Judgment : 1. This writ petition has been filed praying for a writ of Certiorari calling for the records relating to the impugned order passed by the first respondent in his proceedings No. Na. Ka. No.10038/2002, B4, dated 8.5.2004 and to quash the same. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as for the respondents. 3. Brief facts of the case, as stated by the petitioner, are as follows : The petitioner was appointed as a Secretary in the Avalpoondurai Primary Agricultural Co-Operative Bank Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Bank), on 4.7.1968. In the year 1996, when elections were conducted for the Co-operative Societies in Tamil Nadu, one P. Vetrivel was elected as the President of the Bank, the said P. Vetrivel started acting against the interest of the Bank. When he was questioned by the petitioner with regards to such acts he had started to take revenge against the petitioner as he was a highly influential person. As a consequence, the petitioner was reverted from the post of Secretary to the post of Assistant Secretary of the Bank by the President, on 8.12.1997, without framing charges and without conducting an enquiry. Since the petitioner was threatened by the President and his men he had accepted the post of Assistant Secretary without protest, fearing for his life. Hence, he did not prefer any appeal before the first respondent. Even though the petitioner had been submitting his written representations before the Board of Directors, no orders were passed by the Board of Directors managing the Bank on the representations of the petitioner. 4. Later, the petitioner had filed a revision petition, under Section 153 of the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act, 1983, before the first respondent challenging the reversion order passedagainst him. The revision petition had been rejected on the ground that it had been filed beyond the period of limitation. The said order was passed by the first respondent, on 19.2.2001.A writ petition was filed before this Court in W.P. No. 17355 of 2001, made in the revision petition. This Court had passed an order permitting the petitioner to file an appeal before the concerned authority after condoning the delay. The said order was passed by the first respondent, on 19.2.2001.A writ petition was filed before this Court in W.P. No. 17355 of 2001, made in the revision petition. This Court had passed an order permitting the petitioner to file an appeal before the concerned authority after condoning the delay. The first respondent after hearing the matter and the parties concerned, passed an order in his proceedings Na.Ka.No.11552 /2001/ B4, dated 11.01.2002, setting aside the order ofthe second respondent and remanding back the matter to the second respondent to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitionerin accordance with law. 5. Thepetitioner had further stated that the second respondent had deliberately refrained from issuing a second show cause notice for the alleged proposal of demotion of the petitioner from the post of Secretary to that of Assistant Secretary. Further, the second respondent had not furnished the report of the domestic enquiry to the petitioner soas to enable him to defend his case and submit his explanation. The petitioner had pointed out that with regard to the second show causenotice, the second respondent had admitted in the impugned order that the documents and the enquiry report had been sent to the petitioner only along with the impugned order. Therefore, it is clear that the second show cause notice had not been sent before the impugned order was passed. The second respondent had not conducted the domesticenquiry properly. Therefore, the enquiry is null and void and the consequential impugned order is also invalid and liable to be set aside by this Court. 6. Thepetitioner had filed a writ petition in W.P. No. 29423 of 2002 before this Court challenging the order passed by the second respondent. While disposing of the writ petition, this Court had directed the petitioner to file a revision petition under Section 153 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies act, 1983, before the first respondent. Based on the said direction, the petitioner had filed a revision petition before the first respondent challenging the order of the second respondent, dated 28.2.2002. The first respondent had disposed of the revision petition by passing an order, dated 8.5.2004, in his proceedings Na. Ka. No. 10038/2002 B4. The said order dated 8.5.2004 has been challenged in the present writ petition. The first respondent had disposed of the revision petition by passing an order, dated 8.5.2004, in his proceedings Na. Ka. No. 10038/2002 B4. The said order dated 8.5.2004 has been challenged in the present writ petition. The impugned proceeding of the first respondent Na.Ka.No.10038/2002/B4, dated 8.5.2004, had been challenged by the petitioner on several grounds, including those that are enumerated hereunder: (a) The first respondent had failed to note that the order of reversion made against the petitioner had been passed by the second respondent without following the procedures established by law. (b) The second respondent ought to have issued a second show cause notice to the petitioner on the proposed punishment. (c) The domestic enquiry report had not been furnished to the petitioner and thereby, he had been denied the