JUDGMENT T. Vaiphei, J. 1. This appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to 'the Act') is directed against the judgment and award dated 24.02.1999 passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, West Tripura, Agartala (hereinafter referred to 'the Tribunal') in T.S. (MACT) No. 89 of 1996, by which a sum of Rs. 1,54,000/- with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition was awarded in favour of the claimant-Respondents. 2. Heard Mr. A. Lodh, the learned Counsel for the Appellant. I have also heard Mr. Somik Deb, the learned Counsel for the Respondent-owner of the vehicle and Mr. A. Gan Choudhury, the learned Counsel for the claimant-Respondents. 3. The material facts of the case are that on 14.01.1996 at about 10-40 pm when the deceased Makhan Debnath was proceeding for home along Assam-Agartala Road, he was knocked down by a Commander Jeep bearing No. TR-01-2266 at a place near Khayerpur Bazar due to the rash and negligent driving by the driver. The deceased apparently died instantaneously due to the accident One Sri Bhabatosh Bardhan, alleged to be an eye witness of the incident, lodged an FIR to the Officer in-charge of East Agartala P.S. reporting the vehicular accident. The police registered a regular case in connection therewith as East Agratala P.S. Case No. 5 of 1996 under Sections 279 / 304(A) of IPC. 4. The Respondent No. 1 is the wife of the deceased while the Respondent No. 2 is his minor son. The said Respondents filed a claim petition before the Tribunal claiming a compensation of Rs. 9,82,000/-. According to the claimant-Respondents, the deceased was a Manager of a Cloth shop under the name and style of 'Punjabi Store' at Hawkers' Corner, Agartala and was earning Rs. 2,500/- per month as salary and that he was about 35 years old at the time of the accident. 5. The claim petition was resisted by the Appellant herein as well as the owner of the vehicle, who is arranged herein as Respondent No. 3. Both the insurance Company and the owner of the vehicle denied the involvement of the Jeep in question in the accident and accordingly, prayed for dismissal of the claim petition. On the premises of the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues: (i) Is the suit maintainable? Both the insurance Company and the owner of the vehicle denied the involvement of the Jeep in question in the accident and accordingly, prayed for dismissal of the claim petition. On the premises of the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues: (i) Is the suit maintainable? (ii) Whether an accident occurred on 14.1.96 at about 10-45 pm near Khayerpur Bazar on Assam-Agartala Road under East Agartala P.S. causing death of Makhan Debnath due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle TR 01-2266 (Commander Jeep)? (iii) Whether the claimant-Petitioners are entitled to compensation, if so what will be the amount? (iv) Who will pay the compensation amount? 6. To substantiate the claim for compensation, the claimant-Respondents examined two witnesses on their behalf while one witness was examined on behalf of the Appellant-Insurance Company. At the conclusion of the enquiry, the Tribunal passed the impugned judgment and order awarding compensation of Rs. 1,54,000/- with interest @ 12% per annum in favour of the claimant-Respondents. Aggrieved, this appeal has now been filed by the Appellant-Insurance Company. 7. It is contended by Mr. A. Lodh, the learned Counsel for the Appellant-Insurance Company that the findings of the Tribunal on the involvement of the vehicle in question in the accident is based on no evidence and the impugned judgment based on no evidence cannot be sustained in law. He submits that the Tribunal completely overlooked the glaring facts that none of the eye witnesses could see the number of the offending vehicle and of the omission on the part of the author of the FIR to state the number of the vehicle in the FIR and also of his statement to the Officer in-charge of East Agartala P.S. that the vehicle was plying without any number, that just after the accident, the lights of the vehicle were put off and that since the vehicle was in a vary high speed, it was impossible to see the number of the vehicle. It is further contended by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the Tribunal erroneously held that the vehicle No. TR 01-2266 was involved in the accident when P.W.2, who was supposed to be the eyewitness of the incident, did not make any specific statement that the deceased was knocked down by the said vehicle. It is further contended by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the Tribunal erroneously held that the vehicle No. TR 01-2266 was involved in the accident when P.W.2, who was supposed to be the eyewitness of the incident, did not make any specific statement that the deceased was knocked down by the said vehicle. According to the learned Counsel for the Appellant, the Tribunal also failed to take into account the statement of P.W.3, who is the owner of the vehicle that his vehicle was not involved in the said accident and that he was never informed by his driver about the accident and further that his vehicle was never seized by the police in connection with the case. On the other hand, Mr. A. Gan Choudhury, the learned Counsel for the claimant-Respondents submits that the statement of P.W.2 coupled with the surrounding circumstances clinchingly establish the involvement of the offending vehicle and, as such, the findings made on this behalf by the Tribunal cannot be interfered with by this Court. His submission is that the aforesaid evidence and circumstances constitute legal evidence, which reasonably supports the conclusion of the Tribunal. He places strong reliance on the decision of this Court in Union of India and Anr. v. Mrs. Saraswati Debnath reported in AIR 1996 Gau 31 . 