Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2006 DIGILAW 2855 (RAJ)

Jaabid Hussain v. State of Rajasthan

2006-10-10

GOPAL KRISHAN VYAS

body2006
Gopal Krishan Vyas, J.— I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner(s) as well as learned Public Prosecutor for the State and carefully gone through the material placed on record. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Mohanani submits that the petitioner in this case is facing trial for alleged commission of offences punishable under Secs. 377, 363, 342 and 324 IPC. 3. Earlier the petitioner had moved bail application which was dismissed by this Court on 21.04.2006 observing that the petitioner is free to move fresh bail application after recording of statement of Dilip Singh. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that challan was filed in this case before the Court on 19.04.2006 and charges were framed on 20.05.2006 and the first date of recording evidence was fixed on 25.05.2006 and since 25.05.2006 to 26.07.2006 the trial was to be completed as per the mandatory provision of Section 437(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is contended that statements of P.W.1 Dilip Singh, P.W. 2 Hakam Singh, P.W.3 Bhawani Singh, P.W.4 Victim Rajendra Singh and P.W.5 Nisar Ahmed have been recorded by the trial Court and, therefore, the trial Court has committed an error while rejecting the bail application of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is entitled to bail as per the mandatory provisions of Section 437 (6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In support of his contention, he invited attention of the Court towards judgments reported in 1966 Cr.L.R. 819 Om Prakash vs. State of Rajasthan and 1988 R.C.C. 382, Om Veer vs. State of Rajasthan, etc. 4. The learned Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed the bail application and contended that Section 437 (6), Cr.PC. does not leave the Court helpless. It is argued by the learned Public Prosecutor that sufficient prudence and caution is explicitly embodied in the enactment to make it possible for the Court to exercise judicious discretion and, therefore, the Section itself incorporates riding provision but casts duty upon the Court to record the reasons in writing, in case, the Magistrate otherwise directs. The learned Public Prosecutor contended that in this case the accused is charged for sodomy practiced upon a school boy which, by its very nature, reflects the criminal mentality on the part of the accused. The learned Public Prosecutor contended that in this case the accused is charged for sodomy practiced upon a school boy which, by its very nature, reflects the criminal mentality on the part of the accused. He further contended that there is no ground for disbelieving the testimony of the victim whose statement has been recorded by the trial Court and nothing could be elicited from him in his cross-examination to shatter the case of the prosecution. The prosecution argued that the benefit of bail should not be granted to such accused and the learned Court below has rightly passed the order impugned rejecting the application of the petitioner for bail. 5. I have carefully gone through the material on record and also perused the statements of the witnesses examined by the trial Court. I have also gone through the judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. In the case of Om Prakash vs. State of Rajasthan, the main consideration for granting the bail was prolongation of the trial. Therein, the accused had been facing trial for more than 4 years and the delay in completion of trial was attributable to the prosecution. The thrust of argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner before the Court in that case was that direction had been issued by the High Court for completing the trial within six months but the trial had not been completed within the said period and co-accused were already granted bail. In the case of Omveer vs. State of Rajasthan, again, the Court observed that in normal circumstances bail could not have been granted in this case but the direction of the Court have repeatedly been flouted by the prosecution; and, more than two and a half years’ period is sufficiently long period to detain a person in custody without adjudicating his guilt much less when directions are issued by the Court. Thus, in both the cited cases, the provisions of Section 437(6), Cr.P.C. were referred and resorted to manifestly for coming to aid of the accused who languished behind the bars during lengthened out trial for the fault of the prosecution. These are not the facts and circumstances in the present case. 7. I have carefully gone through the impugned order. The learned Sessions Judge, Bhilwara has recorded reasons for rejecting the bail application of the petitioner. These are not the facts and circumstances in the present case. 7. I have carefully gone through the impugned order. The learned Sessions Judge, Bhilwara has recorded reasons for rejecting the bail application of the petitioner. The accused is charged with the commission of sodomy upon a child student and the victim has categorically deposed against the accused in his statement before the Court Moreover, none of the witnesses has turned hostile in this case and the trial Court too, is proceeding expeditiously to record the evidence. In my considered opinion, no interference is warranted in this case. The trial Court has commited no error in rejecting the petitioner’s bail application. 8. The mandate enshrined in the provisions of Section 437(6), Cr.P.C. binds the Court to consider bail application of the accused if evidence is not completed within 60 days but does not divest the Court of its power to direct otherwise. It casts duty upon the Court to record the reasons in writing if the Magistrate otherwise directs. I am satisfied by the reasons recorded by the Court below for rejecting the petitioner’s bail application. 9. Consequently, the present bail application is dismissed. * * * * *