A.P. LAVANDE, J. :- The above Confirmation Case and Criminal Appeals are being disposed of by common Judgment since they all relate to the Judgment and Order dated 30th September, 2004 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Akola in Sessions Trial No.22/ 2002. 2. Criminal Appeal No.738 of 2004 has been preferred by accused no.1 Ajay @ Rameshwar Raghuram @ Sheshrao Galat Dhabekar; Criminal Appeal No.686 of 2004 has been preferred by accused no.2 Subhash Ramkrishna Zope; Criminal Appeal No.698 of 2004 has been preferred by accused no.3 Subhash Harnarayanji Laddha, CIiminal Appeal No.682 of 2004 has been preferred by accused no.4 Suresh s/o. Mohanlal Maheshwari. The original accused no.5 Bajirao alias Rawalsingh Salu Rathod who has been convicted for the offence under section 465 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years has not preferred any appeal. 3. By the impugned Judgment, the accused no.1 Ajay @ Rameshwar Raghuram @ Sheshrao Galat Ohabekar has been convicted under sections 364, 302, 467,468,471 read with 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- and in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and further to suffer rigorous Imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- and in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one year for offence under section 364 of the Indian Penal Code and for the offences under sections 467, 468 and 471 he has been further sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.2000/- in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.3000/- and in default to suffer simple imprisonment for 18 months. The accused nos.2 to 4 have been convicted for the offences under sections 364, 302,467,468,471 read with 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and each of them is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/- and in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years. Out of the fine amount, an amount of Rs.10,000/- has been ordered to be paid to the wife of the deceased Kausalyabai Yadav Navkar as compensation under section 357 of Cr.P.C. 4. Out of the fine amount, an amount of Rs.10,000/- has been ordered to be paid to the wife of the deceased Kausalyabai Yadav Navkar as compensation under section 357 of Cr.P.C. 4. The appellants shall be hereinafter referred to with respect to their positions in the trial Court. 5. Briefly, the case of the prosecution is as follows: On 18th September, 2000 Kausalyabai Yadav Navkar filed report with Civil Lines Police Station, Akola stating that her husband Yadav Navkar had left the house on 3rd September, 2000 at about 9 O'clock and he had stated he will return within half an hour but he had not returned. The missing report was registered and search was carried out for Yadav Navkar but he was not traced. Meanwhile. Kausalyabai received a letter in the name of her daughter Geeta purported to have been addressed by Yadav Navkar informing her that he had gone to village Pandhari near Shegaon and then he had left for Shirdi. Since Yadav Navkar was still not traceable search was being carried out. Thereafter, Kausalyabai received information that the land owned by her husband bearing Survey No.45 of village Umri, Taluka Akola was sold by one Ajay Galat (accused no. 1) under the garb of general power of attorney executed by Yadav Navkar in his favour to accused nos.2 to 4 and that the said power of attorney was executed by Yadav Navkar in favour of the accused no.1 on 30-6-2000. She also learnt that the sale-deed in respect of the said land was executed on 8-8-2000 for consideration of Rs.9 lacs. However, since Yadav Navkar along with his family members had gone to pilgrimage and had returned to Akola on 1-7-2000 in the morning it was impossible for Yadav Navkar to execute the power of attorney on 30th June, 2000. Moreover, earlier there was an agreement of sale executed between the deceased and accused nos.2 to 4 in respect of the very same property under which Yadav Navkar had received an amount of Rs.75,000/-. The said agreement which was executed on 16th May, 2000 was later on cancelled and hence there was no possibility of Yadav Navkar selling the same land to accused nos.2 to 4. On 14th October, 2000 Kausalyabai lodged a report stating all the above referred facts. The said agreement which was executed on 16th May, 2000 was later on cancelled and hence there was no possibility of Yadav Navkar selling the same land to accused nos.2 to 4. On 14th October, 2000 Kausalyabai lodged a report stating all the above referred facts. She also stated in the said report that accused no.1 Ajay Galat had been to her house on 3rd September, 2000 and her husband had gone with him and then her husband had not returned. She suspected the role of accused no.1 in commission of murder of her husband. Thereafter, police again started searching accused no. 1 who was absconding. On 22nd October. 2000. Civil Lines Police Station, Akola received information from Police . Station. Bhaisdchi in the State of Madhya Pradesh that a dead body was found within the limits of the said Police Station. On the next day i.e. on 23rd October, 2000 the Police from Akola along with Kausalyabai and Dnyaneshwar, the brother of Yadav Navkar went to Bhaisdehi Police Station. At the Police Station. P.S.I. Herold Jonson showed them the photographs of the dead body, spectacles worn by the said person and the clothes on the person as well as one chappal. Both Kausalyabai and Dnyaneshwar identified the clothes, spectacle and the chappal as that of Yadav Navkar. They also identified the photographs as that of Yadav Navkar. The Akola Police procured all the case papers in connection with the accidental death case from Bhaisdehi Police Station. On the same day i.e. on 23rd October, 2000 one Sunil Shamgar Manmote surrendered before the Police Station at Akola and informed that Yadav Navkar was murdered by Ajay Galat (accused no. 1). He further stated that he was with Ajay Galat at that time. He showed willingness to show the places where Yadav Navkar was taken as well as the place where Yadav Navkar was murdered by accused no. 1. The Police with two panchas started from the Police Station. According to Sunil Manmote, on the fateful day Ajay Galat had been to him with his motor cycle and he was dropped at Tower Chowk, Akola and was asked by Ajay Galat to wait there. Thereafter, within about 15 minutes he came with Maruti Car and Yadav Navkar was found sitting on the rear seat of the car. According to Sunil Manmote, on the fateful day Ajay Galat had been to him with his motor cycle and he was dropped at Tower Chowk, Akola and was asked by Ajay Galat to wait there. Thereafter, within about 15 minutes he came with Maruti Car and Yadav Navkar was found sitting on the rear seat of the car. They had a cup of tea at Tower Chowk and they proceeded towards Railway Station. Akola where they had break fast at Gujrat Sweet Mart. Accused no. 1 then asked Yadav Navkar and Sunil Manmothe to accompany him in the car to Akot as some amount was due from one Suresh Deshmukh. Ajay Galat as well as Sunil Manmote consented and they proceeded towards Akot. Near Ashram of Narsing Maharaj at Akot, the accused no. 1 stopped the car and asked both of them to wait there and he proceeded to the city. He returned after about half an hour and informed that Suresh Deshmukh had gone to paratwada. Thereafter, they proceeded to Paratwada but Suresh Deshmukh was not found there. Accused no.1 then asked them to accompany him to Hoshangabad. He stated that he had contacted accused no.2 and accused no.2 had informed him that someone from Hoshangabad was to pay him an amount of Rs.1 lac and accused no.2 had asked Ajay to go there and bring the amount. Sunil declined to accompany accused no.1. However, both accused no. 1 as well as Yadav Navkar insisted that he should accompany them to Hoshangabad. Accused no.1 assured to pay Rs.500/- to Sunil and Yadav Navkar stated that if accused no. 1 failed to pay the amount he would pay the same. Sunil consented and they proceeded towards Hoshangabad. On the way they had lunch. When they reached Itarsi accused no.1 asked Yadav Navkar to inform his family members at Akola that he would return on the next day. The accused no.1 asked Yadav Navkar not to state his name as the person accompanying him. He also suggested to Yadav Navkar to inform his family members that he had been to Pandhari and therefrom he would proceed to Shegaon. Accordingly, Yadav Navkar telephoned his neighbour Laxmanrao Athawale as no telephone connection was available at his residence and informed the facts accordingly. Thereafter, all three of them proceeded to Hausangabad. Near the check post the car was stopped and accused no. Accordingly, Yadav Navkar telephoned his neighbour Laxmanrao Athawale as no telephone connection was available at his residence and informed the facts accordingly. Thereafter, all three of them proceeded to Hausangabad. Near the check post the car was stopped and accused no. 1 alone went to the city and returned after some time and informed Sunil and Yadav Navkar that the person is going to hand over the demand draft within one hour. Thereafter they proceeded towards Narmada river and spent some time. Thereafter they went to earlier spot. Accused no.1 again went to the city, returned and informed both of them that the person will come on the following day with the amount. Thereafter, petrol was filled in the car from Faujdar Petrol Pump. Thereafter, three bottles of Coca-cola were purchased and were kept in the car. Accused no.1 opened one of the bottles and added some powder from the capsule in the coca-cola and again sealed it with his teeth and started further journey. By that time, it was already dark. The accused no. 1 after crossing some distance stated that there was some problem with the rear wheel of the car and, therefore, it was necessary to change the tyre. He stopped the car and asked Yadav Navkar to unscrew the wheel with the spanner. He further stated that he would use the jack and then would go for easing. Yadav Navkar got down from the car holding the spanner in his hand. He sat at the rear driver's side for unscrewing the rear wheel. Accused no. 1 then took out the jack and rushed to the rear side and hit Yadav Navkar with the jack on his head. Yadav Navkar shouted as "Aare Bapre" but accused no. 1 continued hitting him with the jack. Accused no. 1 was holding empty bottle of Coca-cola in his left hand. He gave one blow of the said empty bottle on the face of Yadav Navkar. Yadav fell down. Upon hearing shouts of Yadav Navkar, Sunil Manmote came out from the car and saw that accused no. 1 was giving blows with the jack on the head of Yadav Navkar. He got frightened and started shivering. Therefore, he again went to his seat. Soon thereafter accused no. 1 asked Sunil to come out of the car to hold hands of Yadav Navkar. 1 was giving blows with the jack on the head of Yadav Navkar. He got frightened and started shivering. Therefore, he again went to his seat. Soon thereafter accused no. 1 asked Sunil to come out of the car to hold hands of Yadav Navkar. Both of them dragged the body of Yadav Navkar to the road side. Accused no.1 then tightened the screw of the wheel of the car. Thereafter, he proceeded with Sunil Manmote who suddenly changed his mind and turned the car towards Hoshangabad to have petrol. Then he again returned to the spot and stopped the car. Accused no.1 went under the car and sucked the petrol from the petrol tank of the car in one recxine bag and spirinkled the petrol on the body of Yadav Navkar. Then he set the body of Yadav Navkaron fire. Sunil was surprised to see Yadav Navkar getting up when he was set ablaze. Soon Yadav Navkar collapsed. Thereafter, both of them proceeded to return to Akola. Since Sunil Manmote was shivering on account of fear, accused no. 1 offered him liquor and asked hi m not to disclose this fact to anyone else. On the way, there was a hilly track where he got down from the car and threw the jack. Both of them returned to Akola at about 4.00 a.m. and went to their respective homes. Thereafter, in the morning accused no. I again went to Sunil and asked him to come out from the house. They again came to the Tower Chowk. Accused no. 1 asked Sunil to write a letter and also sent telegram in the name of wife of deceased Yadav Navkar by going to Shirdi. He was asked to give telephone call from Shirdi. Both of them came to bus Stand where accused no.1 gave some amount to Sunil and from the bus Stand Sunil went to Aurangabad. Sunil reached Aurangabad in the evening on 4th September, 2000. Before leaving for Aurangabad Sunil got written from accused no.1 the recitals to be written in the letter which was to be sent from Shirdi. After reaching Aurangabad, Sunil went to Siddharth Garden. He got the post card written in the name of Kausalyabai from one of the boys who were playing in the garden and dropped it at Aurangabad. Before leaving for Aurangabad Sunil got written from accused no.1 the recitals to be written in the letter which was to be sent from Shirdi. After reaching Aurangabad, Sunil went to Siddharth Garden. He got the post card written in the name of Kausalyabai from one of the boys who were playing in the garden and dropped it at Aurangabad. Then he went to the S.T.D. Booth in front of the said garden and telephoned at the residence of Laxmanrao Athawale to inform at the residence of Yadav Navkar that Yadav Navkar was at Shirdi and he was proceeding towards Pashupatinath and would return after a month. On the next day evening he started from Aurangabad and reached Akola in the night. Sunil showed all the places to Police who seized print outs of the S.T.D. calls made from Itarsi as well as Aurangabad. In the course of investigation several statements were recorded by the Police. Accused no. 1 was arrested on 2nd November, 2000 and pursuant to the disclosure made by him, jack was recovered from the spot where it was thrown by the accused no.1. The letter received by Kausalyabai in the name of her daughter Geeta was also seized. The draft of recitals which was entrusted by accused no. 1 to Sunil was also seized. 