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2006 DIGILAW 25 (ORI)

Choudhury Niranjan Mohapatra v. Andhra Bank

2006-01-17

A.K.SAMANTARAY, B.P.DAS

body2006
JUDGMENT A. K. SAMANTARAY, J. : In this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has as¬sailed the order passed by the opposite parties in imposing the punishment of compulsory retirement in a Departmental proceeding and has come with the prayer for quashing the order of the Disci¬plinary Authority under Annexure-18 and order of the Appellate Authority under Annexure-20. 2. It is necessary to set out in some detail the facts which gave rise to the Departmental Proceeding against the peti¬tioner resulting in the order of his compulsory retirement from service. The petitioner was initially appointed as Rural Credit Officer in Andhra Bank which was latter on re-designated as Rural Development Officer in the Grade of J.M.-I and the petitioner while working as such at Dhone, he was transferred to Berhampur Regional Office vide order dated 1.7.1991. Pursuant to the said order of transfer the petitioner joined in the Regional office, Berhampur on 12.7.1991 and on the same day the Regional Manager, Berhampur issued order of his transfer to Kashinagar branch of the Bank. After joining at Kashinagar the petitioner submitted a T.A. bill for Rs. 9,404/- and against that T.A. Bill the peti¬tioner drew an advance of Rs.4,500/- from Kashinagar branch on 4.9.1991. Soon after his drawing Rs.4,500/- he was communicated letter dated 17.12.1991 indicating therein that he had unautho¬risedly drawn advance as he was not entitled to T.A. and D.A. on account of his transfer from Dhone to Berhampur on his own re¬quest and he was asked to explain the reason for drawing such amount and was also asked to re-pay the said amount and close the said outstanding advance with interest. Notwithstanding the fact that in the transfer order itself it was stipulated that he was not entitled to T.A. and D.A. for the said transfer which was on his own request, the petitioner submitted his explanation vide his letter dated 21.12.1991 indicating that since he had complet¬ed more than five years at a stretch outside his home State, he was eligible to the T.A. and D.A. His explanation was not accept¬ed and his salary for the month of December, 1991 was withheld and the advance drawn by him against the said transfer was ad¬justed. While the matter stood thus, the petitioner was placed under suspension by the Personnel Manager and Disciplinary Au¬thority, Head Office, Andhra Bank (O.P. No.4) vide order dated 9.1.1992 followed by memorandum of charges dated 18.3.1992 issued by O.P. No.4 and it was alleged that he had violated Regulation 3(1) and 24 of the Andhra Bank Officers/Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1982. In the said memorandum of charges the peti¬tioner was asked to submit his explanation within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the same. On receipt of memoran¬dum of charges the petitioner asked for time up to 30.4.1992 for submitting his explanation which was allowed and in the meantime the petitioner requested for supply of documents which were re¬ferred to in the memorandum of charges, to him for his submission of an effective explanation and he further requested for more time to furnish his explanation. In the meantime O.P. No.4 ap¬pointed Sri Bhaskar Sahu as the Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges. Since some deduction were made from the subsistence allowance of the petitioner, he approached this Court OJC No. 5924 of 1992 challenging the said deductions and the said writ petition was disposed of an 2.5.1994 with a direction that the disciplinary proceeding shall be finalized by end of August, 1994 and as regards the deductions from the subsistence allowance it was directed that the interim order passed earlier staying deduc¬tions shall continue till disposal of the disciplinary proceed¬ing. Ultimately, the copies of the documents asked for by the petitioner were supplied and petitioner submitted his explanation denying all the allegations vide his explanation under Annexure-8. 3. For better appreciation of the factual foundation of the allegation leading to the charges the details of the charges are extracted hereunder :- “Charge No.1. You were transferred from Dhone Branch to the Regional office, Berhampur vide Central Office transfer order No.666/3/N/TR-1306, dated 1.7.1991. It was clearly mentioned in the order that you were not eligible for TA/DA at the transfer was effected at your request. Though you were not eligible for any advance against T.A. and D.A. as per the stipulations contained in the referred order, on 4.9.1991, you have drawn an amount of Rs.4,500/- as advance, at Kashinagar branch, vide T.A. bill dated 10.10.1991, you have submitted a T.A. bill for Rs.9,404/- in connection with your transfer from Dhone to the R.O. Berhampur. Though you were not eligible for any advance against T.A. and D.A. as per the stipulations contained in the referred order, on 4.9.1991, you have drawn an amount of Rs.4,500/- as advance, at Kashinagar branch, vide T.A. bill dated 10.10.1991, you have submitted a T.A. bill for Rs.9,404/- in