Judgment :- (Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records relating to C.M.A.No.19 of 1995 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Chingleput and to quash the Award and set aside the surcharge award passed in the proceedings in R.C.No.1/1992 E-2 dated 30.07.1992 on the file of the first Respondent.) The Petitioner challenges the order of the Principal District Judge/ Cooperative Tribunal, Chengalpat, made in C.M.A.No.19/1995 [dated 30.11.1998], confirming the surcharge order of the first Respondent. 2. The relevant facts could be stated thus – The Petitioner was appointed as a Clerk in the Second Respondent society in 1984. One G.C.Subramaniam was the Secretary and was in charge of the administration of the Society. On noticing irregularities in the management of the second Respondent Society, the first Respondent ordered statutory enquiry under Section 81 of the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act, 1983 [for short, TNCS Act]. Surcharge proceedings revealed that there were irregularities committed by writing false accounts to the tune of Rs.41,190.14, jointly both by the Writ Petitioner and the then Secretary Subramaniam, who died subsequently. The Respondents 3 to 5 are the Legal Heirs of the deceased Subramaniam. In the surcharge proceedings, final order was passed on 30.07.1992 holding both the Writ Petitioner and the deceased jointly and severally liable for the loss sustained by the second Respondent Society and directing them to pay Rs.86,045.31 with interest at 18% p.a. The Petitioner is said to have paid an amount of Rs.815.02. 3. Challenging the surcharge order, C.M.A.Nos.15 and 19 of 1995 were filed. By a common order dated 30.11.1998, the Cooperative Tribunal/PDJ, Chengalpat, confirming the surcharge order, dismissed both the C.M.A.s, which is now challenged in this Writ Petition. 4. 3. Challenging the surcharge order, C.M.A.Nos.15 and 19 of 1995 were filed. By a common order dated 30.11.1998, the Cooperative Tribunal/PDJ, Chengalpat, confirming the surcharge order, dismissed both the C.M.A.s, which is now challenged in this Writ Petition. 4. Raising strong contention of the violation of the Principles of Natural Justice, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner inter alia raised the following contentions: " The Petitioner had acted only as per the direction of the Secretary and there was no willful negligence on the part of the Petitioner; " During surcharge proceedings, no opportunity was given to the Petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses and there is gross violation of the Principles of Natural Justice, causing prejudice to the Petitioner and the same was not considered by the Tribunal; " Surcharge proceedings had been initiated nearly six years after the alleged commission, just at the closure of the limitation period of seven years. 5. Drawing the attention of the court to various dates of the surcharge hearing, the learned Government Advocate has submitted that sufficient opportunity was afforded to the Petitioner. It was further submitted that the Petitioner who was in-charge of writing accounts had committed willful negligence in writing false accounts and was rightly surcharged, which was confirmed by the Tribunal. 6. The findings and the surcharge are challenged mainly on the ground that the Respondent has acted arbitrarily and that mere negligence will not constitute willful negligence. To appreciate this contention, the nature of the allegations levelled against the Petitioner is to be considered. The Petitioner, who was a Clerk, was in-charge of writing the accounts and ledgers. The main charge against the Petitioner is, while writing the opening balance, the Petitioner deliberately wrote lesser amount and caused loss to the Society. At least six such instances have been noted, causing loss to the tune of Rs.25,883. Other instances of writing false accounts were also noticed. On 20.05.1986, the Society had received Rs.385.44 and the Petitioner had signed in the shop chitta. While writing the account on 24.05.1986, instead of writing the total of Rs.980.14, the Petitioner had written as Rs.504.70 and misappropriated Rs.385.44. There were several other instances or irregularities in writing the false accounts, deliberately showing lesser amount. The total loss caused to the Society was arrived at Rs.40,948.40. 7. While writing the account on 24.05.1986, instead of writing the total of Rs.980.14, the Petitioner had written as Rs.504.70 and misappropriated Rs.385.44. There were several other instances or irregularities in writing the false accounts, deliberately showing lesser amount. The total loss caused to the Society was arrived at Rs.40,948.40. 7. On behalf of the Petitioner, it was contended that the Petitioner was only a Clerk and that he acted as per the instructions of the then Secretary. Writing of false accounts was not confined to a a few instances, but persisted and spread out for a length of time. In a Cooperative Society, which is constituted for the benefit of its members, good conduct and honesty are the in-built essentials of the employees thereon. Though the Petitioner was appointed as Clerk, by the Secretary, the Society has reposed confidence in him. In a Cooperative Society dealing with money transactions, honesty and integrity are inseparable from the nature of the duty. Only then the interest of the members of the Society could be promoted. The contention of the Petitioner that he acted only on the instructions of the Secretary cannot be countenanced. 8. On behalf of the Petitioner, the main contention urged is that mere failure to write correct accounts would not amount to willful negligence and that the Petitioner could be surcharged only if had there been willful negligence and reckless disregard of duties. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner relied upon 1981 (2) MLJ 9 [Ramachandran Vs. Deputy Registrar, Dairying, Trichy], where it was held that the mere failure by itself cannot come with the expression 'willful negligence' which has been construed as meaning something done either by commission or omission in a deliberate and reprehensible manner, with reckless callousness and with a supine indifference [but not by accident or inadvertence, without taking due care and precaution ordinarily expected from a reasonable prudent man under the existing circumstances. 9. What is contemplated under Section 87 of TNCS Act is willful negligence. 