Judgment :- S.P. Talukdar, J. The petitioner by filing an application under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code sought for quashing of the case being C-816 of 2004 under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act now pending before the learned Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kolkata. 2. The backdrop of the present case may briefly be stated as follows: On 6th July, 1994 a Development Agreement was executed between opposite party No. 1 company and the petitioner and it was in connection with proposed development of a property being No. 8, Gyan Goswami Sarani, Kolkata. In pursuance of the said agreement the complainant issued a cheque in favour of the accused/petitioner for Rs. 17 lakhs on 05.07.1994 by way of an adjustable advance. It was agreed that the accused would get the plan sanctioned by Kolkata Municipal Corporation within the stipulated time. It was also agreed by the accused that if he failed to provide with such plan, the complainant company would be at liberty to realise the said amount together with interest by encashing the cheque No.589761 drawn on Syndicate Bank dated 07.11.1994 for Rs. 18,19,000/- and No. 563940 for Rs. 1,06,748/- dated 15.02.1995. The accused failed to perform his duty. The complainant extended the time but the accused failed to perform his obligation under the said agreement. The cheques were deposited with the banker of the complainant. The same was, however, dishonoured on the ground that the funds were insufficient. Complainant sent Advocates notice dated 08.05.1995. Demand was made for payment of the total sum of Rs. 19,25,748/-The letter, however, returned on 12.08.1995 by the postal authorities and it could be seen that the envelope was cut on both sides thereby leading to the presumption that the accused might have had read the same and, thereafter, returned it. The accused did not respond to the notice nor any payment was made. The accused deliberately and wilfully issued the cheques knowing fully well that the same would be dishonoured. Such act on the part of accused tantamounts to an offence. In such circumstances, an application was filed before the learned Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore with a prayer for taking of cognizance under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 3. The learned Court after taking cognizance of the offence transferred the case to the file of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, 24-Pgs (S). In such circumstances, an application was filed before the learned Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore with a prayer for taking of cognizance under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 3. The learned Court after taking cognizance of the offence transferred the case to the file of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, 24-Pgs (S). Learned Transferee Court, thereafter, being satisfied with the materials on record directed issuance of notice upon the accused person. The petitioner appeared before the learned Court of Magistrate on 30.10.1995 and was let out on bail. On 20.06.1996 the petitioner appeared before the learned Court and filed an application praying for dropping of proceedings. The said application was rejected by order dated 19.05.1999. A revisional application being C.R.R. No. 1202 of 1998 was filed by the complainant with a prayer for direction for expeditious disposal of the case. By order dated 30.03.1999 the learned Single Bench of this Court directed the learned Magistrate to expedite the trial and to conclude the same within a period of three months from the date of communication of the order. 4. The petitioners prayer for recalling the process issued against him and for dropping of the case was rejected by the learned Court by order dated 19.05.1999. Petitioner preferred a revisional application. The learned Single Bench of this Court by order dated 26.07.1999 issued a rule. Prayer for quashing was made on several grounds like non-service of notice under section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, noncompliance of the mandatory provision giving fifteen days time to the accused person, want of territorial jurisdiction of the learned Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, lack of authority of the complainant to file the case, non-maintainability of the proceeding under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as the cheques were not issued for discharge of any debt or liability and on the further ground that the complaint was barred by limitation. 5. Learned Single Bench of the Court by order dated 10.11.2000 passed in C.R.R. No. 1392 of 1992 directed the learned Magistrate to proceed with the case in terms of the earlier order passed in C.R.R. No. 1202 of 1998. The petitioner filed a special leave petition being special leave to Appeal (Cri) No. 1817 of 2001 before the Apex Court being aggrieved by the order dated 10.11.2000 passed by learned Single Bench as referred to earlier. The petitioner filed a special leave petition being special leave to Appeal (Cri) No. 1817 of 2001 before the Apex Court being aggrieved by the order dated 10.11.2000 passed by learned Single Bench as referred to earlier. The Apex Court by order dated 02.05.2002 disposed of the special leave petition by transferring the case to the learned Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kolkata, for enquiry and trial and with the direction that the learned C.M.M. may retain the case in his file or may send the same to a competent Court for trial. 