JUDGMENT : S.P. MEHROTRA, J. – The present second appeal has been filed by the defendants-appellants against the judgment and decree dated 8.2.1984 passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Allahabad (Lower Appellate Court) whereby Civil Appeal No. 281 of 1979, filed by the plaintiffs-respondents herein, was allowed, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif, Allahabad (Trial Court) dated 9.4.1979 was set aside, and the Original Suit No.5 of 1975, filed by the plaintiffs-respondents herein, was decreed. 2. It appears that the plaintiffs-respondents herein filed a suit for permanent injunction against the defendants-appellants herein in respect of a House shown by the letters Aa, Ba,. Sa, Da in the plaint map. The said house has hereinafter been referred to as "the disputed house". The details in regard to the said disputed house were given at the foot of the plaint of the said suit. 3. The said suit was registered as Original Suit No.5 of 1974. 4. It was, inter alia, alleged by the plaintiffs-respondents herein in the said suit that Daya Ram had been the owner of the disputed house; and .that the disputed house was got built by the ancestors of the said Daya Ram; and that the plaintiff-respondent No.1 herein (Smt. Amriti) was the wife of the said Daya Ram, and their marriage had taken place 13 years back; and that the plaintiff-respondent No.2 herein (Smt Prema) was the real sister of the said Daya Ram; and that the said Daya Ram died on 21.5.1972; and that the said Daya Ram and the plaintiff-respondent No.; 1 (Smt. Amriti) had no issue, and as such, on the death of the said Daya Ram, the plaintiff-respondent No.1 (Smt. Amriti) and the plaintiff-respondent No.2 (Smt. Prema) inherited the disputed house and they had been living in the disputed house; and that the defendants-appellants had neither any right nor possession over the disputed house in any manner, but out or ill-will, the defendants-appellants were threatening to forcibly take possession of the disputed house and evict the plaintiffs-respondents from the disputed house; and that in the circumstances, it was necessary that the defendants-appellants be restrained from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs-respondents over the disputed house. 5. It was, inter alia, prayed in the said suit that permanent injunction be issued against the defendants-appellants restraining them from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs-respondents over the disputed house. 6. 5. It was, inter alia, prayed in the said suit that permanent injunction be issued against the defendants-appellants restraining them from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs-respondents over the disputed house. 6. The defendants-appellants contested the said suit and filed their joint written statement. 7. It was, inter alia, stated in the said written statement that the plaintiff-respondent No.1 (Smt. Amriti) was not the widow of the said Daya Ram; and that the said Daya Ram was bachelor and was a patient of T.B.; and that the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 (Smt. Amriti) had never resided in the village in question, namely Paigambar Pur, nor was she ever married to the said Daya Ram; and that the plaintiff-respondent No.2 (Smt. Prema) was not the sister of the said Daya Ram; and that the said Daya Ram was the only issue of his parents; and that the plaintiff-respondent No.2 (Smt. Prema) was the wife of Doodh Nath and was resident of village Deoria, Tehsil Sora on, Allahabad; and that the plaintiff-respondent No.2 (Smt. Prema) had never resided in the village in question, namely Paigambar Pur. 8. It was, Inter alia, further stated in the said written statement that the disputed house was never in occupation of the said Daya Ram, and the said Daya Ram was not the owner of the disputed house; and that the house of the said Daya Ram was situated in the eastern side of the disputed house; and that the house of the said Daya Ram had fallen-down and was in the shape of Khandhar; and that the house of the said Daya Ram was situated in between the disputed house and the house of Beni Madho; and that the Khandhar of the house of the said Daya Ram was also in possession of the defendants-appellants. 9. 9. It was, inter alia, further stated in the said written statement that House No. 67 and House No. 60 were the one and the same, and it was divided into two portions; and that in the western portion of House No. 60, Raja Ram (defendant-appellant No.2) lived with his family; and that the disputed house was the eastern portion of House No. 60 which was in possession of Masuria Deen (defendant-appellant No.1); and that the defendant-appellant No.2 (Raja Ram) and the defendant -appellant No. 1 (Masuria Deen) were the owners of House No. 60 and were in possession of the same; and that the disputed house was in possession of Masuria Deen (defendant -appellant No.1). 10. It was, inter alia, further stated in the said written statement that the plaintiffs-respondents were neither owners of the disputed house nor in the possession over the disputed house, and they were not even the residents of the village in question, namely, Village Paigambar Pur. 11. It was, inter alia, further stated in the said written statement that the said Daya Ram died on 16.7.1972 and not on 25.5.1972; and that the said Daya Ram executed a Will in favor of the defendants-appellants for the agricultural plot and the Will had been held to be valid by the Revenue Court. 12. Pedigree showing the relationship of the defendants-appellants with the said Daya Ram was -given in paragraphs 27 of the said written statement. The Trial Court framed the following issues : 1. Whether Daya Ram son of Shiv Dayal was the owner of the disputed house? 