Judgment Ajay Rastogi, J.-Petitioner has assailed order dated 06.02.1990 (Exhibit-6), whereby he has been punished with different penalties under each of charges after a regular inquiry under Arvali Kshtrya Gramin Bank (Staff) Service Regulations, 1982 (“1982 Regulations”), which was upheld by appellate authority vide order dated 10/01/1991 (Exhibit-11). 2. Petitioner joined service of Arvali Kshtrya Gramin Bank (“respondent Bank”) on 30.10.1982. While posted as Manager of respondent Banks Branch at Mandiya (Tonk), he was suspended vide order dated 16.02.1988, and charge-sheet dated 08.07.1988 (Exhibit-1) was issued for alleged misconduct under Clause 30 and for breach of Banks instructions, Clauses 19 and 22 of 1982 Regulations. Petitioner denied allegations imputed against him by reply dated 23.09.1988 (Exhibit-2). In course of regular inquiry, petitioner made oral request to provide him services of one Shri Ranjan Gandhi as his defence assistant, which according to him was permitted by inquiry officer but information was not sent to Shri Gandhi to assist delinquent as defence assistant, and he was asked to call him at his own level. However, the fact remained that petitioner has neither filed consent of Shri Gandhi to become his defence assistant nor made any effort to request for appearance in inquiry. But, the petitioner participated in inquiry proceedings at his own and did not cross-examine departmental witnesses rather made request that witnesses would be cross-examined by his defence assistant. Inquiry Officer after affording opportunity of hearing, held the petitioner guilty for all charges except Nos. 1 (g),(h), 2(a) and 5 as is evident from findings recorded in inquiry report (Annexure R-3) but in his final conclusion which he has arrived at, he held all charges 1 to 9 proved against him, to which disciplinary authority finally concurred and after holding him guilty, vide order dated 06.02.1990 (Exhibit-6) punished with separate penalties inter alia (i) stoppage of one increment for each of charges 1 to 2, 4, 6 and 9 and (ii) stoppage of two increments for charge No. 3, (iii) stoppage of three increments for charge No. 7, (iv) delay in promotion for next three years for charge No. 8 and (v) warning for charge No. 5 However, disciplinary authority observed that all punishment shall run concurrently with cumulative effect and period of suspension be treated as period not spent on duty. Against aforesaid punishment order, petitioner preferred appeal which was turned down vide order dated 17.03.1990 on the premises that it was barred by limitation, against which he furnished some detailed facts vide application dated 29.03.1990 (Exhibit-9) that his appeal was not time barred and accordingly it was entertained by the Board as appellate authority, which was presided by Chairman of respondent Bank. The appellate Board in its meeting dated 212.1990 considered his appeal and finally upheld the impugned penalties and rejected his appeal as conveyed vide order dated 10.01.1991 (Exhibit-11). Hence, this writ petition. 3. Counsel for the petitioner urged that services of Ranaj Gandhi as defence assistant to petitioner in course of inquiry were not provided by respondent, as such he was unable to cross-examine witnesses, which resulted in causing prejudice to him. Counsel further urged that list of witnesses and documents was mentioned in the charge-sheet but documents were provided in piecemeal manner at last moment thereby he could not prepare his defence in time. Counsel also contended that copy of inquiry report and Note of disagreement in respect of charges for which inquiry officer has not found proved, were not made available by disciplinary authority before holding him guilty and punishing with impugned penalties has caused prejudice. Counsel also submitted that for misconduct which he has allegedly committed, he was charged under 1982 Regulations but the authority was not competent to inflict delinquent with separate penalties for each of imputed charges. That apart, as per order of punishment, all penalties would run concurrently but for charge No. 7 he has been inflicted with penalty of stoppage of three annual increments while for charge No. 8 his promotion has been deferred for next three years whereas Clause 30(b) prescribes penalties delay or stoppage of increments or promotion, which either way can be inflicted but both of penalties like stoppage of increments and delay in promotion cannot simultaneously be imposed upon for misconduct found proved against him. 4. 4. Last but significant contention urged by Counsel for petitioner is that Chairman of the Bank is the disciplinary authority who has punished the petitioner vide impugned order, and he has presided as Chairman of the Board as appellate authority and considered his appeal, as such he has functioned in dual role of disciplinary as well as appellate authority and participation in proceedings as appellate authority, his decision was biased and in such circumstances, rejection of appeal that too by non-speaking order is in violation of principles of natural justic. 