Judgment 1. This order will dispose of four appeals bearing Nos. 272 to 275 of 2005. The facts are being taken from IT Appeal No. 272 of 2005. 2. This is an appeal filed by the assessee raising following substantial question of law, arising out of common order passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench A (for short the Tribunal) in ITA Nos. 717/Chd/2000 and 718/Chd/2000, dt. 21st Feb., 2003, for the asst. yrs. 1997-98 and 1998-99, respectively: Whether the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the law on the date of passing the order under Section 143(1)(a) will apply and not the law on the date of filing the return of income as held by Hon ble Supreme Court in CIT v. Hindustan Electro Graphites Ltd. ? 3. Brief facts of the case are that the assessee filed its return of income, which was processed by the AO under Section 143(1)(a) of the IT Act, 1961 (for short the Act) and keeping in view the legal position on the subject, undisputed facts and information on record, deduction claimed by the assessee under Section 80P(2)(a)(iii) of the Act was disallowed. Against the order passed by the AO, the assessee went in appeal before the Income-tax Commr. (Appeals) [for short the CIT(A)], inter alia, raising grounds that the disallowance of deduction claimed by the assessee under Section 80P(2)(a)(iii) of the Act was not a kind of prima facie adjustment. In fact the same was debatable issue and regular assessment under Section 143(3) of the Act should have been framed for the purpose. Having failed in appeal, the assessee further went in appeal before the Tribunal where also the assessee could not succeed. The relevant findings of the Tribunal on the issue raised by the assessee are as under: 2.4 We have considered the rival submissions of both the parties, perused the material on record as well as the legal luminaries relied upon by the leaned Tribunal. We find that there is no dispute that when the AO processed the return under Section 143(1)(a), Section 80P(2)(a)(iii) has been amended with retrospective effect w.e.f. 1st April, 1968 by which deduction was restricted only in respect of income earned for marketing of the agricultural produce grown by the members of the assessee-society. We find that there is no dispute that when the AO processed the return under Section 143(1)(a), Section 80P(2)(a)(iii) has been amended with retrospective effect w.e.f. 1st April, 1968 by which deduction was restricted only in respect of income earned for marketing of the agricultural produce grown by the members of the assessee-society. Learned Authorised Representative was also fair enough that in view of this amendment, the assessee is not entitled for the deduction but contended that the issue was debatable as the law on the date of filing of return allowed for the deduction and retrospective amendment was challenged before the Hon ble Supreme Court. Section 143(1)(a) empowers the AO to disallow the deduction claimed by the assessee where the assessee is (sic-not) entitled for the same on the face of return. The AO, in our opinion, while processing the return has to apply the law which was in existence at the time of processing the return and was applicable to the assessment year in respect of which the return has been processed by the AO. The law has been amended with retrospective effect and the amended law was applicable to the assessment year under consideration. There cannot be any interpretation to the amended law taken by the AO. Merely that retrospective operation of the law has been challenged before the Hon ble Supreme Court does not mean that there may be two interpretations in the law laid down or the interpretation taken by the AO was debatable. Learned Authorised Representative contended that it is the only retrospective operation of the law which has been challenged. There is no plea advanced by the Authorised Representative that the interpretation taken by the AO was not correct in law or there cannot be two interpretations of the section. Thus, in our opinion, the AO has correctly made the prima facie adjustment under Section 143(1)(a) and Section 143(1)(a) authorises the AO to make such prima facie adjustment because the claim of the assessee was not allowable on the face of the return on the basis of the amended law and the law as in existence at the time of processing the return was applicable to the assessment year under consideration. We have gone through the judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Hindustan Electro Graphites Ltd. as well as the judgment of the Hon ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CIT v. Gian Talkies (1982) 31 CTR (P&H) 93 relied upon by the learned Authorised Representative and we find that these citations will not help the assessee. The issue involved in this case was only charging additional tax. There was retrospective amendment under Section 28 by which Clause (iiib) was inserted with retrospective effect and due to this retrospective effect, cash assistance received by the assessee becomes the income of the assessee. The AO made the prima facie adjustment while processing the return in respect of cash compensatory (support) and imposed additional tax on the assessee under Section 143(1)(a). Neither the appellate authority nor the Hon ble High Court or the Hon ble Supreme Court has held in this case that no prima facie adjustment under Section 143(1)(a) can be made where the retrospective amendment was made. Thus, we find no merit in the first ground of appeals of the assessee and accordingly, we dismiss the first ground of the appeals in both the assessment years i.e., 1997-98 and 1998-99. 