6. On 8th December. 2000 Sunil Manmote made an application for tendering of pardon to him which was granted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Akola on 8-1-2001 in terms of Section 306 of Cr.P.C.. The statement of Sunil was recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Akola. During the course of investigation, P.I. Shri. Shaikh Sultan came to know that accused nos.2 to 4 were also involved in the offence since earlier agreement of sale executed between Yadav Navkar and accused nos.2 to 4 was cancelled and power of attorney was purported to have been executed on 30th June. 2000 by Yadav Navkar in favour of accused no.1 when in fact Yadav Navkar was not at Akola on the said date. P.I. Shaikh Sultan arrested the accused nos.2 to 4 on 26th and 27th December, 2000. 2000 by Yadav Navkar in favour of accused no.1 when in fact Yadav Navkar was not at Akola on the said date. P.I. Shaikh Sultan arrested the accused nos.2 to 4 on 26th and 27th December, 2000. On 29th December, 2000 the house of the accused no.2 was searched and sale-deed executed by the accused no.1 in favour of the accused nos.2 to 4 along with xerox copy of the power of attorney and the copy of 7/12 extract of the land of Yadav Navkar as well as agreement of sale dated 16th May, 2000 were seized under the seizure panchanama. The Investigating Officer collected the specimen signature of Yadav Navkar and thumb impression of the person executing the power of attorney from the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Akola. Accused no.5 Bajirao Rathod was arrested on 9-1-2001 and his thumb impression was also obtained. Investigating Officer sent the specimen signature of Yadav Navkar available with Sub-Registrar, thumb impression of the person who had executed the power of attorney as well as the thumb impression of accused no.5 to the finger print expert, Nagpur. The expert opined that the finger print of the executant of the power of attorney is matching with the finger prints of accused no.5. The hand writing expert also opined that signatures on the post card seized from Kausalyabai and signature of Yadav Navkar on the power of attorney were not matching with his admitted signature. In the course of investigation, it also revealed that after executing the sale-deed dated 8-8-2000 an amount of Rs.8 lacs was found credited in different accounts of accused no. 1 in Akola Cooperative Bank at Akola on 9-8-2000. All these accounts were attached. After completing the investigation, the Investigating Officer filed the charge-sheet against all the accused. After committal of the case, charge was framed against all the accused. They pleaded nut guilty and claimed to be tried. 7. On 19th July, 2004 at the request of the prosecution, the charge was altered. However, all the accused submitted that they did not want to cross-examine any of the witnesses already examined. During the course of the trial besides denial accused no. 1 also took a defence that Sunil Manmote might have committed murder and falsely implicated the accused no.1. On 19th July, 2004 at the request of the prosecution, the charge was altered. However, all the accused submitted that they did not want to cross-examine any of the witnesses already examined. During the course of the trial besides denial accused no. 1 also took a defence that Sunil Manmote might have committed murder and falsely implicated the accused no.1. The accused nos.2 to 4 submitted that they were real estate brokers and builder's and in the course of their business they had purchased the land from accused no. 1 on the basis of the power of attorney executed in his favour by Yadav Navkar. They denied any prior agreement of sale between them and Yadav Navkar. During the trial, the prosecution examined 49 witnesses and produced several documents some of which have been admitted by the accused. After appreciating the evidence led by the prosecution and after hearing the learned counsel for the accused the trial Court convicted and sentenced each of them as stated above. 8. The trial Court formulated the following points for consideration and gave findings thereon which are as follows. Points Findings 1. Whether the dead-body found within the limits of Bhaisdehi P.S. was that of Yadav Navkar ? ..Yes. 2. Whether the death of Yadav Navkar is homicidal? .. Yes. 3. Does the prosecution prove that the accused nos. 1 to 5 conspired to abduct and or to commit murder of Yadav Navkar and to forge power-of attorney ? ..proved against accused no.1. 4. Does the prosecution prove that the accused no. 1 in pursuance of the conspiracy hatched with accused nos.2 to 4 or in furtherance of common intention with approver or alone has caused injury to Yadav Navkar to cause his death? .. Yes, Death caused with conspiracy. 5. Does the prosecution prove that the accused no. 1 alone or in furtherance of common intention with the approver with intent to disappear the evidence of murder, set the dead body of Yadav Navkar on fire ? .. Yes caused with common intention. 6. Does the prosecution prove that in pursuance of criminal conspiracy the accused nos.1 to 5 forged the power of attorney of Yadav Navkar to use it as genuine document for cheating? ...Conspiracy proved against accused nos.1 to 4 but accused no.5 prepared false document. OR 6. .. Yes caused with common intention. 6. Does the prosecution prove that in pursuance of criminal conspiracy the accused nos.1 to 5 forged the power of attorney of Yadav Navkar to use it as genuine document for cheating? ...Conspiracy proved against accused nos.1 to 4 but accused no.5 prepared false document. OR 6. Does the prosecution prove that the accused Nos.1 to 5 in furtherance of their common intention forged the power of attorney to use to as genuine document for cheating? ….No 7. What offence, if any, and against whom is proved? .. U/ss.364, 302, 201, 467, 468, 471 r/w 120-B, I.P.C. against accused nos.1 to 4. U/s 465, I.P.C. against accused no.5. 8. What order ? The accused are convicted. 9. We have heard Advocate Avinash Gupta on behalf of accused no. 1 ; Senior Advocate Shri. V. R. Manohar with Advocate A. Mardikar, for accused no.2, Advocate S.C. Bora with Advocate V. M. Deshpande for accused no.3 and Senior Advocate Shri. Surendra Singh with Advocate Mrs. K. Sirpurkar for accused no.4. Mr. Ujwal Nikam the learned Special Public Prosecutor and Mr. S. G. Loney, learned A.P.P. have advanced arguments on behalf of the Respondent/State. During the course of arguments, it was brought to our notice that certain material, more particularly the medical evidence which was relied upon by the trial Court for convicting them for several offences without putting this material to the accused in their statements under section 313 of Cr.P.C. Code. We, therefore, put this material to all the accused and recorded their further statements under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.. 10. Mr. Gupta, the learned counsel appearing for the accused no. 1 submitted that the trial Court erred in convicting accused no.1 for different offences for which he was charged. According to the learned counsel the evidence of the approver neither inspires confidence nor is corroborated by independent evidence but on the contrary the evidence of the approver is falsified on many aspects by the evidence of other witnesses examined by the prosecution. The learned counsel further submitted that the trial Court ought not to have relied upon' Article L' since the same was not proved as required under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned counsel further submitted that the trial Court ought not to have relied upon' Article L' since the same was not proved as required under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned counsel further submitted that the evidence of Kaushalyabai (P.W.38) wife of the deceased as well as that of Geeta (P.W.18) the daughter of the deceased does not inspire confidence and, therefore, the learned trial court ought not to have relied upon their evidence. The learned counsel further submitted that the evidence of prosecution witnesses is not trustworthy and no reliance ought to have been placed on their evidence by the trial court for the purpose of convicting the accused no. 1 for various offences. According to the learned counsel, the investigation carried out by the investigating agency in the case has not been honest and the same has been conducted to falsely implicate the accused no.1 in the commission of several offences for which he has been convicted. According to the learned counsel the medical evidence led by the prosecution clearly falsifies the evidence of the approver and. therefore, no reliance could have been placed on the testimony of the approver. The learned counsel submitted that the trial court ought not to have relied upon the evidence of the approver since his evidence is not corroborated by the evidence of the other witnesses who have been examined by the prosecution. He further submitted that the chits (Exh.86) which have been produced by the prosecution are fabricated and they have not been signed by original panchas. According to the learned counsel the evidence led by the, prosecution is not sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the offences for which accused no.1 has been convicted. According to the learned counsel it was the case of the prosecution itself that on 18-1-2001 that the agreement 'Exh.L' was executed. The learned counsel in support of his submissions relied upon the following authorities. 1. AIR 1937 Rangoon 513 (Nga. Pauk Vs. The King). 2. AIR 1975 Supreme Court 856 (Ravinder Singh Vs. State of Haryana). 3. AIR 1975 Supreme Court 863 (Pann Jadhav Vs. The State of West Bengal). 4. 1994 Supp (2) Supreme Court Cases 73, Rampal Pithwa Rahidas and others Vs. State of Maharashtra. 5. 1994 Supp (2) Supreme Court Cases 93, Asifali Alias Montu Badeali Saiyed Vs. State of Gujrat. 6. AIR 1975 Supreme Court 856 (Ravinder Singh Vs. State of Haryana). 3. AIR 1975 Supreme Court 863 (Pann Jadhav Vs. The State of West Bengal). 4. 1994 Supp (2) Supreme Court Cases 73, Rampal Pithwa Rahidas and others Vs. State of Maharashtra. 5. 1994 Supp (2) Supreme Court Cases 93, Asifali Alias Montu Badeali Saiyed Vs. State of Gujrat. 6. AIR (36)1949 Privy Council 257, Bhuboni Sahu Vs. The King. 7. AIR (36)1949 Privy Council 261, George Edmund de Silva Vs. Attorney General of Ceylon and others. 11. Shri. V. R. Manohar, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of accused 00.2 submitted that the conviction of accused no.2 as well as of accused nos.3 and 4 and for having committed several offences has been recorded on surmises and conjectures. He further submitted that the investigation of the case has not been honest but on the contrary has been dishonest and has been carried out to falsely implicate accused no.2 as well as accused nos.3 and 4. The learned counsel further submitted that 'Article L' upon which reliance has been placed by the trial Court could not have been relied upon since it was not the original document but only a copy and as such under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act the same ought not to have been relied upon without satisfying the conditions as laid down in section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned counsel further submitted that there is absolutely no evidence, direct or circumstantial, against accused no.2 showing his complicity in any of the offences for which he has been convicted. The learned counsel further submitted that the prosecution had not led any evidence so as to warrant application of section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act and, therefore, the conviction of accused no.2 for different offences and more particularly the offence of conspiracy is absolutely unjustified and illegal. According to the learned counsel' Article L' came into existence only after 30-10-2000 and the same was fabricated in order to falsely implicate the accused no.2 along with accused nos.3 and 4. According to the learned counsel, the accused nos.2, 3 and 4 were bona fide purchasers of the property in question which was belonging to the deceased and the same was purchased pursuant to the advertisement published in "Daily Deshonnati" by the accused no.1. According to the learned counsel, the accused nos.2, 3 and 4 were bona fide purchasers of the property in question which was belonging to the deceased and the same was purchased pursuant to the advertisement published in "Daily Deshonnati" by the accused no.1. According to the learned counsel, the investigating officer has not investigated many material aspects of the case which could have proved that accused nos.2, 3 and 4 were not involved in commission of any offences for which they have been charged. He fUl1her submitted that since Article L' could not have been relied upon having not been proved, the entire prosecution case which is based on 'Article L' falls to the ground. The learned counsel submitted that the statement made by the accused no.5 in his statement under section 313 of Cr.P.C. cannot be treated as evidence and as such same cannot be used as evidence against accused no.2. He further submitted that since accused nos.2, 3 and 4 were not permitted to cross-examine the approver before the trial started and as such there is a clear breach of section 306, Cr.P.C. and on this· count the entire trial is vitiated and, therefore, the matter deserves to be remanded to the trial Court. The learned counsel submitted that conviction of accused no.2 is without any cogent evidence in support of the charges framed against him. Lastly, the learned counsel submitted that each of the accused nos.2, 3 and 4 has been sentenced for offences under sections 364, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code for life while the accused no. 1 has been awarded sentence of ten years for offence under section 364 of the Indian Penal Code and seven years for offences under sections 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code without any valid reason. In support of his submission, the learned counsel relied upon the following authorities. 