JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. History is not merely a collection of the events of the past, but a connecting link between the past and the present. In the case at hand, the Petitioner, who stands removed from the office of Syiem of Mylliem, following a referendum held by the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council to test if the Petitioner had lost confidence of the majority of his electors, has challenged the legality and validity of his removal from the said office. Whether a Syiem of a tribal society, in the State of Meghalaya, can be removed by holding referendum and, if so, how to hold the referendum and decide the out-come of the referendum are some of the vital issues raised for determination in the present writ petition. What changes have taken place, since after coming into force of the Constitution of India, in the concept of the office of the Syiem, in the tribal societies falling under the Autonomous District Council, in the State of Meghalaya, is yet another important issue raised in the present writ petition. 2. As, at the bottom of this writ petition, lies a controversy as to whether the Petitioner could have been removed from the office of Syiem of Mylliem by resorting to referendum in the manner as has been done in the present case, desirable it is that I, first, in the light of the relevant provisions of the Constitution of India and the laws enacted thereunder, ascertain as to what is the status of a Syiem in the tribal societies of the State of Meghalaya. 3. My quest for an answer to the question, as to what the status of a Syiem is, necessarily takes me to the history of the Institution of Syiem and the changes, which this Institution has undergone, particularly, with the coming into force of the constitution of India. 4. Before I deal with the facts of the present case and decide the issues raised for determination, in this writ petition, let me, for the sake of clarity, summarize the changes in the status of the office of Syiem since after coming into force of the Constitution of India. 5. Let me, at the very outset, point out that the Apex Court has considered, in T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Stem and Anr. 5. Let me, at the very outset, point out that the Apex Court has considered, in T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Stem and Anr. AIR 1961 SC 276 , the concept of the office of Syiem and clarified as to what the position of the Chiefs or Syiems in the former Khasi States were before the year 1947 and how that position has been affected by coming into force of the Constitution of India in the year 1950. 6. It may be re-called that before India gained her independence and the Constitution of India was adopted, the areas, comprising of the Khasi Hills District, barring a few villages and areas known as European Ward of Shillong, were, almost entirely, governed by the traditional system of governance under different Syiems, there being altogether 25 Syiems flourishing under the Khasi Hills District. The origin of Syiem lies in the tribal States of the Khasis. The small Khasi States were, almost in all cases, formed voluntarily by a group of villages. The heads of these Khasi States were called Syiems. Thus, the Khasi States were a kind of limited monarchy of the Syiems, where the Syiem's powers, unlike other Kings or Emperors, were severely limited and clearly circumscribed. In some of these Khasi States, the succession to the office of the Syiem had been hereditary, but in most of these States and, one may say, almost invariably, the Syiem used to be from the clan of the Syiem in a given Khasi State. The Syiem or the Chief, as they were called, used to get elected by an electoral college comprising of Myntries, who were also known as Lyngdos or Basan. These Myntries were, in turn, elected by their co-villagers of the villages concerned. In some cases, the Syiem or the Chief were also elected directly by the people; but such elections remained confined, in almost all cases, within the members of certain families commonly known as Chiefs families. The Syiem, who were so elected, managed, with the help of the Myntries in their Courts, which were popularly known as Durbar Pyllun, the business of the concerned Khasi State and exercised powers within unwritten, but well-defined limits. The Syiem, who were so elected, managed, with the help of the Myntries in their Courts, which were popularly known as Durbar Pyllun, the business of the concerned Khasi State and exercised powers within unwritten, but well-defined limits. Though the British had conquered Khasi hills, they allowed the local tribal inhabitants of the area to remain wedded to their own institutions of governance and customs and, in consequence thereof, the Syiems continued to thrive; but irrespective of the fact as to whether the office of the Syiem was hereditary or elected by electoral college or by the people, in general, the recognition of the British Government, through the Crown representative, was a condition precedent for the Chief to exercise any powers. The recognition of a Syiem was conveyed by the Crown representative by means of an order/certificate of authorization popularly known as sanad. 7. It is pertinent to note that being the centre of paramount power, the British Government, through the Crown representative, reserved to itself the right to remove the Chief in case of oppression, misconduct or dereliction of duty, though before taking such action, the customs, prevailing in the particular State regarding the ascertainment of the wishes of the electoral college or of the people, in general, were followed. The Chiefs were also under the control of the Deputy Commissioner of the district concerned. This was the position upto 15th of August, 1947, when India became a Dominion. Thereafter, the Paramountcy of the British Government lapsed and it appears that the twenty five chiefs established a Federation. Thereafter, a new relationship was established between these twenty-five Chiefs and the Government of India by means of an Instrument of Accession, which was accepted by the Governor General of India on August 17, 1948. By this Instrument, the Chiefs, individually as well as collectively, acceded, as members of the Federation, to the Domination of India with a clear understanding that all the existing administrative arrangements between the Government of India and the State of Assam, on the one hand, and the Khasi States, on the other, would continue until new or modified arrangements were made subject to certain exceptions as regard the judicial and administrative powers. This position continued till the Constitution came into force. This position continued till the Constitution came into force. There was, according to what is observed in T. Cajee (supra), no merger as such of the twenty-five Khasi States in India before January 26,1950; but the Constitution, by the First Schedule in which the territories of the State of Assam were defined, merged the Khasi States into the State of Assam, for, the State of Assam, under our Constitution, came to consist of the territories, which immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, were comprised in the province of Assam, the Khasi States and the Assam Tribal Areas excluding, however, the territories specified in the Schedule to the Assam (Alteration of Boundaries) Act, 1951. With the coming into force of the Constitution of India, the merged States of the Khasis lost their separate entities except to the extent their existence and authority were recognized and preserved by the Constitution and by the laws made under the scheme of Constitution. 8. Thus, as observed in T. Cajee (supra), by coming into force of the Constitution, the Khasi States were merged in the State of Assam and any power of the Chiefs or Syiems, so far as administration was concerned, came to an end. However, because of Article 244(2) of the Constitution of India, special provisions, contained in the Sixth Schedule thereof, were to apply to the administration of the Tribal Areas in the State of Assam. The position, therefore, after the coming into force of the Constitution, as indicated in T. Cajee (supra), was that with the merger of these twenty-five Khasi States in Assam, the Chiefs lost whatever ruling or administrative powers they had and the governance of these Khasi States was to be, now, carried on according to the provisions of the Sixth Schedule. Thus, the Sixth Schedule is a special feature of our Constitution, particularly, because it provides a scheme of governance of the tribal societies in Assam and it is out of the State of Assam that the State of Meghalaya was carved out and created by an Act of Parliament on 21.01.1972. 9. The present writ petition arises out of an area or elaka of the State of Meghalaya, which is known as Mylliem. As in the case of other Syiems, Mylliem Syiemship was also allowed to flourish by the British; but under its watchful eyes. 9. The present writ petition arises out of an area or elaka of the State of Meghalaya, which is known as Mylliem. As in the case of other Syiems, Mylliem Syiemship was also allowed to flourish by the British; but under its watchful eyes. In the year 1948, Syiem of Mylliem along with other Khasi States, as pointed out hereinabove, acceded to the Dominion of India through an Instrument of Accession, which was accepted by the then Governor General of India on 17th August, 1948, and a Khasi State Federation came into being. In course of time, as already pointed out hereinabove, these States were, under the scheme of the Constitution, merged into the State of Assam. 10. Because of the distinctive character of history and tradition and for the reason that it was considered desirable to preserve, in some respects, the tribal usages and customs of governance of the Khasi States, the office of Syiem was not completely abolished even in the case of Mylliem and, as described in T. Cajee (supra), the office of the Syiem was allowed to survive, though with severely truncated powers. In fact, as noted by the Apex Court, in T. Cajee (supra), the Syiem of Mylliem became 'no more than an administrative officer appointed by the District Council by virtue of its powers under Para 2(4) of the Sixth Schedule and working under its control. 11. It is, now, time to point out that the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India provided for setting up of, inter alia, Autonomous Districts and these Autonomous Districts could have been divided into Autonomous regions. The administration of the Autonomous Districts and the Autonomous regions were to fall under the Autonomous District council and autonomous regional council. The United Khasi and Jaintia Hills Autonomous District Council accordingly came into being on 26th January, 1952, and United Khasi and Jaintia District Council was constituted on 27th January, 1952. The administration of the Autonomous Districts and the Autonomous regions were to fall under the Autonomous District council and autonomous regional council. The United Khasi and Jaintia Hills Autonomous District Council accordingly came into being on 26th January, 1952, and United Khasi and Jaintia District Council was constituted on 27th January, 1952. The District Council has, under Sub-clause (g) of Clause (1) of paragraph 3 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, the powers to make laws with regard to appointment as well as succession of Chief or Headman and in exercise of these powers, the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council has enacted United Khasi Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Appointment and Succession of Chief and Headman) Act, 1959 (in short, 'the said Act'), which, of course, has undergone some amendments from time to time. It is this Act, which we are concerned with in the present case. 12. Following a vacancy in the office of the Syiem of Mylliem, a meeting to elect Syiem of Mylliem was held, on 03.08.1990, at Synjuk Kynthei Civil Welfare Centre, Mylliem. This meeting was attended by 43 Myntris out of the total strength of 49 Myntris, which formed the electoral college. In the meeting, so held to elect the Syiem of Mylliem, 22 electors expressed their support to the present writ Petitioner, while 21 electors supported the other contender. The writ Petitioner, Shri Laborious M. Syierri, was elected by the Myntris/electors and, on being nominated by them, to occupy the office of Syiem of Mylliem, a 'sanad', (i.e., certificate) was issued, on 17.11.1990, by the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council appointing the writ Petitioner to the post of Syiem of Mylliem and the Petitioner accordingly assumed charge of his office. 