connection with your transfer from Dhone to the R.O. Berhampur. An amount of Rs.3,774/- was claimed by you towards railway fare from Dhone to Bhubaneswar for 5 full tickets and 1 half ticket for the journey purported to have been undertaken by you on 5.7.1991 in A.C. Sleeper by Venkatadri and Konark Expresses, vide ticket No.869268. In fact, there is no reservation for A.C. sleeper in Venkatadri express from Dhone and the particulars of the ticket number and the class of travel claimed by you are bogus and false. Further, you have submitted one original lorry receipt for Rs.4,500/- for vehicle OSG 1727 towards charges claimed to have been incurred by you for transporting your house hold goods from Dhone to Berhampur on 6.7.1991. In fact, as per the certificate issued by the ARTO, Chatrapur, Ganjam District, on 9.12.1991 the owner of the vehicle bearing No. OSG 1727 is one Shri S. Sriram Murty, son of Satyanarayana, who confirmed that he had not issued any lorry receipt to you, nor transported, your house hold goods in his Tata Truck which is not having National permit. From the foregoing facts, it is evident that you have sub¬mitted a bogus T.A. bill in gross violation of the laid down stipulations and rules for your unlawwful personal gains. Charge No.2. Whereas you have submitted a T.A. bill dated 10.10.1991 for Rs. 6,587.50 in connection with your transfer from R.o. Berhampur to Kashinagar branch. You have submitted as taxi receipt for Rs. 700/- of the vehicle AAP 8626 for carrying you and your family members (5 adults and 2 children) from Berhampur to Kashinagar on 24.7.1991. You are not eligible to travel by taxi without the prior permission of the competent authority when the place viz. Kashinagar is connected by public transport sys¬tem, as per rules. Further, our enquiries with the concerned RTA authorities revealed the fact that the vehicle APP 8626 is a Suvega Moped of 0.50 H.P. and not a taxi. You are not eligible to travel by taxi without the prior permission of the competent authority when the place viz. Kashinagar is connected by public transport sys¬tem, as per rules. Further, our enquiries with the concerned RTA authorities revealed the fact that the vehicle APP 8626 is a Suvega Moped of 0.50 H.P. and not a taxi. For the above facts, it is clear that you have submitted a false taxi receipt in violation of the rules and claimed amounts on the above count, for your unlawful personal gains. Whereas you have submitted a lodge bill bearing receipt No.23 dated 4.8.1991, purported to have been issued by one Indro Lodge, Parlakhemundi towards lodging charges claimed to have been incurred by you for the period from 24.7.1991 to 4.8.1991 amounting to Rs. 1,980/- for 11 days. Similarly, you have submit¬ted another lodge bill issued by Indro Lodge, bearing receipt No.24 for the lodging charges claimed to have been incurred by you for the period from 3.9.1991 to 7.9.1991 amounting to Rs. 720/- Enquiries revealed the fact that you never stayed in Indro lodge between 24.7.1991 - 4.8.1991 and from 3.9.1991 to 7.9.1991 and the two receipts under reference were not issued by the said lodge authorities. Further, it is ascertained that the lodge authorities are charging a maximum tariff of Rs.125/- per day, that too for an AC double room whereas the bill submitted by you indicate the charges as Rs.180/- per day. Further, you have submitted a typed bill covering your boarding expenses, from 24.7.1991 to 7.9.1991 for Rs.1344/- issued by Indro Lodge. En¬quiries revealed the fact that Indro lodge authorities have not issued the said bill and thus the bill submitted by you is not a genuine one. From the foregoing facts, it is clear that you have submit¬ted fake receipts and claimed amount with an intention to defraud the bank. Whereas you have submitted a lorry receipt for Rs.1200/- of the vehicle bearing registration No. OSG 1727 for the charges claimed to have been incurred by you, for transporting your house hold goods from Berhampur to Kashinagar on 25.7.1991. Whereas you have submitted a lorry receipt for Rs.1200/- of the vehicle bearing registration No. OSG 1727 for the charges claimed to have been incurred by you, for transporting your house hold goods from Berhampur to Kashinagar on 25.7.1991. As per the certificate issued by the ARTO Chatrapur, Ganjam district the owner of the above referred vehicle is one Shri S. Sriram Murty, who declared that he had not issued the above lorry receipt.Thus, it is evident that you have submitted a fake lorry receipt with an intention to defraud the Bank. Charge No.3. You have submitted a T.A. bill dated 26.11.91 for Rs.3,407.40 Ps in connection with your deputation to Aska branch from 9.11.1991 to 23.11.1991. You have submitted a lodge bill No.93 dated 23.11.1991 issued by lodge Sweet Home for Rs.2,250/- @ Rs.150/- per day for 15 days towards the lodging expenses claimed to have been incurred by you. It is ascertained that the maximum tariff levied by the lodge authorities is only Rs.60/- per day. The lodge authorities have also confirmed that they have not issued the above lodge receipts. It is also ascertained that during the period of depu¬tation, you were staying with the Manager of Aska Branch, which was confirmed by him, vide his letter dated 11.12.1991. From the foregoing facts, it is evident that you have sub¬mitted false T.A. bills by producing bogus bills, for your unlaw¬ful personal gains. Thus, all your aforementioned acts indicate that you have failed to discharge your duties with utmost honesty and integrity and thereby constitutes misconduct on your part, within the meaning of Regulation 3(1) read with Regulation 24 of Andhra Bank Officer, Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1982, liable to be punished under the provisions of Andhra Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981. Yours faithfully, Sd/- (C. Brahmaiah,) Personnel Manager and Disciplinary authority.” 