JUDGMENT : Rakesh Tiwari, J. Heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. This writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 24.2.2003, passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer/ Additional City Magistrate VII, Kanpur Nagar, in Misc. Case No. 54 of 2001 declaring vacancy in House No. 119/562-A (Old No. 119/276-A), Ram Nagar, Darshanpurwa, Kanpur Nagar. 3. Brief facts of the case are that Respondents gave notice of vacancy u/s 15(1) and filed release application u/s 16(1)(b) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972) (hereinafter called as the Act) on 12.6.2001. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer deputed the Rent Control Inspector to make spot inspection and submit his report. 4. The Rent Control Inspector submitted his report dated 18.7.2001 after making spot inspection and after giving notice on the basis of which notices were sent to the parties. On receiving notice the Petitioner filed objection dated 20.8.2001 and sought time to file further objections. 5. On behalf of the Respondents, Anil Kumar Agrawal, husband of Respondent No. 1, filed his affidavit stating that the house in dispute was vacant u/s 12(3) of the Act as the Petitioner had purchased a house in front of the house in dispute. 6. The case of the Petitioner was that the house purchased by her was in a dilapidated condition and was inhabitable to support which averment she prayed for appointment of a Commissioner to make spot inspection of the house purchased by her and there was no question of deemed vacancy u/s 12(3) of the Act. 7. Both the parties led oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their case. 8. The case of the Petitioner is that she has been tenant in the house in dispute since 1973 and that the sale deed in favour of the Respondents is void ab-initio. 9. It is alleged that Suit No. 276 of 2000, Munna Lal and Ors. v. Smt. Kanchan Agrawal, is pending in respect of the aforesaid dispute in the Court of the civil Judge (Senior Division), Kanpur Nagar and the Petitioner was depositing the rent in Misc. Case No. 131/70 of 1998, Smt. Kamla Tripathi v. Chaman Lal and others, in the Court of the Civil Judge (Jr. v. Smt. Kanchan Agrawal, is pending in respect of the aforesaid dispute in the Court of the civil Judge (Senior Division), Kanpur Nagar and the Petitioner was depositing the rent in Misc. Case No. 131/70 of 1998, Smt. Kamla Tripathi v. Chaman Lal and others, in the Court of the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Kanpur Nagar in pursuance of an order passed by the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Kanpur Nagar in this regard. Smt. Kanchan Agrawal filed Civil Revision No. 314 of 1999 against the aforesaid order permitting the Petitioner to deposit the rent in Misc. Case No. 131/70 of 1998 which has been dismissed by order dated 21.10.1999 confirming the order of the court below permitting deposit. 10. It is alleged by the Petitioner that Respondent Smt. Kanchan Agrawal has also filed release application u/s 21(1)(a) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 which was registered as Suit No. 39 of 2000 and is also pending. It is admitted by the Petitioner that House No. 119/277, Darshanpurwa was purchased by her but the same being in dilapidated condition and almost in the shape of open land is inhabitable. It is further stated by the Petitioner that she has also filed a Suit No. 41 of 1998 for injunction in the Court of Civil Judge, which is still pending, hence, the application for declaring vacancy and release was not maintainable. 11. From the record and perusal of impugned order dated 24.2.2003 it appears that the Respondents produced the certified copy of the registered sale-deed dated 12.1.2000 along with map before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer showing that the Petitioner Smt. Kamla Tripathi and Abhai Tripathi had purchased House No. 119/277 (New No. 119/563), Darshanpurwa for Rs. 1,40,000 from a perusal of which the Rent Control and Eviction Officer found that there was residential construction made in 33 square metre area comprising two rooms measuring 11 ft. ? 12 ft., kitchen measuring 6 ft.? 10 ft. and latrine 4 ft.? 8.6 ft. 1,40,000 from a perusal of which the Rent Control and Eviction Officer found that there was residential construction made in 33 square metre area comprising two rooms measuring 11 ft. ? 12 ft., kitchen measuring 6 ft.? 10 ft. and latrine 4 ft.? 8.6 ft. It is further held by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in the impugned order relying upon a Full Bench decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Smt. Ramti Devi v. Union of India, 1995 (1) ARC 1, that the registered sale deed will continue to remain legal and binding till the same is declared void ab-initio or cancelled and further that the tenant has no right to challenge the sale-deed. 12. Thus, in view of the above decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, even if it is presumed that the House No. 119/277 is now in the shape of open land and the construction was demolished subsequently by the Petitioner to show otherwise that there was no residential construction to live in as alleged by the Respondents, the same would not affect the declaration of vacancy as at the time of purchase of the aforesaid house vide sale-deed dated 12.1.2000, it has been specifically mentioned in the sale deed that there were two rooms measuring 11 ft. ? 