JUDGMENT : Rakesh Tiwari, J. Heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. The Petitioner has filed this writ petition praying for quashing of the order dated 30.3.1996 passed by the 4th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi in Rent Appeal No. 214 of 1993, Gyan Kumar Singh v. Sayeed Khan Rent Appeal No. 214 of 1993. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the Petitioner is the tenant of one shop @ Rs. 175 per month in premises No. 25/26, Mohalla Purani Taksal (Kabirchaura), Varanasi City of which Respondent No. 3/landlord who moved an application dated 12.11.1990 u/s 21(1)(a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 before the Prescribed Authority (Respondent No. 2) for its release. The application was registered as P. A. Case No. 6 of 1990. 3. The main ground taken by Respondent No. 3 in his application u/s 21(1)(a) of the U. P. Act 13 of 1972 was that he required the shop in dispute for establishing his two sons, Sanjay Kumar Singh and Sujeet Kumar Singh in automobile engineering business who were un-employed. 4. The Petitioner filed objection denying inter alia that the need of the landlord was not bona fide and genuine as two shops in the same premises which had fallen vacant were given by the landlord to Singh brothers and one Sri Devasheesh after taking handsome premium from them. It was also averred in the objections that the income of the landlord is approximately Rs. 17,000 per month, as such his financial condition was very sound and he could establish his sons elsewhere. 5. On the question of bona fide need and comparative, hardship it was pleaded in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Petitioner that the elder son of the Respondent-landlord was employed as an Engineer with Samarth Automobile Service. It was also pointed out before the Prescribed Authority that the younger son of the landlord was getting education and therefore there was no question of any urgent and pressing need for any accommodation for running of any business. 6. The case of the Petitioner-tenant also was that he has no other accommodation for the purpose of running his business except the shop in dispute which was the only source of income and in case he is evicted therefrom he would be left with no option except to face starvation. 7. 6. The case of the Petitioner-tenant also was that he has no other accommodation for the purpose of running his business except the shop in dispute which was the only source of income and in case he is evicted therefrom he would be left with no option except to face starvation. 7. In reply to the objection filed by the Petitioner, the landlord filed an affidavit admitting that two shops were let-out to the Singh brothers and one Sri Devasheesh. 8. The Prescribed Authority after appreciating the evidences on record rejected the application for release of the shop in dispute, holding that: (1) The need of the landlord was not genuine and bona fide. (2) It could not be proved by the landlord that his two sons were unemployed and were seeking the entry into the business which had to be carried out in the shop in dispute. (3) The accommodation in question was not bona fide required by the landlord in as much as he had let-out two other shops in the same premises which had fallen vacant recently. (4) The accommodation in question was not fit for the proposed business in view of the evidence available in the record And (5) that a more befitting portion was lying vacant in the same premises which the landlord could use for his requirement. 9. Rent Appeal No. 214/1993 u/s 22 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 was preferred by the landlord before the District Judge, Varanasi which was transferred to Respondent No. 1 for adjudication. 10. Before the appellate court an affidavit dated 15.12.1995 was filed on behalf of the Petitioner to the effect that the elder son Sri Sanjai Kumar was employed in the firm of one Sri U. B. Agarwal situated at Sigra, Varanasi and Sri Sujeet Kumar, the younger son of the Respondent-landlord was a teacher in the Sun Beam English School, Bhagvanpur, Varanasi for the last two years. 11. The Respondent-landlord denied the allegations made in the affidavit aforesaid, filed by the tenant. 12. After hearing the parties the appellate court by the impugned order dated 30.3.1996 allowed the appeal of the landlord and set aside the order dated 23.4.1993 of the Prescribed Authority. 13. 11. The Respondent-landlord denied the allegations made in the affidavit aforesaid, filed by the tenant. 12. After hearing the parties the appellate court by the impugned order dated 30.3.1996 allowed the appeal of the landlord and set aside the order dated 23.4.1993 of the Prescribed Authority. 13. The petition has been filed challenging the validity and correctness of the order dated 30.3.1996 passed by the appellate authority, the IVth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi, Respondent No. 1. 14. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner in the writ petition is that Respondent No. 1 has failed to consider the factum that the landlord has admitted the fact of letting out the vacant portion of the accommodation to other persons and has also ignored the finding of fact recorded by the Prescribed Authority that the disputed accommodation was not fit for the purposes of business of the landlord, as such the impugned order deserves to be quashed. He relied upon the decisions in Kedar Nath Agrawal (dead) and Anr. v. Dhanraji Devi (dead) and Anr. 2004 (2) ARC 764 : 2004 (4) AWC 3709 (SC); Sri Parma Nand Vs. 3rd Additional District Judge, Prescribed Authority, Diwan Chandra Sharma and Smt. Mengi Bai, (2006) 3 AWC 2532 and Ansuyaben Kantilal Bhatt Vs. Rashiklal Manilal Shah and Another, (1997) 5 SCC 457 with regard to whether subsequent events can be taken into consideration. 