Judgment : G. RAJASURIA, J. Heard Mr. Prabhu Rajadurai, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr.R. Janakiramulu, learned Special Government, for the respondent. 2. Though the matter is listed for considering the question of stay, yet, in view of the very same question being involved in the appeal itself, on consent of the counsel appearing for the parties, the writ appeal itself is taken up for hearing and disposal on merits. 3. This writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge, dated 27.6.2006, passed in W.P. (MD) No. 2878 of 2006. A result of facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this writ appeal would run thus: (a) Theappellant herein S. Krishnasamy is working in the Police Station. While he was working at Ayakudi Police Station in Dindigul District as Armed Reserve Police Constable (AR.PC) he was deployed to drive a Mahindra Van bearing Regn. No. TCL 3442 belonging to the Police Station. While so, there was a collision between the said van and a two wheeler, which resulted ultimately in the death of the rider of the two wheeler. A case was registered as against the rider of the two wheeler for rash and negligent driving. Since he died, action was dropped as against him. (b) However, the legal heirs of the deceased filed MCOP No. 315 of 1999 in the Principal District Court, Dindigul, claiming compensation and ultimately the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal fixed contributory negligence on the part of the appellant herein also and accordingly compensation was ordered to be paid by the police department, which paid a compensation of Rs. 2,38,170/-Consequently, as per G.O.Ms. No. 393, Home (Transport IV) Department, dated 1.3.1988, the Superintendent of Police, DIndigul District, the respondent herein, initiated action as against the appellant for recovery of the amount by way of the Government getting reimbursed the compensation amount paid to the legal heirs of the deceased, in 114 installments commencing from the month of April, 2006. The Police department has started recovering the dues from the salary of the appellant herein. (c) Being aggrieved by the action of the police department in having started recovering the compensation amount in installments from his salary, the appellant has filed W.P. (MD) No.2878 of 2006 before this Court. The Police department has started recovering the dues from the salary of the appellant herein. (c) Being aggrieved by the action of the police department in having started recovering the compensation amount in installments from his salary, the appellant has filed W.P. (MD) No.2878 of 2006 before this Court. The learned single Judge, in the order dated 27.6.2006 in the aforesaid writ petition dismissed the writ petition with a finding that the Government Order passed by the Government Drivers and that the action taken by the Police department cannot be found fault with. 4. Being aggrieved by the said order of the learned Single Judge, the appellant has filed the present writ appeal on the following grounds among others. • (i) The learned Single Judge failed to note that the Superintendent of Police, without giving any opportunity to the appellant, ordered recovery from his salary. • (ii) The principles of natural justice have been violated by the Superintendent of Police in ordering recovery of such a huge amount from the appellants salary. 5. The point for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the Superintendent of Police, Dindigul District who is the respondent herein, has ordered recovery from the salary of the appellant without adhering to the principles of natural justice and more specifically without conducting a departmental proceedings as contemplated under the relevant Rulese 6. The point: In the course of hearing of the appeal what transpired from the arguments advanced on both sides is that the Superintendent or Police, without conducting any departmental proceedings, simply ordered for recovery of the amount from the salary of the appellant herein. The order, dated 10.3.2006, passed by the Superintendent of Police is extracted here under for ready reference. “In accordance with the orders of the Government in G.O.2D.No.297, Home (Pol.XI) Department dated 24.6.2004 communicated in Chief Office Endt. No. 45548/M.T.II (i)/2004 dated 28.6.2004, the compensation amount of Rs.2,38,170/- (Rupees Two lakhs thirty eight thousand one hundred and seventy only) ordered by the Principal, District Judge, DIndigul, dated 27.11.2003, in O.P.No.315/99 was sanctioned by the Government and the above compensation amount of Rs.2,38,170/- was already drawn and deposited in the Court. 2. No. 45548/M.T.II (i)/2004 dated 28.6.2004, the compensation amount of Rs.2,38,170/- (Rupees Two lakhs thirty eight thousand one hundred and seventy only) ordered by the Principal, District Judge, DIndigul, dated 27.11.2003, in O.P.No.315/99 was sanctioned by the Government and the above compensation amount of Rs.2,38,170/- was already drawn and deposited in the Court. 2. And also in accordance with the orders of the Government in G.O.Ms.No. 393 Home (Transport IV) Department dated 1.3.1988 and in view of the specific findings of the Court in accordance with the rule in force, the compensation amount of Rs. 2,38,170/- is hereby ordered to be recovered from the salary of the driver P.C.1549 Krishnasamy of Palani Town Police Station. 3. The effect of this recovery will be given immediately and the recovery of the compensation amount of Rs.2,38,170/- will be made from his salary for the month of 4/06 @ Rs.2,170/- in the 1st instalment and Rs.2,000/- in the next 113 installments. 4. Pay section Superintendent/Assistant will make necessary entries in the Long Roll for the above recovery.” 7. A mere perusal of the said order would at once expose as to how the respondent arbitrarily issued the order without complying with the principles of natural justice and more specifically the maxim ‘ audi alteram partem’. The respondent virtually proceeded on the wrong assumption that the finding of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in the MCOP proceedings could be adapted straightaway and recovery could be ordered from the appellant herein, although it was an order passed by the Tribunal as against the respondent herein, in a departmental proceedings. Admittedly, the appellant herein was not a party co-nomine in MCOP proceedings even though he might have been examined as a witness,. Obviously, he did not have had the opportunity of filing any appeal as against the order passed in MCOP wherein he was found negligent in view of his contributory negligence in causing the accident. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant has correctly argued that whenever there is a motor vehicle accident and the driver of the motor vehicle is found negligent, the employer of the driver of the vehicle is found liable to pay compensation as per the order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by adapting a liberal standard. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant has correctly argued that whenever there is a motor vehicle accident and the driver of the motor vehicle is found negligent, the employer of the driver of the vehicle is found liable to pay compensation as per the order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by adapting a liberal standard. However, automatically the employer would not be entitled to get himself reimbursed of the compensation amount which the employer is made to pay to the victim of the accident and that there should be evidence to show that the degree of negligence on the part of the driver was so serious enough warranting action to be taken against him by the employer. The appellant herein is entitled to plead that he was not at all liable for the accident and in the alternative that he was not at all that much grossly negligent for causing the accident warranting any action to betaken as against him by the department by way of getting reimbursed of the compensation amount which the department was made to pay to the legal heirs of the deceased as per the order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. There should have been proper communication of charges against the appellant herein and as against which he should have been given the opportunity of furnishing his explanation. After conducting due enquiry only order, if any, could be passed and that to while passing such order, there is no necessity that the entire amount should be ordered to be recovered from him and depending upon the facts and circumstances, the quantum of amount to be recovered from his salary could be fixed by the disciplinary authority. 9. In view of the analysis above, a fortiori we hold that the action of the respondent is a misconceived one. Nowhere G.O.Ms.No. 393, Home (Transport IV) Department, dated 01.03.1988, envisage that without adhering to the principles of natural justice, the amount should be recovered under Rule 8(v) (a) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal Rules. (Previously nomenclatured as TNCS (CCA) Rules), There is no ambiguity or double entendre in the G.O. in addition to there being no carte blanch given to anyone to arbitrarily recover from the driver, any amount. Paragraph No. 3 of the said G.O. is extracted hereunder for ready reference. “3. (Previously nomenclatured as TNCS (CCA) Rules), There is no ambiguity or double entendre in the G.O. in addition to there being no carte blanch given to anyone to arbitrarily recover from the driver, any amount. Paragraph No. 3 of the said G.O. is extracted hereunder for ready reference. “3. In order to enforce strict discipline among the drivers of Government Vehicles, Government have examined the question of recovering token amount from the drivers in cases of accidents to Government vehicles. Government consider that under the provisions of rule 8 (v) (a) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (C.C.A) Rules, when any pecuniary loss is caused, recovery from their pay of the whole or part of such pencuniary loss may be made by way of penalty. In these circumstances, Government consider that there is no need for making separate rules for effecting token recovery from the drivers in case Government vehicles got involved in accidents.” (emphasis suppled) 10. What the said G.O. inter alia evinces, is that it is for the disciplinary authority to consider on merits, whether whole or part of such pecuniary loss could be recovered. In the impugned order passed by the respondent, absolutely there is no iota or shred of evidence to show as to why the appellant should be ordered to pay the entire compensation amount, including the interest and costs paid by the Police department. The G.O. by specifically referring to the words “whole or part of such pecuniary loss”, mandates the disciplinary authority concerned to apply his mind based on facts and evidence whether whole or part of such loss should be recovered or not. Without, in any ways considering all these legal requirements set out supra, the respondent has passed the impugned order which is liable to be set aside. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant cited the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited v. Sikandar Singh AIR 2006 SC 1438 : (2006) 3 SCC 736 : 2006-II-LLJ-14. An excerpt from the said decision would run thus at p.17 of LLJ: “16. The appellant is “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The terms and conditions of service by and between the appellants and the respondents herein are governed by the service rules and/or terms and conditions of contract. An excerpt from the said decision would run thus at p.17 of LLJ: “16. The appellant is “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The terms and conditions of service by and between the appellants and the respondents herein are governed by the service rules and/or terms and conditions of contract. If the respondents herein had committed misconduct they could have been and in fact were departmentally proceeded with. In the said departmental proceedings appropriate punishments had been imposed upon them. So far as Respondent defendant 1 is concerned, therein his negligence had been held to have contributed to the loss of 2/3rd of the shortages and by way of penalty, he was asked by the Appellant Authority to deposit the requisite number of bags of wheat and/or pay the price thereof. The said order having been complied with and attained finality, it is binding on the appellant. The dispute cannot, therefore, be permitted to be reopened.” In fact, this decision has been cited out of context on the side of the appellant as the facts in the cited case are different from the one on hand. Even otherwise, from the cited decision. It is clear that departmental proceedings could be initiated by the employer for the loss caused to him. 12. In the result, the writ appeal is allowed setting aside the order dated 27.6.2006 in W.O.(MD) No. 2878 of 2006 and by giving the following directions. • (a) The order of the respondent in R.C.No. J2/26050/1998 (D.O.168/2006), dated 10.03.2006, is quashed. However, it is open for the respondent to initiate appropriate departmental proceedings, complying with the appropriate rules and adhering to the principles of natural justice as envisaged in the maxim “au di alteram partem”. • (b) The learned Advocate for the appellant prayed for refund of the amount so far recovered from the appellant under the impugned order. In view of this Court quashing the order of the respondent, as a sequale, the respondent/government is ordered to refund the amount recovered, so far, to the appellant. • (c) We make it clear that the respondent shall be at liberty to initiate departmental proceedings, as set out supra and the disciplinary authority, is at liberty to take independent decision, without in any way influenced by the observations and findings given in this writ appeal. 13. Accordingly this writ appeal is allowed. • (c) We make it clear that the respondent shall be at liberty to initiate departmental proceedings, as set out supra and the disciplinary authority, is at liberty to take independent decision, without in any way influenced by the observations and findings given in this writ appeal. 13. Accordingly this writ appeal is allowed. Connected miscellaneous petition M.P. (MD) No. 1 of 2006 is closed.