Judgment ( 1. ) THIS appeal is filed by the defendant challenging the judgment and decree dated 3-8-1998 passed by the Second Additional District Judge, Shivpuri in Civil suit No. 10-A of 1981 whereby the Court has decreed the suit for declaration of possession and mesne profits. ( 2. ) THE brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff has filed the present suit alleging that the House No. 251 was owned by Shankarlal Cheetarmal, his name was recorded in the Municipal record since Samvat 2002. Pyarelal who was natural son of Nemi Chand was adopted by Shankarlal somewhere in 1925 when he was 4-5 years of age. Nemichand had two other sons Dhannalal and pannalal. Pyarelal died in the year 1948-49, while Shankarlal died in the year 1951, at that time present plaintiff was minor. Sonibai wife of Pyarelal and chhutanki Bai wife of Shankarlal were looking after him, at that time Nemiehand, who was residing in Rajasthan came to Shivpuri and started looking after the business as Ammuktiyar. Nemichand was thus put in possession of the suit property by Sonibai and Chhutanki Bai to look after the business. At the time of filing of suit the plaintiff attained majority as he was 20 years of age as defendant started claiming right to the suit property. The present suit was filed for declaration of title to the suit house which is bearing survey No. 251, relief of possession and mesne profit is also made in the plaint. ( 3. ) IN Para 5 of the plaint pedigree is given as under :- ( 4. ) THE defendant filed the written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint. It is submitted that the house was not owned by Shankarlal. Shankarlal and Chhitarmal were not related to each other. Chhitarmal was son of Laliram and they were not related to Shankarlal. According to the defendant pedigree of the family was as under :- ( 5. ) THE defendant has also pleaded that he has acquired right to the suit property by way of adverse possession. According to him the defendant is in possession of the property since 1928. He has denied the fact that he was inducted in the possession in pursuance to Ex. P-1 the power of attorney in the year 1952 as alleged by the plaintiff. According to him the defendant is in possession of the property since 1928. He has denied the fact that he was inducted in the possession in pursuance to Ex. P-1 the power of attorney in the year 1952 as alleged by the plaintiff. The Trial Court after framing issues and recording evidence has decreed the suit. Hence, this appeal. ( 6. ) THE Counsel for the appellant challenged the finding of the Court. Atcording to the Counsel plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendant was put in possession in 1953. According to him he is in possession since 1928. The counsel for the appellant submitted that the alleged adoption of the Pyarelal by Shankarlal is also not proved and therefore, in absence of proof of adoption even if the defendant has no title to the property, decree for possession in favour of the present plaintiff cannot be passed. From the allegations and evidence, it appears that the house in question was initially owned by Chhitarmal. Shankarlal was son of Chhitarmal and Shankarlal has adopted Pyarelal. The present plaintiff alleged to be a son of Pyarelal. There is no dispute about the title of shankarlal to the suit house. ( 7. ) THE first question urged by Counsel for the appellant is that adoption of Pyarelal by Shankarlal is not proved. As per plaint allegation the said adoption has taken place in the year 1925. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the burden of proving adoption is heavy on the plaintiff and he has failed to discharge the burden placed upon him. To support his argument has invited attention of this Court to the evidence on record. Plaintiff to prove his case has examined Sonibai (P. W. 1), Sonibai wife of pyarelal, was 60 years of age at the time of evidence. Her statement was recorded on 14-1-1984, i. e. , she was about one year old at the time of adoption. This witness has stated that Pyarelal has gone in adoption to Shankarlal in very young age at that time his age was 4-5 years. This witness has married to Pyarelal after adoption. Thus, this witness has no personal knowledge about the adoption and does not proof any light on the question of adoption. ( 8. ) SHRINARAYAN Nigam (P. W. 2) is 90 years old person. This witness has married to Pyarelal after adoption. Thus, this witness has no personal knowledge about the adoption and does not proof any light on the question of adoption. ( 8. ) SHRINARAYAN Nigam (P. W. 2) is 90 years old person. This witness has nowhere stated anything about the adoption. This witness was examined to prove Ex. P-1 which is power of attorney executed by Sonibai and Chhutanki bai who appointed the Nemichand as power of attorney holder. Kaushal Chand jain (P. W. 3), who is plaintiff in the prese t case, is aged about 48 years, when his statements were recorded. His statement was recorded on 18th July, 1988. Thus, this witness was not born at the time of adoption. In his statement, he has stated that he does not know about adoption and his grandmother has told him about adoption. Counsel for the appellant submits that statement of this witness is hearsay and cannot prove the adoption of