opportunity of defending himself against the order of reversion. (d) Since the second show cause notice, the domestic enquiry report and the other relevant documents had not been given to the petitioner, the impugned order passed by the second respondent is liable to be set aside as being invalid in law. (e) The alleged admission of the charges by the petitioner was only due to threats and coercion by the then President of the Bank and therefore, such admission of the charges levelled against the petitioner could not be put against the petitioner. (f) The second respondent had not filed a review or an appeal against the order passed by this Court in W.P.No.17355 of 2001 by which the delay in filling the revision petition by the petitioner had been condoned. (g) The order passed by the second respondent is unsustainable in law as it had been done without following the principles of natural justice. 7. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the second respondent bank in which it is stated that the second respondent bank has been registered under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act, 1983, and the Rules framed thereunder. The writ petitioner was appointed as a Secretary in the year 1968 and during his entire service his performance has been unsatisfactory. Based on the enquiry conducted under Section 81 the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983, the petitioner was placed under suspension with effect from 17.11.1989. The petitioner was reinstated in service with effect from 21.9.1990, since the action initiated against him had been dropped. 8. Based on the enquiry conducted under Section 81 the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983, the petitioner was placed under suspension with effect from 17.11.1989. The petitioner was reinstated in service with effect from 21.9.1990, since the action initiated against him had been dropped. 8. The writ petitioner had acted against the interest of the society and had committed serious irregularities while administering the Bank. A charge memo was issued to the petitioner, on 9.9.1995 and he was placed under suspension with effect from 18.10.1997. Subsequent to the order of suspension, another charge memo, dated 8.12.1997, was served on the petitioner. The petitioner had pleaded guilty while admitting the charges. Therefore, the petitioner was reverted to the post of Assistant Secretary of the Bank by an order of demotion, dated 8.12.1997. 9. On 13.9.2000, the petitioner had submitted a letter of resignation, which was accepted by the Board. Thereafter, the petitioner had filed a revision petition before the first respondent herein in R.P.No.12550/2000, under Section 153 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983. On disposal of the said revision petition, the petitioner was allowed to join in service as Assistant Secretary of the Bank, on 22.1.2002. After joining as the Assistant Secretary of the Bank, the petitioner had against committed irregularities and acted against the interest of the Bank. Therefore, he was placed under suspension with effect from 3.2.2001. Challenging the said order of suspension, the petitioner had filed a writ petition before this court in W.P.No. 3337 of 2001. The writ petition was dismissed granting liberty to the petitioner to file a revision petition under Section 153 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983. Based on the said order, the petitioner had filed a revision petition before the first respondent in R.P. No. 4476/2001-A4 and the same was dismissed, on 30.4.2001, holding that the order of suspension pending disciplinary proceedings cannot be questioned in the revision petition. A charge memo, dated 13.2.2001, had been issued and an Enquiry Officer was appointed to conduct the domestic enquiry. Despite repeated reminders, the petitioner had refused to participate in the enquiry and therefore, an ex parte enquiry was held and the report of the enquiry had also been filed. Based on the said enquiry report, a second show cause notice was issued to the petitioner, on 15.5.2001. Despite repeated reminders, the petitioner had refused to participate in the enquiry and therefore, an ex parte enquiry was held and the report of the enquiry had also been filed. Based on the said enquiry report, a second show cause notice was issued to the petitioner, on 15.5.2001. The said show cause notice was challenged by the petitioner in W.P.No.9902 of 2001 and an order of interim injunction had been granted. Later, the writ petitio had been dismissed by this court. Thereafter, the writ petitioner was dismissed form service with effect from 22.11.2001. Against the said order of dismissal, dated 22.11.2001, the petitioner had filed a revision petitio before the first respondent in R.P.Na.Ka. No.13636/2001/B4, dated 12.5.2002. The first respondent had set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the matter to the Special Officer of the Bank for the purpose of giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, before imposing the punishment on the petitioner. After the remand, an opportunity had been given to the petitioner and thereafter, the punishment was also imposed demoting the petitioner to the post of Senior Clerk, by the proceedings, dated. 