2. Whether the plaintiff No. 1 (Smt. Amriti) was the widow and the plaintiff No.2 (Smt. Prema) was the sister of the deceased Daya Ram? 3. Whether after the death of Daya Ram, the plaintiffs and ownership and possession over the disputed property? 4. Whether the defendants had ownership and possession over the disputed house? 5. Whether the Court did not have jurisdiction to try the suit? 6. Whether Court Fee paid was sufficient? 7. Whether the suit was barred by the principles of estoppel and acquiescence ? 8. Whether the suit was barred by section 34 of the Specific Relief Act? 9. Whether the plaintiffs entitled to any relief? If yes, to what relief? 10. Whether the suit was bared by the principle of res-judicata? 13. 6. Whether Court Fee paid was sufficient? 7. Whether the suit was barred by the principles of estoppel and acquiescence ? 8. Whether the suit was barred by section 34 of the Specific Relief Act? 9. Whether the plaintiffs entitled to any relief? If yes, to what relief? 10. Whether the suit was bared by the principle of res-judicata? 13. The parties led oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective cases. The Trial Court by its judgment and order dated 9.4.1979 dismissed the said suit filed by the plaintiffs-respondents. Issue No.5 regarding jurisdiction of the Court was decided in the negative and against the defendants-appellants. Issue No.6 regarding Court Fee was decided in the negative and against the defendants-appellants. Issue No.7 regarding the suit being barred by the principles of estoppel and acquiescence was decided in the negative and against the defendants-appellants. Issue No.8 regarding the suit being barred by the principle of res-judicata was decided in the negative and against the defendants-appellants. Issues Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were collectively decided by the Trial Court. 14. It was, inter alia, held that the evidence on record showed that the defendants-appellants got the said Daya Ram treated in his last days, and the said Daya Ram executed a Will in favour of the defendants-appellants. It was, inter alia, further held that the version of the defendants-appellants that owing to the House of the said Daya Ram having fallen-down, the said Daya Ram was residing with the defendant-appellant No.3 (Ram Nath), stood to reason. 15. It was, inter alia, further held that the plaintiffs-respondents were in possession of the disputed house as was apparent from the report of the Commissioner, but there was no evidence of the possession being legal, and as such, the claim of ownership of the plaintiffs-respondents over the disputed could not be accepted on the basis of their possession. 16. In view of the said findings, Issues Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were decided in the negative and against the plaintiffs-respondents. 17. As regards Issue No.4, it was, inter alia, held by the Trial Court that the defendants-appellants had ownership and possession over the disputed house. Accordingly, Issue No.4 was decided in the affirmative and in favour of the defendants-appellants. 18. 1, 2 and 3 were decided in the negative and against the plaintiffs-respondents. 17. As regards Issue No.4, it was, inter alia, held by the Trial Court that the defendants-appellants had ownership and possession over the disputed house. Accordingly, Issue No.4 was decided in the affirmative and in favour of the defendants-appellants. 18. In view of the said findings, the Trial Court held that the plaintiffs-respondents were not entitled to any relief, and the said suit filed by the plaintiffs-respondents was dismissed. 19. Thereupon, the plaintiffs-respondents filed an appeal being Civil Appeal No. 281 of 1979 against the said judgment and decree dated 9.4.1979 passed by the Trial Court. 20. The Lower Appellate Court by its judgment and order dated 8.2.1984, allowed the said Civil Appeal No. 281 of 1979, set aside the judgment and decree dated 9.4.1979 passed by the Trial Court and decreed the said suit for permanent injunction filed by the plaintiffs-respondents. 21. The Lower Appellate Court framed the question to be decided in the Civil Appeal as follows : "Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to the injunction claimed ?" 22. The Lower Appellate Court held that there was no need to decide the relationship between the plaintiffs-respondents and the deceased Daya Ram, as an effective decree could be passed even otherwise. 23. It was, inter alia, further held by the Lower Appellate Court that it must be accepted that the plaintiffs-respondents were in possession over the disputed house after the death of the said Daya Ram, and they continued in possession peacefully for six months, and they were entitled to seek assistance of the Court to protect their possession. 24. The Lower Appellate Court, inter alia, further held that "even if the defendants were the rightful owners, the plaintiffs were entitled to injunction to protect their peaceful possession. 25. It was, inter alia, further held by the Lower Appellate Court that the defendants-appellants claimed that the house of the deceased Daya Ram had fallen down and his house was to the east of the disputed house, and that thus even if the defendants-appellants had a Will in their favour executed by the deceased Daya Ram, that was of no help to them because the Will related to the said house which was said to have fallen down and not to the disputed house. 26. 