5. Respondents in their reply averred inter-alia that on the request made by petitioner seeking assistance of defence assistant, he was permitted to do so but neither he filed application nor consent of Shri Gandhi was furnished and so also no efforts were made by petitioner asking him to appear as defence assistant and he never submitted application to his authority to get Shri Gandhi relieved for appearing in the inquiry as defence assistant and that apart inquiry officer always granted him permission to call his defence assistant but he, himself , has not made any effort for calling Shri Gandhi and voluntarily took his decision not to cross-examine witnesses, therefore, it cannot be said that procedure in course of inquiry was at all defective or has caused any prejudice to him. 6. Shri R.K. Kala, Counsel for respondent Bank urged that all documents demanded were furnished and inspected by him and a vague allegation has been made but he failed to substantiate by any material on record. As regards non-supply of copy of inquiry report, Counsel urged that there is no such requirement under scheme of 1982 Regulations since it was a case prior to Judgment of Apex Court in Union of India vs. Ramzan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471 , where copy of inquiry report was not required to be supplied. As regards holding the petitioner guilty and non-compliance of principles of natural justice, Counsel contends that no prejudice has caused to him in course of inquiry and in compliance of principles of natural justice, opportunity has been afforded to him asper scheme of Regulations 1982, and since disciplinary authority concurred with finding of guilt recorded by inquiry officer, reasons were not required to be stated separately under Regulations. Counsel placed reliance on decision of Apex Court in National Fertilizers Ltd. vs. P.K. Sharma, 2005 (8) JT 125 (SC). As regards disciplinary authority having presided over as Chairman of appellate Board for consideration of appeal of petitioner, Counsel contended that sub-committee was constituted to examine and consider appeal and its recommendations were accepted by the Board presided by Chairman of the Bank, and rejected his appeal as such no error was committed in passing the order impugned and also contended that for each charge, separate punishment can be inflicted upon delinquent as provided in the Schedule of penalties provided under Regulations. In support of his contention, Counsel placed reliance upon decision of Madras High Court in Workman of R.P. David & Co. vs. R.P. David & Co., 1965 (1) LLJ 2.88. Last but not least the Counsel has placed reliance upon decision of Lalit Popli vs. Canara Bank, 2003 (3) SCC 583 and contended that scope of judicial review of this Court is very limited in writ jurisdiction and in such like cases where the petitioner has failed to show any manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice, interference is not called for. 7. I have considered rival contentions of Counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused material on record. Albeit all submissions urged at the bar have been stated, but in my opinion, fate of this petition hinges only upon significant argument that appeal of petitioner was decided by the Board which was presided over by Chairman of the Bank who too acted as disciplinary authority while holding him guilty for imputed charges and punished with different penalties vide impugned order, which has caused great prejudice to him and in this view of matter, his appeal deserves to be remitted back for fresh consideration. Hence, I refrain myself to consider and express any opinion on other contentions touching merits or demerits of impugned order of punishment 8. Hence, I refrain myself to consider and express any opinion on other contentions touching merits or demerits of impugned order of punishment 8. As regards pivotal issue as to whether appellate order is cryptic and non-speaking and does not disclose reasons for upholding guilt of petitioner and for adequacy of penalties imposed upon him, this fact has not been disputed that Chairman of respondent Bank passed impugned order (Exhibit-6) as disciplinary authority for holding petitioner guilty of imputed charges that too after having concurred with finding recorded by inquiry officer and punished him with impugned penalties; against which an appeal has been provided under Clause 31 of 1982 Regulations, which lies to the Board. Indisputably, petitioner preferred appeal which was considered by the Board being appellate authority where an obligation is casted under Clause 31(2) to consider independently as to whether findings of disciplinary authority are justified and whether the penalty imposed is adequate and to pass suitable orders. 9. However, before adverting to outcome of this petition, I may firstly browse Scheme of Regulations, 1982 wherein right of appeal has been provided under Regulation 31, through import of word, “consider” as appearing in Clause 31(2) of 1982 Regulations, depicts that the appellate authority shall “consider” as to whether findings of disciplinary authority are justified and the penalty inflicted is adequate or not and pass suitable orders. Relevant Clause 31(2) reads as under:- “(2) The appeal shall be preferred to the appellate authority mentioned in the Regulation 32 within 30 days of the date of service of the order appealed against. The appeal authority shall consider whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are justified and whether the penalty imposed is adequate and pass suitable orders as early as possible.” As per Blacks Law Dictionary (6th Edn. p. 306) the word, “consider” means “with a view to carefully examine; to examine, to inspect; to deliberate about and ponder over; to entertain and to give heed to”. New Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines the word, “consider”-“consider” means look at attentively; survey; scrutinize; to give mental attention to, think over; meditate or reflect on; pay heed to; take note of ; weigh the merits of ; give mental attention to the fact that reflect or take note of; think carefully”. Thus, the word, “consider” in Clause 31(2) is wide enough to require appellate authority to hold a detailed examination of the matter. Thus, the word, “consider” in Clause 31(2) is wide enough to require appellate authority to hold a detailed examination of the matter. Rule making authority deliberately used the word, “consider”, which merely connotes that there should be active application of mind by appellate authority after considering entire circumstances of the case in order to decide nature and extent of penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee. 10. Statutory provision merely imports a rule of natural justice in enjoining that before taking final action in the matter the delinquent employee