JUDGMENT S.D. Anand, J. - Desertion and cruelty were two planks on the basis whereof the husband (respondent to the present FAO) applied for a decree of divorce. The latter plea was negatived. However, the former plea prevailed and the trial Court allowed divorce. The wife-appellant is in appeal. 2. The plaintiff-respondent filed divorce plea on allegations which may be summarized as under :- 3. The marriage between the parties was solemnized on 13.12.1998, as per Hindu rites and ceremonies, at Sonepat. After the marriage, the parties co- habited at the matrimonial house and a female child was born out of their union. Prior thereto, the ring ceremony was performed on 10.6.1998. At that time, both the parties were un-employed. However, on 21.7.1998, the appellant joined employment in an educational institution where her father was Vice- Principal. 4. On 14.2.1999, the parties attended a marriage ceremony in the family of a relation of the respondent at Village Garhi Brahmnan. The appellant-wife insisted upon leaving the function midstream all of a sudden in spite of the repeated persuasion by the respondent. In the context, the appellant misbehaved with the respondent. 5. In the month of April, 1999, the appellant-wife went over to her natal house as she had to appear at the M.A. improvement examination to be held from 17th to 19th of May, 1999. However, before that examination could take place, the respondent-husband fell ill on 12.5.1999. The appellant-wife was duly informed of ill health of the respondent but she came over to her matrimonial house only for 1/2 hour and, then, left for her parental house. The efforts made by the respondent and members of his family requesting her to stay on in view of the health of the respondent did not bear any fruit. 6. On 24.5.1999, a havan ceremony was to be performed at the matrimonial house of the parties. For securing her presence at the function, respondents mother rang up appellants mother requesting the latter to send the appellant along to attend the function. The appellants mother flatly declined and informed the caller relation (i.e. mother of the respondent) that the appellant would join matrimonial company only when the respondent would separate in mess and residence from his natal family. Appellants mother further informed that the appellant would neither cook food nor wash clothes at the matrimonial house. 7. The appellants mother flatly declined and informed the caller relation (i.e. mother of the respondent) that the appellant would join matrimonial company only when the respondent would separate in mess and residence from his natal family. Appellants mother further informed that the appellant would neither cook food nor wash clothes at the matrimonial house. 7. On 26.6.1999, in pursuance of consultation amongst the members of his own family, the respondent separated in mess and residence from his parental family. That course of action was adopted in order to ensure "peace and harmony in the family". On 28.6.1999, the appellant joined the respondent at the matrimonial house aforesaid. 8. Even thereafter, the appellant would always insist upon paying repeated visits to her natal family. When the respondent tried to persuade her to desist from paying frequent visits to her parental house, she used derogatory language against him. 9. On 13.8.1999, at about 5.00 p.m., the appellant went to a nearby S.T.D. Booth to make a call. However, she returned to the matrimonial house only at about 10 p.m. The respondent, who had made frantic efforts in the meantime to search for her, required her to clarify her whereabouts during that period. She not only declined to offer clarification but also misbehaved with the respondent. It was only subsequently that it came to the notice of the respondent that the appellant spent the time aforesaid at the house of a neighbour by the name of Prushotam Lal, who is in possession of House No. 976, Sector 14, Sonipat. 10. On 14.8.1999, a brother of the appellant came over to fetch her to her parental house for celebration of Teej festival. Respondents father did not agree with the proposal. However, appellants brother secured the intervention of Sh. Prem Tirath, Advocate who persuaded respondents father to send the appellant along for one day only. However, the appellant did not return to the matrimonial house thereafter. While leaving the matrimonial house on 14.8.1999, she had also taken along the ornaments which she was wearing at that time. 11. On 22.8.1999, the respondent requested Sh. Prem Tirath, Advocate (a close relation of the wife - as per an averment in Ex. PW-4/A, the affidavit filed by the husband in lieu of the examination-in-chief) to intervene but the request was declined. 