Judgment 1. This writ petition seeks quashing of Show Cause Notice dated 3-3-2005 (Annexure P-33) issued by Additional Director General, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Ludhiana. Further prayer made is that Union of India may be directed to initiate disciplinary and departmental proceedings and prosecution against the officials including respondents No. 4 to 7 i.e. different functionaries of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, who are responsible for illegal detention of the petitioner No. 1 and pay compensation to the petitioners for wrongful detention. 2. It is stated that the petitioners are engaged in the business of manufacturing/export of acrylic yarn, blankets and shawls. On 26-5-2004, the officers of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence raided the residential premises of petitioner No. 1. No incriminatory material was found. The petitioner was illegally detained for over two days and later on shown arrested under the provisions of Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 (for short the 1962 Act) and on medical examination, injuries were found on his person. He was, thereafter, released on bail. Bank accounts were also ordered to be seized, later on de-freezed. Petitioner No. 1 filed a criminal complaint on 18-2-2005 alleging wrongful confinement, physical torture and defamation, which is stated to be at a stage of preliminary evidence. On 31-3-2005, the order of detention under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 was passed. In the grounds, it is mentioned that the raw material imported without import duty was clandestinely diverted and for fulfilling export obligations, sub-standard material was procured and supplied. Order of detention was challenged and vide judgment dated 10-3-2006 reported in Rajinder Arora v. Union of India and others, 2006 (4) SCC 796, Honble Supreme Court quashed the order of detention on the ground of delay in passing and executing the order. It was also noticed by the Honble Supreme Court that no prosecution has been initiated nor any show cause notice has been issued by the Director General of Foreign Trade and that redemption certificates indicating fulfillment of export obligations were duly issued by the Director General of Foreign Trade. It was further observed that status report was submitted by the DRI office Ludhiana on 15-2-2005 proposing that the detention order may not be passed. In para 14, it was observed: - 14. Mr. It was further observed that status report was submitted by the DRI office Ludhiana on 15-2-2005 proposing that the detention order may not be passed. In para 14, it was observed: - 14. Mr. Lalit, however, is not correct in his submissions that only because a redemption certificate had been granted by DGFT, the same would itself be sufficient for quashing an order of detention as the activities of smuggling on the part of the importer may come to their notice at a later part of time. 3. The petitioner claims to have received the impugned show cause notice on 15-4-2006 after the judgment of Honble Supreme Court was passed. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that only competent authority to take action on the allegations in the show cause notice is the adjudicating authority under the provisions of Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act, 1992 (for short the 1992 Act) and action by the authorities under the 1962 Act is without jurisdiction. 5. In the present case, show cause notice has been issued to the petitioners inter alia which requires them to show as to why :- (a) The said goods, i.e. 507042.700 Kgs of acrylic fibre/tow (assessable value Rs. 3,55,35,475/-), (Annexure-G) imported through Kolkata port should not be held liable to confiscation under Section 111(d), 111(m) & 111(o) of the Customs Act, 1962 read with notifications Nos. 43/2002-Cus. dated 19-4-2002, Rules 13(2) & 14 of the Foreign Trade (Regulation) Rules, 1993 and para 4.1.2 of the Export-Import Policy for year 2002-2007, para 4.16 & 4.30 of Hand Book of Procedures for the years 2002-2007. (b) Duty amounting to Rs. 1,39,32,089/- (Rs. One crore thirty nine lakhs thirty two thousands eighty nine only), which was foregone at the time of import, should not be demanded and recovered under the proviso to section 28 of Customs Act, 1962 read with Notification No. 43/2002-Cus. dated 19-4-2002. (c) Interest should not be recovered from the importer under Section 28AB of the Customs Act, 1962 read with the terms of Notification No. 43/2002-Cus. dated 19-4-2002. (d) Penalty should not be imposed on them under Section 112(a) & (b) and/or under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 for above mentioned acts of omission and commission which have rendered the subject goods liable to confiscation under Section 111 of the Customs Act, 1962 . 6. dated 19-4-2002. (d) Penalty should not be imposed on them under Section 112(a) & (b) and/or under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 for above mentioned acts of omission and commission which have rendered the subject goods liable to confiscation under Section 111 of the Customs Act, 1962 . 