( 1 ) THIS petition deals with the power of the regional Provident Fund Commissioner to unveil the petitioner who is seeking infancy protection by virtue of Section 16 (l) (d) of the employees' Provident Funds and miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. ( 2 ) SHORT facts leading to the writ petition are that there was one Perfect Agencies Private limited with its head office at Indore. The petitioner (Perfect Industrial Agencies Pvt. Ltd.) was incorporated at registration No. 11-59184/1990 as revealed in the certificate of incorporation marked as Annexure B. It is stated that the petitioner has its own memorandum and Articles of Association under the provisions of the Companies Act and has its legal independent entity. It applied for agency of Leyland Trucks on November 30, 1990 and the same was achieved by it in pursuance of its application. It has been stated by the petitioner that it is a new concern having no nexus with M/s. Perfect Agencies Private limited and is entitled to the exemption under section 16 (l) (d) of the aforesaid Act. This provision reads as under: "16 (1 ). This Act shall not apply- (d) to any other establishment newly set up, until the expiry of a period of three years from the date on which such establishment is, or has been, set up. Explanation. For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that an establishment shall not be deemed to be newly set up merely by reason of a change in its location. " ( 3 ) LETTER dated January 8. 1992 was issued by the Assistant Commissioner of the office of regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Sub regional Office, Jabalpur, directing thereby that the petitioner-Company should pay the contribution. It was found that the management, employees and the premises of the old concern were common with the petitioner and the petitioner was bound to make compliance of the provisions of the said Act. The petitioner replied to the aforesaid letter categorically saying that the petitioner-Company is entirely a new legal entity and has no concern with the earlier establishment. Proceedings under Section 7-A of the said Act were initiated under the Code no. 5725. The petitioner produced the relevant material, namely, Memorandum and Articles of Association, application of the petitioner seeking agency of Leyland Trucks, copy of ledger cash book etc. Proceedings under Section 7-A of the said Act were initiated under the Code no. 5725. The petitioner produced the relevant material, namely, Memorandum and Articles of Association, application of the petitioner seeking agency of Leyland Trucks, copy of ledger cash book etc. ( 4 ) THE respondent appointed its inspectors for personal verification of the petitioner-Company's record. A report was submitted by the squad constituted by the two inspectors on May 3, 1994. On account of the report, certain enquiries were made which were duly replied by the petitioner. Finally the impugned order contained in Annexure A was passed by the Regional Provident Fund commissioner holding that the petitioner has merely made a change in the name of old establishment and is not entitled to any infancy protection. ( 5 ) AGGRIEVED by the same, the present petition has been filed by Perfect Industrial agency Private Limited. ( 6 ) THE respondent vide its return contended that the premises, staff, telephone number and telegraphic address etc. , of M/s. Perfect Agencies Private Limited and the petitioner were common. It is further contended in the return that the dealership of ashok Leyland Limited with the old concern was terminated on January 15, 1991 and it was given to the petitioner on the same day. Thus, the petitioner is merely a new department/branch of the old concern and the paper formalities have been observed in order to defy the provisions of the said Act. It has been further contended that one of the Directors of Perfect Agencies Private Limited, namely, navdeep Khera, is also one of the Directors of the petitioner-Company which establishes that the establishment in the name of the petitioner is a continuation of the previous establishment or in the nature of expansion of the old concern. It is further contended that the petitioner-Company is actually the split unit of perfect Agencies Private Limited. Thus, it is contended that the resignation of the employees of the old concern were obtained and fresh appointments are given to them by the petitioner-Company with a view to avoid the liability of gratuity and provident funds benefit. It is further contended that the petitioner-Company is actually the split unit of perfect Agencies Private Limited. Thus, it is contended that the resignation of the employees of the old concern were obtained and fresh appointments are given to them by the petitioner-Company with a view to avoid the liability of gratuity and provident funds benefit. Additionally, it is contended that the agency of ashok Leyland was simply transferred from one unit of the establishment to the other unit of the same establishment and determination of agency with the old concern and grant of agency to the new concern were performed on the same day. Accordingly, it is contended that the petitioner is not entitled to infancy protection under Section 16 (l) (d) of the Act as a new establishment and the petition is liable to be dismissed. ( 7 ) HEARD the submissions and perused the record. ( 8 ) SHRI D'silva, learned senior advocate, appearing for the petitioner strenuously argued that the petitioner has an independent legal entity and has no nexus with the old concern as such, he claimed the protection under Section 16 (l) (d) of the Act. On the other hand, Shri j. K. Pillai, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the protection has been rightly denied to the petitioner since it is a continuation of the old concern in new name. Much emphasis has been made by Shri Pillai, learned counsel for the respondent, on the verification report contained in Annexure D. ( 9 ) SHRI Pillai, learned counsel for the respondent, further drew attention of this Court to the powers vested in the department by virtue of Section 7-A of the said Act. Sub-section (1)of this provision empowers to decide the dispute regarding applicability of the Act to an establishment. It also empowers to determine the amount due from any employer under any provision of this Act. the Scheme or the Family pension Scheme or the Insurance Scheme, as the case may be. An inquiry for the aforesaid purpose may be conducted by virtue of sub-section (1 ). It also empowers to determine the amount due from any employer under any provision of this Act. the Scheme or the Family pension Scheme or the Insurance Scheme, as the case may be. An inquiry for the aforesaid purpose may be conducted by virtue of sub-section (1 ). Sub-section (2) empowers an officer conducting the Inquiry under sub-section (1) to exercise the same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil procedure, 1908, for trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely: (a) enforcing the attendance of any person or examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; (d) issuing commission for the examination of witnesses. By virtue of sub-section (3) the employer concern is entitled to reasonable opportunity of representing his case. Shri Pillai, relying upon the aforesaid powers submitted that the report contained in Annexure D is binding on the petitioner and the impugned order Annexure A based thereon, does not call for interference. ( 10 ) THE Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Regional Provident Fund commissioner and Another v. Dharamsi morarji Chemical Co. Ltd. (1998) 2 SCC 446 : 1998-1-LLJ-1060 has held that in order to deny the infancy protection under Section 16 (l) (d) on the ground that the old concern and the new concern are not different, there is requirement of an evidence to indicate the interconnection between the two concerns in the matter of supervisory, financial or managerial control. It has been further held that simply because the owner, or the Board of directors is common, that by itself cannot be sufficient unless there is a clear evidence to show that there was interconnection between the two companies and there was common supervisory, financial or managerial control. Earlier in the case of State of Punjab v. Satpal and Another, air 1970 SC 655 : 1970-II- LLJ-64, it has been held by the Apex Court that "the law takes into account only the existence of establishments and the employment of a certain number of persons in factories over a given period. It is for this purpose that change of location or change of composition of partners or even a change in the manufacturing process is not considered vital in the application of this law". It is for this purpose that change of location or change of composition of partners or even a change in the manufacturing process is not considered vital in the application of this law". Considering this also, a definite evidence is required to deny the infancy protection on the ground that the petitioner is not a new establishment but is a continuation of the M/s. Perfect Agencies private Limited (old concern ). ( 11 ) DIVISION Bench of this Court in the case of Shambhudayal Sarju Prasad Tiwari v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner 1977-II-LLJ-455 has categorically held that at p. 458: "11. A distinction has to be made between a similar establishment and the same establishment. If the subsequent establishment is similar, it would not be on that account a continuation of the earlier establishment. " Accordingly, for denying the benefit of infancy protection under Section 16 (l) (d), a definite finding is required about interconnection of the two establishments regarding supervisory, managerial or financial control of both the concern. ( 12 ) THE High Court of Bombay also in a case between Associated Polymers Ltd. and union of India and Others 1999-III-LLJ- (Suppl.) 1543 has held that unless unity of management, employment and functional integrity is established between two companies, the infancy protection under Section 16 (l) (d)of the Act, cannot be denied. ( 13 ) ON the aforesaid parameters, this court has to examine the report contained in annexure D as well as the impugned order contained in Annexure A. The petitioner vide its reply has categorically stated that it has no nexus with Perfect Agencies Private Limited and is not in possession of the record of the old concern. As a prelude, I have to point out that the provision contained under Section 16 (l) (d) is enacted to encourage new entrepreneur by giving exemption from the application of the provisions of the Act for a period of three years. Simultaneously, the explanation inserted in this provision is also to be taken care of which is meant to protect the employees from any kind of injury liable to be caused by the employer by giving a shape of new establishment by making change in the name or otherwise. There is no material on record to show that the respondent issued any notice to the old concern to produce the relevant records. There is no material on record to show that the respondent issued any notice to the old concern to produce the relevant records. Similarly, there is no iota on record to show that record from the old concern was summoned by the department in order to establish the unity in supervisory, managerial or financial control. Neither annexure. D nor the order Annexure A based thereon, contains specific findings about unity in the matter of supervisory, managerial or financial control. Without such a finding, the impugned order cannot be terminated to sustain in law. ( 14 ) ACCORDINGLY, the petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order contained in Annexure A is quashed with the liberty to the respondent to make an enquiry in order to enable itself to arrive at specific conclusion about unity in supervisory' managerial or financial control of the two companies at the relevant time. ( 15 ) SHRI D' Silva, learned senior advocate, appearing for the petitioner, submitted that with the passage of time, the circumstances have undergone a vital change in the premises, phone numbers and staff of the new concern. They are altogether now different. However, the respondent shall examine the case on the strength of the evidence pertaining to the relevant time. Since the enquiry liable to be conducted under sub-section (2) of Section 7-A of the Act is deemed to be judicial proceedings, the respondent may take recourse to the provisions enabling him to draw an adverse inference in accordance with law, in case, if the companies or any of them is non-cooperative in the matter. No order as to costs. .