11. On 22.8.1999, the respondent requested Sh. Prem Tirath, Advocate (a close relation of the wife - as per an averment in Ex. PW-4/A, the affidavit filed by the husband in lieu of the examination-in-chief) to intervene but the request was declined. On that very day, the respondent went over to his in- laws house in the company of one Chander Bhan. However, appellants father denied access to them to the inside of the house and also did not allow them to meet the appellant. On 29.8.1999, respondents parents went over to appellants parental house in the company of Sh. Prem Tirath, Advocate. However, that effort too did not bear any fruit. Appellants father held out threats to respondents parents at a loud pitch, the intervention by Sh. Prem Tirath, Advocate notwithstanding. Appellants mother also appeared on the scene from the inside of the house, scolded respondents mother and also picked up her footwear to beat her. Sunil, a brother of the appellant, also entered the venue with a lathi and tried to beat respondents father with it. Respondents parents could barely escape. 12. In November 1999, respondents mother sustained a burn injury while visiting a market. However, none from appellants side cared to find out her well being. 13. On 18.11.1999, the appellant gave birth to a female child at a Private Hospital. However, the birth of the child was not intimated to the respondent side. When that fact came to the notice of the respondent otherwise, he and members of his family went over to the parental house of the appellant with gifts for the newly born child and eatables for the appellant but the parents of the appellant did not allow access to them. 14. Efforts at persuasion were made a number of times in the month of January 2001 and November 2001 but those proved futile. 15. It was on the above averments that the respondent-husband filed a petition under Section 13 of the HIndu Marriage Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 16. The appellant-wife denied the allegations levelled by the respondent in toto. It was averred that the respondent side was guilty of a fraud inasmuch as at the time of the engagement ceremony, it was represented that the respondent had been selected as a Trained Graduate Teacher at Delhi. That fact was announced in the presence of Sh. Prem Tirath, Advocate and Sh. It was averred that the respondent side was guilty of a fraud inasmuch as at the time of the engagement ceremony, it was represented that the respondent had been selected as a Trained Graduate Teacher at Delhi. That fact was announced in the presence of Sh. Prem Tirath, Advocate and Sh. Satbir Singh, J.E. It was further announced that efforts were being made to get him posted at Narela, which was a place close to Sonipat. In fact, the respondent had not at all been appointed to any such post and that mis-representation had been made only in order to persuade the appellant side to consent to the matrimonial alliance. It was denied that any marriage ceremony had been held in the Village Garhi Brahmanan on 14.2.1999 or that the parties had attended it. It was further averred that the appellant came to the matrimonial house only for a period of two days in order to appear at the Improvement examination held on 17th to 19th May, 1999 and she returned to the matrimonial house thereafter. The other part of the relevant averment was controverted. It was also denied that any Havan ceremony was performed on 14.5.1999 at the house of the respondent. The averment was that there was, thus, no occasion for the mother of the respondent to ring up appellants mother and, obviously, there never was any occasion for appellants mother to utter the attributed dialogues. It was also denied that the respondent ever separated from his parental family or that the parties ever lived away from respondents parental family. Qua the occurrence dated 13.8.1999, it was averred that the appellant had merely gone over to the house of Purshotam Lal to enquire about his health as he was a good friend of her father and she used to address him as Uncle. She stayed over at his house only for a period of 10 minutes. The respondent felt infuriated as she had gone there without his permission. She was belaboured on that count. On 14.8.1999, she rang up her parents and informed them about the maltreatment at the hands of the respondent. Her brother Sunil came to fetch her. He was not allowed to enter the house. When Sh. Prem Tirath, Advocate intervened, respondents father informed him that the appellant had already been turned out of the matrimonial house. On 14.8.1999, she rang up her parents and informed them about the maltreatment at the hands of the respondent. Her brother Sunil came to fetch her. He was not allowed to enter the house. When Sh. Prem Tirath, Advocate intervened, respondents father informed him that the appellant had already been turned out of the matrimonial house. The appellant reached her natal house in a rickshaw in three bare clothes. 17. The trial proceeded on the following issues :- 1. Whether the respondent is guilty of deserting the petitioner for a continuous period of two years immediately preceding from the presentation of the petition with an intention not to joining the company of petitioner ? OPP 2. Whether the respondent is guilty of treating the petitioner with cruelty after solemnisation of the marriage ? OPP 3. Whether the petitioner is guilty of suppressing the facts from the Court, if so to what effect ? OPR 4. Relief. The Trial Judge disposed of issue No. 1 in favour of the respondent-husband by recording a finding thereunder that the appellant-wife was guilty of having deserted the respondent-husband. Insofar as issue No. 2 is concerned, the finding recorded thereunder was adverse to the respondent-husband and favourable to the appellant-wife. Issue No. 3 was disposed of against the respondent. 