Judgment :- This writ petition is filed seeking a declaration that the petroleum dealers owning tanker lorries for the purpose of lifting petroleum products from the installations of the petroleum companies to the retail outlets are not transporting undertakings for the purpose of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers’ Welfare Fund Act, 1985 or the Welfare Fund Scheme thereunder and are not, therefore, liable to pay any contribution under the said Act and the Scheme. A writ of mandamus compelling the respondents to desist from insisting on payment of such contribution as a pre-condition for receiving quarterly tax under the Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1976 is also sought for. 2. Heard Adv. Sri B. Suresh Kumar on behalf of the petitioners and Sri. John Joseph Vettikkad on behalf of the first respondent State of Kerala. 3. The Kerala Motor Transport Workers’ Welfare Fund Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the “WELFARE Fund Act”) was made to provide for the constitution of a Fund to promote the welfare of the motor transport workers in the State of Kerala. It envisages, among other things, the framing of a scheme called “the Kerala Motor Transport Workers’ Welfare Fund Scheme” for the establishment of a Fund for employees and for the administration of the said Fund. 4. The employer is liable to make contributions under the Welfare Fund Act, Section 2(e) of which defines “employer” as follows: “2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, (e) ‘employer’ means in relation to any motor transport undertaking, the person who, or the authority which, has the ultimate control over, the affairs of the motor transport undertaking and where the said affairs are entrusted to any other person, whether called a manager, managing director, managing agent or by any other name, such other person.” 5. Except the terms defied in Clauses (a) to (k) of Section 2, clause (1) thereof provides that “all other words and expressions used but not defined in this Act and defined in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act 4 of 1939), shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act.” 6. By the Kerala Motor Transport Workers’ Welfare Fund (Amendment) Act, 2005 (hereinafter called the “Amending Act”), certain amendments were made to the Welfare Fund Act, also in the interpretation clause in Section 2. By the Kerala Motor Transport Workers’ Welfare Fund (Amendment) Act, 2005 (hereinafter called the “Amending Act”), certain amendments were made to the Welfare Fund Act, also in the interpretation clause in Section 2. The definition of “employer” in Section 2(e) of the Welfare Fund Act has been amended by Section 2(a) of the Amending Act by including the registered owner specifically within the sweep of the said definition. Section 8A introduced by the Amending Act provides as follows: “8A. Production of receipt of remittance of welfare fund contribution.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every registered owner or person having possession or control of a motor vehicle in respect of a motor transport undertaking liable to pay contribution (other than autorickshaws covered under the provisions of the Kerala Autorickshaw Workers’ Welfare Fund Scheme, 1991) shall, at the time of making payment of the tax under the Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1976 (19 of 1976), produce before the Taxation Officer the receipt of remittance of the contribution to the fund due up to the preceding month.” 7. In view of the aforesaid newly introduction Section 8A, receipt of remittance of contribution to the fund due up to the preceding month has to be produced before the Taxation Officer at the time of making payment of the tax under the Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1976. 8. The competence of the State Legislature to bring the amendments as per the Amending Act is beyond challenge. 9. In fact, the nature of the contentions on the basis of which reliefs are sought for in the writ petition is that the definitions of “employer” and “motor transport undertaking” in the Welfare Fund Act, as amended, would not take in petroleum dealers since, according to the writ petitioners, the dealers owning tanker lorries for the purpose of lifting petroleum from the installations of the petroleum companies to the retail outlets are not running a transport undertaking. 10. 10. The petitioners rely on the decision of this Court in Aravindhaksha Kurup’s case (WP[C].No.10903/2005) wherein what fell for consideration was the term “motor transport undertaking” in clause (b) was the term “motor transport undertaking” in clause (b) of Section 2 of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Payment of Fair Wages Act, 1971 which reads as follows: “(b) “motor transport undertaking’ means a motor transport undertaking including a private carrier engaged in carrying passengers or goods or both by road for hire or reward.” In contrast to the above definition, “motor transport undertaking” is defined in Section 2(h) of the Welfare Fund Act as follows: “(h) ‘Motor transport undertaking’ means a motor transport undertaking engaged in carrying passengers or goods or both by road for hire or reward and includes a private carrier.” So much so, the ratio of the judgment in Aravindhaksha Kurup’s case does not apply. 11. The term “private carrier” is not defined in the Welfare Fund Act. However, as already noticed, clause(1) of Section 2 of the said Act provides that all other words and expressions used but not defined in the said Act and defined in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act. Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, among other things, defines “private carrier” in Section 2(22) thereof which reads as follows: “(22) “private carrier” means an owner of a transport vehicle other than a public carrier who uses that vehicle solely for the carriage of goods which are his property or the carriage of which is necessary for the purposes of his business not being a business of providing transport, or who uses the vehicle for any of the purposes specified in sub-section (2) of Section 42.” Sub-Section (2) of Section 42 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 reads as follows: “(2). In determining, for the purposes of this Chapter, whether a transport vehicle is or is not used for the carriage of goods for hire or reward,- (a) the delivery or collection by or on behalf of the owner of goods sold, used or let on hire or hire-purchase in the course of any trade or business carried on by him other than the trade or business of providing transport, (b) the delivery or collection by or on behalf of the owner of goods which have been or which are to be subjected to a process or treatment in the course of a trade or business carried on by him, or (c) the carriage of goods in a transport vehicle by a manufacturer of or agent or dealer in such goods whilst the vehicle is being used for demonstration purposes, Shall not be deemed to constitute a carrying of the gods for hire or reward, but the carriage in a transport vehicle of goods by a person not being a dealer in such goods who has acquired temporary ownership of the goods for the purpose of transporting them to another place and there relinquishing ownership shall be deemed to constitute a carrying of the goods for hire or reward.” 12. When certain provisions of an earlier Act are incorporated by reference into a later Act, the provisions so incorporated become part and parcel of the later Act as if they had been “bodily transposed into it”. This legislative tool, which is called incorporation by reference, is a legislative device adopted for the sake of convenience in order to avoid verbatim reproduction of the provisions of the earlier Act into the later one. In re, Wood’s Estate, Ex parte, Works and buildings Commrs.([1886] 31 Ch D 607), Lord Esher, M.R. stated that if a subsequent Act brings into itself by reference, some of the clauses of a former Act, a legal effect of that, as have been held, is to write those sections into the new Act as if they had been actually written in it with the pen, or printed in it. Profitable support to this proposition can be found in the decisions of the Apex Court in Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553 (at 558) and in Mary Roy’s case, AIR 1986 SC 1011. 13. Profitable support to this proposition can be found in the decisions of the Apex Court in Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553 (at 558) and in Mary Roy’s case, AIR 1986 SC 1011. 13. The aforesaid definition of “private carrier” having been incorporated by reference in to the Welfare Fund Act, the definition of the term “motor transport undertaking” in the Welfare Fund Act includes a private carrier which means an owner of a transport vehicle other than a public carrier who uses the said vehicle solely for the carriage of goods which are his property or the carriage of which is necessary for the purposes of his business, not being a business of providing transport. There could be no doubt that a petroleum dealer who puts his tanker lorry for the purpose of lifting petroleum products from the installations of the petroleum companies to the retail outlet is the owner of a transport vehicle other than a public carrier and the vehicle is used solely for the purpose of carriage of goods, the carriage of which is necessary for the purpose of his business which is not a business of providing transport. Hence, he is a private carrier as defined in Section 2(22) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and therefore, a motor transport undertaking as defined in the Welfare Fund Act. 14. Faced with the above situation, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the repeal of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 by Section 217(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is not followed by any statutory provision other than those provided in the repealing provision and therefore, the incorporation by reference made by Clause (1) of Section 2 of the Welfare Fund Act should be deemed as not surviving after the date of repeal of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 15. By an incorporation by reference, the adoption of the provisions of an earlier Act by reference into a later Act is to constitute the later Act along with the incorporated provisions of the earlier Act. Upon such incorporation, the later Act stands as an independent legislation and will continue to remain untouched by, free from any modification or repeal by any modification or repeal of the earlier Act which was incorporated by reference. Upon such incorporation, the later Act stands as an independent legislation and will continue to remain untouched by, free from any modification or repeal by any modification or repeal of the earlier Act which was incorporated by reference. The decisions of the Apex Court in Narotamdas v. State of M.P. (AIR 1967 SC 1667 (at 1670), Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. V. Union of India (AIR 1979 SC 798) and Bolani Ores Ltd. V. State of Orissa (AIR 1975 SC 17) can be profitably referred to in this context. In Secretary of State v. Hindustan Co-Operative Insurance society Ltd. (AIR 1931 Privy Council 149), Sir George Lowndes stated that “it seems to be no less logical to hold that where certain provisions from an existing Act have been incorporated into subsequent Act, no addition to the former Act, which is not expressly made applicable to the subsequent Act, can be deemed to be incorporated in it, at all events if it is possible for the subsequent Act to function, effectually without the addition.” As a corollary, it has to be understood that no deletion or repeal of the earlier Act results in any modification of the Act into which the earlier Act had been incorporated by referenced. Ordinarily, if an Act is incorporated in a later Act, the intention is to incorporate the earlier Act, with all the amendments made in it up to the date of incorporation. The case in hand is a case of clear incorporation and not merely one of reference alone. The incorporation made by Section 2(1) of the Welfare Fund Act is absolute and is not subject to any qualifications or exceptions. So much so, there is no room to hold that the repeal of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 has any impact on the continued inclusion of the provisions incorporated by reference as part of the interpretation clause of the Welfare Fund Act. The incorporation made by Section 2(1) of the Welfare Fund Act is an incorporation which, in fact, means the bodily lifting of the provisions of one enactment and making it part of another. So much so, the repeal of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 leaves the Welfare Fund Act wholly untouched. The incorporation made by Section 2(1) of the Welfare Fund Act is an incorporation which, in fact, means the bodily lifting of the provisions of one enactment and making it part of another. So much so, the repeal of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 leaves the Welfare Fund Act wholly untouched. The continuance of the provisions incorporated by reference into the definition clause of the Welfare Fund Act by Section 2(1) thereof, does not depend on the continuation of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, without being repealed. Petitioner’s contention on this count fails. 16. There appears to be yet another angle from which the situation has to be viewed. The repeal of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is a fact known to the Legislature while the Amending Act was made in 2005. The law of the land also dictates that such knowledge of the Legislature has to be presumed. When the Legislature undertakes the exercise of amending an existing Act, it has to be presumed that the provisions of the Act that is being amended are duly adverted to and considered as the Legislature should. The fact that the Legislature, even while making the Amending Act, after the repeal of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, did not touch clause (1) of Section 2 of the Welfare Fund Act is a clear indication that the legislative intention is only to have the incorporation made by Section 2(1) to continue. This view of the matter also supports the conclusion arrived at above. In the result, the writ petition fails. The same is accordingly dismissed.