restraining the respondents Nos. 3 and 4, their men, agents and members from creating any obstruction or any inconvenience to the office-bearers of the respondent No. 1 from taking part in the Annual General Meeting and also in the election proceedings to be held on 28th September, 2005. ( 3 ) THE said suit was decreed in terms of compromise effected between the plaintiffs and the defendants. ( 4 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, the present applicant claiming to be a member of the plaintiff-respondent No. l has preferred an appeal before this Court being f. A. T. No. 769 of 2006 along with the present application for leave to file the said appeal on the ground that the Executive Committee of the respondent no. l, which was defunct at the relevant time, was not competent to enter into such compromise in order to frustrate the right of the members and that he would be virtually and substantially affected by the decree. The present applicant further described the decree as fraudulent and collusive. ( 5 ) MR. Tandon, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that his client being prejudicially affected by the compromise decree should be permitted to prefer the present appeal. The present applicant further described the decree as fraudulent and collusive. ( 5 ) MR. Tandon, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that his client being prejudicially affected by the compromise decree should be permitted to prefer the present appeal. ( 6 ) AFTER hearing Mr. Tandon, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant and after considering the fact that the decree impugned is a compromise decree in terms of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in our view, the present first appeal is not at all maintainable, in view of clear bar created under section 96 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 7 ) MR. Tandon in this connection relied upon the provisions contained in order 43 Rule 1a of the Code of Civil Procedure and submitted that his client can definitely challenge the decree by pointing out that the decree was a fraudulent one and that the person who actually signed the compromise had no such authority. ( 8 ) MR. Tandon further submits that in view of Order 23 Rule 3a of the code, a fresh suit is barred and as such, his client has no other alternative but to prefer an appeal against such compromise decree. In support of such contention, Mr. Tandon relies upon two decisions, one in the case of Banowari lal vs. Chando Devi, reported in AIR 1993 SC 1139 and the other in the case of Morium Bibi and Ors. vs. Sowkatara Begum and Ors. , reported in 98 CWN 1074. ( 9 ) IN our opinion, the aforesaid contention of Mr. Tandon is a misconceived one. According to Order 23 Rule 3a of the Code of Civil Procedure, a fresh suit at the instance of the parties to compromise on the basis of which decree was passed is barred and if any of the parties to the alleged compromise is of the view that such compromise was effected by practising fraud or otherwise not lawful, it is his duty to apply before the self-same Court and the said Court should decide whether such compromise should be recorded. If the Court overrules the objection or accepts such protest, the aggrieved party, as the case may be, can prefer a first appeal against the final decree in the suit challenging the finding of the learned Court on such objection by taking aid of the provision contained in Order 43 Rule 1a of the Code. In the case before us, if the allegation of the appellant, a member of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was not properly represented in the compromise is true, in such a case, it is the duty of the plaintiff being properly represented to apply before the Trial Court for recalling such decree on the ground that the plaintiff was not properly represented and if such objection was raised, the trial Court would decide the question and the decision of the Trial Court could be challenged by preferring a first appeal against the final decree by taking the aid of Order 43 Rule 1a of the Code. It is now settled law that even after passing of a decree on the basis of compromise, the affected party can apply for recalling the decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful and if such application is filed, it is the duty of the Trial Court to decide such objection. [see paragraph 14 of the judgment in the case of banwari Lal (supra)]. ( 10 ) BUT without raising any such objection before the Trial Court, a regular first appeal against the compromise decree is clearly barred by the provision contained in section 96 (3) of the Code. ( 11 ) BUT in a case, where a third party wants to challenge such decree on the ground that he is not bound by such decree, he is not required to apply before the self-same Court as he is not a party to the proceedings and he can definitely file a separate suit on the ground that the compromise decree between the parties cannot legally affect his right as he is not bound by the act of the parties to compromise. ( 12 ) MR. Tandon in this connection submitted that his client being the member of the plaintiff association will be bound by the act of the plaintiff and as such, in this case his client should be permitted to come before the appellate Court and challenge such decree. ( 12 ) MR. Tandon in this connection submitted that his client being the member of the plaintiff association will be bound by the act of the plaintiff and as such, in this case his client should be permitted to come before the appellate Court and challenge such decree. ( 13 ) WE have already pointed out that if somebody illegally represented the association and entered into any compromise on behalf of the association, it is for the association, properly represented, to take appropriate