7.6.2002. The said order, dated 7.6.2002, was challenged before this Court in W.P.No. 32902 of 2002. The writ petition was dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to file a revision under Section 153 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983. The petitioner had filed a revision before the first respondent in Na.Ka.No.9555/2002/AA4, dated 25.2.2003, and the same was dismissed by the first respondent. The said order of the first respondent was challenged before this Court in W.P.No. 7702 of 2003 and an order of interim stay had been granted in W.P.M.P.No.9888 of 2003, dated 12.8.2003. Against the final order made in W.P.M.P.No. 9888 of 2003, a writ appeal had been filed before this Court and it is still pending. 10. The petitioner is guilty of suppression of material facts and he has attempted to mislead this Court by making wrong statements. The petitioner was served with a second show cause notice, dated 15.5.2001 and the same had been challenged by way of a writ petition before this court in W.P.No.9902 of 2001, which had also been dismissed. While so, the petitioner is not entitled to canvass the same issue in the present writ petition. The petitioner was served with a second show cause notice, dated 15.5.2001 and the same had been challenged by way of a writ petition before this court in W.P.No.9902 of 2001, which had also been dismissed. While so, the petitioner is not entitled to canvass the same issue in the present writ petition. The petitioner had wilfully avoided participating in the domestic enquiry and therefore, he cannot complain against the findings in the enquiry report. The contentions of the petitioner cannot be accepted to be bona fide. Therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed with exemplary costs imposed on the petitioner. 11. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had contended that he impugned proceedings of the first respondent, dated 8.5.2004, is invalid in law, since the petitioner had not been given sufficient opportunity to defend himself during the domestic enquiry. Further, neither the enquiry report, dated 27.2.2002, nor the second show cause notice had been given to the petitioner to enable him to make his submissions and to defend himself against the order passed against him on 8.12.1997, demoting him form the post of Secretary to the post of Assistant Secretary of the Bank. The letters, which the petitioner had submitted accepting the charges levelled against him, were made only due to threats and coercion by the then President of the Bank. The revisional authority set aside the order impugned in the revision petition and had remanded the matter for conducting a fresh enquiry granting sufficient opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself. Even after the said order, the enquiry officer had been appointed only four months thereafter and there was no delay on the part of the petitioner. It cannot be stated that the petitioner had abandoned the enquiry at any stage of the enquiry proceedings, The onus of proof was on the Management of the Bank to show that the petitioner was guilty of non-participation in the enquiry, especially, when the petitioner had sent a registered letter, dated 15.2.2002, to the enquiry Officer, stating that he had made all his submissions in his statement and that he had nothing further to submit. Further, the petitioner had been denied an opportunity of examining the former President of the Bank in spite of his specific request to that effect. Further, the petitioner had been denied an opportunity of examining the former President of the Bank in spite of his specific request to that effect. In case the petitioner had admitted his guilty, as alleged by the Management of the Bank, there was no necessity for conducting a full fledged enquiry. Further, it is seen from the records available that from the date of the petitioners appointment, namely, 4.7.1968 till 17.11.198, when the petitioner was placed under suspension, no allegations have been made with regard to his performance. If serious irregularities had been committed by the petitioner, as alleged by the second respondent, there was no reason for his reinstatement in service from 21.9.1990. A subsequent charge memo, dated 9.9.1995 and the consequent proceedings initiated by the second respondent, are vindictive in nature and therefore, not sustainable in law. 12. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner had placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court made in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar AIR 1994 SC 1074 (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1994-I-LLJ-162 to contend that refusal to furnish the copy of the Inquiry Officers report to the delinquent amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity. However, from the facts of the case in hand it is seen that there was no such denial or refusal by the management of the second respondent bank to furnish the copy of the inquiry officers report, which could be said to have lead to substantial miscarriage of justice. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner had also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in P. V. Srinivasa Sastry and Others. v. Controller and Auditor-General of India and Others P. V. Srinivasa Sastry and Others. v. Controller and Auditor-General of India and Others P. V. Srinivasa Sastry and Others. v. Controller and Auditor-General of India and Others AIR 1993 SC 1321 : 1993-I-LLJ 824 (SC), wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows at p. 826 of LLJ: “8. While imposing punishment of reduction in rank, the order must have nexus with the post held by the delinquent concerned, from which he had been promoted to the post from which he is being reverted. While imposing punishment of reduction in rank, the order must have nexus with the post held by the delinquent concerned, from which he had been promoted to the post from which he is being reverted. If such an officer had not held that post or was not member of that cadre, then he cannot be reverted to a lower cadre to which he did not belong or to a lower rank which he did not hold at any stage” The above mentioned case related to the reduction in rank of a person holding a civil post under the state as contemplated in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the petitioner cannot find support from the said decision. 14. The learned counsel appearing for the second respondent bank had placed reliance on the decisions, which are as follows: 14.1. In Vice Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Another v. Girdharilal Yadav Vice Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Another v. Girdharilal Yadav Vice Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Another v. Girdharilal Yadav (2004) 6 SCC 325), the Supreme Court has held as follows : “It is also a well-settled principle of law that the principles of natural justice should not be stretched too far and the same cannot be put in a straight jacket formula. In Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala (2004) 6 SCC 311 this Court has noticed that : “24. The principles of natural justice, it is well settled, cannot be put into a straitjacket formula. Its application will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is also well settled that if a party after having proper notice chose not to appear, he at later stage cannot be permitted to say that he had not been given a fair opportunity of hearing. The question had been considered by a Bench of this Court in Sohan Lal Gupta v. Asha Devi Gupta Sohan Lal Gupta v. Asha Devi Gupta Sohan Lal Gupta v. Asha Devi Gupta 2003) 7 SCC 492 …. wherein upon noticing a large number of decisions it was held : “29. The principles of natural justice, it is trite, cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. wherein upon noticing a large number of decisions it was held : “29. The principles of natural justice, it is trite, cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. In a given case the party should not only be required to show that he did not have a proper notice resulting in violation of principles of natural justice but also to show that he was seriously prejudiced thereby”. 25. The principles of natural justice, it is well settled, must not be stretched too far. ( See also Mardia Chemical Ltd. v. Union of India See also Mardia Chemical Ltd. v. Union of India See also Mardia Chemical Ltd. v. Union of India (2004) 4 SCC 311 and Canara Bank v. Debasis Das AIR 2003 SC 2041 : 2003-II-LLJ-532 : (2003) 4 SCC 557 . In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel AIR 1955 SC 1416 : 1985-2-LLJ-206 : (1985) 3 SCC 398 ), this Court held at P. 246 of LLJ: “88. Though the two rules of natural justice, namely, memo judex in cause sua and audi alteram partem, have now a definite meaning and connotation in law and their content and implications are well understood and firmly established, they are nonetheless not statutory rules. Each of these rules yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situations. They do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not alike. These rules are to cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal straitjacket. They are not immutable but flexible. These rules can be adapted and modified by statutes and statutory rules and also by the constitution of the Tribunal which has to decide a particular matter and the rules by which such Tribunal is governed”. 14.2. InUnited India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another v. Samir Chandra Chaudhary United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another v. Samir Chandra Chaudhary United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another v. Samir Chandra Chaudhary (2005) 5 SCC 784 reported in, the Supreme Court has held as follows : “Admission is the best piece of evidence against the persons making admission. 14.2. InUnited India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another v. Samir Chandra Chaudhary United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another v. Samir Chandra Chaudhary United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another v. Samir Chandra Chaudhary (2005) 5 SCC 784 reported in, the Supreme Court has held as follows : “Admission is the best piece of evidence against the persons making admission. As was observed by this Court in Avadh Kishore Das v. Ram Gopal Avadh Kishore Das v. Ram Gopal Avadh Kishore Das v. Ram Gopal (1979) 4 SCC 790 in the backdrop of Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short “the Evidence Act”) it is true that evidentiary admissions are not conclusive proof of the facts admitted and may be explained or shown to be wrong; but they do raise an estoppel and shift the burden of proof placing it on the person making the admission or his representative-in-interest. Unless shown or explained to be wrong, they are an efficacious proof of the facts