JUDGMENT A.B. Pal, J. 1. By this writ petition filed on 31.1.02, the Petitioner who is a Police constable has called in question the correctness and legality of the order of punishment in a disciplinary proceeding which was imposed on 9.11.91 by the Superintendent of Police, West Tripura, Agartala, after more than ten years. 2. The Petitioner while in service as Police constable faced a proceeding on the allegation that on 9.8.77 at about 6 pm he along with two others attacked and severely assaulted one Hemanta Bhowmik. The charges against him were framed under Section 307 and 323 IPC and after a full dressed trial he was found guilty under Section 323 IPC and slapped with a sentence of three months rigorous imprisonment. The conviction and sentence having been assailed by him in Criminal Appeal No. 03 of 79, this Court (Y.I. Singh, J.) by judgment dated 7.2.90 upheld the conviction but allowed him to be released on Probation of Good Conduct on entering into a bond of Rs. 1000/- with one surety of the like amount. Certain observation was made in para 12 of that judgment which having a direct bearing on the present controversy is reproduced below: 12. It is represented to me by the learned Counsel for the Appellants that the Appellant No. 1 Ashutosh Gope is now serving as a Constable in the Police department and that the conviction will affect his service. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the trivial nature of the offence committed by him, I direct that the conviction shall not affect his service. 3. On 12.10.90, after a period of more than one and a half years from the date of disposal of the aforesaid criminal appeal by this Court, the Superintendent of Police, West Tripura, Agartala being the disciplinary authority proposed to hold inquiry against the Petitioner herein under Rule 861 of the Police Regulations of Bengal, 1943 on various allegations of misconduct. On 12.10.90, after a period of more than one and a half years from the date of disposal of the aforesaid criminal appeal by this Court, the Superintendent of Police, West Tripura, Agartala being the disciplinary authority proposed to hold inquiry against the Petitioner herein under Rule 861 of the Police Regulations of Bengal, 1943 on various allegations of misconduct. Six articles of charges were framed against him in that proceeding which are briefly noted below: (I) On 15.8.88 about 9 am, he left the headquarters without any intimation to the authority and did not return for duty till 19.8.88, a conduct unbecoming of a Police personnel; (II) On 13.8.85, he along with two others committed criminal trespass into the house of Smt. Gita Rani Biswas, W/O Shri Chittaranjan Biswas; (III) On 13.8.88 at 10 pm he again committed criminal trespass in the house of Smt. Gita Rani Biswas, W/O Shri Chittaranjan Biswas and outraged her modesty; (IV) On l4.8.90 at about 10 pm he again committed criminal terspass into the house of Smt. Gita Rani Biswas, W/O Shri Chittaranjan Biswas and attempted to assault them; (V) He was convicted and sentenced imprisonment under Section 323 IPC in G.R. No. 1041 of 78; (VI) The Hon'ble Gauhati High Court maintained the conviction but released him on Probation of Good Conduct. After inquiry during which all reasonable opportunities were provided, the disciplinary authority passed the final order on 9.11.91 holding that only charge Nos. (1), (V) and (VI) have been well proved while other charges failed But while imposing penalty the disciplinary authority made following observation: Considering the facts and circumstances and the family condition of the delinquent C/102 Ashutosh Gope, a lenient view is taken and pass following final order giving him a fair chance to himself. (I) His basic pay reduced to the minimum stage for a period of three years without cumulative effect; (II) The period spent by him under suspension from 9.8.77 to 5.11.87 and from 19.8.88 to 23.4.90 is treated as not on duty and he will not get more than what he has already been drawing during the suspension period. (III) The period of unauthorized absence from duty from 15.8.88 to 19.8.88 is treated as without break of service. This final order of punishment dated 9.11.91 has been impugned in the present writ petition. 4. I have heard Mr. (III) The period of unauthorized absence from duty from 15.8.88 to 19.8.88 is treated as without break of service. This final order of punishment dated 9.11.91 has been impugned in the present writ petition. 4. I have heard Mr. Somik Deb, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. T.D. Majumder, learned Counsel for the Respondents. 5. Mr. Somik Deb, learned Counsel for the Petitioner questioned the validity of the impugned order mainly on the ground that the direction of this Court contained in para 12 of the judgment dated 7.2.90 in Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 79 was totally ignored while determining the quantum of punishment. In the said paragraph, this Court directed that the conviction would not affect his service. But, while imposing the penalty, the disciplinary authority had in mind the conviction of the Petitioner which was the subject matter of the above noted criminal appeal as the said conviction and sentence constituted charge Nos. V. and VI. The result of the inquiry that out of the six charges, charge Nos. (I), (V) and (VI) had been proved influenced the mind of the Respondents. No separate punishment with reference to the each of the three proved charges had been imposed, on the contrary, a consolidated