Judgment Ajay Rastogi, J.-Claim of petitioner (workman) was rejected by Labour Court Jaipur vide award dated 26.04.1991 on premises that he had not worked for 240 days in the office of Assistant Engineer, TLCD IV Sub Division V, Fatehpur which was considered to be a separate unit for computing continuous services of 240 days provided under Section 25-B of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“the Act”). 2.As pleaded in writ petition so also before Labour Court, petitioner initially joined service as Helper on 012.1976 and served upto 21.02.1980 in various offices under Chief Engineers R.S.E.B. Jaipur from: (i) 29.03.1977 to 09.08.1977 in Sub Dn 2nd, AEN Phulera (Jaipur), (ii) 01.09.1977 to 310.1977 at Beawar; (iii) 012.1977 to 23.02.1979 in TCD 3rd, Sub Dn. I, Bhilwara; (iv) 01.03.1978 to 31.07.1978 in TCD 3rd, Sub Dn I, Beawar; (v) 17.08.1978 to 110.1978 in Sub. Dn. 2nd , Deedwana, (vi) 212.1978 to 20.06.1979 in TLCD, Sub. Dn. 3rd, Kotputli; (vii) 02.07.1979 to 30.09.1979 in TLCD IV, Sub. Dn. 2nd, Neem Ka Thana, & (viii) 10.1979 to 21.02.1980 in TLCD IV, Sub. Dn. V, Fatehpur. 3.After Conciliation Officer failed to resolve dispute and send report to appropriate Government, reference was made vide Notification dated 21.08.1981. As the petitioner lastly served under Assistant Engineer, TLCD, IV, Sub. Dn. V, Fatehpur, reference was made with regard to termination given effect to by Assistant Engineer concerned. However, petitioner filed application on 24.03.1983 for impleading Chief Engineer RSEB as he had worked under different Assistant Engineers who were under direct supervisory/administrative control of Chief Engineer. After hearing, the amendment was made in reference by appropriate Government and vide Corrigendum dated 15.03.1986 impleading Chief Engineer RSEB and Assistant Engineer RSEB Sikar as respondents reference whereof has been made by Labour Court in Award dated 26.04.1991. Assistant Engineer TLCD Fatehpur, confined his reply only with regard to period during which petitioner allegedly worked under his supervisory control but as regards averments in respect of rest of period of his working under other Assistant Engineers of RSEB, no reply was filed obviously on the pretext that he was not having relevant record of other offices of RSEB whereas Chief Engineer also adopted reply by AEN fatehpur and has not filed separate reply to claim of the workman. Petitioner filed application dated 14.07.1982 (Annexure-5) to summon the record of earlier period during which he had worked in other office of AENs for adjudication of dispute. But any how that record was not produced and the learned Labour Court has recorded a finding that in terms of Section 2(g) of the Act that Assistant Engineer Fatehpur was his employer and since petitioner failed to prove his working for 240 days in preceding 12 months of his impugned termination under supervisory control of one Assistant Engineer, respondents were not under obligation to comply with provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the period during which he had worked under other Assistant Engineers, the same cannot be computed for his continuous service of 240 days in preceding 12 months and consequently rejected his claim vide Award dated 26.04.1991 (Annexure-10). Hence, this petition. 4.Counsel for petitioner contends that facts stated by workman in his statement of claim duly accompanied by affidavit (Annexure-7) stood uncontroverted in so far as they relate to the period of which reference has been made of the period of his working in different Assistant Engineers who were under supervisory and administrative control of Chief Engineer and that being so, corrigendum was issued by State Government by making amendment in reference, therefore, finding recorded by Labour Court for holding that Assistant Engineer, Fatehpur was his employer in terms of Section 2(g) of the Act is totally perverse and deserves to be set aside. Counsel also urged that bare reading of the provision clearly depicts that where no authority is prescribed, Head of Department is the employer and in present case, Head of Department is Chief Engineer who has direct supervisory and administrative control over Assistant Engineers and they work under its delegated authority; holding Assistant Engineer as employer coupled with Head of Department for the petitioner, is clearly misreading of Section 2(g) of the Act and deserves rejection. 5.Counsel further contends that Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act are independent in its entity and even if petitioner has failed to show of his working for 240 days in preceding 12 months under Assistant Engineer, Fatehpur wherefrom his services were terminated, still violation of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, which was raised by the petitioner was not properly appreciated while examining dispute of termination in question. In support of his contention, Counsel placed reliance upon decision of this Court S.B. in CWP No. 1569/1991 Ramnarain Meena vs. State & Ors., decided on 310.1991 which was upheld by Division Bench in Special Appeal (Writ) No. 25/1992, State & Ors. vs. Ramnarain Meena, decided on 28.02.1992, holding that even though units are different, the department is same by which whatever the work assigned to the workman has to be computed with regard to his continuous service of 240 days required under Section 25-B of the Act. 6.Respondents (RSEB) in their reply to writ petition