13. Though elected, originally, by the Myntris/electors, the Syiem, as indicated hereinabove, is required to be nominated by his Myntris to the office of Syiem and, on a person's appointment as Syiem, by the District Council, he becomes merely an administrative officer appointed by the District Council. Thus, the present Petitioner, Shri Laborious M. Syiem, too became, in fact, an administrative officer appointed by the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (hereinafter referred to as 'the KHADC) 14. Thus, the present Petitioner, Shri Laborious M. Syiem, too became, in fact, an administrative officer appointed by the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (hereinafter referred to as 'the KHADC) 14. In the backdrop of the scheme of governance of Syiemship and also keeping in view the system of governance under which the present Petitioner came to occupy the office of the Syiem of Mylliem, let me, now, set out, in brief, the material facts and various stages, which have led to the present writ petition. (i) On a complaint made, in writing, in the year 1997, by some of the Myntris to the KHADC against the Petitioner alleging serious malpractices, abuse of power and irregularities in the discharge of duties, a preliminary inquiry was conducted by the KHADC and, then, the Petitioner was placed under suspension by order, dated 20.03.2001, in exercise of KHADC's powers under the said Act. Thereafter, by another order, dated 22.03.2001, Latho Manik Syiem was appointed by KHADC, in exercise of its power under the said Act, as the acting Syiem until further order. The said order of suspension came to be challenged by the present writ Petitioner in WP(C) No. 41 (SH) 2001. Byjudgment and order, dated 09.11.2001, passed in WP(C) No. 41 (SH) 2001, the said suspension order, dated 20.03.2001, and subsequent Notification, dated, 22.03.2001, aforementioned, appointing Latho Manik Syiem as the acting Syiem in the Mylliem, was set aside and quashed. The KHADC challenged the judgment and order, dated 09.11.2001, aforementioned in WANo. 497 (SH) 2001; but as the appeal did not yield the desired result and the same was dismissed on 10.12.2001, the KHADC carried the matter, in appeal, to the Supreme Court of India and in Civil Appeal No. 4882/2002, arising out of SLP(C) No. 379/2002, the Apex Court, by its judgment and order, dated 09.08.2002, allowed the appeal upholding the suspension order passed against the Petitioner and the orders of the High Court were accordingly set aside and quashed leaving the KHADC with the authority to proceed with the inquiry. The KHADC appointed a Judge of a District Council Court as an inquiry officer, but during the progress of the inquiry, the complaint made against the Petitioner was withdrawn. The KHADC appointed a Judge of a District Council Court as an inquiry officer, but during the progress of the inquiry, the complaint made against the Petitioner was withdrawn. (ii) As the complaint aforementioned has been withdrawn by the complainants and yet the Petitioner had not been re-instated, the Petitioner came to this Court and sought for directions from this Court to KHADC to reinstate the Petitioner. This writ petition gave rise to WP(C) No. 95(SH) 2003 and by order, dated 10.04.2003, this Court made it clear that the pendency of the writ petition shall not be a bar for the Respondents/authorities concerned to consider the question of reinstatement of the Petitioner and pass appropriate order(s) in this regard. Subsequently, by an order, dated 22.07.2003, passed in Misc. Case No. 116 (SH) 2003, which arose out of WP(C) No. 95(SH)2003, aforementioned, the Court passed an order, dated 22.07.2003, directing the KHADC to supply a copy of the inquiry report to the writ Petitioner. On the ground that the inquiry proceedings had not been completed inasmuch as the KHADC, vide its letter, dated 30.07.2003, had summoned the complainants (who had made the complaint against the writ Petitioner) for hearing, no inquiry report was furnished to the Petitioner and the Petitioner remained without being reinstated. On 12.08.2003, a copy of the inquiry report, dated 13.12.2002, was furnished to the Petitioner. But before the inquiry report was so furnished to the Petitioner, a fresh inquiry was already ordered by KHADC, on 04.08.2003, on the basis of the allegations received from some of the Myntris against the Petitioner. (iii) The order directing the second inquiry came to be challenged by the Petitioner in WP(C) No. 241 (SH) 2004 and by an order, dated 22.03.2003, the Court, on 22.02.2004, while issuing notice of motion, stayed the order, dated 04.08.2003, aforementioned, whereby the second inquiry had been ordered. Later on, the KHADC moved a miscellaneous application in WP(C) No. 241 (SH) 2004 aforementioned, which gave rise to Miscellaneous Case No. 52(SH) 2004. Later on, the KHADC moved a miscellaneous application in WP(C) No. 241 (SH) 2004 aforementioned, which gave rise to Miscellaneous Case No. 52(SH) 2004. Contending, inter alia, that the KHADC had received three consecutive complaints against the Petitioner, the first complaint, dated 05.03.2003, having been made by 26 Myntris against the Petitioner alleging various acts of illegalities committed by the Petitioner and expressing their loss of confidence in the Petitioner, the second complaint, dated 14.07.2003, having been made by 26 Myntris stating that they had lost trust in the Petitioner and would not accept him as the Syiem of Mylliem and requesting the Executive Committee of the KHADC to terminate the appointment of the Petitioner as the Syiem of Mylliem, and the third complaint, dated 18.03.2004, having been made by 27 Myntris expressing no confidence in the Petitioner and calling for holding of a referendum, in this regard, in accordance with law, the KHADC, with the help of their said miscellaneous application, (i.e., Misc. Case No. 52 (SH) 2004 aforementioned), sought for leave of the Court of hold a referendum in accordance with law. By order, dated 07.05.2005, passed in Misc. Case No. 52 (SH) 2004 aforementioned, the Khadc was given the liberty to hold the referendum in accordance with law. A notice, under Section 6(2) of the said Act, was accordingly published by the KHADC, on 10.05.2004, fixing 14.05.2004 as the date of referendum. (iv) Aggrieved by the order, dated 07.05.2004, whereby the KHADC had been allowed to proceed with the referendum, the Petitioner preferred an appeal, which came to be registered as WA No. 176 (SH) 2004. In this writ appeal, the KHADC conceded that the order, dated 07.05.2004, aforementioned, passed in Misc. Case No. 52(SH) 2004, may be set aside as the referendum did not form part of the subject-matter in issue in WP(C) No. 241 (SH) 2004. By an order, dated 13.05.2004, passed in WA No. 176 (SH) 2004 aforementioned, the order, dated 07.05.2004, aforementioned was set aside. Since there was no order preventing or restraining the KHADC to hold a referendum on 14.05.2004, the KHADC went ahead with the referendum, on 14.05.2004, as already scheduled. By an order, dated 13.05.2004, passed in WA No. 176 (SH) 2004 aforementioned, the order, dated 07.05.2004, aforementioned was set aside. Since there was no order preventing or restraining the KHADC to hold a referendum on 14.05.2004, the KHADC went ahead with the referendum, on 14.05.2004, as already scheduled. Though the Petitioner, supported by 7 of his Myntris, made a representation to the Khadc requesting the Respondents/authorities concerned not to go ahead with the referendum on 14.5.2004, the referendum was held in the hall of the KHADC on 14.05.2004 and no confidence motion was carried out against the Petitioner. By a notification, dated 26.05.2004, the KHADC accepted the result of the referendum and terminated the service of the Petitioner. 15. It is the termination of the Petitioner's appointment to the post of Syiem of Mylliem, which is the subject-matter of challenge in the present writ petition, the case of the writ Petitioner being, briefly stated, as follows: (a) As early as in the year 1933, 25 Khasi States had formed a federation and after becoming the Syiem of Mylliem, the Petitioner became the President of the said federation. Apart from being the President of the said federation, the Petitioner is also the Vice-Chairman of Rajya Sabha Grass-Root Democracy Advisory Council. The Petitioner has also been spear-heading a movement for constitutional recognition of the customs and traditions of the Khasi States, removal of intermediaries from the scheme of governance, such as, KHADC and providing for direct funding from the Central Government to the traditional grass-root institutions for the purpose of effective implementation of the developmental projects in the tradition bound tribal areas. The Petitioner, in fact, on 31.08.1994, wrote a letter, in this regard, to the Prime Minister of India. (b) When the KHADC came to realize that the Petitioner's move would make authorities, such as, the KHADC, redundant and make the Khasi States direct recipient of the funds from the Central Government, the KHADC, with ulterior motive, decided to see the back of the Petitioner as Syiem of Mylliem and accordingly, various steps have been taken by the KHADC by orchestrating and generating false, fabricated, malicious and untruthful complaints against the Petitioner. This manifests from the fact that the Petitioner was placed under suspension, on 02.01.1999, on the strength of a preliminary inquiry conducted against him, but the full-fledged inquiry, eventually, exonerated the Petitioner. This manifests from the fact that the Petitioner was placed under suspension, on 02.01.1999, on the strength of a preliminary inquiry conducted against him, but the full-fledged inquiry, eventually, exonerated the Petitioner. The exoneration of the Petitioner of the accusations, which were levelled against him, made the Myntris demand that the Petitioner be reinstated as Syiem of Mylliem. The Petitioner was accordingly reinstated on 03.06.1999. (c) The Petitioner's suspension and the inquiry conducted against him did not subdue the Petitioner and he went ahead with his plan to realize the aim and object of the federation of the 25 Khasi States and submitted yet another Memorandum to the Prime Minister of India, on 21.01.2000, seeking, inter alia, greater autonomy for the traditional Khasi States. Infuriated, the KHADC managed to get a second complaint filed against the Petitioner by 7 Myntris on 03.10.2000, wherein allegations were made against the Petitioner regarding some irregularities and misconduct. On the strength of this falsely generated complaint, the Petitioner was placed under suspension, once