Judgment :- (Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying this Court to issue a Writ of Certiorari, calling for the records of the first respondent relating to G.O. (2d) No.331 Home ( Courts IA) Department dated 28.11.2001 as confirmed by the first respondent in Review Petition vide G.O. Ms. No.1043 dated 31.10.2002 and quash the same.) D. Murugesan, J. The challenge to the order of compulsory retirement either under fundamental Rule 56(d) or Rule 56(2) of the Judicial Officer had come up before this Court as well as before the Supreme Court on more than one occasion. The present Writ Petition is one such case. The petitioner entered in the Judicial Service as Second Class Magistrate on 4.1.1983. After his postings in various places, both on civil and criminal side, he was promoted to the post of Subordinate Judge on 21.7.2000 and posted at Tuticorin. He was compulsorily retired under fundamental Rule 56(2) by the impugned G.O.(2D) No.331 Home(Courts IA) Department dated 28.11.2001. Review Petition filed by the petitioner was also rejected in G.O.Ms. No.1034 Home ( Courts IA) Department dated 31.10.2002. The legality of the above orders are questioned in this Writ Petition basically on the following grounds: 1) The impugned orders are vitiated for non compliance of principle of natural justice. 2) Inasmuch as the similarly placed judicial officers were allowed to continue, the petitioner alone was discriminated; 3) No materials are available to pass the order of compulsorily retirement. 4) Having promoted the petitioner on 21.7.2000 and in the absence of any adverse entries in the service records after the promotion, the past records ought not to have been taken into consideration and consequently, the impugned orders are vitiated for want of materials. 2. The recruitment of the officers to judicial service other than the District Judges and the control over the subordinate Courts are dealt with in Chapter VI of the Constitution of India. Article 234 - Recruitment of persons other than District Judges to the Judicial service reads as under: Appointments of persons other than District Judges to the judicial service of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with rules made by him in that behalf after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. Article 235- Control over Subordinate Courts reads as under: The control over District Courts and Courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of District Judge shall be vested in the High Court, but nothing in this Article shall be construed as taking away from any such person any right of appeal which he may have under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service prescribed under such law. 3. The appointment to the post of subordinate Judges including the promotion to the said post from District Munsif or the Judicial Magistrate as the case may be, shall be made by the Governor of the State after consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. The control over the Subordinate Courts including the District Courts and Courts subordinate thereto as well as the posting and promotion, grant of leave etc., shall be vested with the High Court. The members of the subordinate judiciary are not only under the control of the High Court but also under the care and custody of the High Court. The Members of the subordinate judiciary look up to the High Court not only for discipline but also for dignity. The power of control envisaged under Article 235 relates to the power to make a decision by the High Court against a Member of subordinate Judicial service including a decision not to allow an officer to continue beyond the age of 50, of course, under the said Article, the High Court has power to make a recommendation to the Governor for implementation of such recommendation. 4. The control that is vested in the High Court over subordinate judiciary is well explained by the Supreme Court in the judgment reported in High Court Of Judicature At Bombay Vs Shirish Kumar R. Patil ( A.I.R. 1997 SC 2631) in para 10 which reads as under: “It would thus be settled law that the control of the subordinate judiciary under Article 235, is vested in the High Court. After the appointment of the judicial officers by the Governor, the power to transfer, maintain discipline and keep control over them vests in the High Court. The Chief Justice of the High Court is first among the Judges of the High Court. The action taken is by the High Court and not by the Chief Justice in his individual capacity, nor by the Committee of Judges. For the convenient transaction of administrative business in the Court, the Full Court of the Judges of the High Court generally passes a resolution authorising the Chief Justice to constitute various committees including the committee to deal with disciplinary matters pertaining to the subordinate judiciary or the ministerial staff working therein. Article 235, therefore, relates to the power of taking a decision by the High Court against a member of the subordinate judiciary. Such a decision either to hold enquiry into conduct of a judicial officer, subordinate or higher judiciary, or to have the enquiry conducted through a District or Additional District Judge etc., and to consider the report of the Enquiry Officer for taking further action is of the High Court. Equally, the decision to consider the report of the enquiry officer and to take follow up action and to make appropriate recommendation to the Disciplinary Committee or to the Governor, is entirely of the High Court which acts through the Committee of the Judges authorised by the Full Court. Once a resolution is passed by the Full Court of the High Court, there is no further necessity to refer the matter again to the Full Court while taking such procedural steps relating to control of the subordinate judiciary.” 5. The purport of such power vested in the High Court is explained again in the same judgment in para 13 which reads as under: “In a democracy governed by rule of law, under a written constitution, judiciary is the sentinel on the qui vive to protect the fundamental rights and posted to keep even scales of justice between the citizens and the States or States inter se. Rule of law and judicial review are basic features of the Constitution. As its integral constitutional structure, independence of the judiciary is an essential attribute of rule of law. Judiciary must, therefore, be free from pressure or influence from any quarter. The Constitution has secured to them, the independence. Rule of law and judicial review are basic features of the Constitution. As its integral constitutional structure, independence of the judiciary is an essential attribute of rule of law. Judiciary must, therefore, be free from pressure or influence from any quarter. The Constitution has secured to them, the independence. The concept of “judicial independence” is a wider concept taking within its sweep independence from any other pressure or prejudice. It has many dimensions, namely, fearlessness of other power centers, economic or political, and freedom from prejudices, acquired and nourished, by the class to which the Judge belongs. Independent judiciary, therefore, is most essential to protect the liberty of citizens. In times of grave danger, it is the constitutional duty of the judiciary to poise the scales of justice unmoved by the powers (actual or perceived), undisturbed by the clamour of the multitude. The heart of judicial independence is judicial individualism. The judiciary is not a disembodied abstraction.” 6. The High Court being the custodian of subordinate judiciary is more concerned about not only the independence of judicial system but also a fair, impartial, disciplined and honest judicial officers. The Supreme Court in All India Judges' Association Vs Union Of India ( 1992 (1) SCC 119 ) quoted with approval the statement of law by Krishna Iyer in the Fourteenth Report of the Law Commission which reads as follows: “ If the public is to give profound respect to the Judges, the Judges should by their conduct try and observe it, not by word or deed should they give cause for the people that they do not deserve the pedestal on which we except the public to place them. It appears to us that not only for the performance of his duties but outside the Court as well as a Judge has to maintain an aloofness amounting almost to self-imposed isolation” 7. The importance of subordinate judiciary was again stressed in All India Judges' Association Vs Union Of India ( 1993 (4) SCC 288 in the following words. “The Judges do not do an easy job. They repeatedly do what the rest of us seek to avoid, i.e., make decisions. Judges, though are mortals, they are called upon to perform a function that is utterly divine in character. The trial Judge is the Kingpin in the hierarchical system ;of administration of justice. “The Judges do not do an easy job. They repeatedly do what the rest of us seek to avoid, i.e., make decisions. Judges, though are mortals, they are called upon to perform a function that is utterly divine in character. The trial Judge is the Kingpin in the hierarchical system ;of administration of justice. He directly comes in contact with the litigant during the day to day proceedings in the Court. On him lies the responsibility to build solemn atmosphere in dispensation of justice, the personality, knowledge, judicial restraint, capacity to maintain dignity, character, conduct, official as well as personal and integrity are the additional aspects which make the functioning of the Court successful and acceptable” 8. In State Of Haryana Vs Inder Prakash Anand ( 1976 SC 1841) it has been by the Supreme Court as follows: “The control vested in the High Court is that if the High Court is of opinion that a particular judicial officer is not fit to be retained in service, the High Court will communicate that to the Governor because the Governor is the authority to dismiss, remove, reduce in rank or terminate the appointment. In such cases, it is the contemplation in the Constitution that the Governor as the head of the State will act in harmony with the recommendation of the High Court. If the recommendation of the High Court is not held to be binding on the State consequences will be unfortunate. It is in public interest that the State will accept the recommendation of the High Court. The vesting of complete control over the subordinate judiciary in the High Court leads to this that the decision of the High Court in matters within the jurisdiction will bind the State. The Government will act on the recommendation of the High Court. That is the broad basis of Article 235” 9. In Registrar High Court Of Madras Vs R.Rajiah ( AIR 1988 SC 1388 ) the Supreme Court has held as follows: “Article 235 vests in the High Court the control over District Courts and Courts subordinate thereto. The vesting of such control is consistent with the ideal of preservation of independence of the judiciary. The power of control comprises within its various matters in respect of subordinate judiciary including those relating to appointment, promotion and imposition of punishment, both major and minor. The vesting of such control is consistent with the ideal of preservation of independence of the judiciary. The power of control comprises within its various matters in respect of subordinate judiciary including those relating to appointment, promotion and imposition of punishment, both major and minor. If any authority other than the High Court is conferred with the absolute right to take action against a member of the subordinate judicial service, such conferment of power will impinge upon the power of control that is vested in the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution” 10. The power of the High Court to compulsorily retire the Members of Subordinate Judiciary within the purview of Article 235 has been recognized in the judgment reported in Uttar Pradesh Vs Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi ( A.I.R. 1978 (2) SCC 102 ); High Court Of Punjab And Haryana Vs State Of Haryana ( A.I.R. 1975 SC 613); Shamsher Singh Vs State Of Punjab ( AIR 1974 SC 2192 ); State Of Haryana Vs Inder Prakash Anand ( AIR 1976 SC 1841 ) and B. Mishra Vs Orissa High Court ( 1976(3) SCC 327 ). 11. While the power of the High Court under Article 235 to place a judicial officer under compulsory retirement is well recognized by the Supreme Court in the above cases. The Supreme Court has also laid down certain principles by which such power should be exercised. In Rajiah's case the Supreme Court has held in para 21 as follows: “It is true that the High Court in its administrative jurisdiction has power to compulsorily retire a member of the judicial service in accordance with any rule framed in that regard, but coming to the conclusion that a member of the subordinate Judicial service should be compulsorily retired, such conclusion must be based on materials. If there be no material to justify the conclusion, in that case, it will be an arbitrary exercise of power by the High Court. Indeed, Article 235 of the Constitution does not contemplate the exercise by the High Court of the power of control over subordinate Courts arbitrarily, but on the basis of some materials. As there is absence of any material to justify the impugned orders of compulsory retirement, those must be held to be illegal and invalid.” 12. Indeed, Article 235 of the Constitution does not contemplate the exercise by the High Court of the power of control over subordinate Courts arbitrarily, but on the basis of some materials. As there is absence of any material to justify the impugned orders of compulsory retirement, those must be held to be illegal and invalid.” 12. In Baikuntha Nath Das Vs Chief Medical Officer, ( 1992 (2) Scc 299 ), following the decision in Union Of India Vs Col. J.N. Sinha ( 1970 (2) SCC 458 ), the Supreme Court has laid down following: “(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the Government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a Government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate Court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide) or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it arbitrary-in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short if it found to be a perverse order; (iv)The Government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter, of course attaching more importance to record and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit(selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. The circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference” 13. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. The circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference” 13. The above guidelines have been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in State Of Gujrat Vs Umedbhai M. Patel ( 2001(3) SCC 314 ) in para 11 which reads as under: “The law relating to compulsory retirement has now crystallized into a definite principles, which could be broadly summarised thus: (i) Whenever the services of a public servant are no longer useful to the general administration, the officer can be compulsorily retired for the sake of public interest; (ii) Ordinarily, the order of compulsory retirement is not to be treated as a punishment coming under Article 311 of the Constitution. (iii) For better administration, it is necessary to chop off dead wood, but the order of compulsory retirement can be passed after having due regard to the entire service record of the officer. (iv) Any adverse entries made in the confidential record shall be taken note of and be given due weightage in passing such order. (v) Even uncommunicated entries in the confidential record can also be taken into consideration. (vi) The order of compulsory retirement shall not be passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course is more desirable. (vii) If the officer was given a promotion despite adverse entries made in the confidential record, that is a fact in favour of the officer. (viii) Compulsory retirement shall not be imposed as a punitive measure. 14. In HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARAYANA VS ISHWAR CHAND JAIN ( AIR 1999 SC 1677 ), the Supreme Court has held that the order of compulsory retirement can be the subject matter of review. From the above judgment, the scope of interference of the order of compulsory retirement may be (1) if the order is mala fide, (2) there is no evidence and (3) that it is arbitrary as arbitrariness in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material in short, if it is found to be a perverse order. 15. Keeping the above principles of law in mind, the grievance of the petitioner shall be considered. 15. Keeping the above principles of law in mind, the grievance of the petitioner shall be considered. The petitioner was appointed as Judicial Second Class Magistrate on 4.1.1983 and was promoted to the post of Sub Judge on 21.7.2000. He was compulsorily retired on 28.11.2001. 16. Point No.1: Violation of principles of natural justice: One of the challenge to the impugned order is that it is violative of principle of natural justice. The law on the above challenge is not res integra. In the judgment of Baikuntha Nath Das's case the Supreme Court has authoritatively held that the principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. Hence, the said contention has no ground to stand. 17. Point No.2: Insofar as the next challenge to the order of compulsory retirement on the ground of discrimination, we are unable to accept the said contention of discrimination. Of course, similarly placed person who has not shown enough disposal, might have been allowed to continue beyond the age of 50 years. That by itself cannot be a ground to put forth the issue of discrimination and contend that the petitioner also should be allowed to continue beyond the age of 50 years. Consideration of compulsory retirement shall depend upon the facts of each case. The decision of compulsory retirement of a judicial officer is not only based on their disposal but also the overall performance both on judicial work as well as the integrity, character and other relevant criteria. Even, if the issue of discrimination is established that may have a bearing in allowing the other officer to continue in service and the same will not entitle the petitioner to claim for continuation. 18. Point Nos. 3 and 4 : According to Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, the petitioner ought not to have compulsorily retired on the basis of adverse entries made prior to his promotion as by virtue of promotion, it is deemed that adverse entries have already been considered and the High Court after ignoring those entries had made the promotion. 3 and 4 : According to Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, the petitioner ought not to have compulsorily retired on the basis of adverse entries made prior to his promotion as by virtue of promotion, it is deemed that adverse entries have already been considered and the High Court after ignoring those entries had made the promotion. In this context, he has referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Brij Mohana Singh Chopra Vs State Of Punjab ( 1987(2) SCC 188 ); Swami Saran Vs State Of U.P. ( AIR 1980 SC 269 ) and Pritam Singh Vs Union Of India And Others ( 2005(9) SCC 748 ). At the outset we would like to point out that consideration as to the compulsory retirement in case of judicial officers cannot be equated to other government servants in the light of the independence of judiciary and the nature of duties entrusted on judicial officers. The power of the Government to compulsorily retire a government servant under fundamental rule cannot be equated to the power of the High Court in exercise of its controlling power over the subordinate judiciary under Article 235 of the Constitution of India. The scope of review of the order of compulsory retirement had come up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the judgment reported in SHIV DAYAL GUPTA VS STATE OF RAJASTHAN ( 2005(13) SCC 581 ). The Supreme Court has held that the Review Committee has to take the overall assessment of service record for the purpose of continuance of the officer. If the overall assessment of service record does not satisfy the Committee, in the public interest, the Committee can recommend for compulsory retirement. The ultimate criteria is the public interest. The Supreme Court in 1987(2) SCC 188 was considering the case of compulsory retirement of a non-judicial officer, namely, Joint Director of Industries in Government service. The order of compulsory retirement was interfered on the ground that the Review Committee had taken into consideration of the adverse entries made ten years prior to promotion. In view of the recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 2005(13) SCC 581 , the above judgment cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case. 19. The order of compulsory retirement was interfered on the ground that the Review Committee had taken into consideration of the adverse entries made ten years prior to promotion. In view of the recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 2005(13) SCC 581 , the above judgment cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case. 19. In Ramesh Chandra Acharya Vs Registrar High Court Of Orissa ( Air 2000 Sc 2168 ) the Supreme Court had infact held that judicial officer has no right as such to seek for continuance in the absence of any specific rule and in such circumstances, such continuance is permissible only when positive recommendation in favour of the officer for such continuation. Infact in Bishwanath Prasad Singh Vs State Of Bihar ( 2001(2) Scc 305 ) the Supreme Court while considering the compulsory retirement of a District and Sessions Judge of Bihar State Judiciary, has held that so long as the opinion forming basis of the order for compulsory retirement in public interest is formed bona fide, the opinion cannot be ordinarily interfered with by a judicial forum and such an order may be subjected to judicial review on very limited grounds such as the order being mala fide, based on no material or on collateral grounds or having been passed by an authority not competent to do so and the object of compulsory retirement is not to punish or penalise the government servant but to weed out the worthless who have lost their utility for the administration of justice. While the issue relating to compulsory retirement is considered the entire past records could be taken into consideration. This principle of law has been consistently held by the Supreme Court in various judgments including in Baikuntha Nath Das's case. Infact, in Baikuntha Nath Das's case the Supreme Court had gone into the extent of laying down the law by stating that even the order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. At the time when the Writ Petition was filed, it is the case of the petitioner himself that the past records were not taken into consideration before the order of compulsory retirement is passed. At the time when the Writ Petition was filed, it is the case of the petitioner himself that the past records were not taken into consideration before the order of compulsory retirement is passed. Having taken the stand it is only at the time of argument, the learned senior counsel would submit that the order of compulsory retirement cannot be made considering the past record prior to the promotion. It was contended that compulsory retirement was not based on material. In this regard we have perused the records produced by Mr.B. Rajendran. On more than one occasion, the Administrative Judges of this Court had made entries as to the poor performance of the judicial officer and the same reads as under: 01.01.95 to 31.12.1995 P.D.J's Renmarks: "Unsatisfactory" 01.01.97 to 31.5.97 "Needs more disposal" 01.01.98 to 31.12.98 "Disposal should improve" 1.1.98 to 31.12.98 Quality of Judgment/Order Narration : Clarity in thought : Reasoning : Poor Promptitude in disposal of cases Current : Old : Poor 20. The Review-cum-Screening Committee on 10.1.2001, considered the name of the petitioner under Fundamental Rule 56(2) and it resolved to retire him compulsorily. The Resolution of the Review-cum-Screening Committee was placed before the Full Court on 29.3.2001 and the same was adjourned due to administrative reason. Thereafter, the petitioner made a representation on 23.4.2001 to review the recommendations of the Screening Committee. Of course, the said representation was placed again before the Screening Committee, which considered in its meeting held on 3.10.2001 and resolved to place the matter before the Full Court to reconsider the case for review, as the petitioner was promoted one year back and there was no complaint of misconduct or inconsistency thereafter. This recommendation of the Screening Committee was again placed before the Full Court in its meeting held on 10.10.2001 and the Full Court directed the matter to be reconsidered by the Screening Committee. Accordingly, the Screening committee again considered the representation of the petitioner in its meeting held on 12.10.2001 and resolved that the petitioner should be compulsorily retired under Fundamental Rule 56(2) as his continuance in service is against the public interest. The Resolution reads as under: Subjects considered by the Hon'ble Administrative Committee Subject No.3: Courts and Judges-Thiru I. Richard, Sub-Judge, Thoothukkudi Reviewed under F.R. 56(2). Recommended to be compulsorily retired under F.R. 56(2). Review Petition. The Resolution reads as under: Subjects considered by the Hon'ble Administrative Committee Subject No.3: Courts and Judges-Thiru I. Richard, Sub-Judge, Thoothukkudi Reviewed under F.R. 56(2). Recommended to be compulsorily retired under F.R. 56(2). Review Petition. Submitted-considered Rejected-Review Petition submitted again-considered by the Administrative Committee-Minutes of the Committee-Placed before the Full Court-Minutes of the Full Court- submitted for consideration-reg. The case of Thiru I. Richard, Sub Judge, Thoothukkudi is reconsidered under F.R. 56(2). on reconsidering the remarks recorded in the confidential reports, work done and all other relevant records relating to the Officer, as per the guidelines prescribed in G.O. Ms. .No. 623 dated 14.7.1993, Vigilance reports, it is resolved to reject the representation of the Officer and the Committee reiterates the earlier resolution to retire Thiru I. Richard, Sub Judge, Thoothukkudi from the service under F.R. 56(2) on attaining the age of 50 years, as his continuance in service is against the public interest" 21. That apart, it has been held that in the event compulsory retirement is made in public interest and is bona fide, the same cannot be interfered, as the order of compulsory retirement does not amount to an order of punishment and consequently, does not cause a stigma. This principle of law is also settled by the Supreme Court in the judgment of Ishwar Chand Jain's case, cited supra. Further, the petitioner has not questioned the order of compulsory retirement either on the ground that it was mala fide or on the ground that it was perverse. As the order of compulsory retirement was made in the public interest considering the overall records of the petitioner, we are not inclined to interfere with the same. 22. For all the above reasons, we are not inclined to accept the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel in questioning the order of compulsory retirement. Accordingly, the Writ Petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.