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2006 DIGILAW 2526 (RAJ)

Balbhadra Saran Singh v. Board of Revenue

2006-08-21

SHIV KUMAR SHARMA

body2006
Honble SHARMA, J.—This writ petition was dismissed on September 4, 1986. The petitioners preferred Special Appeal against the said order before the Division Bench. Because of the reason that learned Single Judge decided the petition on the limited point relating to exemption under Sectino 30-J of the Act, the Division Bench vide order dated July 4, 2006 desired that the writ petition be decided afresh on merits. That is how the writ petition has been placed before me for hearing. 2. The prayer of petitioners in this writ petition is as under: "Impugned judgments of Board of Revenue (BOR), Revenue Appellate Authority (RAA) and Sub Divisional Officer (SDO) be set aside and they be directed to decide the case of the petitioners in accordance with the provisions of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 (New Ceiling Law)." 3. In order to remove disparity in the holding of agricultural land, a decision was taken no acquire surplus land from the land holders for fair distribution to the landless persons. To achieve this pious object Chapter III-B was introduced in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 which came into force with effect from December 15, 1963. Section 30-E provided that from the date notified by the State Government, the land would be surrendered. April 1, 1966 was notified as the date for the purpose of declaring the land to be surplus in the hand of Khatedar. 4. Contextual facts depict that the petitioner No. 1 had been holding the land as mentioned in Schedule-A (appended to writ petition) as on January 1, 1973. The petitioner No. 1 made a registered gift deed on June 15, 1970 in favour of petitioner No. 2 of 46 bighas of land khasra No. 538 situated at Gudaby. The land was exempted from being acquired under Section 30-J of Chapter III-B of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short Old Ceiling Law). The petitioners No. 3 and 4 are real sister and brother of petitionerNo. 1. By way of family settlement the petitioner No. 1 allotted the land mentioned in Schedule-B of the writ petition in favour of petitioners No. 3 and 4. The petitioner No. 1 made a gift deed on September 10, 1968 in favour of petitioner No. 5 of land mentioned in Schedule C of the writ petition and the possession was handed over to her. The petitioner No. 1 made a gift deed on September 10, 1968 in favour of petitioner No. 5 of land mentioned in Schedule C of the writ petition and the possession was handed over to her. The petitioner No. 1 gifted grove land bearing khasra No. 30 measuring 104 bighas 16 biswas situated at Pal in favour of petitioner No. 6. This grove land was exempted from being acquired under section 30-J of the old Ceiling Law. The petitioner No. 1 gifted the land situated at Guda bearing khasra No. 122 measuring 63 bighas in favour of petitioner No. 7 by registered gift deed dated May 30, 1970. This land also was grove land and exempted from being acquired under the old Ceiling Law. The petitioner made a gift deed on May 30, 1970 in favour of his two minor daughters petitioners No. 8 and 9. 5. The Sub Divisional Officer (SDO) vide order dated March 5, 1975, passed under old Ceiling Law, only one transfer of 37 bighas 13 biswas in favour of Ghamandi but did not recognise other transfers. No notice had been given to transferees. 6. The petitioners No. 2 to 5 filed ujardaries with the averments that neither enquiry had been made nor any opportunity to prove transfers was given to them. Even notice of the ceiling proceeding drawn against petitioner No. 1 was not given to the petitioners No. 2 to 9 and all transfers had been rejected cursorily. The transfers in favour of petitioners No. 2 to 6 and 7 were consisted of grove land which was exempted under section 30-J of the old Ceiling Law upto August 18, 1970, when the exemption was withdrawn. All the gifts were also made before August 18, 1970. The SDO passed another order on March 14, 195 rejecting cursorily the transfers made in favour of petitioners No. 2 to 9. 7. The petitioners filed appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority (RAA), but the RAA rejected the appeals vide judgment dated March 25, 1976 holding that transferees had no right to be heard and they could not file appeal. The petitioners before RAA also urged that since old Ceiling Law had been repealed by New Ceiling Law therefore no proceeding could be taken under the old Ceiling Law. This submission was also rejected. 