12 ft., kitchen measuring 6 ft. ? 10 ft. and latrine 4 ft. ? 8.6 ft. existing thereon. 13. The court below also observed it in the impugned order that the Petitioner despite repeated adjournments to rebut the aforesaid evidence by filing objection did not file the same and instead raised the irrelevant question of ownership of the house in dispute that the Respondents were not the owners of the house in dispute. The findings of the court below are as under: 14. It is clear from above that Smt. Kamla Tripathi took a false stand that she has purchased open land in House No. 119/277, Darshanpurwa, Kanpur. The courts below from the sale deed and the map appended thereto have given a categorical finding of fact based on evidence that the aforesaid plot claimed to have been purchased by Smt. Kamla Tripathi was not a plot but consisted of accommodation of two rooms, kitchen, latrine, bathroom and land appurtenant which was in her possession in vacant state and was recorded as residential accommodation in the sale deed. 15. 15. It is also apparent that the Petitioner demolished the construction of House No. 119/277, Darshanpurwa, Kanpur to establish her case that she had in fact acquired a plot and not a residential accommodation in vacant state. The courts below disbelieved the case of the Petitioner. She took a number of adjournments to stretch the proceedings and prolong the agony of the landlords. She built six independent flats on the land/accommodation after demolishing the existing structure thereon. However, the case of the Petitioner was disbelieved by the courts below. In fact after building the flats she sold them off and kept on occupying the accommodation in dispute on negligible rent of Rs. 100 per month inclusive all taxes, which was convenient for her than shifting in the flats, constructed by her and for this reason she challenged the status of the landlord. 16. No stone was left unturned by her to remain in possession of the accommodation in dispute as long as she could, denying possession of the said accommodation, even after purchase of accommodation/House No. 119/277, Darshanpurwa, Kanpur and building six flats on it. 17. The courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that bona fide need and comparative hardship is in favour of the landlord in the facts and circumstances of the case. 18. Once the Petitioner has built six flats, it is to be deemed to have been available to him in vacant position though he sold them later on. He can neither challenge the bona fide need and comparative hardship of the landlord nor he can take advantage of the fact that the landlord owns any accommodation/shop besides the accommodation/shop in dispute in view of the provisions of Explanation 1 to Section 21(1)(a) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 19. In my opinion, for the reasons stated above there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order warranting interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 20. The Petitioner shall pay the rent at the rate of Rs. 500 from the date of release application till date and shall be paid to the landlord by a bank draft. The amount of Rs. 4,100 deposited by the Petitioner in Court shall be adjusted against the rent to be paid to the landlords by bank draft. The landlords may withdraw the amount so deposited by the Petitioner without security. 500 from the date of release application till date and shall be paid to the landlord by a bank draft. The amount of Rs. 4,100 deposited by the Petitioner in Court shall be adjusted against the rent to be paid to the landlords by bank draft. The landlords may withdraw the amount so deposited by the Petitioner without security. The Petitioner shall vacate the house in dispute within one month and hand over peaceful possession of the same to the landlord failing which the possession may be taken by the landlord with the help of police, if necessary. 21. The petition is liable to be dismissed with costs for the following reasons: (i) Frivolous petition.-After building six flats she sold them off and kept on occupying the accommodation in dispute on negligible rent of Rs. 100 per month inclusive all taxes which was convenient for her than shifting in the flats constructed by her and for this reason she challenged the status of the landlord. (ii) Misconduct of the Petitioner.-Admittedly the Petitioner and Abhai Tripathi purchased House No. 119/277 (New No. 119/563), Darshanpurwa for Rs. 1,40,000 vide registered sale-deed dated 12.1.2000. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer found that there was residential construction made in 33 square metre area comprising two rooms measuring 11 ft. ? 