1. AIR 1940 Nag 287 (Sumitra Vs. Emperor). 2. AIR 1968 SC 609 (Narayan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra). 3. 1988(3) SCC 609 (Kehar Singh & others Vs. State (Delhi Administration)). 4. 1998(3) SCC 410 : (.1998 ALL MR (Cri) 629 (S.C.)] (Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. V. C. Shukla). 5. AIR 1952 Supreme Court 343 (Hanunant Govind Nargundkar & another Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh). 6. AIR 1977 Supreme Court 170 (Rabindra Kumar De Vs. State of Orissa). 7. 1998(5) Scale 4 (Dr. State (Delhi Administration)). 4. 1998(3) SCC 410 : (.1998 ALL MR (Cri) 629 (S.C.)] (Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. V. C. Shukla). 5. AIR 1952 Supreme Court 343 (Hanunant Govind Nargundkar & another Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh). 6. AIR 1977 Supreme Court 170 (Rabindra Kumar De Vs. State of Orissa). 7. 1998(5) Scale 4 (Dr. Gurmukh Ram Madan Vs. Bhagwan Das Madan). 8. AIR 1951 Calcutta 320 (A. K. Shoykumar Vs. Sukumar Dutta). 9. AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1457 (The Roman Catholic Mission Vs. State of Madras). 10. AIR 1984 Supreme Court 1622 (Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra). 11. 1994 Suppl.(2) Supreme Court Cases 73 (Rampal Pithwa Rahidas & others Vs. State of Maharashtra). 12. AIR 1952 Nag 12 (State Govt. of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Rehman & others). 13. AIR 1957 Punjab 14 (Des Raj Sharma Vs. The State). 14. AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1184 (Haricharan Kurmi Vs. State of Bihar). 15. 1985(1) Supreme Court Cases 345 (M1 sAmar Nath Om Prakash & others Vs. State of Punjab and others). 16. AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1230 (Sevi Vs. State of Tamil Nadu). 17. AIR 1993 Supreme Court 2641 (Padmanabhan Vijaykumar alias Vijayan and others Vs. State of Kerala). 18. AIR 1993 Supreme Court 2644 (State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Punati Ramllu & other). 19. AIR 1927 Privy Council 15 (Ma Mi and another V s. Kallander Ammal). 20. AIR 1940 Nagpur 117 (Anantram Vs. Emperor). 21. 2002(2) Supreme Court Cases 490 : [2002 ALL MR (Cri) 1205 (S.C.)] (Pandurang Kalu Patil & another Vs. State of Maharashtra). 12. Mr. S. C. Bora, the learned counsel for accused no.3 submitted that the findings recorded by the trial court while convicting accused no.3 are perverse and there is absolutely no evidence led by the prosecution to connect accused no.3 with the commission of the offences for which he has been convicted. According to the learned counsel the property in question was purchased by accused nos.2, 3 and 4 pursuant to the advertisement published in daily "Deshonnati" and the sale deed was executed pursuant to the power of attorney executed by the deceased in favour of accused no.1. According to the learned counsel the accused nos.2 to 4 are the bona fide purchasers of the said property since the consideration of· Rs.9 lacs which they paid cannot be said to be totally inadequate. According to the learned counsel the accused nos.2 to 4 are the bona fide purchasers of the said property since the consideration of· Rs.9 lacs which they paid cannot be said to be totally inadequate. The learned counsel further submitted that the investigation has not been honest and further that the trial court ought not to have relied upon 'Article L' which was not duly proved as required under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. According to the learned counsel, the evidence led by the prosecution does not inspire confidence. He further submitted that there is no evidence led to" prove conspiracy for which accused nos.2 to 4 have been convicted. Lastly the learned counsel submitted that the conviction of appellant no.3 for various offences has been on conjectures and surmises and without any cogent legal evidence to prove the offences for which he has been convicted. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel relied upon the following authorities: 1. 2005 AIR SCW 2215 : [2005 ALL MR (Cri) 1538 (S.C.)] (Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma Vs. State of Maharashtra and another). 2. 2005 AIR SCW 323 : [2005 ALL MR (Cri) 822 (S.C.)] (Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal Vs. State of Tamil Nadu). 3. AIR 2001 Supreme Court 175 (Saju Vs. State of Kerala). 4. AIR 2000 Supreme Court 3352 (Narauanchetanram Chaudhare and another Vs. State of Maharashtra). 5. AIR 2000 Supreme Court 168 (M/s. Ahlawat Vs. State of Haryana and another). 6. 2000(8) Supreme Court Cases 203 (State of Kerala Vs. P. Sugathan & Others). 7. AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1969: [1999 ALL MR (Cri) 1881 (S.C,)] (Ramprasad Vs. State of Maharashtra). 8. AIR 1999 Supreme Court 2640: [1999 ALL MR (Cri) 1273 (S.c.)] (State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Nalini). 9. 1999(3) Supreme Court Cases 54 (Vijayan Vs. State of Kerala). 10. AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1742 (State of Maryana Vs. Tek Singh and others). 11. AIR 1992 Supreme Court 2100 (State of Maharashtra Vs. Sukhdeo Singh & another). 12. AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1883 (Kehm Singh & others Vs. The State (Delhi Admn.). 13. 1984 Cr.L.J. 1738 (Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra). 14. AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1382 (State (Delhi Administration Vs. V.C. Shukla). 15. AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1489 (State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy and others). 16. AIR 1969 Punjab 69 (Daljit Singh Piara Singh Vs. Smt. Shamsher Kaur w/o Daljit Singh). 17. The State (Delhi Admn.). 13. 1984 Cr.L.J. 1738 (Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra). 14. AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1382 (State (Delhi Administration Vs. V.C. Shukla). 15. AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1489 (State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy and others). 16. AIR 1969 Punjab 69 (Daljit Singh Piara Singh Vs. Smt. Shamsher Kaur w/o Daljit Singh). 17. AIR 1965 Supreme Court 682 (Bhagwan Swarup Vs. State of Maharashtra). 18. AIR 1952 Supreme Court 159 (Kashmira Singh Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh). 19. 2004(2) Supreme Court Cases 9 (R. Sai Bharathi Vs. J. Jayalalitha and others). 20. 2005(2) Mh.L.J. 310 : [2005(3) ALL MR 430] (Prasad nagar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Nagpur Vs. State of Maharashtra and others). 13. Mr. Surendra Singh, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of accused no.4 submitted that no reliance could have been placed on 'Article L' since it was a xerox copy and as such no secondary evidence could have been permitted to be led without satisfying the conditions laid down in section 66 of the Indian Evidence Act. According to the learned counsel the findings recorded by the trial Court are based on unreliable evidence and the trial court has recorded the findings which are not supported by any evidence on record. According to the learned counsel no reliance could have been placed by the trial Court on the documents which are not exhibited during the trial. According to the learned counsel the document 'Article L' was fabricated so as to falsely implicate accused nos.2, 3 and 4 in the commission of the offences for which they have been convicted. According to the learned counsel the evidence of the prosecution witnesses does not inspire confidence and the trial Court was not justified in placing reliance on the testimonies of several witnesses whose evidence did not inspire confidence. According to the learned counsel no reliance could have been placed upon the statement made by accused no.5 in his statement under section 313 of Cr.P.C. implicating accused nos.2 to 4. Lastly, the learned counsel submitted that there is absolutely no evidence brought on record by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the offences for which the accused no.4 has been convicted and sentenced by the trial Court. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel relied upon the following authorities: 1. AIR 1964 Supreme Court 136 (Raghavamma and another Vs. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel relied upon the following authorities: 1. AIR 1964 Supreme Court 136 (Raghavamma and another Vs. A. Chenchamma and another). 2. AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1164 (Narhari Shriram Sheth Narvekar Vs. Pannalal Umediram). 3. AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1029 (Rammurti Vs. State of Haryana). 4. AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1748 (Ashok Dulichand Vs. Madhavlal & another). 5. AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2622 (Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade & another Vs. State of Maharashtra). 6. AIR 1979 Supreme Court 861 (Avadh Kishore Dass Vs. Ram Gopal and others). 7. AIR 1998 Supreme Court 201 : [1998 ALL MR (Cri) 240 (S.C.)] (Kalpnath Rai Vs. State (through CBI). 8. AIR 1936 Madras 426 (Rangappa Goundhau Vs. Emperor). 14. Per contra, Mr. Ujwal Nikam, learned special public prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State submitted that there are several undisputed facts which clearly implicate the accused in the commission of the offences to which they have been convicted. He further submitted that the evidence led by the prosecution fully established beyond reasonable doubt the offences for which they have been convicted. He further submitted that the trial is not vitiated on account of the fact that the accused nos.2 to 4 were not permitted to cross-examine the approver before the approver was examined as a witness in the trial court. According to Mr. Nikam, the evidence of the approver is reliable and has been corroborated in material particulars by several witnesses examined by the prosecution. He submitted that the mere fact that the approver has come with the whole truth after considerable length of time by itself does not discredit the approver and there is absolutely no reason why the approver should implicate accused no. 1 in the commission of the various offences. He further submitted that the Court can even rely even upon uncorroborated testimony of the approver if his evidence inspires confidence. It was further submitted that the medical evidence substantially corroborates the evidence of the approver and the doctrine 'Falsus in Uno falsus in omnibus' applies even to approver since he is also a witness. It was further submitted that the evidence of the approver has been corroborated not only by oral but also by documentary evidence. According to Mr. It was further submitted that the medical evidence substantially corroborates the evidence of the approver and the doctrine 'Falsus in Uno falsus in omnibus' applies even to approver since he is also a witness. It was further submitted that the evidence of the approver has been corroborated not only by oral but also by documentary evidence. According to Mr. Nikam from the statements made by accused no.1 in his statement under section 313 of Cr.P.C. it can be inferred that he was a privy to the commission of the offence for which he has been convicted. It was further submitted that the stand taken by the accused no. 1 has been patently false and as such same supplies missing link thereby completing chain of circumstances against the accused no.1. Mr. Nikam further· submitted that the accused have not challenged the execution of agreement dated 16-5-2000 (Article L). It is further submitted that the admission made by the accused no.5 in the statement under section 313 of Cr.P.C. can be used against the other accused. It has been further submitted that the conduct of the accused nos.2 to 4 before and after execution of the saledeed in their favour establishes their complicity in the offences. Lastly. Mr. Nikam submitted that the findings given by the trial Court while holding that the accused have committed the offences for which they have been convicted and sentenced have been recorded on the basis of admissible and cogent evidence and, therefore, no interference is called for in the Judgment and order impugned by the appellants. In support of this submission Mr. Nikam relied upon the following authorities. 