RAKESH TIWARI, J. Heard S/sri Madhav Jain and Rajneesh Baranwal Counsels for the petitioner ancl S/sri Dhruva Narayana and Bala Krishna Narayana, Counsels for the respon dents. 2. This writ petition is directed against the judgments and orders dated 18-2-2005 passed by District Judge, Mau in Rent Control Misc. Ap peal No. 150 of 1998 and dated 24 8-1998 passed by the Prescribed Authority/civil Judge (Junior Division), Mau in RA. Case No. 5 of 1003. 3. The facts as have been dis closed by the petitioner in the instant writ petition, are that Sri Pramod Kumar Gupta, Smt. Shaila Devi wife of Sri Durga Dutta-respondent Nos. 1 and 4 together with one Smt. Maina Devi claiming themselves to be the landlord, on the basis of a sale-deed dated 15-9-1990 executed by Sri Habib Ahmad, the erstwhile owner of the property, in dis pute, filed release application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) inter alia that the shop under the tenancy of the petitioner, was required by them for their own business purpose. It was averred in the applica tion that Sri Anant Prasad, father and Sri Gyan Chand, elder brother of Sri Pramod Kumar Gupta-respondent No. 1 are in possession of an independent shop in which they can easily carry on their business and that Sri Durga Dutt, the married younger brother of Sri Pramod Kumar Gupta-respondent No. 1 is sitting idle for want of accommoda tion for establishing himself in business. It was also their case that the shop in dispute was purchased by them with a view of establish Sri Durga Dutt in busi ness. 4. The petitioner-tenant contested the release application by filing written statement denying the averments made therein inter alia, that Sri Anand Prasad father of Sri Pramod Kumar Gupta, respondent No. 1, is neither carrying on nor can do any business owing to his old age as he is about 70 years of age and that Sri Durga Dutt for whom the release application has been filed, is carrying on his independent business of General Merchant, sale of tobacco and ropes from his own shop situated near Police Chawki Mohammdabad. It was also the case of the petitioner that apart from the above shop of Sri Durga Dutt, the landlords have 7-8 other shops in their occupation and that the busi ness being carried on by the petitioner in the tenanted shop is in his physical possession for the last about 40 years and is the only source of his livelihood on which about 10 members of his fami ly are dependant. It is averred that the shop, in dispute has been sold by the erstwhile landlord, due to being on inim ical term with the petitioner-tenant whose release application for the evic tion of the petitioner-tenant from the shop, in dispute, had been dismissed. 5. Apart from his own affidavit reiterating the grounds mentioned in the written statement, the petitioner-tenant also filed affidavit of one Mohd. Idrish before the Prescribed Authority who stated that Sri Durga Dutt is carry ing on his independent business of Kirana i. e. , General Merchant, as such, need of the landlord was sham and fic titious. 6. The landlords filed the affidavit of Sri Anant Prasad, father of respon dent No. 1 offering alternate shop to the tenant and the affidavit of Sri Durga Dutt denying the factum of carrying on independent business. 7. After evaluating the evidence, record and hearing the parties, the Prescribed Authority allowed the release application vide decree dated 24-8-1998. 8. Aggrieved, the tenant-petitioner preferred Rent Control Appeal No. 150 of 1998 before the District Judge, Mau, which too was dismissed vide order dated 18-2-2005. 9. The aforesaid orders dated 24-8-1998 passed by the Prescribed Authority and dated 18-2-2005 of the Appellate Authority have been chal lenged by the petitioner in this petition. 10. Counsel for the petitioner con tended that during the pendency of ap peal, Sri Anant Prasad died hence the shop occupied by him became avail able to the landlords, as such, the find ing recorded by the Appellate Court that the said shop will be occupied by his wife, children and grand-sons is thus based on surmises and conjec tures. He submitted that at the time of death of Sri Anant Prasad in November, 1996, his two sons were already engaged in business, therefore, the need of Sri Durga Dutt, the third son, could be satisfied from the shop of Sri Anant Prasad in which vacancy oc curred due to his death. 