admitted. As observed by Phipson in his Law of Evidence (1963 Edn. para 678) as the weight of an admission depends on the circumstance under which it was made, these circumstances may always be proved to impeach or enhance its credibility. The effect of admission is that it shifts the on us on to the person admitting the fact on the principle that what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so, and until the presumption is rebutted, the fact admitted must be taken to be established. An admission is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon, and though not conclusiveis decisive of matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous. (See Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi See Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi See Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi (1960) 1 SCR 773 ).” 14.3. In Sohan Lal Gupta (Dead) Through LRs. and Others v. Asha Devi Gupta and Others Sohan Lal Gupta (Dead) Through LRs. and Others v. Asha Devi Gupta and Others Sohan Lal Gupta (Dead) Through LRs. and Others v. Asha Devi Gupta and Others AIR 2004 SC 856 (2003) 7 SCC 492 , the Supreme Court had held as follows : “23. For constituting a reasonable opportunity, the following conditions are required to be observed : 1. and Others v. Asha Devi Gupta and Others Sohan Lal Gupta (Dead) Through LRs. and Others v. Asha Devi Gupta and Others AIR 2004 SC 856 (2003) 7 SCC 492 , the Supreme Court had held as follows : “23. For constituting a reasonable opportunity, the following conditions are required to be observed : 1. Each party must have notice that the hearing is to take place. 2. Each party must have a reasonable opportunity to be present at the hearing, together with his advisers and witnesses. 3. Each party must have the opportunity to be present throughout the hearing. 4. Each party must have a reasonable opportunity to present evidence and argument in support of his own case. 5. Each party must have a reasonable opportunity to his opponents case by cross-examining his witnesses, presenting rebutting evidence and addressing oral argument. 6. The hearing must, unless the contrary is expressly agreed, be the occasion on which the parties present the whole of their evidence and argument. 29. The principles of natural justice, it is trite, cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. In a given case the party should not only be required to show that he did not have a proper notice resulting in violation of principles of natural justice but also to show that he was seriously prejudiced thereby. In Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee AIR 1977 SC 965 (1977) 2 SCC 256 this Court held : “Natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be finical nor fanatial but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. No man shall be hit below the belt - that is the conscience of the matter”. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be finical nor fanatial but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. No man shall be hit below the belt - that is the conscience of the matter”. (See also Union of India v. Anand Kumar Pandey AIR 1995 SC 3881995-II-LLJ-25 : (1994) 5 SCC 63) and R. S. Dass v. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 593 : 1986 Supp SCC 617. 30. In (1994) 5 SCC 663 case this Court again reiterated that the rules of natural justice cannot be put in a straight jacket and applicability thereof would depend upon the facts and circumstances relating to each particular given situation. 32. In State of U. P. v. Harendra Arora AIR 2001 SC 2319 : 2002-III-LLJ-1124 : (2001) 6 SCC 392 this Court followed, inter alia, Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar inter alia, Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar inter alia, Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727 and State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma AIR 1996 SC 1669 : 1996-II-LLJ-296 : (1996) 3 SCC 364 and held that an order passed in a disciplinary proceeding cannot ipso facto be quashed merely because a copy of the enquiry report has not been furnished to the delinquent officer, but he is obliged to show that by non-furnishing of such a report he has been prejudiced, would apply even to cases where there is requirement of furnishing a cop of enquiry report under he statutory rules. 33.In Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan AIR 2000 SC 2783 : (2000) 7 SCC 529 it was held : “24. The principle that in addition to breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has been developed in several cases. In K. L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India K. L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India K. L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India AIR 1984 SC 273 : 1984-I-LLJ-2 : (1984) SCC 43 SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J. (as he then was) also laid down the principle that not mere violation of natural justice but de facto prejudice (other than non-issue of notice) had to be proved., pp. 472-75), as follows : ‘It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply, not as to their scope and extent,. There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; thee is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with, and so forth‘. 