JUDGMENT Hon’ble D.P. Singh, J.—Heard Counsel for the parties. 2. This petition is directed against an order dated 4.2.2002 passed by Joint Director of Education, 7th Region, Gorakhpur whereby he has held that the respondent No 6 was the senior most teacher in the institution entitled for ad hoc appointment on the post of Principal. 3. The facts alleged in the writ petition are as follows : Pandit Jawahar Lal Krishna Inter College is a duly recognized and aided institution where a temporary vacancy was caused on the post of English Lecturer due to the grant of leave to the incumbent Mohammad Yasin Khan on 1.7.1970. It is alleged that Sri Khan resigned and therefore the Committee of Management appointed the petitioner vide order dated 18.7.1972 on the said vacancy on probation for one year. Nevertheless, the Management terminated his service by an order dated 21.6.1976 with effect from 30.6.1976 treating the appointment of the petitioner on leave vacancy. The petitioner challenged the said order in writ petition No. 1021 of 1976, but it was dismissed as not pressed on 27.7.1976. Subsequently, on 31.1.1977 the Committee of Management passed a resolution cancelling the termination order of the petitioner dated 21.6.1976 holding that the petitioner was a permanent teacher in the institution. The petitioner rejoined the institution on the strength of a resultant appointment letter on 4.11.1977. The post of Principal fell vacant in 1980 and since the two senior most teachers did not want to function as principal, the petitioner was allowed to function as officiating Principal and which arrangement was also approved by the District Inspector of Schools vide his order dated 23.7.1980 on which post he continued till January, 1984. When again vacancy on the post of Principal occurred in 1990, the Management sought to appoint one Murlidhar Singh but the petitioner challenged the said appointment before this Court which petition was disposed off on 22.8.1991 with a direction to the District Inspector of Schools to decide the claim of the petitioner. This claim was decided vide order dated 18.2.1992 holding that the petitioner was the senior most teacher in the institution. This claim was decided vide order dated 18.2.1992 holding that the petitioner was the senior most teacher in the institution. However, again when the post of Principal became vacant on the death of the permanent incumbent on 13.6.1999, the management appointed the respondent No. 6 as officiating Principal and forwarded the papers but the District Inspector of Schools did not attest the signatures of the respondent No. 6 who filed writ petition No. 39747 of 1999 for attestation of his signatures. This petition was disposed off on 15.9.1999 with a direction to the District Inspector of Schools to pass suitable orders thereon. In pursuance thereof the District Inspector of Schools passed an order dated 21.10.1999 holding the petitioner to be the senior most teacher, this order was challenged by respondent No. 6 in writ petition No. 4618 of 1999. Against this very order, the respondent No. 5 raising his individual claim of being the senior most, filed an appeal before the Joint Director of Education which has been disposed off by the impugned order holding the respondent No. 6 to be the senior most Lecturer in the institution. 4. The respondent No. 6 has denied the substantial allegations of the petitioner and •has stated that the petitioner was appointed as untrained teacher on 87.1970. Later he was appointed on a leave vacancy of Mohammad Yasin Khan on the post of Lecturer in English, on 8.7.1971 till the end of the session. Asasri Khan extended his leave, the temporary appointment of the petitioner on the leave vacancy was extended uptill 30.6.1973 which was approved by the District Inspector of Schools on 1.8.1972 till the end of session. This vacancy continued till 30.6.1976, however, in between the Management wrote to the District Inspector of Schools for converting the appointment of the petitioner into a substantive one as Sri Khan was not returning. Nevertheless, the District Inspector of Schools vide his order dated 11.8.1975 rejected the-move of the Management holing that th.e appointment of the petitioner was only on a leave vacancy and any substantive appointment could only be made after following the procedure prescribed. Therefore, on the expiry of the leave vacancy the service of the. petitioner was terminated vide order dated 21.6.1976 whereafter the petitioner ceased to work or draw salary for the said post. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid order before this Court but the petition was dismissed. Therefore, on the expiry of the leave vacancy the service of the. petitioner was terminated vide order dated 21.6.1976 whereafter the petitioner ceased to work or draw salary for the said post. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid order before this Court but the petition was dismissed. Thereafter, on the aforesaid vacancy, one Harish Chand Pandey was appointed as English Lecturer on 16.8.1976 on which he continued to work and receive salary till October, 1977 but when he was appointed in a substantive capacity in Swami Devanand Inter College, Sri Pandey left the institution. In the meantime, the petitioner had approached the State Government for a direction to the Management to grant him appointment, but the State Government vide its order dated 17.10.1977, after finding that the service of the petitioner had been terminated and against which a writ petition had already been dismissed, refused to give any direction to the Committee of Management. After exit of Harish Chand Pandey, the post became substantially vacant on which the petitioner was granted d fresh appointment on 4.11.1977 which was approved on probation for one year vide order of the District Inspector of Schools dated 23.10.1978. 5. The respondent has further stated that he was appointed on a substantive vacancy on 11.11.1971 on temporary basis but on 15.2.1972 he was given substantive appointment, therefore, he contends that he is senior to the petitioner. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has firstly urged that the impugned order by the Joint Director of Education was passed while deciding the appeal of Vishnu Saran Pandey, and once he rejected his appeal he could not have gone on to hold that the respondent No. 6 was the senior most lecturer, especially when the petitioner was not put to notice that his claim would also be considered inspite of the fact that respondent No. 6 had already challenged the order of the District Inspector of Schools dated 21.10.1999 before this Court in Writ Petition No.48618 of 1999. Thus, it is contended, that the Joint Director of Education exceeded his jurisdiction rendering that part of the order illegal through which respondent No. 6 has been declared to be senior to him. 7. Thus, it is contended, that the Joint Director of Education exceeded his jurisdiction rendering that part of the order illegal through which respondent No. 6 has been declared to be senior to him. 7. It is an admitted case of the parties that all the three claimed to be the senior most lecturer entitled to function as Principal of the College and the District Inspector of Schools had upheld the claim of the petitioner. It is also not denied that all the three were parties before the Joint Director of Education and all of them had filed their respective replies and objection and participated in the proceeding. A perusal of the memo of appeal shows that facts of all the three were mentioned and the service record of all the three were available and copies were served on all is also evident from the notice dated 14.12.1999. Therefore, it is not correct to say that the petitioner was taken by surprise or he had no opportunity. Though the appeal was filed by Pandey, but the question which was to be decided by the Joint Director of Education was as to who is the senior most lecturer authorized to work as ad hoc Principal. It needs no reiteration that an appellate authority has all those powers of the original authority and can decide any issue which is germane to dispose it off. The Joint Directorof Education rejected the appeal with the finding that the respondent No. 6 was the senior most lecturer and while holding so he also considered the case of the petitioner in detail. He was neither inhibited nor restrained from deciding the issue only because of the pendency of the Writ Petition No. 48618 of 1999. In fact a perusal of the representation/objection dated 22.4.2001 of the petitioner shows that he had countered the case of the respondent No. 6 in detail which has been considered in the impugned order. Therefore, this argument cannot be accepted. 8. It is then urged that once the seniority of the petitioner had been determined earlier and acted upon without any objection by respondent No. 6, it cannot be reopened now at his instance. Therefore, this argument cannot be accepted. 8. It is then urged that once the seniority of the petitioner had been determined earlier and acted upon without any objection by respondent No. 6, it cannot be reopened now at his instance. In support of this contention .the petitioner has relied upon a Full Bench of our Court in Smt. S.K. Chaudhary v. Mqnager, Committee of Management, Vidyawati Darbari Girls Inter College, Lukerganj, Allahabad and others, 1991 UPLBEC 250 and the Apex Court in. the case of S.B. Dogra v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, 1992(1) SCC 455. 9. It is apparent from the record that the permanent incumbent on the post of Principal, Sri Nakshatra Rai was murdered in November, 1977 when the senior most lecturer Sri Gorakh Nath Dubey was made the officiating Principal and continued. In July, 1980 Sri Dubey all ill and requested to make stop gap arrangement for the time being and when others refused to work on stop gap arrangement,.the petitioner was allowed to work. After regaining his health, Dubey sought to come back as Principal, but for one or other reason the management kept on delaying it forcing Dubey to file a writ in the High Court and on its direction the District Inspector of Schools had no option but to give the charge to Sri Dubey, This situation, the petitioner touts to say, that the respondent No. 6 acquiesced to the fact that the petitioner is senior to him. The arrangement was only stop gap which the petitioner managed to prolong for about three years, but there was no determination of seniority and it was only a fight of wits between the petitioner and Sri Dubey. 10. This issue can also be examined from another angle. A Court is normally very loath to interfere in or set aside an entry which has rem, ained intact for a very long time, basically on the principle of acquiescence, waiver and estoppel. The Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation 0/ Greater Bombay v. Dr. Hakeemwadi Tenants Association and others, 1988 SCC (Suppl) 45 has held that to constitute waiver, which is essence is estoppel, there must be voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a right. The Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation 0/ Greater Bombay v. Dr. Hakeemwadi Tenants Association and others, 1988 SCC (Suppl) 45 has held that to constitute waiver, which is essence is estoppel, there must be voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a right. In K. Ramdas Chenoy v, Chief Officer, Town Municipal Corporation, Udappl, AIR 1974 SC 2177 , the Apex Court setting aside the High Court’s judgment held that an excess of statutory power cannot be validated by acquiescence in or by the operation of estoppel. The import of the word, ‘acquiescence’ has been given in Halsbury’s Laws of England (IVth Edition) Volume 16, at page 995, after equating it with estoppel, it clarifies that “equitable estoppel is not applied in favour of a volunteer. Thus, even applying these principles it cannot be said that any right was created in favour of the petitioner by his mere working in stop gap arrangement so as to dislodge the vested right of the respondent No. 6. 