11. He submitted that at the time of death of Sri Anant Prasad in November, 1996, his two sons were already engaged in business, therefore, the need of Sri Durga Dutt, the third son, could be satisfied from the shop of Sri Anant Prasad in which vacancy oc curred due to his death. 11. He vehemently urged that comparative hardship of the tenant was greater than the landlords and the Courts below have committed manifest illegality in holding otherwise. He further urged that the Appellate Court below has recorded an incorrect finding that the petitioner could shift his business in the shop of his father as it has failed to consider and decide the question that the petitioner has no concern with the shop occupied by his father as tenant in the property of Dr. Inamullah. It is stated that the petitioner is living separately from his father and the shop occupied by his father having been razed to ground due to dilapidated condition during his life time, the tenancy of his father stood extinguished. 12. It is further submitted that the shop, in dispute is 16 ft x 12 ft and is situated at Quasba Mohammadabad, District Mau but the Courts below have failed to consider as to whether part release of the shop will suffice the need set up by the landlords. 13. In support of the aforesaid contention, the Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decisions of Honble the Apex Court in Pratap Narayan Tandon v. Abdul Mukatadir, 2005 (3) JCLR 788 (All) : 2005 (1) ARC 555 ; Smt. Rajrani Mehrotra v. IInd Addl. District Judge & Ors. , 1980 ARC 311 and Ramesh Chand Kesharwani v. Dwarika Prasad & Anr. , 2002 (2) ARC 298. 14. He lastly urged that earlier, the petitioner had filed Civil Misc. Writ No. 36820 of 2000 before this Court, which was allowed vide judgment and order dated 5-1 -2005 and remanded the case to the appellate authority with the fol lowing observations: "the appellate authority will reconsider the matter on the material available or record. However, if it comes to the con clusion that there was material on record to consider the effect of the death of Anant Prasad it will consider this aspect of the mat ter also while recording a finding on bona fide need and comparative hardship 15. However, if it comes to the con clusion that there was material on record to consider the effect of the death of Anant Prasad it will consider this aspect of the mat ter also while recording a finding on bona fide need and comparative hardship 15. It is stated that the Appellate Authority without considering the tenor of above remand order in its correct perspective, the impugned order has been passed which is in teeth of the law laid down in Kishore Kumar Khaitan v. Praveen Kumar Singh, 2006 (2) JCLR 686 (SC) : 2006 (1) ARC 601. 16. Per contra, Counsel for the respondents contended that neither the petitioner-tenant amended the writ peti tion nor filed any material before the ap pellate Court to bring on record the plea that the shop in the possession of late Anant Prasad Gupta was available to the landlords for establishing respondent No. 3 in business, as such, there was no occasion for rebutting the aforesaid plea or filing any evidence in this regard. He submitted that Civil Misc. Writ No. 36820 of 2000 filed by the petitioner was allowed remanding the case to the appellate authority for recording findings on the questions of bona fide need and comparative hardship. After the Appellate Court recorded findings on these questions on remand, the petitioner has no grievance left now. He then urged that the Courts below have recorded con current findings of facts against the petitioner after appraisal of the entire documentary and oral evidence on record, hence the impugned orders may not be interfered with in the writ jurisdiction as they do not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. 17. After hearing the respective submissions advanced by Counsels for the parties and on perusal of record, I find that there is no error apparent on face of record in the impugned judg ments and both the Courts below have arrived at a concurrent conclusion by giving cogent reasons that need of the landlords is bona fide and in case the shop, in dispute, is released in their favour, the petitioner-tenant will not suf fer any hardship rather the landlord will suffer irreparable loss. 18. In Maya Agrawal (Smt.) & Ors. v. 1st Additional Sessions Judqe, Ghazipur & Ors. , 2000 (2) ARC 370, this Court observed thus: ". . . 