4. During the pendency of the inquiry to the charges, the petitioner again represented on 13.12.1993 for supply of addi¬tional documents and O.P. No.4 replied to the said representation vide his letter dated 13.12.1993 that in the inquiry all the relevant documents shall be presented by the Management Represen¬tative, copies of which be supplied and any additional documents which may be considered relevant by the Enquiry Officer may also be produced in the inquiry and the petitioner was advised to cooperate for early disposal of the inquiry. The inquiry com¬menced and the petitioner nominated one Sri Pramod Kumar Sahu, officer, Computer Centre, Zonal Office, Bombay to act as defence representative and the management approved the same. The Enquiry Officer fixed the date of the inquiry to 28.1.1994 and the peti¬tioner attended the inquiry and management representative submit¬ted list of documents and list of witnesses. The next date of inquiry was fixed to 25.2.1994 and the petitioner along with his defence representative attended the inquiry and the Enquiry Officer asked the management representative to produce his wit¬nesses and accordingly one Sri Narasingha Bebarta, manager of one Indro Lodge was produced. But the said witness was not examined on the ground that the witness was persuaded by the petitioner not to depose for which the management representative insisted upon filing of his affidavit evidence which was filed and the inquiry was adjourned to 6.4.1994. Again the inquiry was ad¬journed to 1.6.1994 at the instance of the management representa¬tive and the next date was fixed to 22.6.1994. On 22.6.1994 also the management representative did not turn up to the venue of the inquiry for which the inquiry was adjourned to 21.7.1994. On 21.7.1994 Sri A. Venkat Rao, the Vigilance Officer was examined as M.W.2 and the affidavit of Sri Narasingha Bebarata was pro¬duced and marked as MEX No.27 and the letter of said Sri Bebarta was also produced and the same was marked as MEX No.28. The inquiry was adjourned to 22.7.1994 on which date M.W.2. was further examined and his examination-in-chief was over and the date of inquiry was fixed 12.6.1995 and noticed the petitioner to appear on the date fixed. But since the petitioner remained absent and the inquiry proceeded in his absence and one Sri Sudhakar Rout was examined as M.W.3 his evidence was closed and the inquiry was posted to 13.6.1995 on which date one Sri K.P. Shastri was examined as M.W.4. Since the petitioner did not attend the inquiry the same was adjourned to 17.7.1995. In the meantime, the petitioner approached this Court by filing a writ application challenging the entire disciplinary proceeding in OJC No.4330 of 1995. Since the petitioner did not attend the inquiry the same was adjourned to 17.7.1995. In the meantime, the petitioner approached this Court by filing a writ application challenging the entire disciplinary proceeding in OJC No.4330 of 1995. The further proceeding of the inquiry was stayed by an interim order and the writ petition was finally disposed of on 21.9.1995 with the direction that “all the ex parte orders passed against the petitioner are set aside and the inquiry is to proceed from the stage as on 1.6.1994 as agreed to by the learned advocate for the parties.” Thereafter, the Enquiry Offi¬cer fixed the date of inquiry to 26.12.1995, and the petitioner on the ground of absence of his defence representative went on seeking adjournments almost on all subsequent dates and the En¬quiry Officer on the request of the petitioner adjourned the inquiry to afford him all opportunity of defence. Finally, on 12.4.1996 when the petitioner requested for adjournment on the ground of absence of defence representative, the Enquiry Officer turned down the request and proceeded with the inquiry ex parte. Thereafter, the petitioner was served with copy of the inquiry report wherein he was held guilty of all the three charges and was asked to submit his explanation within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the same. The petitioner submitted his representation/explanation in question and he was communicat¬ed the order of imposition of penalty of compulsory retirement from service with immediate effect passed by the Disciplinary Authority on 12.10.1998. It was also directed therein that the period of suspension from 9.1.1992 to 18.6.1994 was treated as period spent under suspension and accordingly it was held that the petitioner was not eligible to his salary during the said period. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Deputy General manager (Disciplinary Matter) & Appellate Authority, Andhra Bank (O.P. No.2) challenging the penalty imposed raising various contentions in the memorandum of appeal, but the same was reject¬ed by the order of O.P. No.2 on 16.1.1999 and hence this writ petition. 5. The petitioner, in this writ petition, has challenged the order of imposition of penalty of compulsory retirement from service on the following counts. 5. The petitioner, in this writ petition, has challenged the order of imposition of penalty of compulsory retirement from service on the following counts. (i) That their has been violation of principles of natural jus¬tice; (ii) Findings of the Enquiry Officer are based on no evidence and the same is contrary to the evidence on record; (iii) Replacement of the Enquiry Officer in the midst of the enquiry by replacing an Enquiry Officer, who was biased against the petitioner; and (iv) The punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the charges framed. 6. Before we proceed to examine the points raised by the petitioner, we would like to quote the guideline set-forth by the Hon’ble Apex Court as regards the power of this Court under Arti¬cle 226 to interfere with the findings of the enquiry in a de¬partmental proceeding. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh and others vs. S. Sree Rama Rao reported in AIR 1963 S.C. 1723 held as under. “In considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evi¬dence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, does not apply and even if that rule is not applied, the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmen¬tal enquiry against a public servant; it is concerned to deter¬mine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violat¬ed.Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, if is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair deci¬sion by some consideration extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasona¬ble person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there by some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.” The apex Court in Union of India and others v. B.C. Chatru¬bedi reported in AIR 1996 S.C. 484 has held as under. “The Disciplinary Authority is the sole judge of facts. Where the appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to appreciate the evidence or the nature of pun¬ishment. In a disciplinary enquiry the strict proof of legal evi¬dence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of the evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel ( AIR 1964 S.C. 364 ). This Court held at page 369 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the Disciplinary Authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certioraris could be issued.” 7. This Court held at page 369 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the Disciplinary Authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certioraris could be issued.” 7. In the case at hand, the petitioner faced enquiry on three counts of charges as per Annexure-4 and from the charges we find that he had submitted transfer T.A. bills annexing bogus and fabricated receipts such as truck receipts, lodging charges bills and bogus railway ticket number and he had drawn his own advance towards T.A., on the face of administrative direction contained in the transfer order, it is apparent that he was not entitled to T.A. as the transfer was effected on his own request. All these allegations were preliminarily enquired into by the Vigilance Officer of the Vigilance Cell of Andhra Bank management and were found to be prima facie correct. Since it was revealed from the enquiry made by the Vigilance Officer of the Management of the Bank that the petitioner had, with intent to make personal gains, submitted fabricated and bogus. T.A. Bills and thereby intended to defraud the Bank. He was placed under suspension, a charge memo was issued to him asking him to furnish his show cause to the said charges. After submission of show cause by him, enquiry to the charges commenced. 8. We would now proceed to examine the grounds on which the petitioner assails the enquiry report in which he has been awarded punishment. The first ground is violation of principles of natural justice while conducting enquiry by the Enquiry Offi¬cer. In this connection, contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was not allowed time to cross-examine the Management witnesses 3 & 4. The Management wit¬ness No.3 is one Sudhakar Rout, Senior Manager (Credit) working at Zonal Office of the Andhra Bank at Bhubaneswar and he was examined on 12.6.1995. On that date neither the petitioner, nor his defence representative appeared to take part in the pro¬ceeding. The Management wit¬ness No.3 is one Sudhakar Rout, Senior Manager (Credit) working at Zonal Office of the Andhra Bank at Bhubaneswar and he was examined on 12.6.1995. On that date neither the petitioner, nor his defence representative appeared to take part in the pro¬ceeding. In this connection, we would like to mention that the Enquiry Officer afforded all