6. We do not find any merit in the submission made and are unable to hold that the provisions of Section 11 of the 1992 Act exclude the proceedings under the 1962 Act. The Customs Act provides machinery to ensure that there is no evasion of customs duty laid down. In a given case, evasion of customs duty as well as violation under the 1992 Act may be involved. It cannot be held that once there is allegation of violation of 1992 Act, jurisdiction of the Customs authorities is taken away. As is clear from show cause notice quoted above, there are allegations of violation of provisions of the 1962 Act. Jurisdiction of Customs Authority cannot be thus, held to be excluded. 7. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that once redemption certificate had been issued and authorities under the 1992 Act do not hold any violation, the customs authorities will cease to have jurisdiction in the matter is also without any merit. So long as there are allegations of evasion of duty, jurisdiction of customs authorities is not taken away, at the threshold. 8. The Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 has been enacted with a view to regulate foreign trade for facilitating imports and increasing exports. The Act envisages import export policy, importer-exporter Code Number, grant of licence and taking action for contravention of the provisions of the Act. 9. The Customs Act provides for duty on import and export and machinery therefor. 10. Both the Acts may, to the extent, overlap but are not a substitute for each other and do not exclude operation of each other. 11. It is well known that (i) a special statute prevails over a general statute; (ii) an earlier statute may be impliedly overruled by a later statute on the subject; (iii) two statutes may function with full vigour side by side in their own parallel channels. 12. Present case is covered by the third category of statutes. 13. 11. It is well known that (i) a special statute prevails over a general statute; (ii) an earlier statute may be impliedly overruled by a later statute on the subject; (iii) two statutes may function with full vigour side by side in their own parallel channels. 12. Present case is covered by the third category of statutes. 13. InMC of Delhi v. Shiv Shankar , AIR 1971 SC 815, it was observed that liability for prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act did not cease by issuance of Fruit Products Order, 1955 under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. It was observed in para 9 :- 9. The object and purpose of the Adulteration Act is to eliminate the danger to human life and health from the sale of unwholesome articles of food. It is covered by Entry 18, List III of the 7 th Schedule to the Constitution. The Essential Commodities Act on the other hand has for its object the control of the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, essential commodities and is covered by entry 33 of List III. In spite of this difference in their main objects, control of production and distribution of essential commodities may, to an extent from a broader point of view include control of the quality of the essential articles of food and, thus, considered, it may reasonably be urged that to some extent it covers the same field as is covered by the provisions of the Adulteration Act. The two provisions may, therefore, have within these narrow limits conterminous fields of operation. On this premise we have to see if the two provisions can stand together having cumulative effect and in case they cannot, which provision has the overriding or controlling effect. It is needless to point out that they can stand together if the powers are intended to be exercised for different purposes without fatal inconsistency or repugnancy. 10........We are, therefore, unable to find any cogent or convicting reason for holding that the Parliament intended by enacting the Essential Commodities Act or the Fruit Order to impliedly repeal the provisions of the Adulteration act and the Rules in respect of the vinegar in dispute. Both the statutes can function with full vigour side by side in their own parallel channels. Both the statutes can function with full vigour side by side in their own parallel channels. Even if they happen to some extent to overlap, Section 26 of the General Clauses Act fully protects the guilty parties against double jeopardy or double penalty. This section lays down that where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. If, therefore, the provisions of the Adulteration Act and those of Fruit Order happen to constitute offences covering the same acts or omissions then it would be open to the prosecuting authorities to punish the offender under either of them subject to the only condition that a guilty person should not be punished twice over. 14. In M/s. Ram Chandra Mawa Lal v.State of UP , AIR 1987 SC 1837, it was observed : 44. Now, Both the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, as also the Defence of India Rules of 1971, are Central legislations enacted by the Parliament. The DIR were brought into force by the Parliament in 1971 in order to meet an emergency situation. The legislative competence of the Parliament to enact the legislation on the subject in question, namely, fixation of prices of all articles, is not questioned. The parliament having competence to legislate in regard to the subject has enacted both the legislations, one in 1955, another in 1971. The impugned notification has been issued under the latter statute. The DIR having been enacted later, it cannot, and it has not been, contended that the doctrine of repeal is attracted. Since there is legislative