18. In Maya Agrawal (Smt.) & Ors. v. 1st Additional Sessions Judqe, Ghazipur & Ors. , 2000 (2) ARC 370, this Court observed thus: ". . . The Appellate Authority recorded clear and categorical findings to the effect that the need of the landlord for the shop in question was bona fide and genuine. On the question of hardship also, it has been held in case the application of the landlord was rejected, he would suffer more hardship and irreparable loss. The aforesaid findings are based on cogent reasons recorded by the Appellate Authority and also on the evidence on record. They do not suffer from any il legality or infirmity. This Court, in exorcise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the authorities below unless of course they suffer from any error apparent on the race of record. The authorities below, thus, have recorded concurrent findings on the question involved in the case. No case for interference under Article 226 of the Con stitution of India is made out. " 19. To the same effect are the decisions in Gulshan v. XIVth Additional District Judge, Meerut & Ors. , 2002 (2) ARC 699; Manoj Kumar & Anr. v. Munni Devi, 2005 (3) JCLR 1 (SC) : 2005 (4) SCC 191 ; Manoj Kumar & Anr. v. Munni Devi, 2005 (4) SCC 191 ; Munni Lal& Ors. v. Prescribed Authority & Ors. , 1978 SC 29; Munni Lal & Ors. v. Prescribed Authority & Ors. , 1981 ARC 470 and Narsingh Das Agarwal v. District Judge Ballia & Ors. , 2003 (2) ARC 742. 20. There is another important fea ture of the case that even if the conten tion of Counsel for the petitioner that shop of his father is no more under his tenancy is accepted. The tenant-petitioner has not been able to show that he made any effort to search alter nate accommodation after filing of release application by the landlords. In the absence of any such effort on the part of the tenant, he has no right to op pose release application. I am sup ported in my view by the very recent decision rendered in Kalawati v. Addi tional District Judge, 2006 (2) ARC 129. It has also been held by this Court in Mohd. Abdul Gani Azad v. Devi Prasad & Ors. I am sup ported in my view by the very recent decision rendered in Kalawati v. Addi tional District Judge, 2006 (2) ARC 129. It has also been held by this Court in Mohd. Abdul Gani Azad v. Devi Prasad & Ors. , 2005 (2) ARC 825, that where a tenant had no shop available to him in a vacant state, but did not bring any evidence to show the search for alterna tive accommodation, the application may be allowed. 21. Moreover, subsequent events can only be taken into account if they are of such magnitude and dimention that the need propounded by the petitioning party is completely eclipsed by such subsequent events as has been held in Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava & Ors. , 2001 (1) ARC 352; Kedar Nath Agarwal v. Dhanraji Devi, 2001 (2) ARC 764 and Shri Ram Govil v. Smt. Maqsoodan & Ors. , 2006 (3) JCLR 446 (All) : 2006 (3) ARC 416. 22. So far as the contention of Counsel for the petitioner that the need of Sri Durga Dutt, third son, can be satisfied by allowing him to occupy the shop vacated by Sri Anant Prasad due to his death is concerned, suffice it to say that the petitioner- tenant cannot dictate the landlords as to how they can squeeze their need. This view finds sup port from the decision in Iqbal Ahmad (Dr.) v. IInd A. D. J. Ballia & Ors. , 2005 (1) JCLR 260 (All) : 2004 (2) ARC 505, wherein it has been held that the tenant has got no business to dictate the landlord as to how he can squeeze his need in smaller portion. 23. The matter can be looked from another angle also by drawing anology from case where a tenant or landlord dies and the rights of the tenants or landlord, as the case may be, devolve upon they legal heirs and repre sentatives. Similarly in the instant case, after the death of Sri Anant Prasad Gupta, his wife and children would get the shop in which he was doing busi ness and not Sri Durga Dutt, the third son of "the landlord for whose need the shop under the tenancy of the petitioner was required under the release applica tion. The Courts below have rightly came to the conclusion that bona fide need and comparative hardship of the landlord was greater. 24. The Courts below have rightly came to the conclusion that bona fide need and comparative hardship of the landlord was greater. 24. The words bona fide need under Section 21 do not mean dire ur gent or acute. Tenant, in that case, did not bring on record any evidence to show that he made any efforts to pur chase or take on rent any alternate ac commodation after filing of release ap plication. The petitioner-tenant, in the instant case could easily shift to the shop occupied by his father but if the case of the petitioner that the shop oc cupied by his father is no more in exist ence, is accepted, he could easily have searched out a shop of his requirement on rent after filing of the release applica tion during these years. The contention of Counsel for the petitioner is, there fore, untenable in view of the land and facts above. 