1. 1991(3) Supreme Court Cases 471 (Sevaka Perumal & another Vs. State of Tamil Nadu). 2. 2005 Supreme Court Cases (Cri.) 292 (K. Hashim Vs. State of T. N.). 3. AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1006 (Madan Mohanlal Vs. State of Maharashtra). 4. AIR 1998 Supreme Court 2821 (A. Deivendram Vs. State of Tamil Nadu). 5. 2004(2) Supreme Court Cases 694 : [2004 ALL MR (Cri) 1171 (S.C.)] (Simon and others Vs. State of Karnataka). 6. 2002(7) Supreme Court Cases 71 : [2002 ALL MR (Cri) 2263 (S.C.)] (Ganesh K. Gulve Vs. State of Maharashtra). 7. AIR 1967 All. 64 (Devi Prasad & others Vs. State). 8. 2003 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1093 : [2002 ALL MR (Cri) 1443 (S.C.)] (Bijoy Singh and another Vs. State of Bihar). 9. State of Karnataka). 6. 2002(7) Supreme Court Cases 71 : [2002 ALL MR (Cri) 2263 (S.C.)] (Ganesh K. Gulve Vs. State of Maharashtra). 7. AIR 1967 All. 64 (Devi Prasad & others Vs. State). 8. 2003 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1093 : [2002 ALL MR (Cri) 1443 (S.C.)] (Bijoy Singh and another Vs. State of Bihar). 9. 2002 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1220 : [2002 ALL MR (Cri) 1993 (S.C.)] (Krishna Mochi and others Vs. State of Bihar). 10. 2004 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1882 (Main Pal & another Vs. State of Haryana). 11. 2005 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 812 (Jai Karan & others Vs. State of U.P.). 12. 1999(5) Supreme Court Cases 96 (State of Haryana Vs. Bhagirath and others). 13. 2004 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 135 (State of Punjab Vs. Karnail Singh). 14. 2000 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1516 (State of W.B. Vs. Mir Mohammad Omar). 15. 2004 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1195 (State of M.P. Vs. Lattora). 16. 2002 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 247: [2002 ALL MR (Cri) 905 (S.C.)] (Ganesh Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan). 17. 2000 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1546 : [2000 ALL MR (Cri) 1928 (S.C.)] (Narayan Chetanram Choudhary Vs. State of Maharashtra). 18. 2001 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1504 (Chandrasckhar Sureschandra Bhatt & others Vs. State of Maharashtra). 19. 2000 Cr.L.J. 1429 (State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Surinder Mohan & others). 20. 2002 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1568 (Tarun Bora alias Alok Hazarika Vs. State of Assam). 21. AIR 2002 Supreme Court 16 : 12002 ALL MR (Cri) 715 (S.C.)] (State of Maharashtra Vs. Bharat Fakira Dhiwar). 22. 2005 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 853 (Kojja Sreenu Vs. State of A.P.). 23. 2002(4) Mh.L.J. 201 : [2002 ALL MR (Cri) 1908] (State of Maharashtra Vs. Shiyaji Anandrao Chede). 24. 2003 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 869 (Ram Narayan Popti Vs. CBI). 25. 2005 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 292 (K. Hashim Vs. State of T.N.). 26. 2005(1) Supreme Court Cases 108 : [2005 ALL MR (Cri) 533 (S.C.)] (State of M.P. Vs. Balu). 15. We have perused the voluminous record and the authorities relied upon by both sides. Since Mr. 24. 2003 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 869 (Ram Narayan Popti Vs. CBI). 25. 2005 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 292 (K. Hashim Vs. State of T.N.). 26. 2005(1) Supreme Court Cases 108 : [2005 ALL MR (Cri) 533 (S.C.)] (State of M.P. Vs. Balu). 15. We have perused the voluminous record and the authorities relied upon by both sides. Since Mr. Manohar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the accused no.2 has submitted that the trial is vitiated on account of the fact that the approver was not permitted to be cross-examined by the Magistrate before the trial began as required in terms of Section 306(4) of Cr.P.C. and, therefore, the matter deserves to be remanded for fresh trial, it would be appropriate to deal with this submission first. Mr. Manohar has placed reliance upon the Judgment of the Apex Court in Sanjay Gandhi Vs. Union of India (AIR 1978 Supreme Court 514) in support of his submission. Mr. Manohar has fairly brought to our notice the subsequent Judgment of the Apex Court in Ranadhir Basu Vs. State of West Bengal, (2000)3 Supreme Court Cases 161 wherein it is held that it is not necessary to give the accused an opportunity to cross-examine the approver when he is examined by the Magistrate. In Ranadhir Basu's case the Apex Court in para 7 has held that the object of section 306(4) is to provide an opportunity to the accused to show to the Court that the approver's evidence at the trial is untrustworthy in view of the contradictions or improvements made by him during his evidence at the trial. The Apex court has further observed that considering the object and purpose of examining the person accepting tender of pardon as a witness is thus limited. The proceedings which take place before the Magistrate at that stage is neither an inquiry nor a trial; therefore, the submission of the learned counsel that the approver should have been examined as a witness in open court and not in the chamber and that while he was examined the Magistrate should have kept the accused present and should have afforded to them an opportunity to cross-examine the approver, cannot be accepted; the phrase 'examination of a witness' does not necessarily mean examination and cross-examination of the witness. What type of the examination of the witness is contemplated would depend upon the object and purpose of that provision. The Apex court has further observed that although section 202 of Cr.P.C. also contemplates examination of the witness, it has been held, considering the object and purpose of that provisions, that the accused has no locus standi at that stage. In view of the clear ratio laid down by the Apex court in Ranadhir Basu's case (supra) we are unable to accept the submissions of Mr. Manohar that the proceedings before the trial court are vitiated on account of the fact that the Magistrate did not permit accused nos.2 to 4 to cross-examine the approver. A bare perusal of the facts in Sanjay Gandhi's case clearly reveals that the scope of section 306(4) of Cr.P.C. was not before the Apex court and, therefore, it cannot be accepted that the Judgment in San jay Gandhi's case supports the contention of the learned counsel that the Magistrate should have permitted the accused to cross-examine the approver in terms of section 306(4) of Cr.P.C. In our opinion, Sanjay Gandhi's case (supra) does not lay down any such proposition but on the contrary the ratio laid down in Ranadhir Basu's case answers the contention raised by Mr. Manohar. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the submission of the learned Senior Counsel that the trial is vitiated on the above count. 16. In view of the rival submissions made on behalf of the prosecution and the accused the following points arise for determination in the present appeal: i) Whether the dead body found within the limits of Bhaisdehi Police Station was that of Yadav Navkar ? ii) Whether the death of Yadav Navkar was homicidal? iii) Whether in pursuance to criminal conspiracy the accused 1 to 4 forged the power of attorney of Yadav Navkar and used it as genuine document for cheating? iv) Whether accused 1 to 4 conspired to abduct and to commit murder of Yadav Navkar and to forge power of attorney? v) Whether accused no. 1 in pursuance of conspiracy hatched with accused 2 to 4 caused injuries to Yadav Navkar to cause his death? vi) Whether the accused no. I in furtherance of common intention with the approver with intent to disappear the evidence of murder set the dead body of Yadav Navkar on fire? v) Whether accused no. 1 in pursuance of conspiracy hatched with accused 2 to 4 caused injuries to Yadav Navkar to cause his death? vi) Whether the accused no. I in furtherance of common intention with the approver with intent to disappear the evidence of murder set the dead body of Yadav Navkar on fire? vii) Whether the death sentence awarded to accused no.1 is justified? 17. We shall deal with first two points since they are inter connected. To prove these facts the prosecution examined P.W.3 Yeshwant Shivlal Takare, P.W. 4 Rambhau Sheshrao Gawai; P.W.7 Lakhan Nathulal Rathod; P.W.8 Punjabrao Shrikaliram Patil; P.W. 48 P.S.I. Herald Johnson; P.W.38 Kaushalyabai wife of deceased and P.W.15 Dr. Bah-am Sahu. P.W.3 Yeshwant Thakare who is the owner of the field at village Ziri deposed that in the morning at about 6 O'clock on 4th September, 2000 he went to the field and found partly burnt dead body of a male person on the boundary of his land under teak tree. Therefore, he went to police kotwal- Rambhau Gawai and informed him about the dead body. Thereafter, both of them went to Police Station, Bhaisdehi. P.W.4 Rambhau Gawai deposed that he went to the spot and saw the dead body. He also noticed the blood stains near the body on the road and also he saw the broken glasses. He informed this fact by lodging report (Exh.64) in writing. In view of the report, Police Station Officer at Bhaisdehi Police Station called two panchas and along with P.S.I. Herald Johnson and police staff reached the spot. The panchanamu of the scene of offence and inquest panchanama Oil the dead body were prepared. The blood stained soil and ordinary soil from the spot were seized. The pieces of broken glass spectacle and chappal of yellow colour were seized from the spot and separate seizure memo was also prepared. Thereafter, the dead body was taken to Police Station. Rambhau has proved the panchanama of scene of offence (Exh.65), seizure panchanama (Exh.66) and inquest panchanama (Exh.67). P.W.7 Lakhan Nathulal Rathod deposed that at the instance of P.S.I. Herald Johnson he took the photographs of the said dead body. He produced the negative of the said photographs which are at Exh.73 and developed photographs of the dead body are at Exh.74. P.W.7 Lakhan Nathulal Rathod deposed that at the instance of P.S.I. Herald Johnson he took the photographs of the said dead body. He produced the negative of the said photographs which are at Exh.73 and developed photographs of the dead body are at Exh.74. In the cross-examination he has deposed that no clothes were seen below the waste of the dead body in the photographs. He denied the suggestion on behalf of accused no.1 that the photographs were not taken by him. 18. P.W.48 P.S.I. Herald Johnson deposed that after recording the accidental death pursuant to the report lodged by Rambhau he went to the spot along with the photograph and some person and photographs were clicked on the spot and of the dead body with the help of the photographer. He also prepared the sketch and seized the articles found on the spot under the seizure memo. He identified the seizure memo, inquest panchanama as well as the photographs. He further deposed that these photographs were sent to different places. He further deposed that on 23-10-2000 Akola Police came along with Kaushalyabai at Bhaisdehi. They were shown the photographs, chappal, spectacle and clothes which were seized on 4-9-2000 and they were identified as that of Yadav Navkar. Thereafter, investigation and case papers were handed over to Akola Police. The post mortem report was also handed over to Akola Police. Although there is some variance between the evidence of the photographer and that of Herald Johnson as to the exact place where the photographs were taken in our opinion, having regard to the evidence of these two witnesses no much importance can be given to the same so as to disbelieve both these witnesses. In view of the cogent evidence there is no reason to disbelieve these two witnesses or either of them. 19. P.W.38 Kaushalyabai deposed that she was taken to Bhaisdehi Police Station where she was shown the photographs of the dead body, chapals, spectacle, clothes which were seized from the person of dead body of Yadav Navkar. The same were also shown to Dnyaneshwar. She identified the photographs as that of her husband Yadav Navkar. She also identified the clothes, spectacle and chappal as that of her husband. 20. The same were also shown to Dnyaneshwar. She identified the photographs as that of her husband Yadav Navkar. She also identified the clothes, spectacle and chappal as that of her husband. 20. The evidence of Kaushalyabai on the aspect of identification of the dead body and the articles seized has been challenged on the ground that the investigating officer P.W.49 Sk. Sultan Sk. 'Fakira admitted in his crossexamination that the dead body was not exhumed in the course of investigation for the purpose of having DNA test of the dead body. We are unable to hold that the lapse on the pa11 of the investigating officer to exhume the dead body and get DNA test on the dead body is fatal in so far as the identification of the dead body is concerned. The evidence of all these witnesses which has not been shaken in the crossexamination clearly proves that the dead body found within the limits of Bhaisdehi Police Station was that of Yadav Navkur. 