step but an individual member of the association cannot challenge the compromise, if the association does not take any legal step to set aside the compromise allegedly entered into on its behalf. ( 14 ) WE, thus, find that section 96 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure having specifically prohibited filing of an appeal against the compromise decree where the compromise had not been disputed by the parties to the compromise before the Trial Court, this appeal is not maintainable. ( 15 ) IF the association itself alleged before the Trial Court that the so-called compromise was not properly signed on behalf of the association and such objection was turned down by the Trial Court and the decree on the basis of the compromise was maintained, section 96 (3) would not stand in the way of the Association in preferring the appeal. ( 16 ) WE now propose to deal with the decisions cited by Mr. Tandon. ( 17 ) IN the case of Banwari Lal (supra), all that was deeded by the Supreme court was that after the deletion of the provisions contained in Order 43 rule l (m) of the Code, a party to compromise even after the decree on the basis of compromise can file an application before the Trial Court alleging that the compromise was not lawful and if such application is filed it is the duty of the Court to decide such objection and if necessary, to recall the decree already passed. It was further held therein that a separate suit challenging the compromise would be barred. The principle laid down in the said decision, therefore, does not authorise a third party to the litigation to challenge a compromise decree when the party to the compromise had not disputed the compromise as unlawful by filing any application before the Court which passed the decree. The principle laid down in the said decision, therefore, does not authorise a third party to the litigation to challenge a compromise decree when the party to the compromise had not disputed the compromise as unlawful by filing any application before the Court which passed the decree. ( 18 ) IN the case of Morium Bibi and Ors. , (supra), a Division Bench was considering a case where the heirs and legal representatives of one Md. Yasin filed a suit for declaration that a compromise decree passed by an appellate Court in the past where Md. Yasin was party to appeal but admittedly not party to compromise was not binding upon them. It appeared from the said judgment, that in the Trial Court a specific share of Md. Yasin was declared but on appeal, in view of the compromise between the parties other than Md. Yasin, the appeal was disposed of in terms thereof and even the declared share of Md. Yasin by the Trial Court was varied. Subsequently, the heirs of Md. Yasin filed a separate suit claiming declaration that the earlier decree passed by the Appellate Court was not binding upon them. The defendants raised preliminary objection that the separate suit filed by the heirs of Md. Yasin was barred by Order 23 Rule 3a of the Code. The learned Single Judge of this Court overruled such objection and held that the suit was maintainable as Md. Yasin was admittedly not party to the compromise. On appeal, the Division Bench held that as Md. Yasin was party to the appeal, Order 23 Rule 3a was a bar to a fresh suit. ( 19 ) IN our view, the fact of that case is totally different from the one involved herein. In this case, the appellant was admittedly not a party to the suit. In the case of Morium Bibi (supra), the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs was though not party to the compromise, yet, a party to the appeal and on compromise by the other parties, his share was also varied at the instance of the other parties and the decree passed by the Trial Judge was accordingly modified altering the share of Md. Yasin. In our opinion, md. Yasin. In our opinion, md. Yasin being a party to the appeal, it was his duty to challenge the appellate decree by moving higher forum and not having preferred any appeal to the Supreme Court, the decree of the Appellate Court, though apparently erroneous, would be binding upon him and a fresh suit at the instance of his heirs was barred on that ground. With great respect to the learned Judges of the Division Bench, we are unable to accept the reason assigned by that bench for holding that the separate suit was not maintainable, although, we agree with the ultimate conclusion of the Division Bench. As pointed out by the Supreme Court at paragraph 10 of the judgment in the case of Gurpreet singh vs. Chatur Bhuj Goel, reported in 1988 (1) SCC 270 , in order to invoke order 23 Rule 3 of the Code, the agreement must be "in writing and signed by the parties" and consequently, Md. Yasin not being a party to the agreement and not having admittedly signed the same, the bar created under Order 23 Rule 1a would not be attracted; but his share declared by the Trial Judge having been altered by the Appellate Court, he ought to have preferred appeal against the appellate decree and that part of the decree modifying his share being not covered by Order 23 Rule 3, was appealable. Even if a wrong decree is accepted by a party, the same will be binding and subsequently, such party or his successors cannot get rid of that decree by filing a fresh suit. ( 20 ) WE, therefore, find that the decisions cited by Mr. Tandon are of no avail to his client. ( 21 ) WE, thus, overrule the aforesaid contention of Mr. Tandon and hold that the present appeal being not maintainable, no leave can be granted to the applicant to prefer the appeal. ( 22 ) WE, accordingly, dismiss this application. In view of refusal of the leave prayed for, the appeal itself is dismissed as not maintainable. The other pending application is also dismissed as the same has become infructuous. Appeal dismissed.