15. In Kedar Nath Agrawal (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held: In our opinion, by not taking into account the subsequent, event, the High Court has committed an error of law and also an error of jurisdiction. In our judgment, the law is well-settled on the point, and it is this. The basic rule is that the rights of the parties should be determined on the basis of the date of institution of the suit or proceeding and the suit/action should be tried at all stages on the cause of action as it existed at the commencement of the suit/action. This, however, does not mean that events happening after institution of a suit/proceeding cannot be considered at all. It is the power and duty of the Court to consider changed circumstances. This, however, does not mean that events happening after institution of a suit/proceeding cannot be considered at all. It is the power and duty of the Court to consider changed circumstances. A court of law may take into account subsequent events inter alia in the following circumstances: (i) The relief claimed originally has by reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate ; or (ii) It is necessary to take notice of subsequent events in order to shorten litigation ; or (iii) It is necessary to do so in order to do complete justice between the parties. 16. In so far as the case of Parma Nand (supra) is concerned, it was a petition arising out of eviction/release proceedings on the ground of bona fide need u/s 21(1) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The Court in that case considered the subsequent events on the death of the original landlord, extreme old age of his widow, frustration of purpose of education of his grandsons during the passage of 25 years since filing of the release application and non-filing of reply to the supplementary-affidavit bringing on record new facts and held in the circumstances that it has no option except to set aside the release order passed by the lower appellate court in favour of the landlord which was perfectly legal when passed. 17. Thus, because of non-filing of the reply to the supplementary-affidavit by the widow of the landlord bringing on record the subsequent events the matter was remanded back, hence it is a case in which the decision has been given in its own peculiar facts and circumstances and it does not lay down any law. Even otherwise remand order in the aforesaid circumstances cannot be said to have decided the dispute in issue finally. 18. As regards the decision in Ansuyaben Kantilal Bhatt (supra), it was in respect of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (Act No. 57 of 1947). In that case the release application was filed on the ground of bona fide need of accommodation, which came up for hearing after 31 years from the date of filing of the suit. In that case the release application was filed on the ground of bona fide need of accommodation, which came up for hearing after 31 years from the date of filing of the suit. The landlord at the time of filing of the release application was aged about 54 years having four unmarried daughters and when the case came up for hearing the landlord was 87 years old and his unmarried daughters had been married by then. In these circumstances it was held that his need cannot be said to be subsisting. With regard to the need of accommodation for the son of the landlord for establishment of business, it was held that it was always open for him to make necessary application and if such application is made the tenant will have to vacate the accommodation occupied by him. 19. Thus the peculiar facts and circumstances in which the aforesaid cases were decided are not applicable to the instant case and are clearly distinguishable. 20. The learned Counsel for the Respondents submits that the need of the landlord was for two sons and for augmenting his income. The landlord was in acute need of accommodation in dispute for settlement of his sons in business as such the Petitioner being a tenant cannot question the use of the property by the landlord. Referring to the findings in the impugned judgment he contended that if the son of the landlord was employed in a temporary and ad hoc capacity in a stop gap arrangement, it cannot be a ground for ignoring the bona fide need of the landlord as every human being requires income for sustenance and such temporary employment will not extinguish his need of his permanent establishment in business. 21. In support of aforesaid contention he relied upon the decisions in Kanhaiya Lal v. Mahant Indresh Das, Sajadda Darbar Guru Ram Rai Sahab Jhanda Dehradun and Ors. 1983 (2) ARC 108 and Prem Prakash Dhawan and Ors. v. Special Judge (Additional District Judge), Saharanpur and Ors. 1990 (1) ARC 20: 1989 (2) AWC 1419 . 22. In Kanhaiya Lal (supra) the dispute was whether the rent requiring revenue stamp stating about the creation of lease for more than one year could be treated as lease deed and admissible evidence without it being registered. The facts of that case are therefore totally different from the facts of the present case. 22. In Kanhaiya Lal (supra) the dispute was whether the rent requiring revenue stamp stating about the creation of lease for more than one year could be treated as lease deed and admissible evidence without it being registered. The facts of that case are therefore totally different from the facts of the present case. The case of Prem Prakash Dhawan (supra) was regarding subsequent events, i.e., whether the subsequent events can be considered in the judgment. The High Court relying upon the judgment given by the Apex Court in Variety Emporium Vs. V.R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina, (1985) 1 SCC 251 observed that in a suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of premises by landlord the subsequent events ought to be taken into account for the purpose of finding out whether the landlord still required the accommodation in possession of the tenant. It was held in para 26 that in appropriate cases, the Court must have regard to events as they present themselves at the time when it is hearing the proceedings before it and would (grant) the relief in the light of those events. 