14.4. In U. P. State Spinning Co. Ltd. v. R. S. Pandey and Another U. P. State Spinning Co. Ltd. v. R. S. Pandey and Another U. P. State Spinning Co. Ltd. v. R. S. Pandey and Another 2006-I-LLJ-254 : (2005) 8 SCC 264 , the Supreme Court has held as follows at p. 261 of LLJ: 25…….. If after hearing the parties, the court/tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the court/tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The Courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the courts/tribunal which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or to setting aside the order of punishment (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the court/tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Court/tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority / management to proceed with the enquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. 14.5. Where after following the above procedure, the Court/tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority / management to proceed with the enquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. 14.5. In Divisional Manager, Plantation Division, Andaman and Nicobar Islands v. Munnu Barrick and Others Divisional Manager, Plantation Division, Andaman and Nicobar Islands v. Munnu Barrick and Others Divisional Manager, Plantation Division, Andaman and Nicobar Islands v. Munnu Barrick and Others 2005-I-LLJ-557 : (2005) 2 SCC 237 , the Supreme Court has held as follows: “17. The principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It must be viewed with flexibility. In a given case, where a deviation takes place as regards compliance with the principles of natural justice, the court may insist upon proof of prejudice before setting aside the order impugned before it. ( See Bar council of India v. High Court of Kerala See Bar council of India v. High Court of Kerala See Bar council of India v. High Court of Kerala (2004) 6 SCC 311 ) . 19. In (1993) 4 SCC 727 this Court has clearly held that the employee must show sufferance of prejudice by non-obtaining a copy of the enquiry report. 20. This Court in (2003) 4 SCC 557 while following (supra) held: “19. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statue or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statue under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression ‘civil consequence‘ encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression ‘civil consequence‘ encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life.” 21. Referring to a large number of decisions, it was observed that a Court will refrain from interfering with an order, having regard to “useless formality theory”, in a given case.” 14.6. In Dharmarathmakara Raibahadur Arcot Ramaswamy Mudaliar Educational Institution v. Educational Appellate Tribunal and Another Dharmarathmakara Raibahadur Arcot Ramaswamy Mudaliar Educational Institution v. Educational Appellate Tribunal and Another Dharmarathmakara Raibahadur Arcot Ramaswamy Mudaliar Educational Institution v. Educational Appellate Tribunal and Another AIR 1999 SC 3219 : 2000-I-LLJ-393 : (1997) 7 SCC 332 the Supreme Court has held as follows: “8. …. Giving of opportunity or an enquiry of course is a check and balance concept that no ones right be taken away without giving him/her opportunity or without enquiry in a given case or where the statue requires. But this cannot be in a case where allegation and charges are admitted and no possible defence is placed before the authority concerned. What enquiry is to be made when one admits violations. When she admitted she did not join M.Phil. course, she did not report back to her duty which is against her condition of leave and contrary to her affidavit which is the charge, what enquiry was to be made. In a case where the facts are almost admitted, the case reveals itself and is apparent on the face of the record, and in spite of opportunity no worthwhile explanation is forthcoming as in the present case, it would not be a fit case to interfere with the termination order.” 14.7. In Vivekanand Sethi v. Chairman, J and K Bank Ltd. and Others Vivekanand Sethi v. Chairman, J and K Bank Ltd. and Others Vivekanand Sethi v. Chairman, J and K Bank Ltd. and Others 2005-II-LLJ-1034 : (2005) 5 SCC 337 , the Supreme Court has held as follows at p. 1039 of LLJ: c“22. The principle of natural justice, it is trite, is no unruly horse. When facts are admitted, an enquiry would be an empty formality. The principle of natural justice, it is trite, is no unruly horse. When facts are admitted, an enquiry would be an empty formality. Even the principle of estoppel will apply. ( See Gurjeewan Garewal (Dr.) v. Dr. Sumitra Dash See Gurjeewan Garewal (Dr.) v. Dr. Sumitra Dash See Gurjeewan Garewal (Dr.) v. Dr. Sumitra Dash (2004) 5 SCC 263 : 2004-III-LLJ-1). The principles of natural justice are required to be complied with having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein. It cannot be applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case (See State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh See State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh See State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh (204) 8 SCC 129 : 2004-III-LLJ-1148) and Karnataka SRTC v. S. G. Kotturappa Karnataka SRTC v. S. G. Kotturappa Karnataka SRTC v. S. G. Kotturappa (2005) 3 SCC 409 : 2005-II-LLJ-16).” 