JUDGMENT : Rakesh Tiwari, J. Heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. This writ petition has been filed against the order dated 16.2.2002, passed by the Additional District Judge, Mathura, Respondent No. 1, rejecting the application of the Petitioner u/s 21(1)(b) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for release of the shops in dispute Nos. 57 and 57A situate in Mohalla Kucha Sonaran, Holi Gate, Mathura. The application was registered as P.A. Case No. 62 of 1983. Respondents 2, 3 and one Smt. Jamuna Devi had the aforesaid application. 3. Smt. Jamuna Devi died during the pendency of the case. Her heirs and legal representatives were already on record as Respondents 2 and 3. The aforesaid application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority vide order dated 13.4.1990 and was upheld by the District Judge, Mathura vide order dated 27.9.1990 on appeal filed by the Petitioner. 4. Aggrieved the Petitioner had filed Writ Petition No. 4533 of 1991 against the impugned orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge, Mathura. 5. During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, the Petitioner filed a supplementary-affidavit on 3.1.1991 to the effect that the Mathura Vrindaban Development Authority had not sanctioned the map for construction. It was averred in the supplementary-affidavit that the only intention of the Respondents in getting the shops vacated was to let out its various portions to tenants, hence a prayer for issuance of a direction to the Respondents not to let out the portion of the accommodation to any one was also sought. 6. The aforesaid writ petition was dismissed by the Court vide order dated 3.1.1991 holding thus: I have carefully gone through the order of the appellate authority dated 27.9.1990 and in my opinion, it does not suffer from any illegality so as to call for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. The writ petition is dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs. However, in case the landlords without taking steps for reconstruction of the premises have let out the demolished portion to the tenants, there appears to be no justification for refusing the Petitioner also to occupy the demolished portion which was in his possession. The Petitioner can approach the District Judge, Mathura for necessary action in this regard. 7. However, in case the landlords without taking steps for reconstruction of the premises have let out the demolished portion to the tenants, there appears to be no justification for refusing the Petitioner also to occupy the demolished portion which was in his possession. The Petitioner can approach the District Judge, Mathura for necessary action in this regard. 7. Thereafter a review application was filed by the Respondents for recall of the observations made by the Court in the aforesaid judgment dated 3.1.1991 which was dismissed vide order dated 15.9.1992. 8. On a petition for special leave to appeal being filed by the Petitioner against the order dated 3.1.1991 in the aforesaid Writ Petition No. 4533 of 1991, the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the High Court by order of this Court by order dated 14.11.1991 with the following observations: The High Court has adverted to this grievance. It has recognized the right of the Petitioner to seek statutory remedies in the event of his being denied the right to get back into possession. The High Court has indicated that the Petitioner may move the District Judge for requisite relief. It is appropriate that the Petitioner should move the District Judge in the first instance. 9. Accordingly in view of the order dated 3.1.1991 the Petitioner moved an application on 22.1.1991 supported by an affidavit inter alia that he may be given possession of the shops in dispute on the ground that the Respondents, after getting the malba (debris) cleaned on the northern and southern side on the property in dispute with a passage in the centre constructed chabutra and had let out the same on rent to various persons on rent who took the same on rent for the day and vacated the same in the evening. He claimed that this is done to mislead the Court and that the Petitioner is also entitled to possession of the property as tenant. 10. The relevant paragraph 2 of the application reads as under: 11. He claimed that this is done to mislead the Court and that the Petitioner is also entitled to possession of the property as tenant. 10. The relevant paragraph 2 of the application reads as under: 11. The aforesaid application was replied by the Respondent No. 2 by filing objections together with an affidavit on 12.4.1991 as under inter alia that wrong assertions have been made in the application by the Petitioner and the property which according to the Petitioner had itself fallen down and is not in existence after 6.10.1990 hence there arises no question of giving possession of the said property to him. The reply/objection is quoted below for ready reference: 12. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the Petitioner filed overwhelming evidence in proof of the fact that the Respondents have let out the property on rent after securing the demolished shop in dispute u/s 21(1)(b) of the Act but the court below without considering the evidence adduced by the Petitioner in its true and correct perspective has illegally rejected the application of the Petitioner for delivery of possession of the property. It is vehemently urged that in the circumstances the order impugned is arbitrary, illegal, perverse and is liable to be quashed by this Court. 13. The court below rejected the application of the Petitioner dated 22.1.1991 by order dated 16.2.2002. Aggrieved by the rejection of the application he has filed the instant writ petition seeking the same relief which has already been decided by this Court and against which the SLP filed by him was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court directing the Petitioner to approach the District Judge in the first instance for redressal of his grievance. The case of the Petitioner before the District Judge was that the Respondent-landlord after getting the shop released from other tenants had let out the same. 14. Notices were issued to the Respondents 2 and 3 but despite personal service and publication in the daily newspapers they did not reply. 15. Vide order dated 16.10.2006 the service of the notices has been deemed to be sufficient on the Respondents. In the circumstances and in the interest of justice the Court has to consider the case of the Respondents as well in the facts and circumstances of the case. 16. 15. Vide order dated 16.10.2006 the service of the notices has been deemed to be sufficient on the Respondents. In the circumstances and in the interest of justice the Court has to consider the case of the Respondents as well in the facts and circumstances of the case. 16. Considering the contention of learned Counsel for the Petitioner that after he had vacated the shop it was demolished and has not been constructed as yet, as such a direction be given to the landlord to construct a shop and give the same to him as the demolished shop was not bona fide required by the landlord for the reason that he had given the same on rent to another person, the court below has given a categorical finding of fact that some persons might be sitting over the property in dispute for a limited period, i.e., during the day hours as alleged by the Petitioner but the same cannot be termed to be letting out there being no delivery of possession. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that the court below after considering the entire material on record has come to the conclusion that it has not been proved that the property in dispute has been let out to other tenants. The operative portion of the order reads as under: Hence in these circumstances it could not be proved that this property has been let out to other tenants. Some persons did sit over this property for a limited period, i.e., during day hours only may be a temporary phaze and that cannot be termed to be letting out. This could not be proved that this sitting during day hours continues for years together. Even if it would have been there, it does not come within the definition of letting out, as there was no delivery of possession and at the worse they could have been licensee for a limited period. In these circumstances I am of the opinion that application 4C must be rejected. However, in the circumstances of the case parties must bear their own costs of litigation. 17. In these circumstances I am of the opinion that application 4C must be rejected. However, in the circumstances of the case parties must bear their own costs of litigation. 17. During the course of arguments the learned Counsel for the Petitioner-tenant has stated that now as he has purchased part of the building in which the shop is situated, as such it has become more necessary that the landlord be directed to re-construct the shop and give it to him so that he can carry on his business therein. 18. In this view of the matter it has now to be seen as to whether there is any legal right of the Petitioner-tenant now to claim a shop in the part of the building remained with the landlord or not? Subsequent events can be seen by the Court to do substantial justice. Reference in this regard may be made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kedar Nath Agrawal (Dead) and Anr. v. Dhanraji Devi (dead) and Anr. 2004 (2) ARC 764: 2004 (4) AWC 3709 (SC)with regard to whether subsequent events can be taken into consideration, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held: In our opinion, by not taking into account the subsequent event, the High Court has committed an error of law and also an error of jurisdiction. In our judgment, the law is well-settled on the point, and it is this: The basic rule is that the rights of the parties should be determined on the basis of the date of institution of the suit or proceeding and the suit/action should be tried at all stages on the cause of action as it existed at the commencement of the suit/action. This, however, does not mean that events happening after institution of a suit/proceeding cannot be considered at all. It is the power and duty of the Court to consider changed circumstances. A Court of law may take into account subsequent events inter alia in the following circumstances: (i) The relief claimed originally has by reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate ; or (ii) It is necessary to take notice of subsequent events in order to shorten litigation ; or (iii) It is necessary to do so in order to do complete justice between the parties. 19. 19. Admittedly the tenant has purchased a building from the landlord where the shop was situated ; hence he can run his business from the same building which he has acquired now and no prejudice or irreparable loss would be caused to him. Since the Petitioner has now acquired the building in the same premises, hence in view of Explanation I to Section 21(1)(a) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 his bona fide need does not survive and only with regard to comparative hardship it would not be just and equitable to give direction to the Respondent to induct the Petitioner again by way of re-entry. 20. Even otherwise the court below has considered every aspect of the matter in detail and has given thoughtful consideration to the averments made by the Petitioner before him. The order of the court below cannot be said to be a slipshod or contrary to law. 21. There is no illegality or infirmity in the order impugned. 22. It is settled law that the tenant cannot dictate terms to the landlord to release his accommodation particularly in view of the fact that it could not be proved that the property has been let out to other tenants and there was no delivery of possession of it. Moreover, since it is now on record that the Petitioner-tenant has purchased a part of the building in vacant state in which his shop was situated he has become the landlord of that part, hence his case is fully covered by analogy of Explanation to Section 21 of the Act. 23. The Petitioner has miserably failed to establish any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order for exercise of extra-ordinary powers by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The findings earlier recorded were confirmed up to the Apex Court and in view of the subsequent development of facts and circumstances also the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 24. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.