Pyarelal by Shankarlal. ( 9. ) THE next witness Krishan Chand (P. W. 4) 81 years of age, he was examined in the year 1998. Thus, this witness must be about 7-8 years at the time of adoption. He says that he was present at the time of adoption. In Para 4 of his statement he has stated that the ladies were not present at the time of ceremony. Counsel for the appellant submitted that this witness does not prove the actual giving and taking. According to the Counsel for the appellant for valid adoption under the old Hindu Law it was necessary to prove that the natural parents have given the child and the consent of the parents of the adopted child is not proved. This witness does not prove the actual giving and taking by natural parents and adopted parents of Pyarelal and therefore, adoption is not proved. Counsel for the appellant submits that burden of proving the adoption is on the person who claims the right under adoption. A person who seeks to displace the natural course of succession to property by alleging an adoption must discharge the burden that lies upon him by proof of the factum of adoption and its validity. The evidence in proof of adoption should be free from all suspicion of fraud and was consistent and probable as to give no occasion of doubting its truth. The evidence in proof of adoption should be free from all suspicion of fraud and was consistent and probable as to give no occasion of doubting its truth. Thus, according to the Counsel for the appellant it was for the plaintiff to prove not only factum but its validity also. The Apex Court in the case of Madhusudan das Vs. Narayani Bai and others (AIR 1983 Supreme Court 114), has laid down the aforesaid. Similar view taken by the Apex Court in the case of Moran Mar basselios Chatholicos and another Vs. Most. Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and others ( AIR 1954 SC 526 ) and also in the case of Lakshman Singh Kothari Vs. Smt. Rup Kanwar (AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1378 ). There is no doubt that for proving adoption the validity as well as factum is to be proved by the person, who is claiming right under the adoption and the said burden is very heavy. ( 10. ) IN the present case, the adoption has taken place in the year 1925 and i. e. , more than 60 years before filing of the suit. In case of an old adoption it is very difficult to get a direct evidence. Division Bench of this Court has considered this aspect in the case of Surajbai w/o Kaluram and others Vs. Sadashiv Jugal Kishore and another, AIR 1958 MP 100 , wherein this Court has held that where alleged adoption is an old one and has taken place many years ago strict proof of giving and taking or performance of the ceremonies necessary to constitute valid adoption is not necessary and may be difficult to obtain the evidence as alleged adopted son has been treated as such for long series of years very slight evidence is sufficient to prove the adoption for long. This Court in the aforesaid case relied on a judgment in the case of Dal Bahadur Singh and others Vs. Bijai Bahadur Singh and others, AIR 1930 Privy Council 79, wherein the Privy Council has held that onus of proving the adoption is on the part of setting it up, but it is also true that if the plaintiffs adoption is old one and the plaintiff had been treated as adopted boy by the member of the family and in public transactions, then presumption arises in his favour. ( 11. ( 11. ) THUS, from the judgment of Division Bench and the judgment of the Privy Council referred above, it is clear that in old cases of adoption strict proof of adoption is not necessary and what is required is other circumstances, i. e. , adopted boy was treated to be a member of the family or as son of adopted parents. ( 12. ) IN the present case, adoption was taken place in the year 1925, i. e. , merely 60 years before filing of the suit. Therefore, even slight evidence of adoption and conduct of the parties is sufficient to prove adoption. To find out this evidence, statement of Sonibai (P. W. 1) is relevant. In Para 5 of her statement, she has stated that she married to Pyarelal as he was son of shankarlal. Members of the society has always treated Pyarelal as son of shankarlal and he lived with Shankarlal as his son and was conducted his business as son of Shankarlal. The name of shop was Shankarlal Pyarelal. Thus, according to this witness Pyarelal was always treated as son of Shankarlal. There is absolutely no cross-examination on behalf of defendant to this witness on this point. ( 13. ) D. W. 3 plaintiff has proved certain documents in his evidence. Ex. P-2 is tax receipt showing the fact that property was recorded in the name of shankarlal and Chhitarmal. Ex. P-3 to Ex. P-27 show that property was recorded ia Che name of Shankarlal and Chhitarmal. The Ex. P-28 is registered ammuktiyar name executed by the present plaintiff appointing Nemichand ammuktiyar of firm Shankarlal. This document shows that the name of firm was shankarlal Pyarelal. Ex. P-29 is a letter head of the firm of Shankarlal Pyarelal. Ex. P-39is the receipt showing that the property tax paid on behalf of Shankarlal chhitarmal name of the firm (Shankarlal Pyarelal) is mentioned in the said receipt. Ex. P-43 is map granting permission for construction. In