6. The Apex Court did not enter into the merits of the said case but liberty was given to the parties to raise all points before the Trial Court except the question of territorial jurisdiction. The petitioner preferred an application for recalling of the process and/or dropping of the proceeding in pursuance of the liberty by the Apex Court. During pendency of the said application filed on 17.08.2005, the complainant approached this Court under section 483 of the Criminal Procedure Code praying for a direction for expeditious disposal. The said application being C.R.R. No.2875 of 2005 was also disposed of by order dated 13.01.2006 with a direction upon the learned Trial Court to proceed with the case expeditiously to complete the trial within a period of four months from the date of communication of the order. 7. On 20.03.2006 the application dated 17.08.2005, whereby the petitioner prayed for recalling of the process, was taken up for hearing. The learned Magistrate by order dated 20.03.2006 decided to proceed with the case by fixing consecutive dates for evidence and held that the Court did not have the power to recall process or to drop the instant proceeding. 8. The learned Court, thus, failed to appreciate the grievances which were ventilated by filing an application dated 17.08.2005. The present application is directed against such order dated 20.03.2006 whereby the learned Court rejected such application dated 17.08.2005. 9. Mr. 8. The learned Court, thus, failed to appreciate the grievances which were ventilated by filing an application dated 17.08.2005. The present application is directed against such order dated 20.03.2006 whereby the learned Court rejected such application dated 17.08.2005. 9. Mr. Sekhar Basu, as learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, invited attention of the Court to the order dated 02.05.2002 passed by the Apex Court in support of his contention that the Apex Court made it clear that the merits of the case were not entered into and it was open to the parties to raise any point available to them under law before the learned Trial Court, except the question of territorial jurisdiction. Mr. Basu contended that in view of the liberty given by the Apex Court, the petitioner filed the said application dated 17.08.2005 thereby ventilating all his grievances. According to Mr. Basu, the learned Court in view of the direction of the Apex Court was legally bound to dispose of the said application instead of observing that the grievances could very well be raised at the time of final hearing of the case. Mr. Basu in this context referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sadanandan Bhadran vs. Madhavan Sunil Kumar, reported in 1998 (6) SCC 514 . 10. The present petitioner by filing the said application before the learned Trial Court specifically claimed that by agreement dated 06.07.1994 it was mutually agreed upon by the parties that the cheques bearing No. 589761 dated 07.11.1994 was to be deposited for encashment from 121 days from the date of agreement if in the meantime vacant possession of the land with the sanctioned plan could be handed over by the petitioners to the O.P. No.1. But the cheque was placed after 332 days in total violation of the conditions of the agreement dated 06.07.1994. When the cheque was dishonoured by the banker, the complainant sent the purported notice under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act wherein seventy-two hours were given to the petitioner to repay the amount of the cheque. Such notice was in total violation of the provisions of section 138(b) of the NI Act which mandatorily demands that the period of fifteen days has to be given to the drawer of the cheque for repaying the amount. It was further alleged that complaint was hoplessly barred by limitation. Such notice was in total violation of the provisions of section 138(b) of the NI Act which mandatorily demands that the period of fifteen days has to be given to the drawer of the cheque for repaying the amount. It was further alleged that complaint was hoplessly barred by limitation. The petitioner on such grounds approached the learned Court for recalling the process and dropping of the proceeding. 11. Mr. Sekhar Basu, learned Senior Counsel, referring to the decision in the case of K. Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan & Anr., reported in 1999(7) SCC 510 , contended that it is to be decided as to whether the cause of action had at all arisen. 12. Reference was made to the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which may be reproduced as follows: "(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice." 13. The Apex Court in the case of Sadanandan Bhadran vs. Madhavan Sunil Kumar, reported in 1998(6) SCC 514 , observed that "the significant fact, however, is that the proviso lays down three conditions precedent to the applicability of the above section and, for that matter, creation of such offence and the conditions are: (i) the cheque should have been presented to the bank within six months of its issue or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier, (ii) the payee should have made a demand for payment be registered notice after the cheque is returned unpaid; and (iii) that the drawer should have failed to pay the amount within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice." 14. According to Mr. Basu the facts and circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the said conditions were not duly satisfied. 