18. In support of the finding in favour of the respondent-husband and against the appellant-wife under Issue No. 1, the trial Court drew sustenance from the fact that it was the husband only who had filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and he was impelled to get it dismissed as withdrawn when the wife proved non-cooperative and refused co-habitation. In that very context, the trial Court also recorded that the wife had otherwise averred in the reply to the petition that she is willing for restitution. Her subsequent conduct, the Court observed, in the restitution efforts reflected the contrary. The Court also relied upon the fact that the wife side is not proved to have made any reconciliation bid for a period of as many as six years. That refrain on the part of the wife side, the Court observed, was not in accord with the expected conduct of the bride side in the Indian Society. The Court also relied upon the fact that the wife side is not proved to have made any reconciliation bid for a period of as many as six years. That refrain on the part of the wife side, the Court observed, was not in accord with the expected conduct of the bride side in the Indian Society. In that very context, the Court also took adverse notice of the fact that the wife had filed a private complaint under Section 498-A IPC against the husband and other members of his family, though the proceedings had been directed by the Magisterial Court against the husband only. The Court also noticed that, in the reply to the petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the wife had made dowry-related allegations which are conspicuously missing in the written statement filed in the present petition. This, the Court observed, proves the falsity of the allegation. 19. Qua wifes allegation of her having been belaboured and turned out of the matrimonial house, the Court observed that the averment is false as the wife being employed was in dominant position vis-a-vis the unemployed husband. It was also observed that the wife being a qualified teacher would not have kept mum if she had been belaboured. The want of medical evidence in that behalf was also noticed to falsify the plea of the wife. The Court further noticed on the basis of "close scrutiny of the pleadings and the evidence adduced on the record" that "root cause of the dispute between the parties is unemployment of the petitioner." 20. We have heard Mr. Vikram Punia, learned counsel for the appellant-wife and Mr. Ranjan Lakhanpal, Advocate on behalf of the respondent-husband. We have also carefully perused the records. 21. The pleas raised by the learned counsel for the appellant would be reflected in the item-wise discussion hereunder, while the learned counsel for the respondent opted to offer plain reiteration of the line of reasoning adopted by the learned trial Court. 22. Before proceeding to delve deep into the matter, it would be appropriate to indicate that though Issue No. 2 had been framed independently on the basis of plea of cruelty, the trial Judge dealt with the aspect of cruelty under Issue No. 1 as well. Reference, in the context, may be made to para Nos. 22. Before proceeding to delve deep into the matter, it would be appropriate to indicate that though Issue No. 2 had been framed independently on the basis of plea of cruelty, the trial Judge dealt with the aspect of cruelty under Issue No. 1 as well. Reference, in the context, may be made to para Nos. 16 and 17 of the judgment in the course whereof the trial Court noticed certain pieces of evidence which impelled it to hold that the appellant had not been belaboured on the night intervening 13/14.8.1999 and that Ex. PC and PD reveal she had received proper medical treatment during the period of her pRegulation ncy. 23. We do not find the reasoning given by the trial Court to be sustainable. Relying upon the own observations of the trial Court that "ours is a patriarchal society", it may be noticed that in our Indian Society, the bride and members of her natal family would not like to do an act which may make the future resumption of matrimonial ties impossible. Except when things become intolerable or reach a flash point, the bride family would by and large exhibit tolerant attitude. Further, it is not the plea of the appellant that she had sustained any noticeable/grievous injury qua which she may have obtained medico-legal evidence. In the male dominated society scenario, it is illogical for the trial Court to have made a sweeping observation that the appellant being an employed wife was in a dominating position vis-a-vis unemployed husband "at all relevant time". Further, the mere fact that she was under treatment during the period of pRegulation ncy would not, per se, disprove her allegation of having been belaboured at a different point of time. It may be noted in the context that, on the own showing of the respondent-husband "the charges of the hospital for delivery of the child was borne by the parents of the respondent". 