26. It was, inter alia, further held by the Lower Appellate Court that "it was proved that the plaintiffs were in peaceful possession over the disputed house on the date of suit and that was quite sufficient for granting a decree for permanent injunction in their favour". 27. Against the said judgment and decree dated 8.2.1984, the defendants-appellants filed the present second appeal. 28. By the order dated 14.2.1984, the second appeal was admitted. The, said order dated 14.2.1984 is as follows: "Admit on question No. A of the substantial questions of law raised at page 4 of the grounds of appeal. Issue notice." 29. Question No. A mentioned in the above order dated 14.2.1984 is reproduced below: "Whether the decree for injunction could be passed in favour of tresspasser against the rightful owner." 30. I have heard Shri A.N. Mishra, learned Counsel for the defendants-appellants and Shri Raj Kumar Singh holding brief for Shri Ajay Yadav, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents, and perused the record. 31. It is submitted by Shri A.N. Mishra, learned Counsel for the defendants-appellants that the Lower Appellate Court acted illegally in holding that "even if the defendants were the rightful owners, the plaintiffs were entitled to injunction to protect their peaceful possession". 32. It is submitted by Shri Mishra that a person in possession is not entitled to injunction against the rightful owner, and therefore, the Lower Appellate Court acted illegally in holding as above. 33. Shri Mishra places reliance on a decision of this Court in Daya Nand and another v. Harpal and others.1 34. In reply, Shri Raj Kumar Singh holding brief for Shri Ajay Yadav, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents submits that the Lower Appellate Court has recorded findings of fact on a consideration of the evidence on record, and there is no illegally or perversity in the said findings, and, therefore, the second appeal is liable to be dismissed. 35. It is submitted by Shri Singh that the plaintiffs-respondents having been found to be in possession over the disputed house by the Trial Court as well as by the Lower Appellate Court, the plaintiffs-respondents were entitled to injunction, and the Lower Appellate Court rightly decreed the Suit for permanent injunction filed by the plaintiffs-respondents. 36. Shri Singh places reliance on the following decisions : 1. Chhutta and others v. Pyare and others.2 2. Karthiyayani Amma v. Govindan.3 37. 36. Shri Singh places reliance on the following decisions : 1. Chhutta and others v. Pyare and others.2 2. Karthiyayani Amma v. Govindan.3 37. In rejoinder, Shri A.N. Mishra, learned Counsel for the defendants-appellants submits that while deciding Issue No.4, the Trial Court held the defendants-appellants to be the owners of the disputed house. The Lower Appellate Court did not set aside the said finding recorded by the Trial Court on Issue No.4, and illegally proceeded to hold that even if the defendants-appellants were the rightful owners, still the plaintiffs-respondents were entitled to injunction to protect their peaceful possession. 38. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. 39. From a perusal of the findings recorded by the Courts below, the following position emerges: 1. The Trial Court as well as the Lower Appellate Court have held that the plaintiffs-respondents were in possession of the disputed house. 2. The Trial Court while deciding Issue No. 4 held that the defendants-appellants had ownership and possession over the disputed house. However, the Lower Appellate Court' did not record any finding to the contrary, nor did the Lower Appellate Court set aside the said finding recorded by the Trial Court. Instead, the Lower Appellate Court proceeded on assumption that even if the defendants-appellants were the rightful owners, still the plaintiffs-respondents were entitled to injunction to protect their peaceful possession. 40. Keeping in view the above position, let us now consider the Substantial Question of Law formulated in the present case, as quoted above. 41. The question is as to whether the decree for injunction could be passed in favour of trespasser against the rightful owner. 42. As noted above, both the Courts below have held that the plaintiffs-respondents were in possession of the disputed house. 43. Further, the Trial Court has held that the defendants-appellants were owners and in possession over the disputed house. The Lower Appellate Court has not recorded any finding to the contrary nor has it set aside the said finding recorded by the Trial Court. Instead, the Lower Appellate Court has observed that "even if the defendants were the rightful owners, the plaintiffs were entitled to injunction to protect their peaceful possession". 44. The Lower Appellate Court has not recorded any finding to the contrary nor has it set aside the said finding recorded by the Trial Court. Instead, the Lower Appellate Court has observed that "even if the defendants were the rightful owners, the plaintiffs were entitled to injunction to protect their peaceful possession". 44. I am of the opinion that the above view of the Lower Appellate Court, namely, "even if the defendants were the rightful owners, the plaintiffs were entitled to injunction to protect their peaceful possession" was not in accordance with law for two reasons. 45. Firstly, the Lower Appellate Court being the final Court of fact, ought to have considered as to whether the finding recorded by the Trial Court on Issue No.4 regarding the ownership and possession of the defendants-appellants over the disputed house, was correct or not, and on a consideration of the evidence on record, ought to have come to its own conclusion on the said question. 