JUDGMENT Hon’ble Bharati Sapru, J.—Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 2. This petition has been filed against orders passed by the respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 dated 6.9.03, 15.4.02 and 30.10.01 which have culminated into termination of the petitioner who was working as a Lekhpal with the respondent State. 3. The petitioner was appointed as Lekhpal in the year 1987 and was continued to work in the department concerned. The petitioner received a show cause notice on 3.4.2000 stating therein that on account of certain charges against him, a disciplinary proceeding was contemplated. The petitioner submitted his reply on 5.4.2000. The petitioner was charge-sheeted on 5.5.2000 and, thereafter, a supplementary charge-sheet was also issued against him on 25.5.2000. The petitioner submitted his reply to the Enquiry Officer on 14.6.2000 and an order was passed on 1.7.2000 terminating the services of the petitioner. 4. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the District Magistrate, Bijnore on 14.7.2000. The District Magistrate allowed the appeal of the petitioner by setting aside the order-dated 1.7.2000 and made observation that the respondent No.3 Up Ziladhikari, Nazimabad, District Bijnore may pass a fresh order by giving a fresh show cause notice and also may pass an order that the petitioner would be treated to be on suspension during that period 5. The petitioner, thereafter, receivod a fresh show cause notice on 10.1.2001 to which the petitioner gave a reply on 19.1.2001. The respondents, thereafter, passed an order on 30.10.2001 again terminating the scrvices of the petitioner. This is the first order, which is impugned in the present writ petition. The petitioner, thereafter, filed, an uppeal against this order on 12.11.01. The appeal was dismissed by the order-dated 15.4.2002, which is also impugned in the present writ petition. 6. The petitionm, thereafter, filed a revision against the impugned order dated 15.4.2002 and the respondent No.1 Commissioner rejected the revision of the petitioner on 15.1.03. The ultimate order is the order-dated 15.1.03. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that all the impugned orders are fully preverse cmd arbitrary and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India as his right to livelihood is affected by terminating his services without giving him a proper enquiry. 7. The ultimate order is the order-dated 15.1.03. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that all the impugned orders are fully preverse cmd arbitrary and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India as his right to livelihood is affected by terminating his services without giving him a proper enquiry. 7. The petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to the revisional order dated 15.1.03 where the respondent No. 1 the Commissioner recorded that out of 11 charges levelled against the petitioner, seven charges have been found to be proved but four charges are not proved. Learned Commissioner in the revisionai order has stated that one of the most serious charges levelled against the petitioner was that even though chakbandi was going on in a village, the petitioner who was a Lekhpal in that village recommended the allotment of the land to 35 allottees, out of which, 22 allottees were subsequently found not to be genuine persons worthy of allotment. Learned Counsel for the petitioner Shri P.S. Baghel has argued that these findings have been reached by the Commissioner ignoring the material documentary evidence filed by the petitioner in its reply itself, wherein he had clearly disclosed before the Commissioner that the Government had issued a Government Order on 31.12.2000 by which it had permitted the allotments to be made even in villages where chakbandi was going on. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that this material piece of evidence was ignored. It was not a case as if the petitioner had made allotments against the prevalent rules and orders and, therefore, the findings reached ignoring these vital piece of evidence, renders the findings perverse and, therefore also the punishment imposed on the basis of these findings is also disproportionate. 9. The next argumenl of learned Counsel for the petitioner is that in sueh a case, the Court, while exercising its power of judicial review, can interfere with the quantum of punishment. 10. The next argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that in the present case, the entire charge-sheet does not disclose or attribute any motive of personal gain against the petitioner. 10. The next argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that in the present case, the entire charge-sheet does not disclose or attribute any motive of personal gain against the petitioner. At the most, the charge can be a charge of negligence and, therefore, he argues that such a charge of negligence could not have lead to the imposition of a major punistlment such as termination of service, which deprives him of his very livelihood. Learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of this argument has relied in the decision of Dev Singh v. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. and another, (2003) 8 SCC 9 . 11. The next argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner was thal the entire enquiry held against the petitioner was vitiated on account of the fact that the charge sheet did not either disclose the documentary evidence which was proposed to be used against the petitioner and also did not disclose names of any witnesses who shall stand testimony against the petitioner. This, learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued, is in violation of the rules, which have been made in the State of U.P. namely, the U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999. He refers in particular Rule 7 of the Rules, where there is a mandatory requirement that the charge-sheet must disclose firstly, the documentary evidence which is to be used against tile delinquent and secondly, it must disclose the name of witnesses who are to appear testimony against the delinquent. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that in this case the decision has been taken in violation of Rule 7 of the Rules of 1999. In support of his decision, learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in (2001)2 UPLBEC 1475 in the case Subhash Chandra Sharma v. U.P. Cooperative Spinning Mills and othoers, wherein this Court held that in cases where a major punishment proposed to be imposed, an oral enquiry is a must, whether the delinquent makes a request for it or not. Admittedly, he says, in this case, there was no oral enquiry. 12. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also argued that at the most, the petitioner’s case could be considered to be a case of negligence. Admittedly, he says, in this case, there was no oral enquiry. 12. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also argued that at the most, the petitioner’s case could be considered to be a case of negligence. He has cited the case of Union of India and others v J. Ahmed, AI R 1979 SC 1022. He has in particular, referred to paragraph-9 of the said judgment wherein the Supreme Court has explained that negligence in some cases would not constitute misconduct because the levels of administrative ability cannot be measured into strict terms and both lack of efficiency and lack of foresight would amount to a serious lapse, but in the absence of charges of doubtful integrity, would not constitute misconduct. 13. Learned Standing Counsel has argued in reply that firstly, the petitioner has a clearly efficacious alternative remedy of filing a petition before the State Administrative Tribunal. 14. Secondly learned Standing Counsel has argued that from a bare perusal of the impugned orders, it is clearly borne-out that the petitioner was not only guilty of negligence but the charges were fully proved against him. He has argued that not one but many charges were proved against him. 15. Leamed Standing Counsel has argued that it is the Lekhpal, who is the key person in the vil!age, who maintains the records of the village and, therefore, being the in-charge of the village record, he knows clearly as to whom land is to be allowed. In this particular case, 22 persons were wrongly allotted the land. Apart from this charge, there were other charges also against the petitioner such as unauthorized occupation of quarters and unauthonzed absence. 16. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued in rejoinder affidavit that out of the 22 persons who were disclosed to be wrongfully allotted the land, approached the Revenue Court and obtained stay order and, therefore, it cannot be said that the allotment of land was completely wrongful. 17. Have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Standing Counsel at length and I have given anxious and thoughtful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and perused the pleadings on record. Upon perusing the material on record, it is clear that the order of termination has been passed against the petitioner on account of the fact that he made wrongful allotment in village even though cllakbandi was going on. Upon perusing the material on record, it is clear that the order of termination has been passed against the petitioner on account of the fact that he made wrongful allotment in village even though cllakbandi was going on. The process of making allotment of land in the village is not an act, which is singly performed by the Lekhpal. The Lekhpal only recommends the names of the persons who can be made allottees. In this case too, the petitioner had made a recommendation of 35 persons and ultimately, the allotment was allowed under the signatures of the Tahsildar and the S.D.M. 18. In the enquiry that was conducted against the petitioner and upon perusal of the report which is on record of the case, it is apparent that the S.D.M. and the Tahsildar who endorsed and allowed the allotments recommended by the petitioner, was neither asked for an explanation in writing nor did they appear in the enquiry to show the circumstances in which they had put seal of approval on the allotments recommended by the petitioner. The act of allotment was indeed not finally done by the Lelkhpal. His role perhaps was confined to making a wrongful recommendation but the seal of approval was put on it by the Tahsildar and the S.D.M. upon making an enquiry from the learned Standing Counsel. He has been unable to inform the Court as to what action has been taken against these two persons who are also responsible for making all these allotments. There is not even a whisper in the record about what happened to those two f other persons who participated in the alleged wrongful act of allotments made to 22 persons. 19. There is also substance in the argument made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that while replying to the charge that wrongful allotments has been made,despite the process of chakbandi going on in the village, the petitioner had included in his reply from subsequent pleadings that a Government Order had been issued by which it had been permitted that allotment could be made even despite the fact that chakbandi was going on in the village. The revisional order has not dealt with this matter at all. 20. Therefore, the consequential finding that it was done during the course of chakbandi is perverse 21. The revisional order has not dealt with this matter at all. 20. Therefore, the consequential finding that it was done during the course of chakbandi is perverse 21. There is also substance in the argument of the petitioner that under the U.P. Government Servants Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1999, it was mandatory that the provisions of Rule 7 should have been complied with while imposing a major punishment on the petitioner. Had it been a case of imposition of minor punishment, the position would have been different. But here, in this case, when the petitioner was visited with the evil consequences of termination, the minimum to be observed in the enquiry was that the petitioner should have been given the documentary evidence which was against him and also the names of witnesses should have been revealed in the charge sheet itself. This was not done. 22. Moreover, this Court has held in the case of Subash Chandra Sharma that oral testimony is a must in the case for imposition of major punishment. This too was not done in the present case. 23. Such being the facts and circumstances of the case, the conclusion reached is that the enquiry conducted against the petitioner was not fair and was vitiated for all the above reasons. Secondly, the resultant punishment of dismissal was also not fair. 24. I deem it appropriate that the petitioner be given a fair chance of enquiry. The respondents must also initiate action against the Tahsildar and against the S.D.M. if they had not already done so, who put seal of approval on the alleged wrongful action. As such, a fresh enquiry be conducted for the petitioner which may be completed within a period of three months. The petitioner will be allowed to participate freely in the enquiry. For a period of three months, the petitioner will be deemed to be on suspension and will be paid normal subsistence allowance. The orders of dismissal and consequential order passed in appeal and revision are set aside. The subsistence allowance will be paid lo the petitioner as from today. The petitioner will not be entitled to any arrears or back wages until conclusion of the enquiry and/or until fresh order is passed in his favour. 25. The writ petition is allowed. Petition Allowed. ———