25. In view of the discussions made in the foregoing paragraphs of this judgment, there is no illegality or in firmity in the orders impugned warrant ing interference in the writ jurisdiction. 26. The writ petition, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner is directed to vacate the shop, in dispute, three months from today and will make payment of entire arrears of rent to the respondent-landlords within the same period. If the accommodation is not vacated, the petitioner shall be evicted from the disputed accommoda tion by coercive process in accordance with law with the aid of local Police. Costs: 27. So far as cost is concerned; Honble the Apex Court in Salem Advo cate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, 2005 (3) JCLR 251 (SC) : AIR 2005 SC 3353 , has held that: "so far as awarding of costs at the time of judgment is concerned, awarding of costs must be treated generally as mandatory inas much as the liberal attitude of the Courts in directing the parties to bear their own costs had led the parties to file a number of frvolous cases in the Courts or to raise frivolous and unnecessary issues. Costs should invariably follow the event. Where a party succeeds ultimately on one issue or point but loses on number of other issues or points, which were unnecessarily raised. Costs must be appropriately apportioned. Special reasons must be assigned if costs are not being awarded. Costs should invariably follow the event. Where a party succeeds ultimately on one issue or point but loses on number of other issues or points, which were unnecessarily raised. Costs must be appropriately apportioned. Special reasons must be assigned if costs are not being awarded. Costs should be as sessed according to rule in force. If any of the parties has unreasonably protracted the proceedings, the Judge should consider exercising discretion to impose exemplary costs after taking into account the expense incurred for the purpose of attendance on the adjourned dates: 28. Thus from the law laid down by the Honble Apex Court in the aforesaid case of Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra) it is apparent that non-payment of cost is an exception for which special reasons have to be given by the Court and that in normal circumstances cost has to be awarded on the party accord ing to the issue decided in favour of the party which were unnecessarily raised. The cost so imposed should be in ac cordance with rules and if the proceed ings are unnecessarily protracted or ad journments have been sought it is upon the discretion of the Judge to impose exemplary cost taking also into account the circumstances etc. for the purpose of adjournment. 29. Following the ratio laid down in Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra) this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Peti tion No. 48752 of 2006, Nizamuddin v. Shakoor Ahmad, after considering provisions of Rule 9 of Chapter XXII and Rule 11 of Chapter XXI of the High Court Rules, 1951 and provisions of Sections 34, 35- A and 35-B of the Code of Civil Procedure has held that while awarding interest on a party by non- payment of principal amount or any dues should also be considered by the Court and not only interest but penal interest may also be awarded. 30. Since it is a frivolous petition against the material on record and the petitioner has deliberately prolonged the harassment of the respondent-landlord depriving his third son from settlement in life for the last about 8 years, which is hit by Article 21 of the Con stitution of India, it is directed that apart from payment of arrears of rent, if any, the petitioner will also pay cost of Rs. 25, 000 (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand) which shall be deposited by the petitioner before District Judge, Mau within two months from today. The arrears of rent as well as the cost so deposited can be withdrawn by the respondent- landlord without furnishing any security within two months from the date of deposit. In case the petitioner fails to make pay ment of the aforesaid amount, the same shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue. Petition dismissed. .