again, by order, dated 23.02.2001. This suspension was challenged, on 29.03.2001, by filing WP(C) No. 41 of 2001. In this writ petition, not only that 29 Myntris refuted the allegations of misconduct against the writ Petitioner, but they even praised his functioning as Syiem of Mylliem. The Petitioner got himself impleaded as a party to this writ petition. Though the suspension of the Petitioner had been set aside and the writ appeal, preferred against the same by the KHADC, had failed, yet, on an appeal, made by the KHADC, the Apex Court set aside the orders of the High Court and allowed the inquiry to proceed. The suspension of the Petitioner, thus, continued and the inquiry proceeded. During the course of progress of this inquiry, 7 Myntris, who had lodged the complaint against Petitioner, withdrew their complaint. This withdrawal of the complaint was genuine, voluntary and without any coercion. The inquiry officer, vide the inquiry report, dated 13.12.2002, exonerated the Petitioner by holding, inter alia, that the allegations, even if proved, would not warrant dismissal of the Syiem. Instead of accepting the inquiry report, dated 13.12.2002, aforementioned, the KHADC started putting pressure on the said 7 Myntris to withdraw their representation, whereby they had withdrawn their complaint, dated 03.10.2000, aforementioned. Yielding to such pressure, 3, out of 7 Myntris, withdrew their letter of withdrawal of their complaint. Instead of accepting the inquiry report, dated 13.12.2002, aforementioned, the KHADC started putting pressure on the said 7 Myntris to withdraw their representation, whereby they had withdrawn their complaint, dated 03.10.2000, aforementioned. Yielding to such pressure, 3, out of 7 Myntris, withdrew their letter of withdrawal of their complaint. (d) Though the Petitioner, on the strength of the inquiry report, dated 13.12.2002, aforementioned, sought for being reinstated, the KHADC did not respond thereto and the Petitioner, left with no alternative, took recourse to a writ petition, which gave rise to WP(C) No. 241 (SH) 2003 and this writ petition is still pending. When the matter so rested, yet another complaint was orchestrated by the KHADC, on 05.03.2003, in which 27 Myntris, all of whom had supported the writ Petitioner in WP(C) No. 41 of 2001, made wild allegations against the Petitioner totally contradicting their stand in the earlier writ petition. On, however, 13.03.2003, 12, out of 27 Myntris, who had signed the complaint, dated 05.03.2003, aforementioned, withdrew by saying that they had been misled into filing the complaint. This withdrawal of the complaint embarrassed the KHADC and they, once again, resorted to putting pressure on the Myntris to act against the Petitioner. In order to create panic in the Myntris, who had so withdrawn their complaint on 13.03.2003, the KHADC removed one Myntry, who was in-charge of forest. Due to such pressure put by the KHADC and the impeding threat meted out by them, 9 Myntris, again, rejoined the others and submitted fourth complaint, dated 14.07.2003, reiterating the allegations made in their third complaint, dated 05.03.2003. However, 2 of the Myntris, who had refused to fall in line with the wishes of the KHADC, were removed from their respective posts of in-charge of raid market and in-charge of land administration. (e) The KHADC, then, on the basis of the third complaint, dated 03.10.2000, and its fourth orchestrated complaint, dated 05.03.2003, ordered, on 04.08.2003, a fresh inquiry. The Petitioner, then, filed another writ petition, which gave rise to WP(C) No. 241 (SH) 2003, and by interim order, dated 22.08.2003, passed therein, the fresh inquiry, so ordered, on 04.08.2003, by the KHADC, was stayed. (f) Having failed in their third attempt to dislodge the Petitioner completely from the post of the Syiem of Mylliem, the KHADC managed to receive the 5th complaint in November, 2003, and the 6th complaint, dated 18.03.2004. (f) Having failed in their third attempt to dislodge the Petitioner completely from the post of the Syiem of Mylliem, the KHADC managed to receive the 5th complaint in November, 2003, and the 6th complaint, dated 18.03.2004. The 5th complaint aforementioned, dated Nil of November, 2003, purportedly signed by 26 electors/Myntris contained a request made to the KHADC to the effect that the complaint of November, 2003, along with the affidavit sworn by the Myntris, on 30.10.2003, should be treated as referendum under Section 6(2) of the said Act and to terminate the Petitioner's appointment as the Syiem of Mylliem. In the circumstances indicated above, the KHADC moved an application, in WP(C) No. 241 (SH) 2003 (which had been filed by the Petitioner), seeking leave of the Court to hold a referendum in accordance with law. By an order passed, on 07.05.2004, in WP(C) No. 241 (SH) 2003, the learned single Judge allowed the KHADC's prayer to hold the referendum. Acting on the leave, so granted, the KHADC issued, on 10.05.2004, a notice to hold referendum under Section 6(2) of the said Act fixing 14.05.2004 as the date of the referendum. (g) The Petitioner challenged the order, dated 07.05.2004, aforementioned (whereby the KHADC had been allowed to hold referendum) in WA No. 176/2004 and to the surprise of the Petitioner, the KHADC's counsel, under a well-thought scheme, consented to the setting aside of the impugned order, dated 07.05.2004, aforementioned on the ground that the referendum was not the subject-matter in issue in WP(C) No. 241 (SH) 2003. When the KHADC's counsel, so consented, an order was passed, on 13.5.2004, in WA No. 176/2004 setting aside the order, dated 07.05.2004. Since the referendum was already slated to be held on 14.05.2004 and no time was left for the Petitioner to challenge the notification, dated 10.05.2004, scheduling the referendum on 14.05.2004, the Petitioner and 7 of his Myntris filed representations before the KHADC requesting them not to go ahead with the referendum; but the referendum was held, as scheduled, in the hall of the KHADC and in the referendum, so held, neither the Petitioner nor his said 7 Myntris were allowed to participate and it was, later on, claimed by the KHADC that the no confidence motion was carried out against the Petitioner. By impugned notification, dated 26.05.2004, the KHADC accepted the result of the referendum and terminated the Petitioner's service without giving him any notice. The referendum, so held, was against the scheme of the Constitution of India, particularly, the 6th Schedule thereof and also in contravention of the letter and spirit of the said Act. 16. Disputing the Petitioner's claim that he had been illegally removed from the office of the Syiem, the KHADC have filed an affidavit stating to the effect, inter alia, that the referendum was convened in accordance with law. In the referendum, so held, the Joint Secretary of the District Council presided over and in the referendum, so held, 27, out of the total strength of 42, Myntris/electors were present, and all of them unanimously voted in support of the no-confidence motion against the Petitioner. In addition thereto, 3 of the Myntris/electors, who could not attend the referendum, sent their letters supporting the no confidence motion. On 14.05.2004, the Petitioner and 7 Myntris/electors came to the office of the KHADC and filed representations asking the KHADC to refrain from holding the referendum; but as no judicial order had been passed by any Court staying/interfering with the holding of the referendum, the KHADC could not acceded to the requests made by the Petitioner and the said 7 Myntris/electors. On the basis of the report of the proceedings of the referendum, held on 14.05.2004, submitted by the Joint Secretary of the District Council, who had presided over the proceedings of the referendum, the Executive Committee of the KHADC discussed the matter in its meeting held on 24.05.2004 and by an order, dated 24.05.2004, the KHADC terminated the appointment of the Petitioner as Syiem of Mylliem and removed him, with immediate effect, in exercise of powers under Section 6(1)(i) read with Section 6(2) of the said Act. Pursuant thereto, notification, dated 26.05.2004, was issued by the KHADC notifying the removal of the Petitioner from the office of the Syiem of Mylliem in terms of the majority verdict of the referendum, dated 14.05.2004. Pursuant thereto, notification, dated 26.05.2004, was issued by the KHADC notifying the removal of the Petitioner from the office of the Syiem of Mylliem in terms of the majority verdict of the referendum, dated 14.05.2004. In fact, the Petitioner had challenged, in WA No. 176/2004, the notice, dated 10.05.2004, aforementioned, whereby the referendum had been convened and specific prayer for stay of the notice, dated 10.05.2004, aforementioned, had been made by the Petitioner, but the Division Bench, while setting aside the order, dated 07.05.2004, passed, in WP(C) No. 241 (SH) 2003), (whereby the referendum had been allowed to be held) did not stay the referendum. Holding of the referendum and passing of the no-confidence motion essentially from part of democratic process. In the referendum, so held, the same electoral college which had, once, nominated the Petitioner for appointment to the office of the Syiem of Mylliem, voted for the Petitioner's removal from the post of Syiem of Mylliem by expressing their no-confidence against the Petitioner. The writ Petitioner, who has, thus, been voted out of power in a democratic process, cannot have re-entry into his office after losing confidence of his electors. In consequence of the order, dated 09.08.2002, passed in Civil Appeal No. 4822/2002, upholding the suspension order, dated 22.03.2001, it is clear that the writ Petitioner did not hold the office of Syiem of Mylliem since August, 2002. However, the complaints filed against the Petitioner reveal that even though the Petitioner was out of office on being suspended, he had, unauthorizedly, during the month of September, 2002, collected huge sums of money from market and toll gates under the Syiem of Mylliem and, during the financial year 2002-2003, as much as 19,41,000/- belonging to the Syiem of Mylliem, had been illegally collected and retained by the writ Petitioner. The complaints received against the writ Petitioner reveal fresh instances of serious illegalities, financial irregularities and corruption indulged in by the writ Petitioner, not only during the period, when he had functioned as Syiem of Mylliem, but even during his suspension period. The writ Petitioner has never contradicted the allegations made against him. It is not a fact that the Petitioner and the 7 Myntris/electors supporting him had not been allowed to participate in the proceedings of the referendum. The writ Petitioner has never contradicted the allegations made against him. It is not a fact that the Petitioner and the 7 Myntris/electors supporting him had not been allowed to participate in the proceedings of the referendum. The Petitioner and his 7 Myntris/electors were, in fact, present in the office of the KHADC, when the referendum was held, because they had gone to submit the representation requesting the KHADC not to go ahead with the referendum, but their objection, upon being duly considered, was rejected. The referendum was, in fact, held in the presence of a large number of press reporters, press photographers and the entire proceedings of the referendum stood videotaped and was even telecast on local cable TV channels. The writ Petitioner and 7 Myntris/electors, on their own volition, refrained from attending the proceedings of the referendum. The referendum was held in the conference room of the KHADC instead of Durbar of the Syiem of Mylliem so that the proceedings could be conducted in orderly manner without any disturbance/undue influence whatsoever. There was no impediment, in law, in holding of the referendum. The referendum having been held in accordance with law and the verdict having been carried out in terms of the relevant provisions, the removal of the Petitioner from the office of the Syiem of Mylliem deserves to be maintained. The loss of confidence of the Myntris/electors in the Petitioner as Syiem of Mylliem cannot be made subject-matter of judicial scrutiny, particularly, in a writ proceeding. The writ Petitioner received full opportunity to defend himself during the course of the proceedings of the referendum; but he voluntarily declined to avail this opportunity to express his views in the matter before his electors. The electors, thus, as telecast live on local cable TV channel, expressed their no confidence in the Petitioner as Syiem of Mylliem and demanded his removal from the said office. The referendum, so held, cannot, therefore, be faulted. There is also no legal impediment for holding of referendum against a suspended Syiem nor was it necessary to hold referendum in the Durbar Pyllun of the Syiem of Mylliem. 