24. While assailing the line of reasoning adopted by the trial Court, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that it is the husband side which is guilty of having falsely represented at the time of betrothal ceremony that the respondent had been appointed a T.G.T. Teacher at Delhi and that efforts were being made to get him posted at Narela, a place closed to Sonepat where the matrimonial house of the parties is situated. It was also argued that the wife had fully participated in reconciliation endeavour in accord with the plea in the reply to the petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and she alone cannot be blamed for the failure of the endeavour. It was further argued that an inference in favour of the respondent could not have been drawn just because he opted to withdraw the petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The learned counsel proceeded to argue that the filing of the private complaint does not prove anything against the wife as the complaint had been filed at a much later point of time and the truthfulness or otherwise of the averments made therein has not yet been adjudicated upon by the Court. 25. In paragraph 4 (on merits) of the written statement, the appellant-wife did make the following averment : "They had also assumed that as the petitioner has been selected as T.G.T. Teacher in Delhi State but they are trying to get him posted near Sonepat i.e. in Nerala." As against it, in the corresponding para of the replication, the respondent- husband averred that "It is incorrect to say that fraud has been played by the parents of the petitioner as alleged in this para. It is vehemently denied that the parents of the petitioner ever informed or claimed that the petitioner has been selected as TGT Teacher in Delhi.... It is also incorrect to say that the parents of the petitioner have assured the parents of the respondent regarding selection of the petitioner as TGT Teacher in Delhi and claimed to make try to get the petitioner posted near Sonepat." However, when the respondent-husband stepped into the witness box, as his own witness, he initially denied having informed his in-laws that he had been posted as a Teacher at Delhi but proceeded to aver in the following sentence that :- "I had told that I have been selected at Delhi as a teacher and I was in the process of joining." It was only in the matter of posting that he averred that "I did not make any commitment that I will get my posting done in the area of Village Narela near Sonepat." 26. It would be very relevant to point out here that PW-10 Ajit, father of the respondent-husband also averred in the context that "I had apprised the parents of the respondent that the petitioner has been selected as teacher." He only denied, as incorrect, a suggestion that he had held out an assurance that the respondent would be got transferred to some place near Narela after marriage. He further conceded, as correct, a suggestion that the respondent- husband had not been appointed as a teacher even after the marriage and he remains unemployed. 27. It is, thus, apparent from a comparative perusal of the above quoted material that the respondent side did indeed make a factually incorrect averment at the time of betrothal ceremony. 28. In the present case, we are not called upon to analyse the correctness or otherwise of the averments made by the parties against each other up to the period 28.6.1999 in view of the fact that there is a categorical averment in para No. 10 of the petition that the parties resumed co-habitation with effect from that date. That averment was owned up by the respondent-husband by conceding, as correct, a suggestion in the cross-examination that "It is correct that me and respondent started residing together properly as husband and wife after that and there was no complaint of any kind between us." 29. On the own showing of the respondent-husband, there is only one incident during the post 28.6.1999 period, which was referred to by him as an act of cruelty on the part of the appellant-wife. The averment in the context is as under :- "On 13.8.1999, it would 5.00 p.m., the appellant-wife went over to nearby STD Booth to make a telephonic call. She returned in matrimonial house only at about 10.00 p.m. When the respondent, who had been searching her in the meantime, required her to clarify where actually she had been during the period intervening 5.00 p.m. to 10.00 p.m. she declined to furnish any information and misbehaved with him. The appellant-wife has also alleged to have get the respondent-husband beaten up in the context. It was only at a subsequent period of time that it came to the notice of respondent that respondent remained in the nearby house of Shri Prushotam Lal in 976, Sector 14, Sonepat in the said period. The appellant-wife has also alleged to have get the respondent-husband beaten up in the context. It was only at a subsequent period of time that it came to the notice of respondent that respondent remained in the nearby house of Shri Prushotam Lal in 976, Sector 14, Sonepat in the said period. Though, the further allegation was not made in so many words, the parent insinuation was in respect of the character of the appellant-wife." 30. In her testimony in oath, the