12 ft., kitchen measuring 6 ft. ? 10 ft. and latrine 4 ft. ? 8.6 ft. It is further admitted by the Petitioner that she has also filed a Suit No. 41 of 1998 for injunction in the Court of Civil Judge, which is still pending. It is also apparent that the Petitioner demolished the construction of House No. 119/277, Darshanpurwa, Kanpur to establish her case that she had in fact acquired a plot and not a residential accommodation in vacant state. No stone was left unturned by her to remain in possession of the accommodation in dispute as long as she could, denying possession of the said accommodation, even after purchase of accommodation/House No. 119/277, Darshanpurwa, Kanpur and building six flats on it. (iii) Dragging to litigation with mala fide intention.-The courts below have observed in the impugned orders that the Petitioner despite repeated adjournments to rebut the evidence by filing objection did not file the same and instead raised the irrelevant question of ownership of the house in dispute that the Respondents were not the owners of the house in dispute. (iii) Dragging to litigation with mala fide intention.-The courts below have observed in the impugned orders that the Petitioner despite repeated adjournments to rebut the evidence by filing objection did not file the same and instead raised the irrelevant question of ownership of the house in dispute that the Respondents were not the owners of the house in dispute. Costs: In Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu Vs. Union of India (UOI), (2005) 6 SCC 344 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held: So far as awarding of costs at the time of judgment is concerned, awarding of costs must be treated generally as mandatory inasmuch as the liberal attitude of the Courts in directing the parties to bear their own costs had led the parties to file a number of frivolous cases in the Courts or to raise frivolous and unnecessary issues. Costs should invariably follow the event. Where a party succeeds ultimately on one issue or point but loses on number of other issues or points which were unnecessarily raised. Costs must be appropriately apportioned. Special reasons must be assigned if costs are not being awarded. Costs should be assessed according to rule in force. If any of the parties has unreasonably protracted the proceedings, the Judge should consider exercising discretion to impose exemplary costs after taking into account the expense incurred for the purpose of attendance on the adjourned dates. 22. Thus, from the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid case of Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra) it is apparent that non-payment of cost is an exception for which special reasons have to be given by the Court and that in normal circumstances cost has to be awarded on the party according to the issue decided in favour of the party which were unnecessarily raised. The cost so imposed should be in accordance with rules and if the proceedings are unnecessarily protracted or adjournments have been sought it is upon the discretion of the Judge to impose exemplary cost taking also into account the circumstances etc. for the purpose of adjournment. In so far as imposition of cost in the writ petition is concerned, provision has been made in the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1951. for the purpose of adjournment. In so far as imposition of cost in the writ petition is concerned, provision has been made in the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1951. Chapter XXI, Rule 11 of the Rules provided for cost in writ in the nature of habeas corpus under Article 220 of the Constitution whereas Rule 9 of Chapter XXII of the said Rules provides costs in respect of Direction, Order or writ under Article 226 of the Constitution other than a writ in the nature of habeas corpus. In so far as writ of habeas corpus is concerned, provision for cost is given in Rule 11 of Chapter XXI. Rule 9 of Chapter XXII of the Rules is as under: Rule 11. Costs.-In disposing of an application under this Chapter the Court may make such order as to costs as it may consider just. 23. From the aforesaid rule it is evident that the Court can make such order as to costs as it may consider just. It is discretionary power of the Court to impose cost, hence it cannot be said to be illegal or perverse. The Court should award cost of judicious approach taking into consideration the whole set of facts and circumstances and not award cost arbitrarily or capriciously. As regards cost to be awarded in suit, Sections 35A and 35B of the Code of CPC take care of it. Sections 35A and 35B of the Code of CPC are as under: 35. Costs.- (1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, and to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, the costs of an incident to all suits shall be in the discretion of the Court, and the Court shall have full power to determine by whom or out of what property and to what extent such costs are to be paid, and to give all necessary directions for the purposes aforesaid. The fact that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit shall be no bar to the exercise of such powers. (2) Where the Court directs that any costs shall not follow the event, the Court shall state its reasons in writing. 35A. The fact that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit shall be no bar to the exercise of such powers. (2) Where the Court directs that any costs shall not follow the event, the Court shall state its reasons in writing. 35A. Compensatory costs in respect of false or vexatious claims or defences.- (1) If in any suit or other proceeding (including an execution but (excluding an appeal or a revision), any party objects to the claim or defence on the ground that the claim or defence or any part of it is, as against the objector, false or vexatious to the knowledge of the party by whom it has been put forward, and if thereafter, as against the objector, such claim or defence is disallowed, abandoned or withdrawn in whole or in part, the Court, (if it so thinks fit), may, after recording its reasons for holding such claim or defence to be false or vexatious, make an order for the payment to the objector by the party by whom such claim or defence has been put forward, of costs by way of compensation. (2) No court shall make any such order for the payment of an amount exceeding (three thousand rupees) or exceeding the limits of its pecuniary jurisdiction, whichever amounts is less: Provided that where the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of any Court exercising the jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes under the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887 (9 of 1887), (or under a corresponding law in force in (any part of India to which the said Act does not extend) and not being a Court constituted (under such Act or law), are less than two hundred and fifty rupees, the High Court may empower such Court to award as costs under this section any amount not exceeding two hundred and fifty rupees and not exceeding those limits by more than one hundred rupees: Provided further, that the High Court may limit the amount which any Court or class of Courts is empowered to award as costs under this Section. (3) No person against whom an order has been made under this Section shall, by reason thereof, be exempted from any criminal liability in respect of any claim or defence made by him. (3) No person against whom an order has been made under this Section shall, by reason thereof, be exempted from any criminal liability in respect of any claim or defence made by him. (4) The amount of any compensation awarded under this section in respect of a false or vexatious claim or defence shall be taken into account in any subsequent suit for damages or compensation in respect of such claim or defence. 35B. Costs for causing delay.-(1) If, on any date fixed for the hearing of a suit or for taking any step therein, a party to the suit- (a) fails to take the step which he was required by or under this Code to take on that date, or (b) obtains an adjournment for taking such step or for producing evidence or on any other ground, the Court may, for reasons to be recorded, make an order requiring such party to pay to the other party such costs as would, in the opinion of the Court, be reasonably sufficient to reimburse the other party in respect of the expenses incurred by him in attending the Court on that date, and payment of such costs, on the date next following the date of such order, shall be a condition precedent to the further prosecution of- (a) the suit by the Plaintiff, where the Plaintiff was ordered to pay such costs. (b) the defence by the Defendant, where the Defendant was ordered to pay such costs. (2) The costs, ordered to be paid under Sub-section (1), shall not, if paid, be included in the costs awarded in the decree passed in the suit ; but, if such costs are not paid, a separate order shall be drawn up indicating the amount of such costs and the names and addresses of the persons by whom such costs are payable and the order so drawn up shall be executable against such persons. Section 34 of the Code of CPC also provides for interest. 24. Thus, in view of the law laid down in Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra), imposition of costs is mandatory. 25. Section 34 of the Code of CPC also provides for interest. 24. Thus, in view of the law laid down in Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra), imposition of costs is mandatory. 25. Considering the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the provisions of the Allahabad High Court Rules and the Code of CPC coupled with the fact that the Petitioner has filed this writ petition by concealment of aforesaid material facts which he could and ought to have mentioned in the writ petition, deterrent and exemplary costs is necessary to be imposed. 26. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is dismissed with Rs. 20,000 as costs with 9% compound interest.