should be heard and circumstances of the case be objectively considered as it is in keeping with sense of justice and fair play. 11. Keeping in view what has been observed in regard to the word, “consider” (Supra), I must hasten to add that as appellate authority there should be independent application of mind with regard to finding of guilt recorded by the authority and impugned by delinquent and to record how for such impugned finding of guilt is justified and further whether the impugned penalty imposed for the imputed charges proved, is adequate and thereafter suitable orders can be passed. In instant case, indisputably, proceedings of the Board held in its meeting dated 212.1990 (Annexure R-4) depict that in Item 2 finding has been recorded that recommendations of sub-committee after deliberation are accepted; but it is not clear as to what was considered by sub-committee; and what finding has been recorded or recommended by sub-committee in order to hold findings of disciplinary authority justified or penalty imposed is adequate which is the requirement under 1982 Regulations. However, this fact cannot be disputed that final decision has been taken by the Board where Chairman of the respondent Bank who also acted as disciplinary authority while passing impugned order of punishment had presided over in the meeting in question. Relevant extract of minutes of proceedings (Annexure R-4) are reproduced as under:- 12. Very participation by Chairman of the Board who at one time has acted as disciplinary authority, and later on in deliberations where final decision was taken by appellate Board on the appeal of petitioner, in no manner can eliminate allegation of bias against such an appellate authority. As held by Apex Court in Amar Nath Chowdhury vs. Braithwaite & Co. Very participation by Chairman of the Board who at one time has acted as disciplinary authority, and later on in deliberations where final decision was taken by appellate Board on the appeal of petitioner, in no manner can eliminate allegation of bias against such an appellate authority. As held by Apex Court in Amar Nath Chowdhury vs. Braithwaite & Co. Ltd., 2002 (2) SCC 290 , it is trite that no person shall be a judge in his own cause or adjudicating authority must be impartial and must act without any kind of bias. This rule against bias has its origin from a maxim, “nemo debet esse judex in propria causa”, meaning thereby justice not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done and it can only be possible when a Judge or an adjudicating authority decides matter impartially and without carrying any kind of bias. Here pivotal issue is whether an authority can sit in appeal against its own order passed as disciplinary authority. 13. In Amar Nath Chowdhury vs. Braithwaite & Co. Ltd. (Supra), in the light of definition of “Board” as provided in Rule 3(d) of Companys Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, Apex Court held that the Board could have constituted a committee of the Board/management or any officers of the company by excluding the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Company and delegated any its powers, including appellate power, to such a committee to eliminate any allegation of bias against such an appellate authority. Hence, Apex Court observed:- “.... It is, therefore, not correct to contend that the rule against bias is not available in the present case in view of ” doctrine of necessity”. We are, therefore, of the view that reliance on the doctrine of necessity in the present case is totally misplaced.” 14. Thus, viewed, in instant case, as is evident from observations quoted out of proceedings of meeting of the Board dealing with appeal of petitioner, firstly impugned appellate order is non-speaking and does not disclose any reason for rejecting his appeal and secondly, Chairman of the Bank once acted as a disciplinary authority and later on as appellate authority as Chairman of the appellate Board by presiding over and participating in deliberations of the meeting of the Board while deciding the appeal of petitioner, therefore, such a dual function is not permissible on account of established rule against bias. Apex Court in Amar Nath Chowdhary vs. B.W. & Co. (Supra), observed:- “Where an authority earlier had taken a decision, he is disqualified to sit in appeal against his own decision, as he already prejudged the matter otherwise such an appeal would be termed an appeal from Caesar to Caesar and filing of an appeal would be an exercise in futility. In that view of matter, in present case, fair play demanded that Shri Krishnaswami, the then Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the company ought not to have participated in the deliberations of the meeting of the Board when the Board heard and decided the appeal of the appellant.” 15. So far as Judgment cited by Counsel for respondents in National Fertilizers Ltd. vs. P.K. Sharma (Supra), is concerned, it is of no assistance. Apex Court considered as to whether disciplinary authority is required to record separate reasons where he concur with conclusions arrived at by inquiry officer and more so when the rule does not so postulate. In the present case, right of appeal is a statutory right where finding of fact and nature of punishment has to be re-appreciated. It requires independent consideration of material on record. 16. In the result, the writ petition is partly allowed. Order dated 10.01.1991 (Exhibit-11) passed by appellate authority is quashed and set aside. Matter is remanded back to the appellant authority to decide appeal of the petitioner afresh by a speaking order, in the light of what has been observed above, in accordance with law so also in consonance with Clause 31(2) of 1982 Regulations, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner who will also be free to file additional submissions, if so advised. All exercise to comply with this order be made expeditiously but not later than three months. No costs.