9. What is contemplated under Section 87 of TNCS Act is willful negligence. In 1980 (2) MLJ 17, this Court has elaborately examined the expressions "willful negligence" and held thus: "Having regard to the interpretations and discussions in respect of the term 'willful' appearing in various enactments, as found in the case-law decided by the learned English and Indian Judges which serve as a guide to the construction of the term 'willful' used in S.71(1) of the Act, in order to pass a surcharge order under that Section against a person entrusted with the organisation and management of a cooperative society or an officer or servant thereof, such person should have done an actionable wrong, either by commission or omission, in a deliberate and reprehensible manner, with reckless callousness and with a supine indifference [but not by accident or inadvertence], without taking due care and precaution ordinarily expected from a reasonable and prudent man under those existing circumstance, that is to say, not caring what the result of this carelessness would be. To make it explicit, it may be stated that he should have acted in breach of legal obligations or in conscious disregard of duty or with an intentional failure to perform the manifest duty, in the performance of which the public have an interest, and that such commission or omission should be the proximate cause of the loss or deficiency in question." 10. In the light of the above, when the conduct of the Petitioner is viewed, it is clear that there was a violation of duty in writing proper accounts. There had been deliberation in writing the accounts and ledger in his own handwriting. Clearly there is failure to discharge the duties as was expected of a prudent man. The contention that there had been no willful negligence has no force. 11. Placing reliance upon 1978 (1) MLJ 284 [S.Venkataraman Vs. The Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Thanjavur and others], the learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that no opportunity was given to the Petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses. It was further submitted that the witnesses were examined and the Petitioner was not given opportunity to cross examine them. 11. Placing reliance upon 1978 (1) MLJ 284 [S.Venkataraman Vs. The Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Thanjavur and others], the learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that no opportunity was given to the Petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses. It was further submitted that the witnesses were examined and the Petitioner was not given opportunity to cross examine them. It was further submitted that, as held in the aforesaid decision, if a liability is sought to be fastened to the Petitioner on the basis of certain statements, the Petitioner ought to have been given an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses and the surcharge proceedings is vitiated for violation of the Principles of Natural Justice. 12. The above contention is to be analyzed only in the light of the proceedings. It is seen from the records that a Show Cause Notice dated 02.04.1992 was served on the Writ Petitioner on 18.04.1993 and the Petitioner has submitted that his explanation both on 30.04.1992 and 15.06.1992. Subsequently, the Enquiry Proceedings was initiated on 14.05.1992. At the request of the Petitioner, the enquiry was adjourned to 15.06.1992 and to various dates. Only on the date when the statement of witnesses were recorded, the Petitioner's deposition was also adduced. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned to a number of hearings and the final order was made on 30.07.1992. On most of the dates of hearing, the Petitioner is stated to have been present and the Petitioner had sufficient opportunity. In the instant case, the surcharge proceedings are not merely based upon the statement of the witnesses. Besides the statement of the witnesses, the accounts are eloquent enough, bringing home the false writing of the accounts. When all the relevant facts and circumstances are taken into consideration, this Court is of the view that there is no violation of the Principles of Natural Justice. The Petitioner is not right in contending that this aspect was not considered by the Cooperative Society. In paragraph No.11 of its order, the Cooperative Tribunal has adverted to this aspect. 13. Pointing out that the criminal cases filed against the Petitioner and Secretary Subramani in C.C.Nos.4/1994 to 8/1994 [on the file of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kanchipuram], had ended in acquittal, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that when the criminal case has ended in acquittal, there cannot be surcharge against the Petitioner. This contention does not merit acceptance. 13. Pointing out that the criminal cases filed against the Petitioner and Secretary Subramani in C.C.Nos.4/1994 to 8/1994 [on the file of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kanchipuram], had ended in acquittal, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that when the criminal case has ended in acquittal, there cannot be surcharge against the Petitioner. This contention does not merit acceptance. In criminal case, the standard of proof is "proof beyond reasonable doubt". But under Section 81 of TNCS Act, the essence of surcharge proceedings lies in misappropriation of any money or property of the Society by fraudulent intention or willful negligence. When link is established between the willful negligence and loss to the Bank in surcharge proceedings, the Registrar has the power to direct the delinquent person to pay the amount. Standard of proof in the surcharge proceedings is not so rigorous as that of the criminal case. Hence the Petitioner cannot take advantage of the acquittal of the criminal case filed against him. Yet another contention was raised that the surcharge proceedings has been initiated belatedly. In the Proviso to Section 87, no surcharge action shall be commenced after the expiry of seven years from the date of any act or commission referred to in Section 87. The alleged case of misappropriation was in 1986 and the surcharge proceedings was initiated in 1992, well within the period of limitation. 14. Exercising the writ jurisdiction, this Court would not act as a Court of Appeal, reassessing the matter and analyzing the adequacy or insufficiency of the materials. It is stated that in his explanation dated 30.04.1992 and 15.06.1992, the Petitioner has admitted to writing incorrect accounts, but however, has stated that he acted on the instructions of the Secretary. No valid grounds are made out for interference in the surcharge order, confirmed by the Cooperative Tribunal. 15. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P.No.762 of 2001 is also dismissed.