21. The next point for consideration is whether the death of Yadav Navkar was homicidal? P.W.IS Dr. Balram Sahu who conducted the post mortem of the dead body found following nine injuries on the dead body: i) Upper 2 incisors and lower two incisors were broken and upper canines were broken, gums were lacerated. All teeth found loosely attached to the cavity. ii) Right eye lid was swollen due to injuries. iii) Blood clots in nostrils and left external ear. iv) Three lacerated wounds above chin, deep bone under line bone fracture. v) Incised wounds over upper lip to the left side measuring one and half inch and was through and through. vi) Three incised wounds over left external area. vii) Three incised wounds over left postural region. viii) Four incised wounds over left parital region. ix) Six incised wounds over fore-head, center part, bone deep size about 3 inches. He further deposed that the injuries on the left postural region and left parietal region were on vital parts of the body and parital injuries were sufficient to cause death of a person. He further deposed that the injuries nos.6 and 7 could be caused because of broken glass while the injury no.8 could be caused by a hard substance having sharp margin. He further deposed that injury no.8 could have been caused by jack and article 7 which was shown to him. He further deposed that the injuries nos.6 and 7 could be caused because of broken glass while the injury no.8 could be caused by a hard substance having sharp margin. He further deposed that injury no.8 could have been caused by jack and article 7 which was shown to him. Upon internal examination be found that the bone below parietal injury was fractured and brain was lacerated. According to the witness the cause of death was shock due to head injury. He proved the post mortem report (Exh.107). The witness has been extensively cross-examined by the accused no.1. In the cross-examination he has deposed that neither undigested or semidigested food was found in the stomach. There were no carbon in respiratory area or trachea. It is pertinent to note that the evidence of this witness in so far as the external and internal injuries found on the dead body is concerned, has not been shaken in the cross-examination. The evidence of this witness clearly proves that the death of Yadav Navkar was caused due to head injury and the same was homicidal. 22. We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold hat the dead body of Yadav Navkar was found within the limits of Bhaisdehi Police Station on 4-9-2000 and that the death of Yadav Navkar was homicidal. 23. Having held that the death of Yadav Navkar was homicidal now we shall proceed to deal with points for consideration' at serial nos.(iii) to (vi) mentioned in paragraph no. 15 above since they are interconnected. Since it is the case of the prosecution that the power of attorney was forged by accused nos.1 to 4 in pursuance of criminal conspiracy and factually the power of attorney was got executed by accused no. 1 it would be first necessary to decide whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the power of attorney pursuant to which sale-deed was executed by accused no. 1 in favour of accused nos.2 to 4 was forged. To prove this fact the prosecution has relied upon the evidence of several witnesses. P.W. 34 Vas ant Sheshrao Khedkar who was the attesting witness on the deed of power of attorney deposed that he was serving as clerk to Advocate Chauhan and he had gone to the Consumers Forum and the Rent Controller which are situated near Collectorate, Akola. To prove this fact the prosecution has relied upon the evidence of several witnesses. P.W. 34 Vas ant Sheshrao Khedkar who was the attesting witness on the deed of power of attorney deposed that he was serving as clerk to Advocate Chauhan and he had gone to the Consumers Forum and the Rent Controller which are situated near Collectorate, Akola. After completing the work of noting further dates he was returning from the Collectorate. It was as about 3.30 p.m. on 306-2000. At that time accused no. 1 met him and requested him to act as attesting witness for the deed of power of attorney. Accused no. 1 introduced one person as Yadav Navkar and his thumb impressions were taken in his presence. Thereafter he signed the deed as a attesting witness. Another witness. Bandu Bhakre also signed the deed of power of attorney. The witness was shown the certified copy of the saledeed and he admitted that it was a copy of the same power of attorney (Exh.138) on which he had put his signature. The signature of this witness and another attesting witness also appeared on the said document. The thumb impression of one Yadav Navkar also appeared thereon. The witnesses further deposed that it was accused no.5 Bajirao Rathod who put his thumb impression on the power of attorney in his presence. Although the witness has been extensively cross-examined nothing tangible has been obtained in his cross-examination to shake his credibility. At this stage it is pertinent to note that accused no.5 in his statement under section 313 has also admitted that he put his thumb impression at the instance of accused no.1. In order to corroborate the testimony of this witness, the prosecution examined Executive Magistrate P.W.31 Ramchandra Janunkar who had deposed about identification parade held by him. The evidence of this witness also corroborates the testimony of P.W. 34 Vasant Khedkar that it was accused no.5 who put his thumb impression on the said power of attorney. The oral evidence ofP.W.34 Vasant also stands corroborated by documentary evidence. The evidence of this witness also corroborates the testimony of P.W. 34 Vasant Khedkar that it was accused no.5 who put his thumb impression on the said power of attorney. The oral evidence ofP.W.34 Vasant also stands corroborated by documentary evidence. During the course of investigation the Investigating Officer seized thumb impression book kept with the Sub-Registrar and forwarded the same to the finger print expert along with the deed of power of attorney P.W.42 Devidas Bijagare deposed that finger prints on the power of attorney matches with the finger prints of the person who has put thumb impression in the said book. During the investigation, the Investigating Agency also obtained the thumb impression of the accused no.5 and forwarded the same to the expert who deposed that thumb impression of accused no.5 obtained during investigation matches with the thumb impression on the power of attorney and the thumb impression in thumb impression book. Thus, there is cogent evidence led by the prosecution to prove forgery. Moreover the evidence of P.W.38 Kaushalyabai also proves that on 30-6-2000 her deceased husband Yadav Navkar was not at Akola since all of them had gone to pilgrimage prior to 3-6-2000 and they had returned only on 1-7-2000 to Akola. That being the position, the prosecution has been able to prove conclusively and beyond reasonable doubt that the power of attorney was forged by accused no. 1 by getting thumb impression of accused no.5 on the said power of attorney posing himself as Yadav Navkar. Thus, the only conclusion which can be drawn on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution is that the said power of attorney is a forged document and it was the accused no. 1 who got it executed through accused no.5. The said conclusion which we have reached on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution is further corroborated by the fact that the accused no.5 himself in answer to question no.80 in his statement under section 313 of Cr.P.C. admitted that he had executed the power of attorney posing himself as Yadav Navkar at the instance of accused no.1. Although the statement made by the accused cannot be equated with the evidence nonetheless the same can be used to corroborate the evidence led either by prosecution or the defence. Although the statement made by the accused cannot be equated with the evidence nonetheless the same can be used to corroborate the evidence led either by prosecution or the defence. Thus, the prosecution evidence coupled with the admission of the accused no.5 clearly proves that said power of attorney is a forged document. 24. We shall now deal with the evidence of P.W.38 Kaushalyabai wife of the deceased who had initially lodged missing repOt1 (Exh.245) dated 18-9-2000 and report (Exh.246) dated 14-10-2000. Kaushalyabai in her evidence deposed that she had two children viz. Devidas and Geeta. Geeta was studying in 6th standard in the year 2000. Her husband Yadav Navkar had agricultural land admeasuring 2 acres 20 gs at New Tapadiya Nagar, Akola. On 27-6-2000 she along with her husband had been to Shegaon and from there they proceeded to Pandharpur, Tuljapur and Gandgapur in a Tempo Trax belonging to Mohan Pardeshi which was hired and the same was driven by Gajanan Gochare. They returned on 30-6-2000 at about 12 O'clock at Shegaon and from there they started at 5 p.m. on 1-7-2000 and came back to Akola. She further deposed that on 3-9-2000 her husband left the house but did not return. On 18-9-2000 she lodged report (Exh.246). She stated that since she was waiting for her husband she lodged report late. On 3-9-2000 at about 6 p.m. she received message through P.W.13 Athawale who informed her that he had received a phone call from Yadav Navkar that he was talking from Pandhari and from there he was proceeding to Shegaon. On 4-9-2000 at about 7 p.m. one boy from Athawale family gave a message that a phone was received from Yadav Navkar and he had informed that he was proceeding to Pashupatinath. Since she believed that the phone messages were true she waited for her husband. On 11-9-2000 a post card was received in the name of her daughter which was not in the hand writing of her husband. On 22-10-2000 she came to know that her husband had expired. Then she went to Bhaisdehi on 23-10-2000 in the morning where police showed her the clothes, chappals, spectacle, photographs and waist-cord which she identified as those of her husband since they were on the person of her husband when he had left on 3-9-2000. She identified the photograph (Exh.74) as that of her husband. Then she went to Bhaisdehi on 23-10-2000 in the morning where police showed her the clothes, chappals, spectacle, photographs and waist-cord which she identified as those of her husband since they were on the person of her husband when he had left on 3-9-2000. She identified the photograph (Exh.74) as that of her husband. According to this witness, accused no.1 Ajay Galat who was residing in their neighbourhood was the friend of her husband. She further deposed that she had sent· her daughter in search of her husband and wife of accused no. 1 had informed her daughter that accused no.1 was not in the house and that Yadav Navkar had gone with accused no.1. She further deposed that she knew P.W.25 Suresh Deshmukh. The transaction of sale of her land has taken place through Suresh Deshmukh and that was the reason why she knew him. The transaction was settled on 16-5-2000 for Rs.15 lacs with accused no.2 to 4 and they had received Rs.75,000/- from them. Her husband had told her about the transaction and he had given Rs.75,000/- to her. She further deposed that her husband had told her that the transaction was cancelled. The witness identified Article 'L' which is a xerox copy. According to this witness, the original document was with accused nos.2 to 4 and she had taken the xerox copy from the Collector Officer. It is pertinent to note that the production of the document Article 'L' was objected by the learned counsel for the accused on the ground that it was a xerox copy and not the original. She further deposed that the signature on the power of attorney (Exh.138) was not that of her husband. She stated that on 30-6-2000 her husband was with her on pilgrimage and as such he could not have executed the power of attorney on that day. She further deposed that she came to know that her field was sold by the accused no. 1 to accused nos.2 to 4 for Rs.9 lacs on the basis of power of attorney. In her cross-examination she stated that both these reports were written by police as per her say. She stated that her husband had not left on 3-9-2000 at 9 a.m. The contradiction in respect of time has been brought on record and duly proved. 1 to accused nos.2 to 4 for Rs.9 lacs on the basis of power of attorney. In her cross-examination she stated that both these reports were written by police as per her say. She stated that her husband had not left on 3-9-2000 at 9 a.m. The contradiction in respect of time has been brought on record and duly proved. She further deposed that on 49-2000 in the morning she told her brother-in-law Dnyaneshwar that her husband had not come. She also told this fact to her mother-in-law and wife of her brother-in-law on the same day at about 7 to 8 p.m. She further deposed that she received the post card on 11-9-2000 at about 2 p.m. According to this witness she did not lodge report on 11-9-2000 or thereafter as she was waiting for her husband although she came to know that the post card was not of her husband. She further admitted that she did not tell the police about receiving of false telephone and post card while lodging missing report as well as report since she did not feel it necessary. She further deposed that she believed that her husband might have been kidnapped and confined or something has happened to her husband when she lodged report on 14-10-2000. She was confronted with her statement in which she had stated that an amount of Rs.75,000/received as earnest money was given by her to her father for fixed deposits. According to this witness, she had given this amount to her father. She further deposed that she did not ask her husband why the transaction was cancelled. She further admitted that she did not take the post card with her when she went to the Police Station to lodge report on 14-10-2000. 