17. The case of the KHADC, as reflected in their affidavit, has also been supported by 25 numbers of Myntris/electors by filing an affidavit. There is also no legal impediment for holding of referendum against a suspended Syiem nor was it necessary to hold referendum in the Durbar Pyllun of the Syiem of Mylliem. 17. The case of the KHADC, as reflected in their affidavit, has also been supported by 25 numbers of Myntris/electors by filing an affidavit. According to these Myntris/electors, the Petitioner had indulged in financial irregularities and corruption and that the majority of the electors had lost confidence in the Petitioner as Syiem of Mylliem and, on their requests, referendum, in accordance with law, was held and in the referendum, so held, the Myntris/electors, unanimously, expressed their no confidence in the Petitioner and accordingly demanded his removal. The KHADC, having acted on the proceedings of the referendum, so held, did what was warranted in law. The removal of the Petitioner may, therefore, not be interfered with. 18. I have heard Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Senior counsel, supported by Mr. H. Roy, learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, and Mr. S.S. Dey, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3.1 have also heard Mr. N. Dutta, learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the private Respondents. 19. Appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Senior counsel, has submitted that a no confidence motion cannot be moved against a Syiem, who stands suspended, for, according to Mr. Mishra, a Syiem, on being directly elected by the Myntris, becomes an ex-officio member of the general Durbar called Durbar Pyllun and, on being placed under suspension, the Syiem ceases to be ex-officio member of the general Durbar. Hence, the office of the suspended Syiem has to be treated, contends Mr. Mishra, vacant and an acting Syiem merely exercises the powers and functions of the Syiem in the absence of the elected Syiem. It is also contended by Mr. Mishra that as the suspended Syiem ceases to be ex-officio member of the general Durbar, he is rendered incapacitated from attending the general Durbar and defending himself in the general Durbar. A suspended Syiem is, thus, points out Mr. It is also contended by Mr. Mishra that as the suspended Syiem ceases to be ex-officio member of the general Durbar, he is rendered incapacitated from attending the general Durbar and defending himself in the general Durbar. A suspended Syiem is, thus, points out Mr. Mishra, cannot participate in a motion of no confidence brought against him and, hence, in the present case, when the Petitioner, as an elected Syiem, stood suspended, a no confidence motion could not have been brought against him by taking resort to the provisions of referendum contained in Section 6(2) of the said Act. 20. Bringing to the notice of this Court several provisions of the said Act, Mr. Mishra submits that the said Act does not provide any specific procedure for carrying out a vote of no confidence, but in view of the fact that an elector has the right to remove his elected representative by bringing a motion of no confidence against him, what is needed in a case, when an elected Syiem has to be removed by a motion of no confidence, is that a notice needs to be served on the Syiem to requisition the meeting and, then, the Syiem should convene the meeting of the general Durbar to discuss the motion of no confidence. A Syiem, who stands suspended, points out Mr. Mishra, cannot effectively defend himself in the general Durbr and the very purpose of holding of the no-confidence motion stands defeated if the suspended Syiem is not given the opportunity to have his say on the motion of no confidence brought against him. 21. Elaborating further his above contentions, Mr. Mishra has submitted that under the scheme of the said Act, it would be evident that the Chief has a definite role to play in case a no confidence motion is intended to be moved against him, and, ordinarily, a Chief should be requested to summon the general Durbar on a particular date and, on the request so made, the Chief would have to notify all the members about the agenda of no confidence motion and he would have the right to participate in the debate for the purpose of removing any doubt, which the Myntris might have against him, as well as to convince his electors/Myntris that their is no reason for them to lose confidence in him. Seen from this angle also, contends Mr. Seen from this angle also, contends Mr. Mishra, it is clear that a no confidence motion can be initiated and moved only against a functional Syiem and not against a Syiem, who is out of office, because of his suspension. 22. It is also submitted by Mr. Mishra that the sine qua non for exercise of powers under Section6(2) of the said Act is existence of a 'dispute' arising out of the question as to whether the Syiem has or has not lost confidence of his electors. It is contended by Mr. Mishra that in order to be a 'dispute', within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the said Act, there must be, on the one hand, a group asserting that the Syiem has lost confidence of the general Durbar or of the electors and a group, on the other, supporting the Syiem denying the correctness of the assertion that the Syiem has lost the confidence. 23. In the case at hand, points out Mr. Mishra, the KHADC called for the referendum merely on the basis of a complaint received from 27 Myntris, where they had stated to the effect that the Petitioner had lost their confidence and that they did not want the Petitioner to continue as Syiem and a request was made by them to hold a referendum. It is clear, according to Mr. Mishra, that no 'dispute' as envisaged by Section 6(2) of the said Act arose with regard the question as to whether the present Petitioner had lost the confidence of his electors or not and the KHADC merely used the said complaint as the basis for holding of the referendum, the referendum, so held, was, thus, contends Mr. Mishra, wholly without jurisdiction and the result of the referendum has to be treated as nonest in law. Explaining as to what constitutes 'dispute', Mr. Mishra places reliance on Gujrat State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. P.R. Mankad and Ors. reported in (1979) 3 SCC 123 . 24. It is further submitted by Mr. Mishra that the motion of no confidence has to be held on the floor of the house, i.e., the general Durbar of the electors, who had elected the Petitioner as their Syiem; but in the case at hand, the referendum was held at the conference hall of the KHADC. 25. It is contended by Mr. Mishra that the motion of no confidence has to be held on the floor of the house, i.e., the general Durbar of the electors, who had elected the Petitioner as their Syiem; but in the case at hand, the referendum was held at the conference hall of the KHADC. 25. It is contended by Mr. Mishra that in the light of the decision in S.R. Bommai and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. reported in (1994) 3 SCC 1 , holding of the referendum to discuss the motion of no confidence was contrary to the established position of law inasmuch as a vote of no confidence has to be decided on the floor of the House, i.e. the general Durbar of the electors, who had elected the present Petitioner as their Syiem, and, hence, the said referendum could not have been held at any place other than the Durbar Pyllun of the Syiem of Mylliem. Viewed from this angle too, submits Mr. Mishra, the referendum held, at the premises of the KHADC, was illegal and the result thereof cannot be legally acted upon. 26. It is also contended by Mr. Mishra that a 'dispute', in the context of the provisions of Section 6(2)of the said Act, assumes that a motion of no confidence, already brought against a Syiem, had been discussed at the floor of the general Durbar and it is only when, following a motion of no confidence discussed in a general Durbar, a 'dispute' is raised as to whether a Syiem has or has not lost confidence of his electors that the District Council acquires, under Section 6(2), the jurisdiction to determine the 'dispute' by holding the referendum. In the case at hand, points out Mr. Mishra, no motion of no confidence had been brought against the Petitioner and discussed at the floor of the general Durbar of the electors and the referendum, thus, having not been preceded by holding of a no confidence motion in the general Durbar of the electors, the condition precedent for exercise of powers under Section 6(2) did not exist at all. 27. It is submitted by Mr. 27. It is submitted by Mr. Mishra that the present referendum was held by the KHADC with the simple object of removing the Petitioner, who had been spear-heading a movement for improving the status of the Syiem, reducing the role and influence of the District Council and more autonomy for the Myntris at the grass-root level. The referendum held was, contends Mr. Mishra, motivated and mala fide. Holding of the present referendum is, according to Mr. Mishra, a clourable exercise of powers and since the exercise of powers was not bonafide, the result of the referendum, contends Mr. Mishra, can have no legal force. 