46. Secondly, it is well settled that a person in possession of a property is not entitled to injunction against the true manner of the property. 47. In Second Appeal No. 1046 of 1981, Smt. Phool Sakhi v. Ram Sakal Singh (deceased) and others, decided on 2.12.2005 (since reported in AIR 2006 All. 176 ), this Court has held that a person in possession of a property is not entitled to injunction against the true owner of the property. 48. This Court referred to the following decisions : 1. Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander and others.1 2. M. Kallappa Setty v. M. V. Lakshminarayana Rao.2 3. Mahadeo Savlaram Shelka and others v. The Puna Municipal Corporation and others.3 4. Hanumanthappa v. Muninarayanappa.4 5. Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam (Dead) (by legal representatives).5 6. K. V. Narayan v. S. Sharana Gowda and another.6 In Daya Nand case (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the defendants-appellants, this Court opined as follows (paragraph 2 of the said All. C.J.): "2. ..........It is by now well settled that a decree for injunction in favour of a trespasser against the true owner should not be passed. K. V. Narayan v. S. Sharana Gowda and another.6 In Daya Nand case (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the defendants-appellants, this Court opined as follows (paragraph 2 of the said All. C.J.): "2. ..........It is by now well settled that a decree for injunction in favour of a trespasser against the true owner should not be passed. A trespasser can on the strength of his possession resist interference from a person who has no better title than himself and get injunction restraining him from disturbing his possession, but a trespasser cannot get a decree for injunction against the true owner (See M. Kallappa Setty v. M.V. Lakshminarayana Rao7 and Smt. Sabita and others v. Nijja8)................" 49. In view of the above legal position, it is evident that the view of the Lower Appellate Court that "even if the defendants were the rightful owners, the plaintiffs were entitled to injunction to protect their peaceful possession" was contrary to the correct legal position. 50. Let us now refer to the decisions' relied upon on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents. 51. In Chhutta case (supra), this Court has held that a person claiming an injunction against a trespasser need not prove his own title to the land occupied by him. This decision is evidently not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case where the question is as to whether a person in possession is entitled to injunction against the true owner. 52. In Karthiyayani Amma case (supra), the Kerala High Court held as follows (paragraph 7 of the said AIR) : "7. The ultimate position, therefore, reduces itself to this: Can a person in possession without title sustain a suit for injunction against the rightful owner if he proves possession? Yes, in this case, plaintiff is found do be in possession. On the finding, he should be granted the injunction prayed for. A person in possession can be evicted only in due process of law. Even the .rightful owner cannot eject him with force. If he cannot be evicted with force, he continues to be in possession and he can resist invasion of his possession by everyone including the rightful owner. If the rightful owner threatens his peaceful possession, he can approach Courts of Law and pray for the equitable relief of injunction to protect his possession." 53. If he cannot be evicted with force, he continues to be in possession and he can resist invasion of his possession by everyone including the rightful owner. If the rightful owner threatens his peaceful possession, he can approach Courts of Law and pray for the equitable relief of injunction to protect his possession." 53. In my opinion, the said decision is not applicable to the present case. In the present case, it is true that the plaintiffs-respondents made averments in the plaint regarding threat of forcible dispossession of the plaintiffs-respondents by the defendants-appellants. However, no issue has been framed by the Trial Court in this regard, nor any such question appears to have been raised the Courts below. A perusal of the statements of P.W. 1 (Smt. Prema-plaintiff-respondent No.2) and P.W. 2 (Beni Madho) examined on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents shows that no such apprehension regarding threat of forcible dispossession of the plaintiffs-respondents by the defendant-appellants was expressed in the said statements. 54. In view of the above discussion, I am of the opinion that the Substantial Question of Law, as quoted above, is to be answered as follows: "The decree for injunction could not be passed in favour of trespasser against the rightful owner." 55. The Substantial Question of Law is answered accordingly. 56. In view of the above answer to the Substantial Question of Law, the second appeal deserves to be allowed with costs. 57. The second appeal is accordingly allowed with coste. 58. The judgment and decree dated 8.2. 984 passed by the Lower Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 281 of 1979 is set, side. 59. The matter is remanded to the Lower Appellate Court for deciding the said Civil Appeal No. 281 of 1979 afresh in the light of the observations made in this judgment. 60. The Lower Appellate Court will endeavour to decide the said civil appeal expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of the records of the Courts below by the Lower Appellate Court. 61. The Registry of this Court is directed to send back the records of the Courts below to the concerned Lower Appellate Court forthwith. Appeal Allowed.