25. P.W.25 Suresh Deshmukh deposed that he knew deceased Yadav Navkar as well as accused nos. 1 to 4. He was real estate broker. The land bearing survey no.45 of Yadav Navkar was to be sold. On 16-5-2000 there was an agreement between Raju Ingole and deceased Yadav and accused no. 1 was the mediator in that transaction and the transaction was to sell the property to accused nos.2, 3 and 4 for a consideration of Rs.6 lacs per acre and agreement of sale was executed on the stamp paper of Rs.50/- and he signed as a witness. 1 was the mediator in that transaction and the transaction was to sell the property to accused nos.2, 3 and 4 for a consideration of Rs.6 lacs per acre and agreement of sale was executed on the stamp paper of Rs.50/- and he signed as a witness. Yadav Navkar also signed, the total consideration payable was Rs.15 lacs and the original agreement was kept with accused no.2 and the xerox copy was kept with deceased Yadav Navkar and the sale-deed was to be executed within two months from the date of agreement. About 3-4 days before me date fixed for execution of the sale deed accused no.2 called him and said that he was not interested in purchasing the plot. At the time of agreement of sale he along with Raju Ingole, deceased Yadav Navkar and accused nos.1 to 4 were present. The witness identified his signature on the agreement dated 16-5-2000 (Article 'L'). In the cross-examination made on behalf of accused no.1 he deposed that he was doing the business of broker in real estate for the last 10 to 15 years but he did not keep any record in respect of the transaction or the brokerage received from any party. He was not an income tax payer. He had no occasion to see xerox copy or the original of agreement of sale dated 16-5-2000 after it was executed. According to the witness, his statement was not read over to him and he had not stated that accused no. 1 was the mediator in the transaction. It was Raju Ingole who brought this proposal of sale to him. He has been confronted with the police statement in which there is no mention that the original of the agreement was with accused no.2. He denied the suggestion that the transaction of agreement of sale had not taken place with his mediation. In the cross-examination on behalf of accused nos.2 to 4 the witness stated that he did not know what was the Government rate of Survey No.45 in May 2000. He did not know whether accused nos.2 to 4 were doing the profession of development of real estate in 2000. He further deposed that "it is true that after bringing proposal by Ingole I suo moto contacted accused no.2 as I was knowing accused no.2 who was dealing in real estate for sale, purchase and development. He did not know whether accused nos.2 to 4 were doing the profession of development of real estate in 2000. He further deposed that "it is true that after bringing proposal by Ingole I suo moto contacted accused no.2 as I was knowing accused no.2 who was dealing in real estate for sale, purchase and development. Accused no.2 did not inquire from me the Government valuation of the proposed land. Being in the profession I knew at the time of agreement of sale the Government valuation of this land was Rs.10 lacs to Rs.12 lacs." The witness further stated that accused no.2 refused to purchase and when he asked him the reason he said that he will not purchase the land without measuring it through Government surveyor and at that time there was exchange of words between him and accused no.2. The witness further deposed that accused no. 1 came to him and told that he refunded Rs.20,000/- taken as earnest money to accused no.2. The accused no.1 had not asked for xerox copy of the agreement of sale and he told him that the xerox copy is with accused no.2. When he asked about xerox copy of the agreement to accused no. 1 he told that it was with accused no.2. He was knowing deceased Yadav one or two years before 16-5-2000 and he knew accused nos. 1 to 4 eight to ten years before the transaction of 16-5-2000. He further deposed that deceased Yadav Navkar signed the agreement of sale in his presence and he was not shown the original agreement or its xerox copy at the time of recording his statement by police. The contradictions which have been brought on record vis-a-vis his police statement have been duly proved. The evidence of above two witnesses has been attacked on various grounds by the learned counsel appearing for the accused. In so far as the evidence of P.W.38 Kaushalyabai is concerned it has been argued on behalf of the accused that her evidence regarding receipt of post card as well as messages is nothing but an after though which has been fabricated in order to corroborate the version of the approver P.W.1 Sunil. It has been argued that in her missing report dated 18-92000 she has not made any reference to the post card or messages received from her deceased husband. It has been argued that in her missing report dated 18-92000 she has not made any reference to the post card or messages received from her deceased husband. Similarly, in her report dated 14-102000 she has stated that she had not received any chit, letter or telephone call from him. According to the learned counsel the evidence of this witness does not inspire any confidence since in her deposition she has made lot of improvement. 26. We are unable to accept the submissions made on behalf of the learned counsel for the accused. It is to be noted that the witness is an illiterate lady whose husband after leaving the house on 3-9-2000 had not returned for a considerable length of time. Moreover, her evidence stands corroborated by documentary evidence which we shall consider later. We are unable to accept that the post card (Exh.54) has been fabricated in order to lend corroboration to the version of the approver. The version of this witness about the receipt of telephone message also stands corroborated by documentary evidence coming through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. 27. Now we shall deal with the objection raised by the learned counsel on behalf of the accused to the production of the document (Article 'L') on the ground that the same is not the original and being a xerox copy the same could not have been allowed to be produced in spite of the objection raised on behalf of the accused. In this connection, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused have placed reliance upon sections 61 to 66 of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned counsel submitted that the document had to be proved by production of the original as required under section 64 of the Indian Evidence Act and no case has been made out by the prosecution for leading secondary evidence in terms of section 65 since no notice as required under section 66 of the Indian Evidence Act has been given to any of the accused to produce the original. It is the case of the prosecution itself that the original was with accused no.2. It is the case of the prosecution itself that the original was with accused no.2. The learned counsel have relied upon several authorities in respect of their submissions but it is not necessary to deal with them since on plain reading of the provisions of the Evidence Act, that is, Chapter V of the Indian Evidence Act which deals with the documentary evidence it is clear that the document must be proved by primary evidence except in case covered under section 65 in which case the notice under section 66 has tobe given. In the present case, it is not the case of the prosecution that any such notice was given to the accused. Secondly, Kaushalaybai in her evidence claimed that she got the xerox copy of the document from the Collector Office. We fail to understand as to how the witness could have got xerox copy from the Collector Office when no evidence has been led on behalf of the prosecution that either the original agreement or the copy thereof was lodged in Collector's Office. Therefore, we have no hesitation to uphold the objection on behalf of the accused that no reliance could have been placed on Article 'L' by the trial court since the document was not the original document and in the absence of any foundation being led by the prosecution for leading secondary evidence the document could not have been exhibited and relied upon. At this stage we would like to consider whether the prosecution has been able to establish that there was any agreement between deceased Yadav Navkar and accused nos.2 to 4. We consider this is necessary in view of the fact that it is the case of the prosecution that in order to, get out of the agreement of sale for a consideration of Rs.15lacs conspiracy has been hatched pursuant to which forged power of attorney was got executed pursuant to which the same property was sold by accused no.1 as duly constituted attorney of deceased Yadav Navkar to accused nos.2 to 4 for a consideration of Rs.9 lacs. Although section 64 of the Indian Evidence Act requires that the document must be proved by primary evidence and secondary evidence as provided in section 65 is permissible by following the procedure under section 66 of the Indian Evidence Act, the same does not deter us from determining whether there was any prior agreement between deceased Yadav and accused nos.2 to 4 in respect of the same property. In this connection, the evidence of Suresh Deshmukh assumes importance although his evidence about the contents of document Article 'L' is not admissible in view of the clear provisions of the Evidence Act, his evidence about the factum of execution of an agreement in respect of the property of Yadav Navkar to accused nos.2 to 4 cannot be said to be inadmissible under the provision of Chapter V of the Indian Evidence Act. Upon a close scrutiny of his evidence, we are satisfied that this evidence coupled with the evidence of Kaushalyabai established that there was an agreement of sale in respect of the property of Yadav Navkar bearing Survey No.45, admeasuring 2 acres and 20gs between the deceased and the accused nos.2 to 4. Although the evidence of this witness as to the contents of the agreement of sale may not be admissible his evidence about the factum of execution of agreement of sale between deceased Yadav and accused nos.2, 3 and 4 is not barred. Having regard to the cross-examination of this witness on behalf of accused no.1 it is clear that what has been denied is that the agreement of sale did not take place with his mediation. It is pertinent to note that this witness in the cross-examination on behalf of the accused nos.2 to 4 stated that deceased Yadav Navkar signed the agreement of sale in his presence. This fact has not even been disputed by putting any suggestion contrary to this witness. There is no reason to disbelieve the witness on this aspect. This being the position, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the prosecution has been successful in proving that there was an agreement of sale in respect of the property belonging to Yadav Navkar between him and accused nos.2 to 4. There is no reason to disbelieve the witness on this aspect. This being the position, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the prosecution has been successful in proving that there was an agreement of sale in respect of the property belonging to Yadav Navkar between him and accused nos.2 to 4. Although Chapter V of the Indian Evidence Act requires that the document can be proved by primary evidence except in the case covered under section65 of the Evidence Act and the same does not prevent the witness from deposing as to the execution of an agreement between the parties as a matter of fact. Such a fact if deposed by the witness can be certainly looked into and cannot be said to be inadmissible under the provisions of Indian Evidence Act relating to the proof of documents. In so far as the contradictions in the testimony of Suresh Deshmukh are concerned, in our opinion, same are not such as to totally discredit him. We are unable to accept the submissions made by the learned counsel for the accused that the witness is untrustworthy. The witness no doubt is a real estate broker but that by itself is not sufficient to hold that his evidence is untrustworthy. Upon a close scrutiny of the evidence of P.W. 38 Kaushalyabai and P.W.25 Suresh Deshmukh we hold that their evidence except to the extent of proof of the document (Article 'L') which is not admissible inspires confidence. It is also pertinent to note that the evidence of P.W.38 Kaushalyabai also is corroborated on various aspects and we shall deal with those aspects when we consider the evidence of those witnesses at a later stage. 28. Now we shall deal with the evidence of P.W.1 Sunil Manmote the approver upon which heavy reliance has been placed by the prosecution. 