28. Controverting the submissions made on behalf of the Petitioner, Mr. N. Dutta, learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the private Respondents, has pointed out to several provisions of the said Act and contended that for holding of a motion of no confidence, it is not necessary that a suspended Syiem must be reinstated as Syiem. Refuting the allegations made, on behalf of the Petitioner, that the referendum held was mala fide, Mr. Dutta has pointed out that as many as 27 Myntris had complained to the KHADC that because of the financial irregularities and corruption, which the Petitioner had indulged in, the Petitioner had lost their confidence as Syiem and since the Petitioner and some of the Myntris were questioning the correctness of these complaints and were contending that the Petitioner was innocent and was still enjoying the confidence of the majority of the general Durbar, a 'dispute' did exist warranting exercise of powers under Section 6(2) of the said Act and the KHADC committed no wrong in responding to the situation positively by calling for a referendum so that the referendum could have settled, once and for all, if the Petitioner was still commanding the confidence of his electors. Despite the fact that the Petitioner knew about the referendum and was present in the premises of the KHADC, he and 7 of his Myntris chose, contends Mr. Dutta, not to participate in the referendum and in the referendum, so held, all the 27 Myntris, unanimously, declared that the Petitioner did not enjoy their confidence. In such a situation, contends Mr. Dutta, the KHADC was obliged under the law to remove the Petitioner as Syiem of Mylliem and that is precisely what the KHADC has done. 29. Dutta, not to participate in the referendum and in the referendum, so held, all the 27 Myntris, unanimously, declared that the Petitioner did not enjoy their confidence. In such a situation, contends Mr. Dutta, the KHADC was obliged under the law to remove the Petitioner as Syiem of Mylliem and that is precisely what the KHADC has done. 29. Denying the accusations made by the Petitioner that the complaints against the Petitioner have been orchestrated by the KHADC and that the referendum was stage managed, Mr. Dutta submits that the proceedings of the referendum were telecast live on the cable TV and since the Petitioner has not disputed this fact, it is more than abundantly clear that the referendum held was fair and transparent and when the law provides removal of Syiem if he loses confidence of his electors, there is no legal impediment, on the part of the electors, to remove the Petitioner from the office of the Syiem by participating in the referendum. The Petitioner, submits Mr. Dutta, never agitated, at any stage, that the KHADC was not allowing him or his supporters to participate in the referendum; rather, the Petitioner, submits Mr. Dutta, felt shy to participate in the referendum and without participating in the referendum, the Petitioner sought to contend that he still enjoyed the confidence of his electors. 30. Mr. Dutta has contended that there is no sanctified place for either electing the Syiem or for holding of referendum. This is, points out Mr. Dutta, clear from the fact that the Petitioner was elected not in Durbar Pyllun and no wrong was committed by the KHADC in holding the referendum in the conference hall of the KHADC, particularly, when neither the Petitioner nor his supporters, before filing the writ petition, ever alleged to have been stopped from participating in the referendum. The Petitioner, according to Mr. Dutta, did not participate in the referendum at his own peril and if this Court finds that the referendum held was in accordance with law, there is no reason to interfere with the result of the referendum merely on the ground that the Petitioner did not participate in the proceedings of the referendum. 31. It is further submitted by Mr. Dutta, did not participate in the referendum at his own peril and if this Court finds that the referendum held was in accordance with law, there is no reason to interfere with the result of the referendum merely on the ground that the Petitioner did not participate in the proceedings of the referendum. 31. It is further submitted by Mr. Dutta that the scheme of the said Act does not envisage that a referendum must preceded by a vote of no confidence against a Syiem in Durbar Pyllun and/or that a dispute must arise at the floor of the general Durbar as to whether the Syiem has or has not lost confidence of his electors. A 'dispute', in this regard, according to Mr. Dutta, can arise in a variety of circumstances and in the present case, a clear 'dispute' according to Mr. Dutta, did exist as to whether the Petitioner still enjoyed the confidence of his electors and to set at rest this controversy, when the KHADC has held the referendum, such a referendum cannot be said to be illegal and without jurisdiction. The Petitioner has not, submits Mr. Dutta, made out any case for interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction and the writ petition may, therefore, be dismissed with costs. 32. Adopting the above arguments of Mr. dutta, Mr. S.S. Dey, learned Counsel for the KHADC, has pointed out that the electoral college, which elects a Syiem, does not include the Syiem and, hence, it is the electors, who have to decide if a Syiem has or has not lost their confidence, and in a motion of no confidence, the Syiem, not being within the electoral college, has no right to cast any vote. In the case at hand, submits Mr. Dey, the Petitioner, despite being notified, deliberately refrained from participating in the proceedings of the referendum and if he had really been obstructed from participating in the proceedings of the referendum, he could have made a complaint, in this regard, to the KHADC or he could have asked the KHADC to allow him to participate in the referendum. The Petitioner, points out Mr. Dey, did nothing of the sort. It is further submitted by Mr. The Petitioner, points out Mr. Dey, did nothing of the sort. It is further submitted by Mr. Dey that if the Petitioner really wanted to participate in the proceedings of the referendum, he could have, instead of making a representation to the KHADC not to hold the referendum, either at that point of time or prior thereto, requested the KHADC to allow him to participate in the referendum. The Petitioner, emphasizes Mr. Dey, did not intentionally participate in the proceedings of the referendum, for, he knew, according to Mr. Dey, that the majority of the electors had no trust in him and the Petitioner was only interested in stopping the referendum by any means rather than facing the same boldly and refute the allegations levelled against him. The writ petition, therefore, pleads Mr. Dey, be dismissed on the ground that it is based on completely distorted and false assertions and does not make out any case at all of any illegality and infirmity having crept in, while holding the referendum, in question. 33. Because of the fact that it has been seriously contended, on behalf of the Petitioner, that by holding a referendum under the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the said Act, a non-functional or suspended Syiem cannot be removed from his office on the ground that he has lost the confidence of his electors and also because of the fact that it has been emphasized, on behalf of the Petitioner, that before a referendum against a suspended Syiem is held, the Syiem has to be reinstated and made functional and, further, that a referendum under Sub-section (2) of Section 6must precede a discussion on the motion of no confidence at the floor of Durbar Pyllun and if, upon holding of a discussion on the motion of no confidence in Durbar Pyllun, a dispute, following the discussion on such motion of no confidence, arises as to whether or not the Syiem has lost confidence of the majority of his electors and such a dispute is required to be resolved by holding of a referendum and testing thereby as to whether or not the Syiem has really lost confidence of the majority of his electors, it is clear that the case of the writ Petitioner substantially revolves around Section 6 of the said Act. To put it differently, it is Section 6 of the said Act, which functions as a pivot around which revolves the case of the Petitioner. Necessary, therefore, it is that we, first, take into account as to what Section 6, read as a whole, conveys. For this purpose, let me, reproduce hereinbelow, Section 6, which, I find, runs as follows: 6. Removal and Suspension of Chiefs: The Chief may be removed from office or suspended by the Executive Committee if in its opinion. (a) he violates any of the terms and conditions of his appointment; Or (b) he violates any of the laws, regulations, rules and the resolutions passed by the Council; Or (c) he refuses to carry out the orders and instructions issued by the Executive Committee; Or (d) he is found to be mentally unfit to carry out his functions; Or (e) has been incapable of carrying on the administration to the satisfaction of the Executive Committee due to ill health, old age or habitual drunkenness; Or (f) he violates any customary rights and practices prevailing in the Elaka concerned and duly approved by the Executive Committee; Or (g) he has been convicted of an offences involving moral turpitude; Or (h) has been oppressed the people of the Elaka and they have just cause for dissatisfaction with his misrule; Or (i) he has lost the confidence of the majority of his electors or of the people of the Elaka; Or (j) he is an undischarge insolvent; Or Or (k) he does not reside within the Elaka; Or Or (l) he has been conducting himself in a manner derogatory to his office or pre-judicial to the interest of the Elaka or part thereof; (m) has been conducing himself in a manner which may undermine the authority of the Executive Committee of the District Council; Provided that every such case shall be placed before the Council in its next Session; Provided further that no Chief shall be removed from office or punished with suspension unless he is given an opportunity of being heard; Provided further that the requirements of the second proviso above shall not apply- (i) in the case where the order of removal or punishment or suspension is awarded on account of his being convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude; (ii) in the case of order of suspension pending inquiry. 34. 34. A careful reading of Clauses (a) to (m) of Sub-section (1) of Section 6 clearly shows that the grounds on which a Syiem can be suspended are also the grounds on which he can be removed. 35. Is it, therefore, necessary that if a Chief is required to be removed under any of the Clauses of Sub-section (1) of Section 6, he must, if he is under suspension, be reinstated? The answer to this question has to be an emphatic 'no', for, Sub-section (1) of Section 6 shows that a Syiem can be suspended if he is found to be mentally unfit to carry out his functions. If a person is found to be mentally unfit to carry out his functions, the question of reinstating him for the purpose of enabling the District Council to remove him from the office of the Chief does not arise at all. Similarly, a Syiem can be suspended if he has been convicted of offences involving moral turpitude. Should, in such a case, the Syiem be, first, reinstated before a proceeding to remove him can be initiated? The answer to this question too has to be in the negative, for, a person, who is suspended on the ground that he stands convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, need not be reinstated for the purpose of enabling the District Council to initiate a proceeding for his removal from office. As a matter of fact, the second proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 6 clarifies that if a Chief has to be removed on account of the fact that he stands convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, he need not even be given an opportunity of being heard. 36. What surfaces from the above discussion is that a Syiem can, under a given set of circumstances, be removed by the District Council after giving him an opportunity of hearing; but there may be many circumstances in which the Syiem, who is sought to be removed, is a non-functional or suspended Syiem and in such cases, the Syiem need not be reinstated for the purpose of enabling the District Council to remove him from his office. 37. 