opportunities to the petitioner to remain present with his defence representative and participate in the proceeding, but on consecutive dates of enquiry the defence representative, did not turn up and since the petitioner repre¬sented before the Enquiry Officer that without the defence repre¬sentative he could not participate in the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer adjourned the matter to give full opportunity to the petitioner to participate and cross-examine the witnesses pre¬sented by the management and ultimately since it was found that the defence representative was not appearing, the Enquiry Officer on 12.6.1995 proceeded with the enquiry ex parte. On the said date, although the enquiry was scheduled to be held at 10.30 A.M., the Enquiry Officer waited till 12.30 P.M. and neither the petitioner nor his defence representative appeared. After the examination of management witness No.3, Sri Sudhakar Rout on 12.6.1995, the enquiry was fixed to 13.6.1995, on which date M.W.4, Mr. K.P. Sister was examined and the enquiry was fixed to 17.7.95. On that date neither the petitioner nor his defence representative appeared at the venue of enquiry and the petition¬er’s fax message regarding interim stay of proceeding passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.4330 of 1995 was received by the Enquiry Officer. In the said Writ petition, this Court vide its final order dated 21.9.95 directed as follows:- “All the ex parte orders passed against the petitioner are set aside and the enquiry is to proceed from the stage as on 1st June, 1994 as agreed to by the learned Advocates for the parties.” 9. During hearing of this writ petition we had directed the learned counsel for the opposite parties to produce the enquiry proceeding file and as per our direction the same was produced before us. From the enquiry file we find that after disposal of the writ petition bearing No. 4330 of 1995, the En¬quiry Officer set aside the ex parte proceedings and fixed the enquiry to 26.12.95. From the enquiry file we find that after disposal of the writ petition bearing No. 4330 of 1995, the En¬quiry Officer set aside the ex parte proceedings and fixed the enquiry to 26.12.95. But on the said date, although the petition¬er was present, his defence representative did not attend and as per the request of the petitioner the proceeding was fixed to 4.30 P.M. on the same day. But till then since the defence repre¬sentative did not turn up, on the request of the petitioner, the proceeding was adjourned to the next day i.e., 27.12.1995 to com¬mence at 11.30 A.m. On 27.12.95 also the defence representative did not turn up and time was allowed till 12.30 P.M. But since the defence representative did not turn up, the petitioner sub¬mitted before the Enquiry Officer that he could not proceed with the enquiry in absence of the defence representative and the proceeding should be adjourned. The Enquiry Officer did not grant any adjournment and proceeded with the enquiry and the petition¬er, though was afforded opportunity to cross-examine the Manage¬ment Witness, who was examined earlier, did not cross-examine and M.W.3’s examination in chief was over and by then petitioner had left the venue of enquiry. Even after that, the Enquiry Officer while adjourning the enquiry to 19.1.1996, issued notice to all parties, but on that date the petitioner also did not attend the enquiry nor did his defence representative. The enquiry was against fixed to 8.2.96 on which date also neither the defence representative nor the petitioner appeared and the Enquiry Offi¬cer fixed the proceeding to 12.4.1996. On that date although the petitioner was present, his defence representative did not attend and the Enquiry Officer waited for arrival of the defence representative but to no effect. The petitioner requested the Enquiry Officer to adjourn the enquiry to 15.4.96, but the said request was not acceded to and the proceeding continued as the petitioner informed that he was not going to participate any further. On the same day M.W. Sudhakar Rout was examined afresh and the Management representative was asked to submit his written brief on the enquiry. On the same day M.W. Sudhakar Rout was examined afresh and the Management representative was asked to submit his written brief on the enquiry. After receipt of the written submission from the Management Representative, the copy of the same was dispatched to the petitioner to submit his written submissions to the same but no reply was received from the petitioner on that regard and the Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the Disci¬plinary Authority. 