14.8. InLalit Popli v. Canara Bank AIR 2003 SC 1795 : 2003-II-LLJ-324 : (2003) 3 SCC 583 , the Supreme Court has held as follows at p. 329 of LLJ: “18. In B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749 : AIR 1996 SC 484 : 1996-I-LLJ-1231 the scope of judicial review was indicated by stating that review by the court is of decision making process and where the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on some evidence, the court or the tribunal cannot re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding. 19. As observed in R. S. Saini v. State of Punjab AIR 1999 SC 3579 : 1999-II-LLJ-1415 : (1999) 8 SCC 90 , in paras 16 and 17 the scope of interference is rather limited and has to be exercised within the circumscribed limits. It was noted as follows : “15. Before adverting to the first contention of the appellant regarding want of material to establish the charge, and of non-application of mind, we will have to bear in mind the rule that the court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. Before adverting to the first contention of the appellant regarding want of material to establish the charge, and of non-application of mind, we will have to bear in mind the rule that the court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the function of the court to review the evidence and to arrive at his own independent finding. The inquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the Court in writ proceedings. 16. A narration of the charges and the reasons of the inquiring authority for accepting the charges, as seen from the records, shows that the inquiring authority has based its conclusions on materials available on record after considering the defence put forth by the appellant and these decisions, in our opinion, have been taken in a reasonable manner and objectively. The conclusion arrived at by the inquiring authority cannot be termed as either being perverse or not based on any material nor is it a case where there has been any non-application of mind on the part of the inquiring authority. Likewise, the High Court has looked into the material based on which the enquiry officer has come to the conclusion, within the limited scope available to it under Article 226 of the Constitution and we do not find any fault with the findings of the High Court in this regard.” 14.9. In R. Dhanasekaran v. Government of Tamil Nadu and 2 Others R. Dhanasekaran v. Government of Tamil Nadu and 2 Others R. Dhanasekaran v. Government of Tamil Nadu and 2 Others 2004 Writ L.R. 273 : [2004] 1 MLJ 523;, this Court has held as follows at PP. 524:525 of MLJ “3. In R. Dhanasekaran v. Government of Tamil Nadu and 2 Others R. Dhanasekaran v. Government of Tamil Nadu and 2 Others R. Dhanasekaran v. Government of Tamil Nadu and 2 Others 2004 Writ L.R. 273 : [2004] 1 MLJ 523;, this Court has held as follows at PP. 524:525 of MLJ “3. In that view of the matter, I am unable to appreciate the contention of A.S. Thambuswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was not given any further opportunity before passing the impugned order dated 31.8.1998, suspending the registration for one year, on the ground that it suffers for want of principles of natural justice, as the doctrine of principles of natural justice cannot be, in my considered opinion, extended unnaturally as sought for, as held by the Apex Court in the decision of State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma AIR 1996 SC 1669 , as under the facts and circumstances of the case, no other decision would have been taken by the third respondent even if the petitioner was given a further show cause notice, as he was already informed about the proposal by the notice dated 7.8.1998, to suspend the registration if he fails to execute the agreement on or before 17.8.1998. Therefore, the contention made on behalf of the petitioner is nothing, but an useless formality, as held by the Apex Court in the decision of Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan (2000) 7 SCC 527, ”. 14.10. In P. G. Narayanan v. Union of India [2005] 3 MLJ 210 : 2005 Writ LR 761, this COurt has held as follows at pp. 226 and 227 of MLJ: “23. On behalf of the petitioner, much stress was placed on the following paragraph of the judgment in AIR 1991 SC 101 : (1991) Supp. (1) SCC 600 : 1991-I-LLJ-395, (Delhi Transport Corporation v. D. T. C. Mazdoor Congress : “There is need to minimise the scope of the arbitrary use of power in all walks of life. It is inadvisable to depend on the good sense of the individuals, however high-placed they may be. It is all the more improper and undesirable to expose the precious rights like the rights of life, liberty and property to the vagaries of the individual whim and fancies. It is inadvisable to depend on the good sense of the individuals, however high-placed they may be. It is all the more improper and undesirable to expose the precious rights like the rights of life, liberty and property to the vagaries of the individual whim and fancies. It is trite to say that individuals are not and do not become wise because they occupy high seats of power, and good sense, circumspection and fairness does not go with the posts, however high they may be. There is only a complaisant presumption that those who occupy high posts have a high sense of responsibility. The presumption is neither legal nor rational. History does not support it and reality does not warrant it. In particular, in a society pledged to uphold the rule of law, it would