37. The question, therefore, which, now, arises, is this : For the purpose of holding a referendum against a Syiem to determine if he has or he has not lost confidence of his electors, is it mandatory that the Syiem be a functional Syiem or, if the Syiem is under suspension, he be, first, reinstated? While considering this crucial question, what needs to be noted is that there maybe a Syiem, who is found to be mentally unfit and is placed under suspension and because of the fact that he is mentally unfit, a dispute arises, amongst the electors, as to whether the suspended Syiem should any longer be continued and this controversy, in turn, leads to a 'dispute', among the electors, if the Syiem commands any longer confidence of his electors. Will it, in such a case, be necessary that the suspended Syiem be reinstated and referendum be held to make the Syiem face the vote of no confidence? The answer to this question has to be an unhesitant 'no', for, a person, who is mentally unfit, cannot be reinstated merely for the purpose of enabling the District Council to hold referendum on the question as to whether the suspended Syiem has or has not lost the confidence of his electors following his mental illness. In short, if following the suspension of a Syiem on the ground that he is mentally unfit to carry out his functions, a dispute arises as to whether the Syiem is mentally unfit and as to whether, on account of his being mentally unfit, he has lost the confidence of his electors or not, such a person cannot, need not and must not be reinstated only to enable the District Council to hold a referendum in terms of Sub-section (6) of Section 6. 38. 38. Similarly, if a Syiem is placed under suspension on the ground that he has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude and if, following the Syiem's conviction, a dispute, amongst the electors, arises as to whether the suspended Syiem has or has not lost the confidence of his electors due to his involvement in, and conviction for, an offence of moral turpitude, would it be necessary for the District Council, to, first, reinstate such a suspended Syiem to enable the District Council to hold a referendum on the question as to whether the suspended Syiem still commands the confidence of the majority of his electors or not? The answer to this question has also to be in the negative. 39. Coupled with the above, there may also be an occasion, when a Syiem is suspended, in terms of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 6, for not following any law, regulation, rules and resolution passed by the Council. Would such a violator of law be required to be reinstated as Syiem for the purpose of enabling the District Council to hold an enquiry or a disciplinary proceeding and remove the Syiem from his office? The answer to this question has to be, undoubtedly, 'no', for, in the light of the pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in T Cajee (supra), the Syiem is nothing; but an administrative officer and can be removed by drawing disciplinary proceeding. Now, assume a situation in which following the suspension of a Syiem under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section6 as indicated hereinbefore, a controversy, among the electors, arises as to whether the Syiem has, on account of his such conduct, lost the confidence of the majority of his electors and this dispute is required to be resolved by holding referendum. Should one say, in such a case, that the Syiem has to be, first, reinstated, he should be, first, allowed to convene a Durbar Pyllun to discuss the motion of no confidence brought against him and if, even after holding of such Durbar Pyllun, the dispute continues, it is then only that the District Council can take recourse to holding of referendum? The answer to this momentous question has to be a complete 'no', for, a person, who has been suspended under Clause (b), cannot be made functional merely to hold referendum to determine if he, notwithstanding his refusal to follow the laws, regulations, rules and resolutions passed by the Council, still commands confidence of the majority of his electors or not. 40. While considering the above aspects of the case, what also needs to be borne in mind is that if a suspended Syiem is reinstated, the effect would be that he becomes a Chief and he can exercise all such powers, which a Chief has. There is absolutely no provision under the said Act to show that though a suspended Syiem is reinstated and made functional, he can still be stopped from functioning as a regular Chief except for the purpose of enabling him to participate in the proceedings of the referendum held on the ground as to whether he has or he has not lost the confidence of his electors. In fact, once a person is reinstated as Syiem he, in the absence of any law or customs, cannot, with the help of a mere resolution, be restrained by the District Council from exercising the full-fledged powers of Syiem, for, the power to impose such restrictions is not envisaged under the provisions of the said Act. 41. There can, thus, be a large number of circumstances in which even a suspended Syiem may have to face a referendum on the question as to whether he has or he has not lost the confidence of his electors. In such cases, reinstatement of the Syiem will not be necessary. 42. In short, thus, it is permissible to hold, in certain circumstances, referendum, in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 6, even against a suspended Syiem. 43. There can be no doubt, as rightly pointed by Mr. Mishra, learned Senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner, that the words 'any dispute', occurring in Section 6(2), indicate that there has to be a 'dispute' of the kind as Sub-section (2) of Section 6 envisages and, hence, a 'dispute', in the context of Section 6(2), would mean that one group of electors asserts that the Syiem has lost their confidence and the other group of electors asserts that the Syiem still commands confidence of the majority of his electors. It is, no doubt, true that in P.R. Mankad's case (supra), the Supreme Court has held, "As regards the first test, it is to be noted that the expression "any dispute" has not been defined in the Acts of 1925 and 1961. The term "dispute" means a controversy having both positive and negative aspects. It postulates, the assertion of a claim by one party and its denial by the other." 44. The question, now, is as to whether there was, in the present case, a dispute with regard to the fact as to whether the Petitioner, as Syiem of Mylliem, has lost the confidence of majority of his electors? In this regard, Mr. Mishra's contention is that there was no dispute, for, there was no assertion by any elector that the Petitioner had lost confidence of the majority of his electors and there was no formal denial of this assertion by the Petitioner and/or by his supporting Myntris. 45. For testing the correctness of Mr. Mishra's above contention, let us concentrate on the factual matrix of the present case. 46. In the case at hand, there was, admittedly, a complaint made by as many as 27 Myntries out of total number of 42 (who had elected the present Petitioner as their Syiem) regarding his various alleged acts of omission and commission and, at the same time, information was also given by these Myntris to the KHADC that the Petitioner had lost confidence of the majority of his electors and a request was made by the Myntris to hold a referendum. It is not material, in this writ petition, if these accusations made against the Petitioner were or were not true, for, in this writ petition, the Court would not be able to determine the veracity or otherwise of the allegations levelled against the Petitioner. What is material is that it was the assertion of a group of the Myntries that because of his various Acts of omission and commission, the Petitioner had lost the confidence of the majority of his electors and this information was laid before the KHADC. It is also clear from the materials on record that the Petitioner, at all points of time, claimed that he was being harassed by the KHADC with ulterior motive meaning thereby that repeated complaints made against him were being orchestrated at the behest of the KHADC. It is also clear from the materials on record that the Petitioner, at all points of time, claimed that he was being harassed by the KHADC with ulterior motive meaning thereby that repeated complaints made against him were being orchestrated at the behest of the KHADC. This stand of the Petitioner had the support of, at least, seven Myntries. Inherent in this plea of innocence was an assertion that all allegations and complaints, which had been surfacing against the Petitioner, were stage-managed by the KHADC and that notwithstanding such orchestrated complaints the Petitioner still enjoyed the confidence of his electors. Embedded in this plea of innocence of the Petitioner was, thus, an implied assertion that the Petitioner still commanded the confidence of his electors. In the circumstances, such as the present one, it cannot be said that there was no 'dispute' with regard to the fact as to whether the Petitioner, as Syiem, had or had not lost the confidence of his electors. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the District Council did not have the jurisdiction or power to hold a referendum to ascertain if the Petitioner has or has not really lost the confidence of the majority of his electors. The submission, therefore, made on behalf of the Petitioner, that there was no 'dispute', within the meaning of the word 'any dispute' occurring in Sub-section (2), has no force at all. 47. It may also be pointed out that it is the contention of Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner, that the purpose of incorporating the provisions of referendum in the said Act was to give the KHADC supervisory powers to hold referendum if, in case a motion of no confidence, already brought against a functional Syiem, fails in Durbar Pyllun, but the controversy as to whether the Syiem has or has not lost the confidence of the majority of his electors still continues on the allegation that the motion of no confidence had not been properly discussed and/or allowed to be carried out. In short, recourse to the provisions of the referendum can be had, according to Mr. Mishra, only when there is a dispute as to whether a no confidence motion, already brought against a functional Syiem, has or has not been really carried out. In short, recourse to the provisions of the referendum can be had, according to Mr. Mishra, only when there is a dispute as to whether a no confidence motion, already brought against a functional Syiem, has or has not been really carried out. To my mind, the submissions so made, on behalf of the Petitioner, would make this Court to read into the provisions of Section 6, particularly, Sub-section (2) thereof, much more than what the legislative intent apparently is. On a plain reading of Section 6, as a whole, it becomes transparent that there may be a case, where a requisition is given by the electors to the Syiem to convene Durbar Pyllun to discuss a motion of no confidence against the Syiem, and the Syiem, on receiving such a requisition, refuses to hold a meeting of the general Durbar for discussing the motion of no confidence. In such a case, for his refusal to allow the motion of no confidence to be discussed, the KHADC can, in a suitable case, in the light of the provisions of Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 6, direct the Chief to allow discussion on the motion of no confidence brought against him and in such a case, if the Syiem refuses to carry out such a direction or order given by the KHADC, the Syiem can be placed under suspension in terms of Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 6. If, in such a situation, the electors start disputing as to whether the Chief has really lost confidence of his electors or not, there can be no impediment, on the part of the KHADC, to hold, under its supervision, a referendum to decide if the Chief has really lost confidence of his electors. Holding of such a referendum would not require that the Chief, who has been suspended for his refusal to carry out the instructions issued by the KHADC, be reinstated for the purpose of holding a sustainable referendum. There can, thus, be several occasions, when the KHADC has to determine if the Chief has or has not lost confidence of majority of his electors and for this purpose, it would not be necessary to reinstate a suspended Chief. There can, thus, be several occasions, when the KHADC has to determine if the Chief has or has not lost confidence of majority of his electors and for this purpose, it would not be necessary to reinstate a suspended Chief. In short, I am unable to read any limitation or restriction imposed by the said Act on the powers of the KHADC to hold, in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 6, referendum against a suspended Syiem. 