appellant-wife categorically averred that Purshotam Lal aforesaid is a very close friend of her father and that she had gone over to enquire about his health. Interestingly, enough Purshotam Lal aforesaid was examined by the respondent-husband himself as PW-3 and he conceded that the appellant had been to his house on 13.8.1999 to enquire about his health. The relevant suggestion reads as under : "It is correct that respondent had come to know my happiness health." In the course of testimony in oath, this witness also asserted that he has family relations with the family of the appellant. It would be very relevant to point out here that PW-4-Vinod who is non else or other than the respondent-husband himself, conceded a suggestion that the appellant had been to the house of Purshotam Lal on 13.8.1999 to enquire about his health. The relevant suggestion reads as under :- "It is correct that on 13.8.1999 the respondent had gone to the house of Purshotam Lal to enquire about his health." He did, however, proceed to testify in the following sentence that the appellant had been to the house of Purshotam Lal on the above date without his permission. It is one thing to insinuate a wife and quite another thing to aver that the visit was without his permission. The suggested insinuation would have enabled the respondent-husband to raise a plea touching the moral integrity of the wife-appellant. As against it, the grievance presently indicated by him would only be reflective of his domineering attitude vis-a- vis his wife. It would not, however, enable him to raise a plea of divorce on the premise that the appellant had treated him with cruelty. 31. The learned trial Judge drew uncalled for inference in favour of the respondent-husband and against the appellant-wife on account of the withdrawal of the petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. It would not, however, enable him to raise a plea of divorce on the premise that the appellant had treated him with cruelty. 31. The learned trial Judge drew uncalled for inference in favour of the respondent-husband and against the appellant-wife on account of the withdrawal of the petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The Court observed that a plea raised by the appellant-wife in the reply (to the petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act) indicating inclination to assume co- habitation was mala fide because if she was actually favourably inclined in that behalf, there is no reason why she would not have expressly so stated before that Court, thereby ensuring the dismissal of that petition as infructuous. 32. The line of reasoning adopted by the trial Judge is not in order. Exs. P1 to P5 are the certified copies of the orders dated 10.4.2002, 20.4.2002, 26.4.2003, 18.7.2002 and 15.9.2003 respectively, which had been passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Sonepat dealing with the petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which had been preferred by the respondent-husband against the appellant-wife. Exs. P1 and P3 are reflective of the fact that the parties had sought time for reconciliation. Ex. P4 relates to only the filing of the written-statement and adjournment of the matter to 7.9.2002 for filing of replication and framing of issues. It is only in the Ex. P2 that the learned Additional District Judge, Sonepat noticed that the reconciliation efforts had not been fruitful. That order was passed in the presence of the parties and their learned counsel. Ex. P6 is the certified copy of the statement dated 29.10.2002 vide which the respondent- husband had informed the Court that he does not want to proceed with the petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act as the reconciliation efforts had proved fertile (futile ?). All these facts would not, in any case, indicate that the reconciliation efforts failed on account of any act on the part of only the appellant-wife. The mere withdrawal of the petition would also not indicate that the respondent-husband was free from blame. It was he only who filed the petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and further it was he only who opted to get that petition dismissed as withdrawn. The mere withdrawal of the petition would also not indicate that the respondent-husband was free from blame. It was he only who filed the petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and further it was he only who opted to get that petition dismissed as withdrawn. The material obtaining on the file does not support the inference drawn by the trial Court that the withdrawal of the petition indicated that the plea raised by the appellant-wife indicating inclination to resume co- habitation was not bona fide. 33. That Court did not, at all, have any occasion to adjudicate upon the truthfulness or otherwise of the averment made by the wife in the reply that she wanted to assume (resume ?) co-habitation with the husband. Bona fide on the part of the husband could not be read in the mere dismissal of that petition as withdrawn. Simultaneously, mala fide could also not be read on the part of the wife just because the reconciliation efforts did not materialize into any fruitful result. 