28. Now we shall deal with the evidence of P.W.1 Sunil Manmote the approver upon which heavy reliance has been placed by the prosecution. Sunil Manmote deposed that he knew accused no.1 since one and half year before the incident and he was his friend; he also knew deceased and he was residing in front of the house of the deceased since his childhood at small Umri; on 3rd December, 2000 accused no.1 came to his house in between 7 to 8 a.m. and told him that they will go for a walk; he went on his Yamah in Tower chowk, accused no.1 told him to get down from the vehicle and wait near the tea shop for 10 minutes and told him that he will return within 10 minutes; accused no.1 came within about 15 minutes in a Maruti Car along with the deceased; accused no. 1 was driving that car and the deceased was sitting by his side; he placed order for tea for accused no.1 and deceased; accused no. 1 told him that all will have refreshment at the station; therefrom they all three of them went to Gujrati Sweet Mart at Railway Station where he and accused no. 1 took refreshment; deceased was having fast; accused no.1 told him whether the amount could be had on going to Sunil Deshmukh who was at Akot that time; he told him that it was his money. Accused no. 1 then asked the deceased whether he will accompany him up to Akot to which deceased agreed. Then all three of them went to Akot in Maruti car. At Akot the car was stopped in the compound of Narsing Maharaj Ashram. Accused no.1 told him and deceased that he will see whether Sunil Deshmukh is available and asked them to wait there. Accused no. 1 left and returned within 15 minutes and told them that wife of Sunil had told him that he was not in the house and Sunil had gone to Paratwada. Accused no 1 then told them that they will go to Paratwada which was about 40 km from Akot. Then all three of them went to Paratwada. The car was stopped in one chowk and accused no. 1 told them he would see Sunil Deshmukh. Accused no 1 then told them that they will go to Paratwada which was about 40 km from Akot. Then all three of them went to Paratwada. The car was stopped in one chowk and accused no. 1 told them he would see Sunil Deshmukh. Within about 15 minutes accused no.1 returned and told them that he did not meet Sunil and that he had phoned the accused no.2 at Akola and accused no.2 told him that some person at Hoshangabad owed Rs.1 lac to him and they may go there to collect that amount. At that time he told accused no.1 that he will return to Akola whereupon accused no.1 asked him as to what was his work at Akola and he told him that he had to repair the fans. Accused no.1 asked what amount he would get on repairs of the fan and he told them that he would get Rs.300/-. Accused no.1 insisted him to accompany him and agreed to pay Rs.500/-. Deceased also told him that he will pay the amount to him if the accused no.1 fails to pay; then he became ready to accompany accused no.1 and deceased. Then they started for Hoshangabad. They had a halt at Gudgaon for tea and proceeded further. They took meal at one Dhaba at a place about 2 km from Baitul and again started for Hoshangabad. On the way at Itarasi the accused no.1 stopped the car at about 4 p.m. and asked the deceased to phone his family members to Akola as they were waiting for him. Accused no.1 asked the deceased to tell on phone that he had come to Pandhari for Darshan of Ramdeobaba and not to disclose that he (accused no.1) himself was accompanying him (deceased) and that he will return late by night or on the next day. Accused no. 1 and deceased went to telephone and returned and during that time he was sitting in the car. Then they started further for Hoshangabad. Accused no.1 stopped the car at check post near by pass at Hoshangabad where they had taken tea. Then accused no.1 asked him and the deceased to wait and he would go to the person to collect the money. Accused no.1 alone went to Hoshangabad and both of them waited at the tea stall. Then they started further for Hoshangabad. Accused no.1 stopped the car at check post near by pass at Hoshangabad where they had taken tea. Then accused no.1 asked him and the deceased to wait and he would go to the person to collect the money. Accused no.1 alone went to Hoshangabad and both of them waited at the tea stall. After about an hour accused no.1 came back and then brought three bottles of cold drinks-coca-cola and opener and he kept those bottles in the car and came to the tea stall. Accused no.1 told them that the person will be giving D.D. within one hour and in the meantime they would go to river Narmada and wait there. They crossed the bridge over Narmada river and sat in the car on the bank of the river. Accused no.1 then opened one coca-cola bottle; took out paper box from the pocket; took out small bottle from that paper box; accused no.1 then took out a capsule from the bottle and poured it into cocacola whereupon there was foam in the bottle; in the same bottle accused no.2 poured two more capsules and placed the cork of the bottle and pressed it and kept the bottle with other bottles; he asked the accused no.1 about the capsule to which the accused no.1 replied that Dr. Lakhdive had given those tablets for his stomach ache and they were to be taken with coca cola. After waiting on the bank of Narmada for about 45 minutes three of them came to the tea stall where they had tea earlier. Accused no.1 asked them to wait and told them he will see what happened to the D.D. Within about 15 minutes accused no.1 returned and told them that the man will be coming to Akola on the next day with money. Then they started for Akola. At Hoshangabad at about 7.30 p.m. 15 litres of petrol was filled in and accused no. 1 paid petrol charges and took the receipt. Then they had tea at Kirpani and started for Akola. On the way they had a halt at Gudgaon at the same place where they had halted while going to Hoshangabad where the accused no.1 and deceased had refreshment. He took half up of milk as he was suffering from stomachache. 1 paid petrol charges and took the receipt. Then they had tea at Kirpani and started for Akola. On the way they had a halt at Gudgaon at the same place where they had halted while going to Hoshangabad where the accused no.1 and deceased had refreshment. He took half up of milk as he was suffering from stomachache. They turned the car towards the petrol pump on the side of Hoshangabad and there five liters of petrol was filled in. Accused no. 1 asked the person at the petrol pump whether he had empty can of five litres and asked him to give 5 litres petrol in the empty can. Accused no.1 paid the petrol charges. The person at the petrol pump told that he had no empty can. Then they started towards Akola. After crossing about 3-4 villages accused no. 1 told them that rear wheel was brushing and told them that they will have coca-cola and then they will repair the wheel. The car was stopped. Accused no. 1 opened three bottles for coca-cola and each of them had coca cola. Then bottles were kept near the seat by Suresh. Accused no. 1 then took out the wheel spanner from the pocket behind the seat and gave it to the deceased. Accused no. 1 told them that deceased would remove the wheel and he will use the jack. At that time he was sitting near the driver's seat. Accused no. 1 then wore white sock in the left hand and asked him to give one empty bottle of coca-cola which he gave and asked him as to the reason for which bottle was needed. Accused no. 1 then told him that after using the jack he will go for easing and in the meantime the deceased would remove the wheel. He heard the noise "Are Bap Re" and he got down from the car. He saw the accused no.1 beyond the car and was beating the deceased with jack on his head. Accused no.1 hit the deceased on head 3 to 4 times and by his left hand struck the deceased with cocacola bottle on the head. Deceased had stopped crying. He got in the car and sat in his seat due to fear. Then accused no. I gave a call to him to come and to pull the deceased. Accused no.1 hit the deceased on head 3 to 4 times and by his left hand struck the deceased with cocacola bottle on the head. Deceased had stopped crying. He got in the car and sat in his seat due to fear. Then accused no. I gave a call to him to come and to pull the deceased. Thereafter he got down from the car; accused no.1 asked him to hold two hands and he held his two legs and asked him to pull. Both of them pulled the deceased after crossing the height portion adjoining the road. The face of the deceased was blackened due to blood. Accused no.1 pulled the deceased by the side of the road on slope and accused no.1 returned. The accused no.1 then tightened the nut of the wheel of the car and then they started to Akola. On the way accused no.1 asked him whether he had seen the petrol pump on the way while going to Hoshangabad to which he replied that he had not seen the petrol pump in that area. Then accused no.1 turned the car towards Hoshangabad. At the place where deceased was assaulted he saw the blood on the road in the light of the focus of the car; then they reached Gudgaon. Before Gudgaon accused no.1 stopped the car after seeing some persons in Khadi dress. Accused no.1 told him that they were three in number while going and since they were two those persons will suspect and, therefore, accused no.1 told him that they should return from that place. Then they started towards Akola and on the way they reached at the place where deceased was assaulted. Accused no.1 stopped the car at that place and by going under the car sucked the petrol with pipe in aluminum glass and in recgzine bag. Then he went to the place where the body of the deceased was lying and poured the petrol from the glass and recgzine bag on the person of the deceased and took out the match box from his pocket and lit fire with the match stick. Due to fire the deceased woke up and sat. The clothes of the accused no. 1 also got fire. Accused no.1 ran aside and extinguished the fire by rubbing. Deceased then collapsed on the ground. Due to fire the deceased woke up and sat. The clothes of the accused no. 1 also got fire. Accused no.1 ran aside and extinguished the fire by rubbing. Deceased then collapsed on the ground. The accused no.1 then put aluminum glass on the road and picked up a stone and hit with that stone on the head of the deceased. Sound came due to hit of the stone. Accused no. 1 returned with the aluminum glass and kept in the car. Thereafter, both of them started towards Akola. On the way after crossing the M.P. border for a distance of about 3-4 km accused no. 1 stopped the car and threw the jack beyond the road and again started to Akola. He was frightened and was trembling. On the way accused no. 1 told him that he should not be afraid and he will give him liquor. They took liquor bottle and a beer bottle from the Hotel Dwarka just before Paratwada. He drank the liquor in the car and empty bottles were thrown out. Then they came to Akola and on the way aluminum glass was thrown by accused no. 1. They reached Akola at 4 a.m. The car in which they were travelling was Maruti 800 Model of white colour bearing Registration No.MH-30-F-832. Accused no. 1 stopped the car at the bus Stand and asked him to go by auto rickshaw and he went by car. Then he went home. On the next day at 8 a.m. accused no. 1 came to his house and took him on his motor cycle to tower chowk. He told him that he should send a letter in the name of the deceased to his house from Shirdi and also to send telegram and to also give a telephone call. Accused no. 1 asked him to go to Shirdi. Before this he told him that he should mention in the letter that at Pandhari one Maharaj met him and Maharaj told the future of all the family members of the deceased and that he should write in the letter that he (deceased) came with Maharaj to Shirdi. He also told him to mention that Maharaj told him to go to Pashupatinath with him and would return after about one and half month. Accused no. 1 asked him to write the information which he told in the name of the deceased. He also told him to mention that Maharaj told him to go to Pashupatinath with him and would return after about one and half month. Accused no. 1 asked him to write the information which he told in the name of the deceased. The accused no. 1 told him the summary of the information’s to be sent to the house of the deceased by telegram. Accused no.1 also asked him to telephone in the name of the deceased on the telephone in the neighbourhood of the deceased. Accused no.1 asked him to say that deceased was making phone and he was going to Pashupatinath and phone call was made from Shirdi and that a letter had already been dispatched. He told accused no.1 that it was difficult for him to write the letter and he asked accused no.1 to write the letter. Then they went to the Stationery shop in front of LIC Office and took one note book. Thereafter, accused no.1 wrote a letter by his left hand as narrated by him and he also gave the draft for telegram. The notebook was given to the tea stall owner after tearing two pages which were written. Accused no. 1 then gave him Rs.1200/-. Then both of them came to bus Stand for going to Shirdi. Accused no.1 asked him to go to Aurangabad by bus and from there to Shirdi. Accused no. 1 gave him the post card. Two pages of the note book were taken by him in his pocket. The accused no.1 also gave him phone number of Athawale. Then he went to Aurangabad by bus. After reaching Aurangabad in the evening he went in the garden nearby the bus Stand and decided to post the card from Aurangabad itself. In the garden children aged 7 to 8 years were playing and he got the letter written from the student as drafted by accused no.1 which was addressed to the daughter of the deceased at the address of the deceased as given by accused no. 1. Then he came out from the garden and after crossing the road made telephone in the house of Athawale which was received by one girl. 1. Then he came out from the garden and after crossing the road made telephone in the house of Athawale which was received by one girl. He told her that the deceased (Yadav