8. The petitioners before RAA also urged that since old Ceiling Law had been repealed by New Ceiling Law therefore no proceeding could be taken under the old Ceiling Law. This submission was also rejected. 8. The revision petitions before the Board of Revenue came to be dismissed vide order dated uly 13, 1976. Thereafter the review petition was filed but it was dismissed vide order dated August 17, 1976. In this writ petition the petitioners have assailedthe aforequoted orders. 9. It is contended by learned counsel that the case could not be decided under the old Ceiling Law which had been repealed by the new Ceiling Law but the learned BOR did not consider this objection. It is urged that most of the transferred land was grove land which was exempted from being acquired under Section 30-J of the Old Ceiling Law upto August 18, 1970 but this aspect was not been considered properly. Learned BOR wrongly observed that transfers made upto December 31, 1969 could only be recognised under sectino 30DD of Chapter III-B of Old Ceiling Law. 10. It is next contended that section 40 of new Ceiling Law that came into force w.e.f. January 1, 1973 had repealed section 5 clause (6A) and Chapter III-B of old Ceiling Law except as provided in second proviso to sub section (1) of section 4 and sub sectino (2) of section 15 of new Ceiling Law. Therefore it was not within the jurisdiction of SDO to initiate proceedings under the provisions of the repealed law and the proceedings before SDO were illegal and without jurisdiction. The pending proceedings under the repealed law shall lapse, since there was no provision in new Ceiling Law. 11. It is further contended that as per sub section (5) of Section 30-E of old Ceiling Law the surplus land of petitioner could vest in the State Government. Only after the land has been surrendered by petitioner under sub section (2) or the petitioners have been ejected under sub section (4) of Section 30-E of old Ceiling Law. There was no question of surrender or ejectment as per sub-sections (2) or (4) of Section 30-E of the old Ceiling Law. 12. Only after the land has been surrendered by petitioner under sub section (2) or the petitioners have been ejected under sub section (4) of Section 30-E of old Ceiling Law. There was no question of surrender or ejectment as per sub-sections (2) or (4) of Section 30-E of the old Ceiling Law. 12. The Board of Revenue being judicial Tribunal and having power to heard second appeal under Section 23 of new Ceiling Law had no authority to issue orders by circular letters asking subordinate authorities to initiate proceedings under Chapter III-B of old Ceiling Law. Such circulars were illegal and unwarranted. It is further contended that provisions of new Ceiling Law and Rules made thereunder shall apply to all pending cases. Thus the orders passed under the provisions of old Ceiling Law were not sustainable. 13. Having closely scrutinised the impugned judgment of learned Board of Revenue, I notice that whiledisposing petition of the petitioners provisions of New Ceiling Law that came into force w.e.f. January 1, 1973, were not at all considered. The issues which are found involved in the matter may be narrated thus : (i) Whether the case could not be decided under the old Ceiling Law which had been repealed by the New Ceiling Law? (ii) Whether the most of transferred land was grove land which was transferred prior to August 18, 1970 and was exempted from being acquired under section 30-J of the old Ceiling Law? (iii) Whether the SDO did not have jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under the old Ceiling Law which stood repealed? (iv) Whether the Board of Revenue had no authority to issue circulars directing subordinate authorities initiate proceedings under Chapter III-B of old Ceiling Law. 14. Since these issues were not dealt with by the learned Board of Revenue it would be in the interest of justice that the case of the petitioners be decided on these issues afresh at the first instance by the Board of Revenue. 15. Resultantly the impugned orders of learned Board of Revenue are set aside and matter is sent back for fresh decision to Board of Revenue. As the case is very old, the Board is expected to decide it expeditiously. The parties are directed to appear before the Board of Revenue on September 11, 2006. There shall be no order as to costs.