15. Mr. Soumen Sen, appearing as learned Counsel for the private opposite party, however, invited attention of the Court to the decision in the case of Subramanium Sethuraman vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., reported in 2005(1) Cr. LR (SC) 256. It was held that the case involving a summons case is covered by Chapter XX of the Code which does not contemplate a stage of discharge like section 239 which provides for a discharge in a warrant case. The Apex Court in such circumstances was of the view that once the plea of the accused is recorded under section 252 of the Code the procedure contemplated under Chapter XX has to be followed which is to take the trial to its logical conclusion. Reference was also made to the decision in the case of Adalat Prasad vs. Rooplal Jindal & Ors., reported in JT 2004(7) SC 243. 16. Relying upon the said decision in the case of Adalat Prasad vs. Rooplal Jindal & Ors., Mr. S. S. Roy, learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party/State, contended that the learned Magistrate in the facts and circumstances of the case was left with no choice but to proceed with the case keeping grievances ventilated on behalf of the petitioner alive and with liberty to the petitioner to raise the same at the appropriate stage. 17. Mr. Roy, in fact, echoed the voice of Mr. Sen while referring to the decision in the case of Subramanium Sethuraman. Mr. 17. Mr. Roy, in fact, echoed the voice of Mr. Sen while referring to the decision in the case of Subramanium Sethuraman. Mr. Roy further submitted that there can be no bar in presenting cheque to the bank for payment more than once. 18. Referring to the decision in the case of Central Bank of India & Anr., vs. Saxons Farms & Ors., reported in 2000 C Cr. LR (SC) 306, it was contended by Mr. Roy that no form of notice is prescribed in clause (b) of section 138 of the NI Act but the requirement is that notice must be given in writing within fifteen days of receipt of information from the bank regarding return of the cheque as unpaid and in the notice a demand for payment of the amount of the cheque has to be made. 19. Mr. Roy sought to derive further support in this regard from the decision in the case of Krishna Exports & Ors., vs. Raju Das, reported in 2006(1) SCC (Cri) 350. 20. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. S. Basu emphatically submitted that since liberty was given by the Apex Court to raise grievances except on the point of jurisdiction, it was the duty on the part of the learned Court to deal with the said grievances. According to him, the learned Court was not justified in not dealing with the same and there could be no reason for keeping the grievances alive. On the other hand, Mr. Roy, learned Counsel for the O.P./State submitted that the present application is one more attempt on the part of the petitioner to cause delay. In fact, Mr. Sen, appearing on behalf of the private opposite party referred to the backdrop of the present case in support of his contention that the petitioner by filing successive applications for quashing of the proceeding is only attempting to cause delay and, has in fact, succeeded in that regard to a great extent. The case was initially filed as far back as in 1995 and more than a decade has passed with very little progress in the case so far. 21. After due consideration of all relevant facts and materials, I am of the opinion that learned Magistrate quite rightly did not consider it necessary to deal with the points raised on behalf of the petitioner once again. 21. After due consideration of all relevant facts and materials, I am of the opinion that learned Magistrate quite rightly did not consider it necessary to deal with the points raised on behalf of the petitioner once again. In fact, the Trial Court is also not left with any scope for passing an order thereby bringing an end to the present case which had been set into motion long time back. The legality of the proceeding as well as other points, as taken by the present petitioner, are certainly matters requiring adjudication and the same can very well be dealt with at the subsequent stage. 22. As the learned Court did not really choose to go into the merits of the grievances, I dont think it desirable to discuss those aspects in any further detail. In the best interest of justice, the matter is left open for the learned Court to decide. 23. It follows from the aforesaid discussion that the grievances ventilated on behalf of the petitioner do not have any legs to stand upon and the application being C.R.R. No.983 of 2006 be dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 24. Send a copy of the order to the learned Trial Court for information and necessary action. 25. Department is hereby directed to supply xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, to the learned Counsel for the parties, as expeditiously as possible. Application dismissed.