23. The learned Counsel for the Respondent-landlord further contended that it is settled law that each and every adult member of the family of the landlord has right to set up his own independent business and relied upon the decisions in this regard in Deep Chand Nem Chand Jain and Ors. v. Prescribed Authority, A.D.M. (E), Saharanpur and Ors. 1980 ARC 479; N.S. Datta and Ors. v.VIIth Additional District Judge, Allahabad and Ors. 1984 ARC 113 and Sanjay Kumar and Ors. v. Subodh Kumar and Ors. 2004 (1) ARC 148 in this regard. 24. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Respondent-landlord and the Petitioner-tenant and in my opinion the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner-tenant are distinguishable and do not apply to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. On the other hand the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Respondent-landlord squarely apply to the facts and circumstances of the case. 25. On the other hand the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Respondent-landlord squarely apply to the facts and circumstances of the case. 25. In the instant case the release application u/s 21(1)(a) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 filed by the landlord for establishing his two sons Sanjay Kumar Singh and Sujeet Kumar Singh in business cannot be said to have extinguished even in the changed circumstances or subsequent events. It is apparent from the finding recorded by the lower appellate court that the lower appellate court has recorded a categorical finding that a son of the landlord has completed his engineering course and is unemployed. The temporary period of his service in Samarth Automobiles at the rate of Rs. 1,600 per month does not in any manner extinguish his bona fide need. Every adult member strives to get livelihood and earn better. A salary of mere Rs. 1,600 in temporary service is neither permanent settlement of the son for his livelihood in life but is also a compulsion to accept such temporary arrangement as the tenant has not vacated the shop for him to settle himself in business permanently particularly in view of subsequent events. He was removed from service and that the landlord has retired from service in 2004. These subsequent events worth importance that both the sons of the landlord were not permanently settled in life have not been denied by the tenant. It is also undisputed fact that the other son of the landlord could not get admission in B. Sc. The Petitioner-tenant has also not denied in his rejoinder-affidavit that the shop in dispute was let out to them when both the sons of the landlord were minor. The Appellate Authority has, therefore, rightly held that the need of the landlord is bona fide and that comparative hardship is also in his favour. 26. The Court has to look into the bona fide need at the time when the application for release of accommodation occupied by tenant was filed by him/her taking notice of any relevant and subsequent events if required. 27. The release application was filed more than a decade ago. 26. The Court has to look into the bona fide need at the time when the application for release of accommodation occupied by tenant was filed by him/her taking notice of any relevant and subsequent events if required. 27. The release application was filed more than a decade ago. It was incumbent upon the tenant to have searched out alternative accommodation by now but from the record it appears that the tenant has made no such efforts and thus it can be inferred that he has no hardship. The learned Counsel in support of his contention has relied upon the decisions in Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada v. Govindram Ramgopal Mundada, 2003 SCFBRC 167 ; Khubi Ram (Smt.) and Ors. v.IVth Additional District Judge, Jhansi, 2002 (2) ARC 539 ; Usha Devi (Smt.) and Ors. v. Fast Track Court III, Dehradun and Ors. 2004 (1) ARC 342 and Ram Ji Tiwari v.XIth Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur and Ors. 2004 (2) ARC 339. 28. It is apparent from the record that the tenant has not made any efforts to search alternative accommodation and no hardship will be caused to him in case he is evicted from the shop in dispute. He cannot advise the landlord to do his business from anywhere, as hardship is not a ground for rejection of release application. In this regard I am supported in my view by the decision of this Court in Smt. Sakina Bibi v.IXth Additional District Judge, Allahabad and Ors. 1990 (1) ARC 368. In this case I find that the subsequent events substantially and materially affect the case of the parties. As regard to Rule 16 (2) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, I am of the opinion that it is a merely procedural/guideline and the Court can take into consideration other relevant factors also for rendering justice between the parties. Reference in this regard may be made to the decision in Shiv Dev Raj v. Additional District Judge and Ors. 1996 (1) ARC 559 . 29. I am of the considered opinion that the findings of the Appellate Court that bona fide need and comparative hardship of the landlord is greater than the Petitioner-tenant. 30. Reference in this regard may be made to the decision in Shiv Dev Raj v. Additional District Judge and Ors. 1996 (1) ARC 559 . 29. I am of the considered opinion that the findings of the Appellate Court that bona fide need and comparative hardship of the landlord is greater than the Petitioner-tenant. 30. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is dismissed with direction that the Petitioner will vacate the accommodation in dispute within two months from today and clear all his arrears of rent (if any) by that time. In case of failure to comply with this order, the Petitioner will be liable to be evicted by coercive method in accordance with law with the help of local police. No order as to costs.