48. Turning to the question as to whether a referendum could have been held at a place other than Durbar Pyllun, what may be noted is that an electoral college, in terms of Section 2(h) of the said Act, means 'a body of such persons as have been declared qualified to elect a Chief under any Act, Regulation or Rules made by the District Council or under such customary practice as may be recognized by the Executive Committee to be prevailing in Elaka concerned'. The word custom, with reference to any Elaka, means, according to Section 2(b) of the said Act, 'any rule regarding the appointment of a Chief or Headmen for the Elaka, which having been continuously and uniformly observed for a long time, has obtained the force of law in that Elaka'. 49. A careful and combined reading of Clauses 2(b) and 2(h) of the said Act clearly reveals that a Chief is elected by an electoral college in accordance with the customary practice, which is followed with regard to appointment of the Chief in the Elaka, i.e., the area concerned. This custom may require election of the Chief by the elected representative, such as, persons, who are headmen within the meaning of Section 2(k), or by the people, in general, of the Elaka. In other words, a chief can be directly elected by the people of the Elaka or he may be elected by the headmen or the village elders. This is evident from the fact that Clause (i) of Sub-section (1) of Section 6 clearly provides that a Chief may be removed if he has lost the confidence of the majority of his electors or of the people of the Elaka. This is evident from the fact that Clause (i) of Sub-section (1) of Section 6 clearly provides that a Chief may be removed if he has lost the confidence of the majority of his electors or of the people of the Elaka. Similarly, a minute reading of Sub-section (2) of Section 6, which provides for referendum, clearly states that if any dispute 'arises as to whether the Chief has or has not lost the confidence of the majority of the electors or of the people of the Elaka, as provided in Clause (i) of subsection (1), the Executive Committee may, if it deems necessary, hold and conduct a referendum consisting of the electors of the Elaka or of the people of the Elaka, as the case may be, and take appropriate action on the basis of a simple majority of the result of such a referendum. A minute reading of the emphasized words 'of the electors or of the people of the Elaka', occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section 6, clearly shows that a Chief may, in a given case, lose confidence of the majority of the electors or of the people of the Elaka. If a Chief loses confidence of the majority of his electors or people of the Elaka, then, in either case, there can be a referendum, provided that there is a dispute whether he has really lost confidence of the majority of the electors or of the people of the Elaka. Darbar Pyllun, as defined in Section 2(g), means 'a Durbar Hima or a general Durbar of the Elaka to be convened (by the Chief) within 30 days from the date that a requisition is made by not less than one-third of the members of the Durbar as defined in Clause (f) of Section 2, or by no less than 50 adult male residents of the Elaka; provided that the Executive Committee approves the agenda and/or purpose for which the meeting of the Durbar is sought to be requisitioned.' 50. Abare reading of Section 2(g) shows that Durbar Pyllun is the general Durbar, which has to be convened by the Chief within 30 days from the date, when he receives a requisition by not less than 1/3rd of the members of the Durbar. Durbar Pyllun would, thus be convened by the Chief following the requisition given to him in terms of Section 2(g). Durbar Pyllun would, thus be convened by the Chief following the requisition given to him in terms of Section 2(g). The Executive Committee of the KHADC has no power to convene Durbar Pyllun. Does this mean that the Executive Committee of the KHADC has to hold referendum through the Chief? The answer to this question has to be in the negative, for, while the Executive Committee can direct a Chief to allow a vote of no confidence to be discussed and debated by convening a Durbar, it has no power to direct the Chief to hold the referendum. The referendum has to be, therefore, held by the Khadc itself. There can be no sanctified place for holding of such a referendum. In a given case, even the people of the entire Elaka may have to participate in a referendum and such a referendum cannot, therefore, be held in Durbar Pyllun. 51. Coupled with what has been pointed out hereinabove, the election of the Petitioner was, admittedly, not held in Durbar Pyllun; hence, there is no reason why the referendum cannot be held within the precincts of KHADC. As already pointed out above, there is nothing in the said Act to indicate that there is any sanctified place for holding of the referendum. Hence, the question of holding of the referendum on the floor of the House, i.e. Durbar Pyllun, as contended by Mr. Mishra, does not arise at all. 52. We have to also bear in mind the meaning and import of the word 'referendum'. To ascertain the views of the people on any issue or matter is called referendum. When the consent or rejection of the people is sought m regard to any bill or policy, then, it is put to the vote of the people and this system is called referendum. Clarifying the meaning of referendum, Zurcher writes, "Referendum is essentially an instrument, which permits the people to vote or approve Acts of representative assemblies." 53. The word referendum has a historical background. To realize the significance of the history of referendum, what needs to be noted is that there are two forms of democracy. In most of the countries, all the people do not take part in all the works of the administration, but the representatives, elected by the people, make laws, determine policies and carry on administrative works. This form of democracy is called 'indirect'; democracy. In most of the countries, all the people do not take part in all the works of the administration, but the representatives, elected by the people, make laws, determine policies and carry on administrative works. This form of democracy is called 'indirect'; democracy. In some countries, however, people directly take part in public works, make laws and determine the policies of the Government. They, in fact, appoint the officials and make declarations of peace and war. This form of democracy is called 'direct' democracy. In ancient time, direct democracy existed in many States of Greece. In the modern era, due to big size and large population, many countries have adopted indirect democracy in place of direct democracy, but in Switzerland, in the Cantons of Uri, Appenzle, Unter Walden and Glarus, etc, there exists, even today, direct democracy. In these Cantons, the people take direct part in the making of the laws and perform other administrative works. In order to perform these works, an open air assembly is called, which is known as Landsgemcinde. Those Cantons, which have not adopted this form of direct democracy, have also adopted different means of direct democracy, such as, referendum. 54. In the backdrop of the meaning, history and import of the word 'referendum', as indicated hereinabove, when I revert to the said Act, what attracts my eyes, most prominently, is that when any dispute arises as to whether the Chief has or has not lost the confidence of the majority of the electors or of the people of the Elaka as provided in Clause (i) of Sub-section (1) of Section 6, the Executive Committee may, if deems necessary, hold and conduct a referendum consisting of the electors of the Elaka or of the people of the Elaka, as the case may be, and take appropriate action on the basis of the simple majority of the result of such a referendum. 55. What, therefore, with the help of a referendum, the KHADC has to ascertain is the views of the electors or of the people of the Elaka as regards the question as to whether the Chief has or has not lost the confidence of the majority of his electors or people of the Elaka, as the case may be. 55. What, therefore, with the help of a referendum, the KHADC has to ascertain is the views of the electors or of the people of the Elaka as regards the question as to whether the Chief has or has not lost the confidence of the majority of his electors or people of the Elaka, as the case may be. For determination of such an issue, there can be no sanctified place; but what must be ensured if a referendum is to be held is that the referendum held is fair and transparent. In the case at hand, it is not deputed that the entire proceedings of the referendum were telecast live on the TV Channel. While the Petitioner objected to the holding of the referendum, he refrained from participating in the proceedings of the referendum. There was no complaint made by the Petitioner to the Executive Committee of the KHADC, either before or at the time, when the referendum was being held, that he was not being allowed to participate in the proceedings of the referendum nor did the Petitioner, at any point of time thereafter, complained or represented to the KHADC that he had not been allowed to participate in the referendum. Far from this, the Petitioner's stand had all along been that the referendum was without jurisdiction and he, having been placed under suspension, cannot participate in the proceedings of the referendum. It is only in this writ petition that the Petitioner has contended to the effect that he had not been allowed to participate in the proceedings of the referendum. The KHADC has, however, seriously disputed the correctness of this assertion of the Petitioner. At any rate, therefore, the question as to whether the Petitioner was or was not allowed to participate in the proceedings of the referendum is a seriously disputed question of fact and such a disputed question of fact, which requires elaborate investigation or roving enquiry, is not, ordinarily, permissible in a writ jurisdiction. At any rate, therefore, the question as to whether the Petitioner was or was not allowed to participate in the proceedings of the referendum is a seriously disputed question of fact and such a disputed question of fact, which requires elaborate investigation or roving enquiry, is not, ordinarily, permissible in a writ jurisdiction. Nothing could be submitted, on behalf of the Petitioner, to show that the present one is an exceptional case in which an enquiry is required to be made as to whether the Petitioner was really allowed to participate in the proceedings of the referendum or not, particularly, when the proceedings of the referendum were telecast live and was held in the presence of the media and no complaint is shown to have been made by anyone except the Petitioner and seven of his supporting Myntries, and that too in this writ petition, against the fairness or transparency of the referendum so held. 56. Above all, what one has to bear in mind, in a case of present nature, is that though a Syiem is, initially, elected, what the electoral college, on electing a person as Syiem, does is that it, as indicated in T. Cajee (supra), nominates such a person for appointment as Syiem and it is, thereafter that the Executive Committee of the KHADC appoints the person concerned as Syiem and, on such appointment, the Syiem becomes a mere administrative officer, who has to carry out his functions consistent with the provisions of the said Act. At the root of this system lies the essence of the democracy. When out of 42 Myntris, as many as 27 Myntris have, unanimously, expressed their views that the Petitioner has lost their confidence, there can be no difficulty in drawing the conclusion that the Petitioner had lost confidence of the majority of his electors. In a situation, such as this, there is absolutely no reason for this Court to interfere, in exercise of its powers under Article 226, with the result of the referendum held, in this regard, particularly, when no infirmity in holding of the referendum could be convincingly shown by the Petitioner. 