confined their case in totality only with regard to period which he had served in office of Assistant Engineer TLCD, Fatehpur and as regard rest of the period of his service, for which petitioner has specifically mentioned in writ petition so also in statement of claim duly accompanied by affidavit, no reference has been made even before this Court by respondents and when the matter came up for hearing on 29.04.2005, Counsel for respondents was directed to file affidavit pointing out period of service rendered by petitioner workman from 012.1976 to 21.02.1980 in reference to Annexure-5. Pursuant to these directions, respondents filed additional affidavit but again confined to his working in Office of Assistant Engineer TLCD. 7.I have considered contentions of Counsel for the parties and with their assistance, examined material on record. Despite specifically pleaded in statement of claim duly accompanied by affidavit before Labour Court so also in writ petition before this Court, pointing out period of service rendered by petitioner workman in different subordinate Offices of Chief Engineer (respondent) from 012.1976 to 21.02.1980 as referred to in Annexure-5, these facts remain un-controverted and further unagitated before Labour Court specially the fact as to whether he at all worked under respective Assistant Engineers who were under supervisory and administrative control of Chief Engineer RSEB, for which reference has been made under Section 2(g) of the Act, “employer” has been defined to mean- “(i) in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central Government or a State Government the authority prescribed in this behalf , or where no authority is prescribed, the head of the department. (ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority the Chief Executive Officer of that authority.” 8.The definition is not exhaustive and has been provided only in relation to the industries specified under the Act. The term is to be given its ordinary meaning keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and the purpose for which the Act was enacted. Basic object and import of provision is to consider “employer” who holds ultimate supervisory and administrative control over the workman covered under Section 2(g) of the Act. 9.From a bare reading to term, “employer”(supra), it is clear that where authority is not prescribed, “employer” will be the Head of Department. Assistant Engineer where petitioner worked was never notified as an authority under Section 2(g) of the Act, therefore, the Head of Department will be the “employer”. Assistant Engineer under whom petitioner was working or had worked, in no manner can be said to be the Head of Department as provided under Section 2(g) of the Act, which in present case, is Chief Engineer, who ultimately holds supervisory and administrative control over his subordinates including present Assistant Engineers where petitioner worked for different span of time (supra), and merely because Chief Engineer delegated powers of making appointment will not hold Assistant Engineer to be employer of petitioner or the Head of Department as contemplated in Section 2(g) of the Act. 10.In Shiv Kumar vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., Special Appeal (Writ) No. 25/1991 decided on 010.1991, where the petitioner worked for more than 240 days (viz. 303 days) in various Sub-Divisions of Irrigation Department, Division Bench of this Court held as follows:- “We are of the considered opinion that provisions of Section 25-F of the ID Act should have been followed. Merely because the petitioner worked in different sub-divisions of the same department will not make any difference. (emphasis added) 11.The Act has been enacted with a basic object to provide protection certainly to workmen who have no right of say. Merely because the petitioner worked in different sub-divisions of the same department will not make any difference. (emphasis added) 11.The Act has been enacted with a basic object to provide protection certainly to workmen who have no right of say. If interpretation of Section 2(g) of the Act, as referred to by Labour Court is accepted, it will have a wide repercussions and certainly workmen who have no right to say, can be deprived of his lawful right conferred under the Act and can easily be frustrated by employer by shifting workmen in different units under his control before he completes 240 days in one unit in preceding calendar year and Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which are independent provisions, can also be defeated by shifting from one unit to the other. Thus, viewed, in my opinion, very finding recorded by Labour Court assailed herein is perverse and deserves to be set aside. 12.Consequently, this writ petition is allowed and impugned Award dated 26.04.1991 (Annexure10) is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Labour Court, Jaipur to consider the dispute afresh after affording opportunity of hearing to both the parties in accordance with law in the light of what has been observed above. Since, the matter pertains to termination given effect to long back on 21.02.1980, Labour Court No. 2 Jaipur is directed to decide the dispute on merits as early as possible but not later than six months from the date of receipt of this order. Both the parties are directed to appear before Labour Court Jaipur on 20.02.2006. No costs. A copy of this order be sent to respondent No. 1 for immediate compliance.