4. At the time of argument, counsel for the assessee could not dispute that with the retrospective amendment of Section 80P(2)(a)(iii) of the Act w.e.f. 1968, the deduction as claimed by the assessee from the income were not admissible and in fact he very fairly conceded that subsequently order under Section 143(3) of the Act has also been passed and the amount of tax in fact has been deposited by the assessee, which is not in dispute. All what he contended is that the return filed by the assessee should have been processed under Section 143(1)(a) of the Act, keeping in view the law as was there on the date when return was filed and not on the date when it was processed. All what he contended is that the return filed by the assessee should have been processed under Section 143(1)(a) of the Act, keeping in view the law as was there on the date when return was filed and not on the date when it was processed. To substantiate his plea, the assessee relied upon a judgment of Hon ble the Supreme Court in CIT v. Hindustan Electro Graphites Ltd. On a specific query by the Bench as to what effective relief the assessee will get when the levy of tax is not in dispute even on the date the return was processed, he fairly stated that in case the orders under Section 143(1)(a) of the Act are set aside, the amount of tax paid by the assessee in terms of assessment would be refundable and it will become payable only when the assessment was framed under Section 143(3) of the Act. Consequently, for the intervening period, the assessee would be entitled to interest on the amount. 5. We have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the assessee and also perused the judgment of Hon ble the Supreme Court in Hindustan Electro Graphites Ltd.s case (supra). Learned Counsel for the assessee has not cited any judgment to support his argument to the effect that while processing the return under Section 143(1)(a) of the Act, the assessing authority is not to proceed in terms of law as existed on the date of processing. 6. As far as the judgment of Hon ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Electro Graphites Ltd.s case (supra), is concerned the same was a case where an additional tax, a kind of penalty, under Section 143(1A) of the Act was sought to be levied, in case tax deposited as per returns was found to be less than the tax assessed while processing the return under Section 143(1)(a) of the Act. That is not the position in the case in hand. The assessee is not being penalised for any default, rather in the present case, following the dictum of law laid down by Hon ble the Supreme Court in Hindustan Electro Graphites Ltd.s case (supra), levy of additional tax under Section 143(1A) of the Act was set aside by the CIT(A). That is not the position in the case in hand. The assessee is not being penalised for any default, rather in the present case, following the dictum of law laid down by Hon ble the Supreme Court in Hindustan Electro Graphites Ltd.s case (supra), levy of additional tax under Section 143(1A) of the Act was set aside by the CIT(A). The relevant part of the judgment in Hindustan Electro Graphites Ltd. s case (supra) is extracted below: Held, dismissing the appeal, that where a return is filed the law applicable would be the law as it stood on the date of filing of the return. In the instant case, there was not even a bona fide mistake and in fact it was not a case where under some mistaken belief the assessee did not disclose the cash compensatory support received by it. It is true that income by way of cash compensatory support became taxable retrospectively w.e.f. 1st April, 1967, but that was by an amendment of Section 28 by the Finance Act of 1990, which amendment could not have been known before Finance Act came into force. Levy of additional tax bears all the characteristics of penalty. Additional tax was levied as the assessee did not in his return show the income by way of cash compensatory support. After the assessee had filed its return of the income which was correct as per law on the date of filing of the return, the cash compensatory support also came within the sway of Section 28. When additional tax has the imprint of penalty the Revenue cannot say that levy of additional tax is automatic under Section 143(1A) of the Act. If additional tax could be levied in such circumstances it will be punishing the assessee for no fault of his.That cannot ever be the legislative intent. In the circumstances of the present case, levy of additional tax taking into account the income by way of cash compensatory support was not warranted. (emphasis, italicised in print, supplied) 7. In view of our above discussion, we do not find any substantial question of law arising in the present appeals. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. 8. In the circumstances of the present case, levy of additional tax taking into account the income by way of cash compensatory support was not warranted. (emphasis, italicised in print, supplied) 7. In view of our above discussion, we do not find any substantial question of law arising in the present appeals. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. 8. Since, we have not found any merit in the appeals of the assessee, we do not deem it appropriate to go into the averments raised by the assessee in the application for condonation of delay of 602 days in IT Appeal Nos. 272 and 273 of 2005 and 619 days in IT Appeal Nos. 274 and 275 of 2005 in filing the appeals respectively.