competence, since the statute is not eclipsed by the doctrine of express or implied repeal, how can the power exercised under the valid st atute be assailed? The only argument advanced, a misconceived one in our opinion, is that since the Act deals with essential commodities, and fertilizer has been declared under the Act as an essential commodity, the power conferred by the DIR cannot be exercised in respect of regulation of the price of such a commodity or article. It is not disputed that under the DIR power has been conferred, inter alia , to regulate the price of any article. It is not disputed that under the DIR power has been conferred, inter alia , to regulate the price of any article. The expression any article is wide enough in its amplitude to envelope fertilizers. The fact that fertilizers have been declared as an essential commodity and its price can be regulated under the powers conferred by the Act, is altogether immaterial. There is no constitutional or jurisprudential limitation on the competence of the Parliament to create two avenues or sources of power for the regulation of prices of articles. There is nothing in principle or precedent to support the proposition that two avenues or sources of power cannot be validly created. What then is the fabric of the challenge? The only answer offered by the counsel is that the Act is a statute specially enacted, inter alia , for regulation of the prices of commodities declared, to be essential and therefore in respect of such commodities, the power can be exercised only under the Act. We are unable to accede to this argument. Since, as discussed earlier, Parliament can constitutionally and validly enact two statutes creating two sources of power, and since under both the statutes prices of fertilizers can be regulated, there is no illegality in acting under either or both. Counsel, however, seeks support from the following passage from Craies On Statute Law (Statute Law of Craies, 7 th Edition, page 222): - Acts of Parliament sometimes contain general enactments relating to the whole subject matter of the statute and also specific and particular enactments relating to certain special matters; and if the general and specific enactments prove to be in any way repugnant to one another, the question will arise, which is to control the other? In Pretty v.Solly , (1859) 26 Beav. 606, 610, Romilly M.R. stated as follows what he considered to be the rule of construction under such circumstances, the general rules, said he, which are applicable to particular and general enactments in statutes are very clear; the only difficulty is in their application. In Pretty v.Solly , (1859) 26 Beav. 606, 610, Romilly M.R. stated as follows what he considered to be the rule of construction under such circumstances, the general rules, said he, which are applicable to particular and general enactments in statutes are very clear; the only difficulty is in their application. The rule is that whenever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute, and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply." (Emphasis added)." 45. It is overlooked that the said passage deals with different provisions in the "same" statute. That when there is a special provision in the very same statute in regard to a subject matter, the special provision of the statute will ordinarily prevail, in rivalry or competition with the general provision, is a proposition with which there is no quarrel. But then we are not at all concerned with any rivalry between two provisions of the same statute. We are faced with two enactments by the same legislature, which create two sources of power to achieve the same purpose. To repeat what has been observed earlier, there is no legal bar to creating two sources of power. And there is no authority in principle or precedent for contending that one source of power is more valid than the other. Or that the power validly conferred by the same legislature can be exercised only under one, and not the other, of the two statutes, leaving aside the question of irreconcilable or intolerable inconsistency. We, therefore, confirm the view of the High Court and repel the challenge. 15. The question whether the exercise of jurisdiction by customs authority in the given case is uncalled for or colourable exercise is a different matter. 16. We do not find any justification to go into the question on merits at the stage of show cause notice, in view of the complex factual matrix. 17. Next submission of the petitioner No. 1 is that since he suffered injuries as per medical report, he is entitled to compensation for wrongful detention and torture in custody- which course could be taken in writ jurisdiction also. 18. 17. Next submission of the petitioner No. 1 is that since he suffered injuries as per medical report, he is entitled to compensation for wrongful detention and torture in custody- which course could be taken in writ jurisdiction also. 18. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that since the petitioners have already filed criminal complaint which is pending consideration before a competent Court, there is no ground to entertain the prayer in writ proceedings at this stage. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and the petitioners are at liberty to take such defence as may be available to them under the law in reply to the show cause notice. Writ petition is dismissed.