10. We have carefully examined the enquiry file with refer¬ence to the orders passed by this Court and we are fully satisfied that all possible opportunities have been afforded to the petitioner by the Enquiry Officer for his full-fledged par¬ticipation in the proceeding and to cross-examine the Management witnesses. But the petitioner, on one pretext or the other, has all along tried to prolong the proceeding and although on most of the occasions he has requested for adjournment on the ground of absence of his defence representative, right from the beginning, he never chose to replace him nor himself cross-examined the witnesses as a result of which the Enquiry Officer had to proceed with the enquiry ex parte after the petitioner finally gave out on 12.4.1996 that he was not going to participate in the proceed¬ing. In this connection, it would not be out of place to cite the decision of this Court reported in 2005-I-LLJ (S.C. & H.C.) Page 43 Santosh Kumar Samal vs. Tata Iron Steel Co. Ltd., and others where it has been held as under. “From the order sheet it is clear that the petitioner was absent in the domestic enquiry on some ground or other and sever¬al adjournments were granted by the Enquiry Officer giving oppor¬tunity of hearing to the petitioner. However, the petitioner appears to have failed to avail the opportunity and therefore cannot make a grievance that he was not given opportunity of hearing. The petitioner expected the enquiry to continue as long as he wanted and from the order sheet as indicated above,it is clear that the enquiry officer had allowed several adjournments to the petitioner and therefore it cannot be said that reasonable opportunity of hearing was not allowed to the petitioner.” 11. The petitioner expected the enquiry to continue as long as he wanted and from the order sheet as indicated above,it is clear that the enquiry officer had allowed several adjournments to the petitioner and therefore it cannot be said that reasonable opportunity of hearing was not allowed to the petitioner.” 11. In the case at hand, we find similar situation and we would reiterate that all possible opportunity has been afforded to this petitioner to take part in every stage of the proceeding so that he might not complain of violation of principles of natural justice. But on some ground or other and mostly on the ground that his defence representative was absent he had sought adjournments which have been allowed liberally, but he has failed to avail it. After perusing the record of the enquiry proceeding we have not the slightest hesitation to comment that the Enquiry Officer has rightly proceeded with the enquiry after the peti¬tioner expressed that he was not going to participate in the enquiry any further. In that view of the matter, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that he was not granted time to cross-examine M.Ws. 3 & 4 is absolutely without any substance. 12. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are based on no evidence and the same are contrary to the evidence on record. In this connection, we would like to reiterate that the departmental authorities are, if the inquiry is properly held, the sole judges of the facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. We would also like to note here that it is the settled law that Evidence Act has no application to the inquiry conducted during the disciplinary proceeding.The evidence adduced is not in strict conformity with the Indian Evi¬dence Act, though the essential principle of fair play envisaged in the Evidence Act are applicable. We would also like to note here that it is the settled law that Evidence Act has no application to the inquiry conducted during the disciplinary proceeding.The evidence adduced is not in strict conformity with the Indian Evi¬dence Act, though the essential principle of fair play envisaged in the Evidence Act are applicable. Keeping in view the above settled principles, we have scrutinized the departmental inquiry file and we find that the inquiry has been conducted giving full opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the management which the petitioner has not availed on the ground of absence of his defence representative as a result of which evidence of witnesses examined and documents marked as exhibits proved through the witnesses in proof of the charges have gone un assailed and have been used and relied by the Enquiry Officer in reaching the findings for which it can not be said that the finding of the Enquiry Officer is based on no evidence. 13. We have already observed that the petitioner did not avail the opportunity of cross-examination of any of the manage¬ment witnesses and on 12.4.1996 he abandoned the inquiry stating in clear terms that he was not going to participate in the in¬quiry any more. The evidence adduced goes unchallenged and unassailed and on scrutiny we also find that each and every charge has been substantiated through oral and documentary evidence. Apart from that, we find from the inquiry report that the Enquiry Officer has dealt with the entire evidence and has passed reasoned order reaching logical conclusion on each of the charges levelled against petitioner. 