57. With regard to the submission made by Mr. In a situation, such as this, there is absolutely no reason for this Court to interfere, in exercise of its powers under Article 226, with the result of the referendum held, in this regard, particularly, when no infirmity in holding of the referendum could be convincingly shown by the Petitioner. 57. With regard to the submission made by Mr. Mishra, learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner, that as held in S.R. Bommai (supra), the test to determine the question as to whether a Council of Ministers or a person has or has not lost the confidence of the majority of the legislators or electors is a floor test, what may be noted is that with regard to the question as to whether the floor test is the only way to determine if a Council of Ministers has or has not lost the confidence of the legislators, the relevant observations made by the majority, in paragraphs 119 and 395 of the decision in S.R. Bommai (supra), are as follows: 119. In this connection, it is necessary to stress that in all cases where the support to the Ministry is claimed to have been withdrawn by some legislators, the proper course for testing the strength of the Ministry is holding the test on the floor of the House. That alone is the constitutionally ordained forum for seeking openly and objectively the claims and counter a claims in that behalf. The assessment of the strength of the Ministry is not a matter of private opinion of any individual, be he the Governor or the President. It is capable of being demonstrated and ascertained publicly in the House. Hence when such demonstration is possible, it is not open to bypass it and instead depend upon the subjective satisfaction of the Governor or the President. Such private assessment is an anathema to the democratic principle, apart from being open to serious objections of personal mala fides. It is possible that on some rare occasions, the floor-test may be impossible, although it is difficult to envisage such situation. Even assuming that there arises one, it should be obligatory on the Governor in such circumstances, to state in writing, the reasons for not holding the floor-test. It is possible that on some rare occasions, the floor-test may be impossible, although it is difficult to envisage such situation. Even assuming that there arises one, it should be obligatory on the Governor in such circumstances, to state in writing, the reasons for not holding the floor-test. The High Court was, therefore, wrong in holding that the floor-test was neither compulsory nor obligatory or that it was not a prerequisite to sending the report to the President recommending action under Article 356(1). Since we have already referred to the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission in this connection, it is not necessary to repeat them here. 395. The High Court, in our opinion, erred in holding that the floor test is not obligatory. If only one keeps in mind the democratic principle underlying the Constitution and the fact that it is the Legislative Assembly that represents the will of the people--and not Governor the position would be clear beyond any doubt. In this case, it may be remembered that the Council of Ministers not only decided on April 20, 1989 to convene the Assembly on 27th of that very month, i.e., within 7 days, but also offered to prepone the Assembly if the Governor so desired. It pains us to note that the Governor did not choose to Act upon the said offer. Indeed, it was his duty to summon the Assembly and call upon the Chief Minister to establish that he enjoyed the confidence of the house. Not only did he not do it but when the Council of Ministers offered to do the same, he demurred and chose instead to submit the report to the President. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the Governor's report contained, or was based upon, relevant material. There could be no question of the Governor making an assessment of his own. The loss of confidence of the House was an objective fact, which could have been demonstrated, one way or the other, on the floor of the House. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the Governor's report contained, or was based upon, relevant material. There could be no question of the Governor making an assessment of his own. The loss of confidence of the House was an objective fact, which could have been demonstrated, one way or the other, on the floor of the House. In our opinion, wherever a doubt arises whether the Council of Ministers has lost the confidence of the House, the only way of testing it is on the floor of the House except in an extraordinary situation where because of all-pervasive violence, the Governor comes to the conclusion--and records the same in his report--that for the reasons mentioned by him, a free vote is not possible in the House. 58. From a very cautious reading of the above observations made in S.R. Bommai (supra), which reflect the views of the majority what emerges is that ordinarily and except in extra-ordinary circumstances, the test for determining the question as to whether the Council of Ministers has or has not lost confidence and support of the majority of the legislators shall be on the floor of the House. This, in turn, clearly shows that there may be, though rare, circumstances, when holding of no confidence motion on the floor of the House may not be possible. It is, therefore, not correct, as contended by Mr. Mishra, that the only place to test the question as to whether a person has or has not lost the confidence of the majority of the electors is the floor-test in the House, i.e., the Durbar Pyllun, in the present case; more so, when I have already pointed out above that a motion of no confidence can be convened in terms of Section 2(g) of the said Act by the Syiem or the Chief and not the Executive Committee of the KHADC. Though the KHADC can direct a Chief to convene Durbar Pyllun for discussing the motion of no confidence, the fact remains that such convening of Durbar Pyllun would be possible only when the Syiem is functional and not under suspension. Neither, when the Syiem is functional, nor, when the Syiem is non-functional because of his suspension, the KHADC has the power under the said Act to convene Durbar Pyllun to discuss the motion of no confidence. Neither, when the Syiem is functional, nor, when the Syiem is non-functional because of his suspension, the KHADC has the power under the said Act to convene Durbar Pyllun to discuss the motion of no confidence. The resultant effect of this limitation, imposed on the KHADC, is that the KHADC has to hold a referendum, at a place, where it can conduct and supervise the holding of a fair and transparent referendum. 59. What may also be noted, if I may hasten to point out, is that while a 'floor-test', which is essentially a concept of indirect democracy, is held in order to determine as to whether an indirectly elected representative does or does not enjoy the confidence of the House of the elected representatives, a 'referendum' is a concept of direct democracy, which involves participation of the people, in general, in order to let the Government know as to what the views of the people, in general, or the majority of the people on a given issue is. Since 'referendum', in an indirect form of democracy, is held to elicit or determine the views of the people on a given issue, a referendum need not necessarily be confined to the determination of the question as to whether an elected representative does or does not enjoy the confidence of the people. A 'referendum', therefore, need not necessarily be held on the floor the House. 60. In the case at hand, what was held is not merely a motion of no confidence on the floor of House, i.e. Durbar Pyllun, but a referendum, and such a referendum, has to be held, as already indicated hereinabove, outside the Durbar Pyllun, for, the KHADC does not have the power to convene the Durbar Pyllun. 61. At any rate, the referendum is held, as already indicated above, for the purpose of determining the views of the majority of the electors or of the people of a given area. In the case at hand, the majority of the electors have clearly expressed their views to the effect that the Petitioner does not command their confidence. Such a precise verdict given by the majority of the electors, in a democratic institution, may not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its powers under Article226 except in extra ordinary cases. Such a precise verdict given by the majority of the electors, in a democratic institution, may not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its powers under Article226 except in extra ordinary cases. The present one is not a case, which can be described, either in fact or in law, as an extraordinary case. 62. What may also be noted is that the Petitioner has made a number of allegations against the KHADC and has also contended that all the complaints against him have been engineered and orchestrated by the KHADC. These assertions of the Petitioner have been disputed by the KHADC and also by the private Respondents. The question as to whether the complaints made against the Petitioner were founded on truth or not is an intensely disputed question of fact and such a disputed question of fact requires roving enquiry and detailed investigation. I am afraid that the present one is not one of such cases, where this Court shall hold or conduct any enquiry or investigation to determine as to whether there is any grain of truth in the allegations levelled against the Petitioner and/or whether the complaints lodged against him have or have not been engineered and/or orchestrated by the KHADC. On the ground, therefore, that the complaints, in question, are based on falsehood and the conduct of the KHADC suffers from mala fide, no interference, in the context of the peculiar facts of the present case, is possible by this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226of the Constitution of India. 63. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, I do not find that the Petitioner has been able to make out any case for interference by this Court in exercise of its powers under Article226 of the Constitution of India. 64. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, this writ petition fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 65. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed