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2006 DIGILAW 2821 (PNJ)

Surjit Kaur v. Jaspal Singh

2006-07-17

MAHESH GROVER

body2006
JUDGMENT MAHESH GROVER, J. 1. This judgment will dispose of Regular Second Appeal Nos. 4371 and 4372 of 2004 as common questions of law and facts are involved therein. 2. Two separate suits were filed in the trial Court, one by Jaspal Singh and Narinder Singh ( respondents in the appeals) for permanent injunction and the other by Surjit Kaur (appellant in both the appeals) for mandatory injunction. The respondents had prayed that the appellant be restrained from interfering in their peaceful possession over a house fully detailed in the head note of the plaint, whereas the appellant had prayed that the respondents be directed to vacate and hand back the possession of the house shown in the green portion of the site plan attached and as detailed in the head note of the plaint. 3. The facts, in brief, are that the respondents claimed to be the owner in possession of the house in question by virtue of decree dated 7.12.1979 of the Civil Court passed in Suit No.346 of 12.11.1979 and averred that ever since, they are in possession of the suit property. They further averred that the appellant was given one room, bathroom, kitchen and open yard shown in the site plan for her residence where she was residing as a licencee and during the pendency of the suit, the appellant had forcibly put a lock on their lock and, therefore, they were entitled to get the lock removed . They alleged that the appellant was threatening to dispossess them even though she had no right, title or interest in the suit property. 4. The appellant resisted the suit of the respondents and denied that they were owner in possession of the house in dispute under the decree of 7.12.1979. It was pleaded that the decree was not registered and, therefore, it was not recognizable in the eyes of law. She had set up the case that Gurdev Singh, her husband, had purchased the plot in the name of the appellant and prior to that, had executed an agreement to purchase the same with the vendor in the year 1970 for a sum of Rs.5000/-, but the sale deed was actually executed in her favour and thereafter, the house was constructed by her and her husband in the year 1972-73 and that they were living in that house ever since. The appellant had further averred that the respondents were permitted to use some portion of the house as tenanted premises which was in dilapidated condition and the respondents are now taking advantage of that situation. 5. The appellant, in her suit, prayed that a decree of mandatory injunction be passed against the respondents directing them to vacate and hand over the possession of the portion of the house in question which they were occupying. 6. The trial Court consolidated both the suits vide order dated 19.11.1999 and proceeded to decide the same. 7. After taking oral as well as documentary evidence of the parties and hearing their learned counsel, the trial Court decreed the suit of the respondents and dismissed that of the appellant. In appeals, the lower Appellate Court affirmed the findings of the trial Court. Hence, the present appeal. 8. It was contended by Shri S.S.Salar, learned counsel for the appellant that the earlier decree dated 7.12.1979 was not registered and, therefore, it does not confer any title upon the respondents. 9. On the other hand, Shri R.K.Aggarwal, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the collusive decree was suffered by the appellant herself in favour of the respondents and, therefore, it did not lie in her mouth to say that the decree was not registered and was not recognisable in the eyes of law. 10. I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel and perused the record. 11. It is a conceded case of the parties that the appellant is a relation of the respondents being their mother’s sister. She had admittedly suffered a consent decree before the Court and she had filed written statement Exhibit P3 in the suit filed by the respondent, a copy of which is Exhibit P2. A statement was suffered by the appellant wherein she had admitted the claim of the respondents. On the basis of the consent, decree dated 7.12.1979 was passed. This decree was never challenged by her for long number of years and it is only in 1996, after a lapse of 17 years, that she chose to file the instant suit. The only ground on which she could have succeeded was that a decree had been obtained as a result of fraud or collusion or if she had denied the execution of the decree on the ground of impersonation. That is not the case of the appellant. The only ground on which she could have succeeded was that a decree had been obtained as a result of fraud or collusion or if she had denied the execution of the decree on the ground of impersonation. That is not the case of the appellant. She is, therefore, estopped by her own conduct to challenge the decree which she had suffered on account of her free will and volition. Once the decree had been voluntarily suffered out of free will and volition, it can be set aside only if the party challenging the same succeeds in proving to the contrary. Great sanctity has to be accorded to the proceedings before the Courts and the statements and compromises recorded before the Courts are to be given due effect to. In the judgment reported as AIR 2001 S.C. 2790 -Salkia Businessmen’s Association and others Versus Howrah Municipal Corporation and others, the Supreme Court has held that the compromises effected in the Courts are to be given due effect as there is a great sanctity accorded to the Court proceedings. Some of the observations made by their Lordships in that judgment are produced below:- “The memorandum and terms of the compromise in this case became part of the orders of the High Court itself when the writ petition was finally disposed of in terms of the compromise reached between the parties notwithstanding that there was no verbatim reproduction of the same in the order. While so, it is beyond one’s comprehension as to how any violation of terms of compromise could have been viewed by the Court as a matter of mere contract between parties and under that pretext absolve itself of the responsibility to enforce it, except by doing violence to the terms thereof in letter and spirit. While so, it is beyond one’s comprehension as to how any violation of terms of compromise could have been viewed by the Court as a matter of mere contract between parties and under that pretext absolve itself of the responsibility to enforce it, except by doing violence to the terms thereof in letter and spirit. If Courts are not to honour and implement their own orders, and encourage party litigants - be they public authorities, to invent methods of their own to short circuit and give a go-bye to the obligations and liabilities incurred by them under orders of the Court - the rule of law will certainly become a casualty in the process - a costly consequence to be jealously averted by all and at any rate by highest Courts in States in the Country.”, the Supreme Court has held that the compromises effected in the Courts are to be given due effect as there is great sanctity accorded to the Court proceedings.” 12. There being no challenge to the earlier decree on the ground of fraud or collusion, the appellant would be estopped from challenging the same on the ground of non-registration. 13. There is, thus, no infirmity in the findings recorded by the Courts below which are concurrent. No substantial question of law has been shown to have arisen in the present appeals. The same are devoid of any merit and are dismissed as such.