penalty for all the three proved charges had been imposed, though in terms of the direction of this Court in above noted criminal appeal, no penalty for charge Nos. (V) and (VI) could be legally sustainable. In fact, charge No. (VI) cannot be the charge at all as it is the repetition of the same charge contained in Article-V only with the indication of its result in the criminal appeal. It is, thus, clear that the criminal offence committed by him in 1977 for which he was convicted by the trial court and the said conviction was affirmed by this Court on 7.2.90, no charge was permissible in the disciplinary proceeding in view of the direction of this Court in the said criminal appeal. Even if it is presumed that the said charges relating to the criminal offence of 13 years old had crept into the disciplinary proceeding as distinct and separate charge due to oversight, the apprehension that the mind of the disciplinary authority might have been influenced by the findings of the inquiry on those charges cannot be ruled out altogether. Such being the position, Mr. Such being the position, Mr. Deb argues, the impugned combined order of punishment relatable to charge Nos. (I), (V) and (VI) is not sustainable in law. 6. Mr. T.D. Majumder, learned Addl. Govt. advocate, on the other hand, endeavoured to controvert the submission of Mr. Deb pointing out that in the first place this very writ petition is not maintainable for the long inordinate and unexplained delay of more than ten years in approaching this Court only in the year 2002 against the impugned order passed in 1991. Secondly, though the disciplinary authority concluded that charge Nos. (I), (V) and (VI) had been proved but he had taken a lenient view keeping in mind the order of the Hon'ble High Court, though, however, in using the words in the concluded paragraph of the impugned order a different interpretation can be conveniently put forward. But a consolidated and careful reading of that paragraph would show that the punishment imposed is the outcome of a lenient approach taken by the disciplinary authority presumably keeping in view the observation of this Court in the said criminal appeal. The concluding part of the said final order of punishment is reproduced below: The offences committed/removal from service, but bearing in mind of the order of the Hon'ble High Court, I am declined to take a lenient view. Considering the facts and circumstances and the family condition of the delinquent C/102 Ashutosh Gope a lenient view is taken and pass following order giving him a fair chance to rectify himself. At the first blush the impression would be that the disciplinary authority declined to take a lenient view bearing in mind the order of the High Court. But in the next paragraph he stated that he had taken a lenient view in order to give the delinquent a fair chance to rectify himself. Undoubtedly, for the word 'inclined' the word 'declined' has been wrongly used or typed. A joint reading of the above two paragraphs would give an unmistakable impression that the direction of this Court in the said criminal appeal was in the mind of the disciplinary authority which actuated him to take a lenient view. In other words, though the disciplinary authority was considering the penalty of removal from service for the proved misconduct, he had taken a lenient view keeping in mind the direction of this Court. 7. In other words, though the disciplinary authority was considering the penalty of removal from service for the proved misconduct, he had taken a lenient view keeping in mind the direction of this Court. 7. The extent of the power of the writ court and the circumstances calling for exercise to such powers to interfere with the penalty imposed in a disciplinary proceeding is no longer res integra after a long catena of decisions of the Apex Court on the issue. It is not within the jurisdiction of the writ court to walk into the executive arena of domestic inquiry where the disciplinary authority enjoys the exclusive power to determine, on a given facts and circumstances and the evidence and materials on record, the just and correct penalty to be imposed and such a decision of the said authority cannot except in very rare cases, be subjected to legal scrutiny by way of re-assessing and re-evaluating those evidence and materials. In other words, a writ court can not act as a court of appeal and while exercising the power of judicial review it is concerned with illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety of an order passed by the State or a statutory authority as held by the Apex Court in Dwarika Prasad Agarwal v. B.D. Agarwal reported in (2003) 6 SCC 230 in para 28. In Union of India v. B.C. Chaturbedi reported in (1995) 6 SCC 750, the Apex Court in para 12 and 13 held thus: 12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel this Court held at P. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. Only in exceptional circumstances when the penalty is grossly disproportionate and shocks the judicial conscience, then the High Court no doubt can step forward to mould remedy as has been held in Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya v. Commissioner of Police reported in (2004) 4 SCC 560 . Only in exceptional circumstances when the penalty is grossly disproportionate and shocks the judicial conscience, then the High Court no doubt can step forward to mould remedy as has been held in Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya v. Commissioner of Police reported in (2004) 4 SCC 560 . In the case on hand a minor penalty of reduction of basic pay to the minimum stage for a period of three years only without cumulative effect has been imposed on the Petitioner against whom charges were framed on several allegations of causing violence and leaving headquarter without authority. The other part of the penalty as to how the period of suspension shall be treated and what amount would be admissible during that period cannot be said to be a penalty at all as the same has been passed under relevant provision of fundamental rules. Therefore, the reduction of the basis pay to the minimum stage for a period of three years only without cumulative effect cannot be said to be disproportionate penalty in my considered view if it is considered that the Petitioner is a Police constable whose standard of discipline should always be of paramount consideration. It is, therefore, not a case of serious disproportionate penalty which may shock judicial conscience calling for interference. 8. The procedural irregularity or impropriety in the disciplinary proceeding has not been a part of the present controversy and, therefore, the other question regarding delay in approaching this Court can now be adverted to. Mr. Deb has made a robust submission that even a delay of 10 years, as in the present case, cannot be a ground for disallowing the petition once it is established that a legal right of the Petitioner created by the decision of this Court in the above noted criminal appeal has been infracted. In support of the submission he has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in K. Thimmappa and Ors. v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, State Bank of India and Anr. reported in (2001) 2 SCC 259 . In that case, an argument was placed that gross delay on the part of the employees in filing the writ petition disentitles them to get any discretionary relief and in support of the same reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in P.S. Sadasivaswami v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (1975)1 SCC 152 . In that case, an argument was placed that gross delay on the part of the employees in filing the writ petition disentitles them to get any discretionary relief and in support of the same reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in P.S. Sadasivaswami v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (1975)1 SCC 152 . In the said case, the Apex Court held that even though no period of limitation is provided for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226, but it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their extra ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. Against this argument, the rival submission was advanced urging that if the treatment meted out to the Petitioners is found to be discriminatory and as such violates the Article 14 of the constitution, then the court will not throw away the petition merely on the ground of laches. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the constitution Bench decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1974)1 SCC 317 . In para 10, it was observed as follows: Moreover, it may be noticed that the claim for enforcement of the fundamental right of equal opportunity under Article 16 is itself a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 32 and this Court which has been assigned the role of a sentinel on the qui vive for protection of the fundamental rights cannot easily allow itself to be persuaded to refuse relief solely on the jejune ground of laches, delay or the like. Considering the rival submission which were backed by the earlier decisions of the Apex Court as noted above it was held in para 9 of K. Thimmappa (supra) as follows: 9. On consideration of the aforesaid legal position, though, we are inclined to agree with Mr. Considering the rival submission which were backed by the earlier decisions of the Apex Court as noted above it was held in para 9 of K. Thimmappa (supra) as follows: 9. On consideration of the aforesaid legal position, though, we are inclined to agree with Mr. P.P. Rao that these cases should not be thrown out on the ground of laches alone, inasmuch as the placement made on 1.10.1979 was assailed in the year 1988 at the earliest and 1998 at the latest, yet the same may not be brushed aside, particularly, when we have not been able to find out any infraction of any fundamental right of these Petitioners, guaranteed under the Constitution. 9. From the above, it leaves no doubt that the delay or laches of a long period also can be ignored only when there is a infraction of fundamental right. In the present case, reduction of basic pay to the minimum stage for a period of three years by an order passed in 1991 was fully executed and after three years his original basic pay was restored. He was preferred this writ petition after a long period of 10 years knowingly taking a chance if he succeeds in the gamble he would be entitled to the full pay and allowances for the said period of three years. For this claim of monetary benefit only which cannot be said to have originated from infraction of any legal right, much less a fundamental right, such a long delay of ten years in approaching this Court cannot be totally ignored. Apart from what has been stated above on merit of this case, the long delay also prevents me from giving any relief to the Petitioner. 10. Consequently, this writ petition being devoid of any merit stands dismissed with no order as to cost. Petition dismissed