be both unwise and impolitic to leave any aspect of its life to be governed by discretion when it can conveniently and easily be covered by the rule of law”. But, as observed by the Supreme Court in Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajaykumar AIR 2003 SC 1843 : 2003-II-LLJ-150 : (2003) 4 SCC 579 , allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved and Courts would be allow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. In this case, even the allegations are vague and the facts are incomplete……. Therefore, while there cannot be any gainsaying the position that when allegations of mala fides or impropriety of part of persons in authority are made, the persons in authority should place on record their version or denial, when those persons have not been made parties, there is no occasion or opening for them to place on record their case and it would be violation of the principles of natural justice to come to any conclusion without hearing them, which in this case would be the Union Minister for Communications and Information Technology and his brother. The grounds of mala fides and bias therefore cannot be accepted.” 15. The grounds of mala fides and bias therefore cannot be accepted.” 15. From the cases cited by the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent bank it is seen that the principles of natural justice could be applied to varying situations not as a straight jacket formula but with certain acceptable modifications. 16. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner had relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in inter alia, Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar inter alia, Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar inter alia, Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar AIR 1994 SCW 1050 to emphasise that non-furnishing of a copy of the Inquiry Officers report to the delinquent would amount to denial of reasonable opportunity end it would amount to infringement of the principles of natural justice. The report of the Inquiry Officer, in a disciplinary enquiry, has to be furnished to the employee even if statutory rules are silent or against it. The Supreme Court, in the above mentioned case, had further stated that when the Inquiry Officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the Inquiry Officers report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employees right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the Inquiry Officers report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice. 17. It is seen from the above mentioned cases that it is not in all the situations where the Inquiry Report has not been furnished to the delinquent employee the Court has interfered holding that the principles of natural justice have been violated. The Court has to see whether the non-furnishing of the Inquiry Report to the delinquent employee has resulted in a serious violation of the principles of natural justice and whether such non-furnishing of the report has resulted in substantial prejudice being caused to the said employee. 18. The Court has to see whether the non-furnishing of the Inquiry Report to the delinquent employee has resulted in a serious violation of the principles of natural justice and whether such non-furnishing of the report has resulted in substantial prejudice being caused to the said employee. 18. In the present case no such prejudice has been caused to the petitioner, even if it is accepted that the report had not been furnished to him sufficiently in advance to enable him to counter the findings therein. In fact, it is not the case of the petitioner that he was not furnished with the Inquiry Report. It is his specific case that the Inquiry Report, dated 27.2.2002, had been furnished to him on 28.2.2002 only and therefore, he did not have sufficient opportunity to make his representation before the order of punishment had been confirmed. Given the background of the case and the protracted proceedings indulged in by the petitioner, it cannot be said that he was in any way prejudiced by not being given sufficient opportunity to respond to the enquiry report. 19. Thelearned counsel appearing for the petitioner had specifically admitted that there is no provision of law in the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983, or in the Rules framed thereunder, making it a statutory right in favour of the petitioner for the furnishing of the second show cause notice or of the Inquiry Report, it is also seen that even the by-laws of the Society do not contain such a provision. 20. Insuch circumstance, this Court is of the considered view that the concept of principles of natural justice cannot be strictly applied as a straight jacket formula in all circumstances and in all situations. It can neither be like an unruly horse nor like a run-away train sans control or direction. It should rather be, atleast to a reasonable extent, flexible and elastic to suit the varying exigencies of the situation providing the healing touch needed in the application of the law and in serving the ends of justice. In such view of the matter, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the Court does not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the first respondent bank in its proceedings No. Na. Ka. No. 10038/2002 B4, dated 8.5.2004. Therefore, the writ petition stands dismissed. No costs.