14. It is the settled principle of law that disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and where appeal is present¬ed, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. It is also the settled principle that normally the High Court and the apex Court do not interfere with the finding of fact recorded at the domestic inquiry, but if the finding of guilt is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding that would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. A broad distinction has therefore to be maintained between the decision which are perverse and those which are not. A broad distinction has therefore to be maintained between the decision which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied on, however compendious it may be, the conclusion would not be treated as perverse and the finding would not be interfered with. 15. In the instant case, on a perusal of the evidence adduced, we find ample evidence has been led against the peti¬tioner in the departmental inquiry and the findings of the En¬quiry Officer are based on sound logic. In that view of the mat¬ter, we are not able to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer as against the petitioner are based on no evi¬dence. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner during the course of argument submitted that the management in the midst of the in¬quiry replaced the Enquiry Officer who was biased against the petitioner. In this connection, the learned counsel submitted that the Enquiry Officer who replaced the earlier Enquiry Officer had filed counter affidavit on behalf of the management in anoth¬er writ petition which the petitioner had filed before this Court. In reply to this, learned counsel for the opposite parties submitted that during the pendency of the inquiry the Andhra Bank Head Office at Hyderabad centralized the inquiry proceeding and created an enquiry cell in the head office at Hyderabad and on such constitution of the enquiry cell all the disciplinary pro¬ceedings were transferred to Hyderabad enquiry cell and in this disciplinary proceeding involving the petitioner, on Sri B. Palesethy was appointed Enquiry Officer to conduct the inquiry. He also submitted that the change of the Enquiry Officer was necessitated because of the creation of the enquiry cell at the Head Office at Hyderabad for all such disciplinary proceedings pending at that time and there is no question of any discrimina¬tion in the case of the petitioner. He further submitted in reply that in OJC No.4330 of 1995 the petitioner had made a prayer to quash the order regarding change of Enquiry Officer. He further submitted in reply that in OJC No.4330 of 1995 the petitioner had made a prayer to quash the order regarding change of Enquiry Officer. But that matter was not agitated by the petitioner and as such this Court did not pass any order and only passed orders directing the inquiry to proceed from the stage as on 1.6.1994. In this connec¬tion, it would not be out of place to mention that this new Enquiry Officer after taking up the inquiry has conducted himself in a most reasonable manner affording all opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses, adjourning the inquiry from time to time on the request of the petitioner till the petitioner finally gave out that he was not going to participate in the inquiry proceeding. It is only thereafter that he has pro¬ceeded to examine the witnesses and recorded their statements in absence of the petitioner and defence representative. On the face of this, we find absolutely no bias of the Enquiry Officer against the petitioner, rather, he has been very fair to the petitioner in granting him adjournments so that he could effec¬tively participate in the inquiry. In that view of the matter and in absence of any prejudice shown to have been caused to the petitioner by replacement of Enquiry Officer, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the new Enquiry Officer was biased is without any merit and substance. 17. The last contention of learned counsel for the peti¬tioner is that the punishment imposed by the disciplinary author¬ity is highly disproportionate to the charges proved. In this connection, he took us to Regulation 4 of Andhra Bank Officers Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulation, 1981 where the penalties have been provided for and in the major penalties heading the following four penalties have been enumerated: (i) Reduction to lower grade or post or to a lower stage in a time scale. (ii) Compulsory retirement. (iii) Removal from service which shall not be a disqualifica¬tion for future employment. (iv) Dismissal which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment. 18. In the instant case, the petitioner has been visited with the punishment of compulsory retirement by the Disciplinary Authority. (ii) Compulsory retirement. (iii) Removal from service which shall not be a disqualifica¬tion for future employment. (iv) Dismissal which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment. 18. In the instant case, the petitioner has been visited with the punishment of compulsory retirement by the Disciplinary Authority. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the T.A. bills submitted by the petitioner were not passed and were never sanctioned for disbursement, it was within the competency of the authority to reject the T.A. bills. He further argued that since the amount claimed under the T.A. bills were not disbursed to the petitioner, mere submission of T.A. bills, accepting that the petitioner was ineligible to receive the same, the allegation of commission of misconduct and the proceeding against the petitioner is totally misconceived and motivated. In this connection, learned counsel for the opposite parties argued that a bank officer since deals with public money is required to maintain high standard of honesty and integrity and is required to take all possible steps to protect the interest of the bank. In support of his contention he cited a decision reported in 2005 AIR SCW 95 (Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank v. Munna Lal Jain) wherein the apex Court in paragraph 17 has held as under: “17. A Bank officer is required to exercise higher stands of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank Officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseraparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. As was ob¬served by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihar Patnaik (1996) (9) SCC 69), it is no defence available to say that there was no loss of profit result¬ed in case, when the officer/employee acting without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a Bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one’s au¬thority is by itself breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious.” 19. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a Bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one’s au¬thority is by itself breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious.” 19. In this connection, the Disciplinary Authority has also observed in the same line in the ordering portion while passing orders for imposition of punishment and has stated that the act of misconduct committed by the petitioner as proved in the en¬quiry is very grave and serious in nature and warrants imposition of appropriate major penalty. Here we would like to reiterate that in the evidence adduced during the departmental enquiry proclivity of corrupt conduct on the part of this petitioner, bank officer,has been amply manifested and we have found too that the enquiry made into his conduct is fair and germane. In that view of the matter, we have nothing to differ from the order for imposition of punishment of compulsory retirement which in our view is appropriate considering the magnitude of misconduct. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner finally contended that the Disciplinary Authority while issuing show cause notice to the petitioner to the findings in the enquiry report did not indicate the proposed punishment to be imposed which has serious¬ly prejudiced the petitioner as abruptly order of punishment of compulsory retirement from service was passed. The learned coun¬sel for the opposite parties argued that the petitioner was found guilty of all the three charges by the Enquiry Officer and the copy of the enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner to submit his explanation. The gravity of the charges proved mani¬fests the magnitude of misconduct and his propensity to indulge in corrupt practices for making illegal personal gain defrauding the Bank where he serves is no less serious and appropriate pun¬ishment as thought just and proper has been imposed. In our considered view, non-indication of proposed punishment in the show cause in the instant case has no way prejudiced the peti¬tioner. In our considered view, non-indication of proposed punishment in the show cause in the instant case has no way prejudiced the peti¬tioner. In this connection, he cited before us a decision of the apex Court reported in AIR 1994 SC 1074 (Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad vs. B. Karunakar), the relevant portion of which is extracted under :- “xxx xxx xxx The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed ‘on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an “unnatural expansion of natural justice” which is itself is anti¬thetical to justice.” 21. Learned counsel for the opposite parties submitted further that even if the Disciplinary Authority had indicated that he proposed to impose one of the major punishments the consequence would not have been any different in the circum¬stances of the present case. The punishment of compulsory retire¬ment is considered in the wisdom of the Disciplinary Authority to be the most appropriate punishment to get rid of the petitioner from the services of the Bank whose confidence he had lost by the gross misconduct exhibited. We have already observed about the gravity of misconduct proved against the petitioner and in view of the aforementioned observation of the apex Court, we are of the view that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner by non-indication of proposed punishment that the Disciplinary Authority intended to impose. 22. In the result, therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Author¬ity under Annexure-18 and the order of the Appellate Authority under Annexure-20 upholding the same and as such direct dismissal of this writ petition. 22. In the result, therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Author¬ity under Annexure-18 and the order of the Appellate Authority under Annexure-20 upholding the same and as such direct dismissal of this writ petition. However, in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to cost. B. P. DAS, J. I agree. Petition disposed of.