this document the name is mentioned as Pyarelal Shankarlal. Ex. P-44 certificate issued by municipality Shivpuri which is issued in the name of Shankarlal Pyarelal Jain. Even the power of attorney Ex. P-1 which is a registered document of the year 1952 mentions the name of the firm as Shankarlal Pyarelal. ( 14. ) THUS, from these documents it appears that the name of firm was shankarlal Pyarelal. Ex. P-44 certificate issued by municipality Shivpuri which is issued in the name of Shankarlal Pyarelal Jain. Even the power of attorney Ex. P-1 which is a registered document of the year 1952 mentions the name of the firm as Shankarlal Pyarelal. ( 14. ) THUS, from these documents it appears that the name of firm was shankarlal Pyarelal. From the evidence it appears that the name of firm was initially Saligram Lalliram. Saligram is father of Lalliram and subsequently the name has changed to Chhitarmal Shankarlal and then Shankarlal Pyarelal. ( 15. ) THUS, from these evidence and on the testimony of P. W. 1,itisclear that Pyarelal was always treated as son of Shankarlal. Moreover, Ex. P-43 and ex. P-39 show that the name of Pyarelal is mentioned as son of Shankarlal. These documents were prepared long before filing of the proceedings and long before the dispute started between the parties. Thus, in the light of the judgment of Division Bench of this Court, there is sufficient evidence to hold that Pyarelal was adopted by Shankarlal and therefore, he has title to the suit property. ( 16. ) NOW, the question about the nature of possession of the defendant. The defendant is claiming to have acquired right to the suit property by way of adverse possession. Ex. P-1 is the power of attorney of the year 1952. This power of attorney shows that the house was owned by the firm Shankarlal Pyarelal and present plaintiff is owner of the property. He was minor at that time. His age is described as 12 years. The documents is executed by Sonibai and Chhutanki Bai, i. e. , mother and grandmother. The present plaintiff was appointed as power of attorney holder to look after the affairs of the property of the family. Thus, from the said documents the present plaintiff was put in possession of the property as Ammuktiyar. The defendant is also not claiming to be a real owner of the property but is claiming right only by way of adverse possession. The power of attorney holder cannot claim right to property by way of adverse possession. Similarly, there cannot be adverse possession against a minor. The limitation of adverse possession will start only after the minor attained majority. Moreover, ex. P-28, which is registered power of attorney executed by the present plaintiff also describe Nemichand as power of attorney. The power of attorney holder cannot claim right to property by way of adverse possession. Similarly, there cannot be adverse possession against a minor. The limitation of adverse possession will start only after the minor attained majority. Moreover, ex. P-28, which is registered power of attorney executed by the present plaintiff also describe Nemichand as power of attorney. This document is registered document. Ex. P-29 is letter signed by the present defendant on the letter head of Shankarlal Pyarelal Jain. In this letter, he has stated that he has taken possession of the house in Diwali 1953 for residential purpose of his son pannalal. He would continue to deposit tax on behalf of plaintiff. Thus, nemichand has admitted the title of the present plaintiff by the said letter Ex. P-29, which was written by him on 4-6-1965. There is nothing on record that he has started claiming hostile title against the present plaintiff at any point of time. In absence of this evidence, it cannot be said that defendant has acquired any right to the property by way of adverse possession. In the case of Madhusudan Das (supra), the Apex Court held that in an appeal against a Trial Court decree, when the Appellate Court considers an issue turning on oral evidence it must bear in mind that it does not enjoy the advantage, which the Trial Court had in having the witnesses before it and of observing the manner in which they gave their testimony. When there is a conflict of oral evidence on any matter in issue and its resolution turns upon the credibility of the witnesses, the general rule is that the Appellate Court should permit the findings of fact rendered by the Trial court to prevail unless it clearly appears that some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness has escaped the notice of the Trial Court or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace it opinion as to where the credibility lies. In view of the aforesaid judgment, I do not find any perversity or special reason to call for interference in the finding arrived at by the Court below. In such circumstances, me Court below has not committed any error in passing impugned judgment. ( 17. ) THE appeal is without any merits and is dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by the Court below is hereby confirmed. In such circumstances, me Court below has not committed any error in passing impugned judgment. ( 17. ) THE appeal is without any merits and is dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by the Court below is hereby confirmed. First Appeal dismissed.