34. It would be appropriate to notice that the trial Court was also persuaded to grant the impugned divorce as it found that the marriage between the parties was irretrievably broken (para 19 of the judgment). 35. As correctly argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, that ground is not envisioned by the Hindu Marriage Act. The Honble Apex Court did grant a divorce on such a finding in the relied upon judicial pronouncement but that finding was obviously relatable to the given facts and circumstances of that case. No such facts are proved in the present case. We have, before us, a case in which the boy side is proved to have made a false representation (at the time of betrothal ceremony) to the girl side about the professional placement of the groom. Further, the respondent-husband is proved to have entertained a misplaced grievance about her whereabouts on 13.8.1999 when she is proved to have gone to a neighbours house to enquire about his health and that neighbour is proved to be a friend of her father since the year 1982, vide PW3 Purshotam Lal Chabra. The matrimonial house of the parties is situated in House No. 975; whereas neighbour aforesaid is residing in House No. 976. The parties also have a female child. The matrimonial house of the parties is situated in House No. 975; whereas neighbour aforesaid is residing in House No. 976. The parties also have a female child. The mere fact that they appear to be trading charges against each other would not suggest that their marriage is dead. Drawal of such an inference and grant of decree of divorce on the basis thereof would amount to putting a premium on the proven in discretion on the part of the respondent-husband and members of his parental family. 36. Though it is common ground that the appellant-wife is presently residing at her natal house, it also stands proved that her stay over there (and away from the matrimonial house) is for a sufficient cause. The reasons in support thereof have been indicated in the preceding paras of the judgment. Those reasons may be summed up for facility of reference. The appellant is a qualified employed teacher. The respondent side falsely represented at the time of betrothal ceremony that the groom had been appointed a Trained Graduate Teacher in Delhi and that efforts were a foot to get him posted at Narela, a place close to Sonepat where the matrimonial house of the parties is located. As a matter of fact, the husband is unemployed till date. He had given vent to a misconceived grievance regarding a visit of the appellant to the house of a neighbour who also happened to be a friend of her father. The husband filed a petition under Section 9 of the Act but unilaterally withdrew it. All these reasons, appreciated in the light of the fact that the respondent was turned out of the matrimonial house, indicate that the wife is presently staying at her natal house (and away from the matrimonial house) for a sufficient cause. 37. It would be pertinent to notice yet another relevant fact here. In the course of the proceedings, this Court brought the parties around to agree to the idea of respondent-husband agreeing to spend few days at the natal house of the appellant-wife. The conceptualised endeavour was to bring the parties together in order to enable them to iron out the creases in their relationship. The matter was, accordingly, adjourned. However, on the adjourned date, it transpired that the respondent did not at all visit the natal house of the appellant. The conceptualised endeavour was to bring the parties together in order to enable them to iron out the creases in their relationship. The matter was, accordingly, adjourned. However, on the adjourned date, it transpired that the respondent did not at all visit the natal house of the appellant. No particular cause for the change of mind on the part of the respondent was indicated. In the context, the attitude exhibited by the respondent and his father requires to be noticed. At the trial, they categorically averred that they are not prepared for the restoration of the appellant to the matrimonial house at any cost. All these facts, appreciated in conjunction with each other, indicate that the respondent is bent upon parting company with the appellant. 38. Thus, we have no hesitation in invalidating the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge under Issue No. 1. 39. By the very nature of things, the counsel for the appellant did not challenge the finding recorded by the trial Court under Issue No. 3 because that finding is in favour of the appellant only. No challenge thereto was posed on behalf of the respondent either. Even otherwise, there is nothing on the record to invalidate that finding which shall stand affirmed accordingly. 40. As a result thereof, this appeal stands allowed. The judgment dated 20.1.2006 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Sonepat shall stand reversed. The petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act filed by the respondent-husband shall stand dismissed. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the husband is also burdened with special costs of Rs. 10,000/- which shall be disbursed to the appellant-wife. Appeal allowed.