8. I have gone through the decision of this Court cited by Mr. A. Gan Choudhury, the learned Counsel for the claimant-Respondents. This is what the court says: 6. The law is settled that in a claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, the evidence should not be scrutinized in a manner as is done in a civil suit or a criminal case. In a civil case the rule is preponderance of probability and in a criminal case the rule is proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not necessary to consider these niceties in a matter of accident claim case inasmuch as it is summary enquiry. If there is some evidence to arrive at the finding that itself is sufficient. No nicety, doubt or suspicion should weigh with the Tribunal in deciding a motor accident claim case. 9. There can be no quarrel with the proposition of law laid down by this Court in the afore-cited case. The Claim Tribunal is not expected to insist upon the claimants to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt. No nicety, doubt or suspicion should weigh with the Tribunal in deciding a motor accident claim case. 9. There can be no quarrel with the proposition of law laid down by this Court in the afore-cited case. The Claim Tribunal is not expected to insist upon the claimants to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt. If there is some evidence, which reasonably supports the conclusion of the Tribunal, the appellate court cannot interfere with such findings of the Tribunal. However, it must be remembered that the evidence adduced by the claimants must satisfy the case of legal proof. The claimants in a claim petition must, and are expected to, furnish some evidence on the preponderance of probability that the vehicle is actually involved in the accident. In other words, the claimants are not exempted from proving that the vehicle involved in the accident is the vehicle belonging to the Respondent in the petition filed by them. 10. In the instant case, the only evidence implicating the vehicle of the Respondent No. 3 is found in the statement of P.W.2. What the P.W.2 deposed before the Tribunal is that he saw a vehicle bearing No. TR-01-2266 (Commander Jeep) coming from Agartala towards Teliamura at a very high speed and at that time he was standing in the market and that he saw a violent noise in the market, whereupon he rushed to the spot and found a Commander Jeep slowing down its motion and then moving speedily and saw a dead body on the main road. He did not depose that he saw the Commander Jeep hitting the deceased. The author of the FIR also did not mention in the FIR that the vehicle of the Respondent No. 3 knocked down the deceased or that the same was involved in the accident. The author of the FIR was also not examined before the Tribunal. It is a common ground of the parties that the vehicle of the Respondent No. 3 was never seized by the police in connection with the said accident. On the other hand, the statement of the Respondent No. 3, i.e. O.P. No. 1 cannot be easily brushed aside. The author of the FIR was also not examined before the Tribunal. It is a common ground of the parties that the vehicle of the Respondent No. 3 was never seized by the police in connection with the said accident. On the other hand, the statement of the Respondent No. 3, i.e. O.P. No. 1 cannot be easily brushed aside. In his deposition, the Respondent No. 3 clearly stated that his vehicle was not involved in the accident and that his vehicle was never seized by the police nor was his driver ever arrested by the police in connection with the accident. In his cross-examination, he further stated that on the date of occurrence, his vehicle was brought to his house by his driver at 3-30 pm. It may be noted that the accident took place at 10-30 pm on the fateful day. A critical examination of the statement of P.W.2 and that of O.P.W. No. 1 in juxtaposition can lead me to one and one conclusion only, i.e. there is no evidence to prove that the vehicle of the Respondent No. 3 was involved in the accident. When the evidence adduced by the claimant-Respondents is scanty and does not inspire any confidence, it will be difficult to hold that the deceased was knocked down by the vehicle of the Respondent No. 3. In my opinion, the Tribunal adopted an erroneous approach in appreciating the evidence on record and in the process came to the dubious conclusion that the deceased was killed in an accident involving the vehicle of the Respondent No. 3. Consequently, the impugned judgment and award cannot be sustained in law. 11. The net result of the aforesaid discussion is that the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and award dated 24.02.1999 is hereby set aside. However, on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellant shall not recover the amount already paid to the claimant Respondents. If any amount is already deposited by the Appellant and has not been withdrawn by the claimant-Respondents, the same shall be refunded to the Appellant. I may, however, observe that since this appears to be a hit and run motor accident, the claimant-Respondents are at liberty to approach the competent authority under Section 161 and 163 of the Act for appropriate compensation. I may, however, observe that since this appears to be a hit and run motor accident, the claimant-Respondents are at liberty to approach the competent authority under Section 161 and 163 of the Act for appropriate compensation. Needless to say, if and when the claimant-Respondents approach the competent authority for the purpose, the same shall be dealt with and disposed of by him in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed