JUDGMENT Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.—The plaintiff-respondents filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from evicting them from the office allotted to it by the Chairman Zila Panchayat Deoria. This suit was filed on 27.1.2006. An application for grant of a temporary injunction under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 C.P.C was also filed. It transpires, that the Zila Panchayat apprehended that a suit was going to be filed, therefore, it filed a caveat before the civil court. At the time of the presentation of the suit, the defendants appeared and objected to the grant of a temporary injunction. While the hearing on the application for temporary injunction was going on, the plaintiffs filed an application under section 151 of the C.P.C. praying that the plaintiff’s possession be restrained as they have been evicted by the defendants during the hearing of the injunction application. This application was rejected by an order of the trial court, pursuant to which, the plaintiffs filed a revision which was allowed by a judgment dated 27.5.2006. The revisional court, by its order, directed the defendants to give possession of the premises in question within 15 days. The defendants, being aggrieved by the aforesaid order has filed the present writ petition. 2. Before proceeding further, it is essential to state the factual background which led to the filing of the suit. 3. It transpires that the previous chairman of the Zila Panchayat Smt. Krishna Jaiswal made a number of allotments of shops, etc. in favour of various persons on the date when a no confidence motion was to take place against her. These allotments were made by Smt. Krishna Jaiswal on 22.2.2005. Amongst other allotments, the plaintiffs were allotted a premises, for their office purposes, by an allotment order dated 22.2.2005. Apparently, the premises in question which was allotted to the plaintiffs was none other than the official residence of the Chairman of the Zila Panchyat in which Smt. Krishna Jaiswal was residing in her official capacity as the Chairman of the Zila Panchayat. The allotment order, indicated that the possession of the premises would be given as and when the same became vacant and that the allotment would be subject to the approval by the State Government. It transpires from the record that a motion of no confidence was passed against Smt. Krishna Jaiswal on 22.2.2005 and a new Chairman took over. The allotment order, indicated that the possession of the premises would be given as and when the same became vacant and that the allotment would be subject to the approval by the State Government. It transpires from the record that a motion of no confidence was passed against Smt. Krishna Jaiswal on 22.2.2005 and a new Chairman took over. A notice dated 30.3.2005 was published in the newspaper cancelling all the allotments made by the previous Chairman and the allottees were directed to take back their money from the Zila Panchayat. It transpires, that the plaintiff No. 2 along with several other allottees filed Writ Petition No. 29555 of 2005 praying for the quashing of the order dated 30.3.2005 as published in the Hindi Daily ‘Dainik Jagran’, dated 31.3.2005 cancelling the allotment orders. This advertisement dated 31.3.2005 also included the cancellation of the allotment of the premises of the present plaintiffs. The writ petition was dismissed by judgment dated 18.5.2005. The Division Bench held that no proper advertisement was issued with regard to the allotment. It was found that the Chairman could not execute the contract under his seal and signature and that the shops had been allotted at a throw away price. The Court held that the allotment was made in a fraudulent manner and that fraud vitiates everything and that the allottees could not be permitted to reap the fruits. The net result of the dismissal of the aforesaid writ petition was that the cancellation order dated 30.3.2005 as published in the news paper dated 31.3.2005 was upheld by this Court. 4. It further transpires that eviction proceedings were initiated against the ex-Chairman and eventually, by a police force, the ex-Chairman was evicted from the official residence on 31.1.2006. The suit was filed on 27.1.2006 and it is alleged that during the course of the hearing of the injunction application, the plaintiffs were evicted. On the other hand, the defendants’ case is that the ex-Chairman was evicted from the premises. 5. A perusal of the plaint indicates that the plaintiffs has not disclosed as when they came in the possession of the premises upon the premises becoming vacant. This is a crucial fact which has not been averred by the plaintiff in their plaint. Another striking feature is that the order of the cancellation of the allotment has not been disclosed in the plaint. This is a crucial fact which has not been averred by the plaintiff in their plaint. Another striking feature is that the order of the cancellation of the allotment has not been disclosed in the plaint. The plaintiffs have concealed this fact. It was in their knowledge that the allotment of the premises made by the ex-Chairman was cancelled by an order dated 30.3.2005 which was published on 31.3.2005 in the Hindi Daily “Dainik Jagran”. The plaintiff No. 2 cannot escape from this fact nor can she allege that the allotment order was never cancelled. This is on account of the fact that the plaintiff No. 2 had filed a writ petition challenging the notice dated 30.3.2005 which was published in the news paper on 31.3.2005. The notice, clearly indicated at Sl.No. 24 about the cancellation of the premises in favour of the plaintiff Nos.1 and 2. Therefore, non-disclosure of the cancellation order was a deliberately done by the plaintiffs for vested reasons. Not only this, the litigation initiated by the plaintiff No. 2 before the High Court in a Writ Petition was also not disclosed. 6. Heard Sri Namwar Singh, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Sanjeev Singh for the defendant-petitioners and Sri N.C. Rajvanshi, the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff-opposite parties. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that against the rejection of the application filed under section 151 C.P.C. for an interim relief of possession, no revision under section 115 C.P.C. was maintainable, inasmuch as there was no jurisdictional error nor was there was any material irregularity nor the order amounted to a case decided. In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chandra Rai and others, 2003 ACC 2122, wherein the Supreme Court held as under : “Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, does not now permit a revision petition being filed against an order disposing of an appeal against the order of the trial Court whether confirming, reversing or modifying the order of injunction granted by the trial Court. The reason is that the Order of the High Court passed either way would not have the effect of finally disposing of the suit or other proceedings. The reason is that the Order of the High Court passed either way would not have the effect of finally disposing of the suit or other proceedings. The exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such a case is taken away by the proviso inserted under sub-section (1) of Section 115 CPC. The amendment is based on the Malimath Committee’s recommendations. The Committee was of the opinion that the expression employed in Section 115 CPC, which enables interference in revision on the ground that the order if allowed to stand would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made, left open wide scope for the exercise of the revisional power with all types of interlocutory orders and this was substantially contributing towards delay in the disposal of the cases. The Committee did not favour denuding the High Court of the power of revision but strongly felt that the power should be suitably curtailed. The effect of the erstwhile clause (b) of the proviso, being deleted and a new proviso having been inserted, is that the revisional jurisdiction, in respect of an interlocutory order passed in a trial or other proceedings, is substantially curtailed. A revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised unless the requirement of the proviso is satisfied.” 8. Further reliance was made on a decision in Col. Anil Kak (Retd) vs. Municipal Corporation, Indore and others, 2005 (99) RD 667. The leaned counsel further submitted that assuming without admitting that a revision under section 115 of the C.P.C. was maintainable, the revisional court could not substitute its finding with the findings given by the trial court and, at best, it could have remanded the matter back to the trial court for reconsideration. In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance of a decision in the case of Manik Chandra Nandy vs. Debdas Nandy and others, AIR 1986 SC 446 . The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the suit was for an injunction. The relief claimed was that the defendants be restrained from evicting or for dispossessing the plaintiff from the premises in question. No relief of possession was sought in the suit. Consequently, an interim relief for possession under section 151 C.P.C. could not be prayed for which was, otherwise not prayed for, in the suit. Therefore, no such relief could be granted by the court below. No relief of possession was sought in the suit. Consequently, an interim relief for possession under section 151 C.P.C. could not be prayed for which was, otherwise not prayed for, in the suit. Therefore, no such relief could be granted by the court below. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Metro Marins and another vs. Bonus Watch Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others, AIR 2005 SC 1444, wherein the Supreme Court held that the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to possession having not been decided by the trial court, no interim order would be issued directing a party to hand over the possession which would amount to decreeing the suit even before the trial. 9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiff, Sri N.C. Rajvanshi, submitted that the petitioner took the law into their hands and did not allow the trial court to pass an order on the application for a grant of a temporary injunction. The learned counsel submitted that during the course of hearing of the application for a grant of temporary injunction, the plaintiffs were ousted from the premises in question and, therefore, the application under section 151 C.P.C. seeking an interim relief for possession was not only maintainable but was also justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon two decisions of this Court in the case of Rajendra Pratap and others vs. Ist Additional District Judge, Jaunpur and others, 1992(2)ARC 189 and in Smt. Rajesh and another vs. VIIIth Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr and others, 1998(1)ARC 145, wherein the Court held that an order of status-quo passed on an injunction application can be enforced in an application under 151 C.P.C. 10. Upon giving my thoughtful consideration on the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the opinion, that the order of the revisional court was patently erroneous and without jurisdiction and is liable to be set aside. The plaintiff filed a suit for an injunction praying that the defendant should be restrained from interfering in their possession. The crucial fact which the plaintiff had to show in his plaint was as to when they came in possession on the basis of the allotment order. The plaintiff filed a suit for an injunction praying that the defendant should be restrained from interfering in their possession. The crucial fact which the plaintiff had to show in his plaint was as to when they came in possession on the basis of the allotment order. This crucial fact is missing in the plaint especially when the allotment order indicated that the possession of the premises would only be given when the premises got vacant. Consequently, it was imperative for the plaintiffs to indicate the date of the actual possession given to them pursuant to the allotment order. I also find that the allotment order was cancelled by the authorities. This fact was in the personal knowledge of plaintiff No. 2 inasmuch as she had challenged the said cancellation order with regard to another shop allotted in her favour by means of Writ Petition No. 29555 of 2005. A Division Bench of this Court held that the allotment orders were validly cancelled inasmuch as, the allotment orders were made fraudulently. In view of the aforesaid judgment, upholding the cancellation of the allotments made by the ex-Chairman of the Zila Panchayat, it was no longer open to the plaintiffs to allege that they are valid allottees. This fact relating to cancellation of the allotment was also not disclosed by the plaintiffs in the plaint deliberately. The concealment of crucial facts disentitles the plaintiffs from any equitable relief from a Court of law. 11. Further, no relief for possession could be granted under section 151 C.P.C. by way of an interim relief. The question as to whether the plaintiff was in possession had not yet been decided nor was the question of possession prayed for in the suit. A relief for possession can be claimed but only after amending the plaint seeking a relief of possession. Unless and until the suit is amended, the relief of possession cannot be claimed. Another option available to the plaintiff was to file a summary suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. In the present case, neither the plaint was amended nor a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act was filed. Consequently, the relief of possession, as an interim measure during the pendency of the suit could not be granted in an application under section 151 C.P.C. The application filed by the plaintiffs was patently misconceived. In the present case, neither the plaint was amended nor a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act was filed. Consequently, the relief of possession, as an interim measure during the pendency of the suit could not be granted in an application under section 151 C.P.C. The application filed by the plaintiffs was patently misconceived. The revisional court committed a manifest error in issuing a direction to the defendants to hand back the possession. The order of the revisional court was clearly without jurisdiction. 12. This Court further finds that an order of the trial court on the application of the plaintiff-39-Ga seeking possession does not come within the para meters of the words “case decided” as provided under section 115 C.P.C. In Surya Devo Rai (supra), the Supreme Court held that no revision was maintainable in view of the amendment made in section 115 C.P.C. I am of the opinion that the order of the trial court rejecting the application of the plaintiff seeing an interim relief of possession does not fulfil the requirement contemplated under section 115 C.P.C. and therefore, the revision filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable. 13. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order dated 27.5.2006 passed by the revisional court cannot be maintained and is set aisde. The writ petition stands allowed. Petition Allowed. ———