11. A regular Principal Lallu Pathak was appointed and he continued from 1986 to 28.6.1991 and in the meanwhile Sri Dubey retired. Pathak was relieved on 28.6.1991 to join another institution and another junior person Murlidhar Singh was made officiating Principal and worked from July, 1991 to May, 1992 but Pathak reclaimed the post in July, 1992 and continued till June, 1999 when he died in harness to create a substantial vacancy. When the management resolved to appoint the petitioner as Principal, respondent No. 6 filed his objection claiming to be senior to petitioner, therefore, the management resolved to appoint respondent No. 6 and appointed him treating him senior to the petitioner. However, when the District Inspector of Schools was not attesting his signature, the respondent No. 6 preferred writ petition which was disposed off on 15.9.1999 with a direction to the District Inspector of Schools to decide the claim of seniority which has given rise to this writ petition 12. From the facts noted above, it will be clear that the seniority was never determined between the petitioner and respondent No. 6 prior to 21.10.1999 which was the resultant order of writ order dated 15.9.1999. Lying dormant is one thing, but staking claim at the proper time is quite another. From the facts noted above, it will be clear that the seniority was never determined between the petitioner and respondent No. 6 prior to 21.10.1999 which was the resultant order of writ order dated 15.9.1999. Lying dormant is one thing, but staking claim at the proper time is quite another. The respondent No. 6 rightly did not raise his claim when the officiating Principal, Gorakh Nath Dubey sought to be relieved of the work due to illness, because it was a question of stop gap arrangement for a very short period and in such a situation the management could make an arrangement for couple of months under Chapter II of the Regulations framed under the Act. No doubt the petitioner did continue for an extended period even when Dubey reported for joining, but that would not enure to the benefit of the petitioner as that fact itself would not create a right which the petitioner in law does not have. The ratio laid down in Smt. S.K. Chaudhary or S.B. Dogra’s case (supra) would not apply to the facts of this case as there was no determination of seniority between the two. In the case of Smt. S.K. Chaudhary (supra), the claims of the three competing teachers with regard to seniority had been decided by the Committee of Management in favour of one of them after hearing them and the said order was allowed to become final as no appeal was filed. On those facts, the Full Bench held that the determination of seniority, which had remained intact for about 15 years, could not be called in question especially when no appeal was filed. In the present case, there is no determination of seniority between the petitioner and the respondent No. 6. The alleged decision dated 18.2.1992 was ex parte without any opportunity or notice to the respondent No. 6 and, therefore, so far as he is concerned, the order was a nullity. Further, except for an alleged seniority list of 1980, it is nowhere pleaded in the petition that the seniority list was duly published and accepted. The alleged decision dated 18.2.1992 was ex parte without any opportunity or notice to the respondent No. 6 and, therefore, so far as he is concerned, the order was a nullity. Further, except for an alleged seniority list of 1980, it is nowhere pleaded in the petition that the seniority list was duly published and accepted. The seniority list of 1980 has been denied as being forged since there was absolutely determination of seniority, vis-a-vis, respondent No. 6 at any point of time, thus it cannot be said that a long standing seniority is being challenged, especially when this ground was never taken before the Joint Director of Education who passed the impugned order 13. Lastly it is asserted that the Joint Director was wrong in holding that the petitioner was given substantive appointment on 4.11.1977 in the teeth of the fact that he was appointed in substantive capacity on 18.7.1972. 14. While noticing the facts, as is also evident from the impugned order, that the petitioner was given a tenure appointment in a leave vacancy of Mohd. Yaseen Khan on 8.7.1971, this fixed period appointment continued till his services were terminated on 21.6.1976 as the tenure expired. This was challenged by him before this Court, however, the Writ Petition No. 1021 of 1976 was dismissed as not pressed on 27.7.1976 Once this Court had upheld the termination of the petitioner, there was no question of the Committee of Management recalling the termination order. Counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any provision of law enabling the Committee of Management to review its earlier order, especially when there was no apparent mistake and that too after one and a half years. The petitioner has failed to satisfy the Court that he was ever granted a substantive appointment with the approval of the District Inspector of Schools, except the appointment dated 4.11.1977 which was approved on 23.10.1978. However, since the said order is not under challenge, the Court refrains from going further into this aspect of the matter. It is also not denied that the petitioner neither worked nor was given salary from 1.7.1976 to 3.11.1977. There is also no approval of the District Inspector of Schools for substantive appointment prior to 23.10.1978. The Joint Director was perfectly justified in holding that the petitioner was granted substantive appointment only on 4.11.1977, which decision is based on cogent reasons. 15. There is also no approval of the District Inspector of Schools for substantive appointment prior to 23.10.1978. The Joint Director was perfectly justified in holding that the petitioner was granted substantive appointment only on 4.11.1977, which decision is based on cogent reasons. 15. No other point has been urged. 16. For the reasons given above, the Court is of the opinion that the order of the Joint Director does not call for any interference. The petition is, therefore, rejected with costs. Petition Rejected. ———