Navkar) was speaking and asked her to give message in the house of the deceased that he was calling from Shirdi and he was going to Pashupatinath and he will require one and half month to return. He asked the girl to give message to the house of the deceased. He also dispatched the letter. The witness identified the letter written on the page of note book by the accused no. 1 (Exh.52) and also identified the hand writing of accused no. 1. The witness further deposed that the substance of Exh.52 was written on the post card. The witness also identified the second page of the note book to be in the hand writing of accused no.1 and which was written in his presence. The witness further deposed that Exh.53 was written for writing the telegram. The witness also identified the post card (Exh.54) and stated that the substance on the post card was written in his presence by a boy in the garden of Aurangabad as narrated by him. The witness further deposed that he dictated the substance of the post card from the draft (Exh.52) written by accused no.1 but he did not send any telegram to the house of the deceased. He then posted the post card in the post office box in the chowk. He halted at the bus Stand for the whole night that day and started for Akola at about 10 a.m. on the next day. After reaching Akola at about 4 p.m. he went home. Accused no.1 then went to his house and asked him whether he posted that letter or not. He told him that he had posted that letter and had also sent telegram. Thereafter for 4-5 days accused no.1 used to come to his house and threaten him that he should not disclose the things and would pay some amount to him and in case he disclosed to anybody he would kill him. He told accused no.1 that he will not disclose anything to anybody. Thereafter he went to his maternal aunt at Khandwa and after staying there for one month returned back to Akola. He told accused no.1 that he will not disclose anything to anybody. Thereafter he went to his maternal aunt at Khandwa and after staying there for one month returned back to Akola. Accused no.1 then came to him and asked him why he had come back to Akola. Accused no.1 told him that he will pay some amount to him and he should go back to Khandwa. On 8 or 9th October, 2000 accused no.1 took him to Dreamland Hotel in the cabin where accused no.2 was sitting. Accused no.1 asked accused no.2 to give some amount to him. He told accused no.2 that he was present at the time of murder along with accused no.1. Accused no.2 told accused no.1 that he will not give any money and asked accused no.1 as to who had asked him to murder deceased. Thereafter, the witness clarified that actually accused no.2 told accused no.1 that he was asked to go alone and why he had taken the witness with him. Accused no.2 told that he had given money to accused no.1 and he will not pay anything to him (witness). The accused no. 1 and he came out. Then he asked accused no. 1 why accused no.2 was saying like that to which accused no. 1 told that power of attorney of the deceased by getting executed by other person was given to accused no.2 and this fact should not be disclosed. Accused no.2 had asked him to kill the deceased and further told him that he would pay him money. Thereafter both of them went home. Witness identified accused no.2 before the court as the person who was present in the cabin of Dreamland Hotel. Witness further deposed that he surrendered before the police upon reading the Newspaper and he was arrested on 23rd or 24th October, 2000. Thereafter, on 27-10-2000 the police party, he and two panchas started to Hoshangabad and he showed the place of occurrence to police. After returning to Akola on 28-10-2000 he produced clothes and chits which were seized under the panchanama. On 29-10-2000 he along with the police and panch went to Aurangabad and showed the S.T.D. Booth in front of Siddarth Garden from where he telephoned to the house of Athawale. Some documents were seized there by police. After returning to Akola on 28-10-2000 he produced clothes and chits which were seized under the panchanama. On 29-10-2000 he along with the police and panch went to Aurangabad and showed the S.T.D. Booth in front of Siddarth Garden from where he telephoned to the house of Athawale. Some documents were seized there by police. Witness identified the jack (Article 2) which was in two pieces as jack by which accused no. 1 had hit the deceased. The witness also identified the spectacle which the deceased was wearing when he accompanied him to Hoshangabad. The witness also identified the photograph of the deceased. The witness also identified the application (Exh.55) signed by him from jail. When the witness was shown Articles Band C which are the application dt. 2-12-2000 and 6-1-2001 the witness stated that they were not in his hand writing. The witness has been cross-examined at length. He admitted that he had been to jail on two occasions. The witness has been confronted with his statement dt:26-12-2002 in which it is stated that the accused no. 1 had come to his house at 7 a.m. and the witness stated that it was false. He further stated that since accused no. 1 was having Maruti car and many friends had bikes he remembered the registration number of the Maruti car. The witness was also confronted with his police statement where it has been mentioned that they reached Itarsi from Paratwada and the witness stated that the statement was not correct. The witness further admitted that he did not remember whether he told the Investigating Officer Sk. Sultan something which never happened as he was in tension. But, the witness asserted that he did not state anything which did not happen. The witness also admitted that he was in the habit of consuming liquor since 4-5 years prior to October, 2000. He also admitted that as he was frightened he had given incomplete information to police in his statement recorded by the police on 23-10-2000. The witness categorically denied that the post card (Exh.S4) was in his hand writing. The witness also denied that he neither telephoned nor had sent the post card by getting it written at Aurangabad. 29. To corroborate the testimony of this witness, the prosecution examined several witnesses. P.W.S Govind Ghatol deposed that he had his field at village Chachwandi. The witness categorically denied that the post card (Exh.S4) was in his hand writing. The witness also denied that he neither telephoned nor had sent the post card by getting it written at Aurangabad. 29. To corroborate the testimony of this witness, the prosecution examined several witnesses. P.W.S Govind Ghatol deposed that he had his field at village Chachwandi. He used to go to his field from the field of the deceased which is within the limits of village Umari. He was knowing deceased since he is also residing at village Umri. On every Sunday he used to go to Janata vegetable market near the tower chowk at Akola. On 3-9-2000 being Sunday he had gone to janata vegetable market in the morning and as usual he was having tea at tea stall near tower chowk at about 8.30 a.m. At that time a maruti car came there in which deceased was sitting on the rear side both of them wished each other by saying 'Namaskar'. He inquired from the deceased as to where he was going and he told him that he was going for bringing money. Another person who was sitting at the tea stall also boarded the said car and car went towards the Railway Station. A short person was driving the car. The witness identified accused no.1 as the person who was driving the car and approver as a person who boarded the car form the tea stall. The witness claims that he suo moto approached the police on 2-11-2000 after returning from Pune on 1-11-2000. We find it difficult to place reliance on the testimony of this witness since there was no special reason for this witness to remember about the incident on 3-9-2000 near the tea stall. Nothing has been brought on record so as to convince us that as to why he remembered about the incident of 39-2000 near the tea stall. Moreover, he had not given the description of the approver and the accused no.1 in his statement to police. Therefore, we find it difficult to accept his testimony that on 3-9-2000 he had seen the deceased, accused no. 1 and approver near the tea stall. 30. The next witness examined by the prosecution is P.W.6 Vijay Giri who was working at the tea stall belonging to Aurn Deshmukh at the relevant time. Therefore, we find it difficult to accept his testimony that on 3-9-2000 he had seen the deceased, accused no. 1 and approver near the tea stall. 30. The next witness examined by the prosecution is P.W.6 Vijay Giri who was working at the tea stall belonging to Aurn Deshmukh at the relevant time. He deposed that accused no.1 and Sunil used to come to the tea stall as customers and many times he served tea to both of them. After identifying the accused no.1 and Sunil in the court he deposed that on 3-9-2000 Sunil and accused no. 1 had come to his tea stall on motor cycle and Sunil waited there and accused no. 1 left the shop. The time was about 7 to 8 p.m. Sunil had a cup of tea and after some time accused no. 1 returned with maruti car of white colour and one person was seated on the rear seat of the car. Sunil asked accused no.1 to pay the bill which was paid by accused no. 1 and then Sunil sat in the car and left towards the tower chowk. On the next day accused no.1 and Sunil again came back to the tea stall at about 8 to 8.30 a.m. and tore pages of the note book and after tearing two pages of the note book the note book was given to him by accused no. 1 and he deposed that he used that note book for writing the account. In the cross-examination the witness stated that the owner never used to come to the tea stall. In a day only about 2 to 4 customers used to come. According to this witness about 4 to 5 litres of milk was used for preparing tea at the tea stall and he was getting Rs.800/- per month as his salary. The witness has also been confronted with his police statement where he had·· mentioned that Sunil had given a call to accused no. 1 and then got down from the car and that Sunil told accused no. 1 to pay the bill and that accused no. 1 paid the bill. Similarly, the witness has also been confronted with his police statement wherein he had not stated that on the second day accused no. 1 and Sunil were writing something on the note book. 1 and then got down from the car and that Sunil told accused no. 1 to pay the bill and that accused no. 1 paid the bill. Similarly, the witness has also been confronted with his police statement wherein he had not stated that on the second day accused no. 1 and Sunil were writing something on the note book. We are unable to place reliance on the testimony of this witness having regard to the omissions vis-a-vis his police statements which have been duly proved. Moreover, there appears to be no cogent reason for this witness to remember the date i.e. 3-9-2000 on which date the accused no.1 and Sunil had visited the tea stall. In cannot be expected of a person serving in the tea stall to remember as to who had come to the tea stall on a particular day unless something important takes place on that day so that the witness remembers the incident which had taken place on that particular day. We are, therefore, unable to place any reliance on the testimony of this witness as the same does not inspire confidence. 31. P.W.9 Rajesh Dhanokar deposed that he had pan shop near Hotel Anand at Railway Station Chowk, Akola and Hotel Gujrati which is also know as Gujrati Sweet Mart is opposite his shop. He deposed that on 3-9-2000 at about 10 a.m. accused no. 1, Yadav Navkar and one person got down from maruti Car near Gujrati Sweet Mart and they had refreshment there and left the Hotel. He identified accused no.1 before the court and approver as the third person who got down from the car on 3-9-2000. In cross-examination he admitted that he was a witness in Sessions Trial No.1/2001. However, he did not admit the suggestion that he was also the witness in Sessions Trial No.94/2000 and also in Sessions Trial No.27/2000. He further deposed that he knew Yadav from 10 to 15 years before the incident. He claimed that on 2-11-2000 police came to his pan shop and he came to know about missing of Yadav Navkar. When specifically asked about the reason for remembering the date 3-9-2000 as the date on which Yadav had come to Gujrati Sweet Mart the witness answered that on that day he was writing the account regarding the arrears of his shop and, therefore, he remembered the date. When specifically asked about the reason for remembering the date 3-9-2000 as the date on which Yadav had come to Gujrati Sweet Mart the witness answered that on that day he was writing the account regarding the arrears of his shop and, therefore, he remembered the date. The witness could not tell the names of other persons who had visited Gujrati Hotel on 3-9-2000. The evidence of this witness does not inspire confidence and we do not find cogent reason for this witness to remember the date i.e. 3-9-2000 as the date on which Yadav Navkar had gone to Gujrati Hotel. The person having a pan shop cannot be expected to remember the date on which particular person visited the Hotel in front of his shop on a particular day unless some important incident takes place to remember that date. The evidence of witness being intrinsicly improbable does not inspire confidence and as such we are unable to place any reliance on his testimony. 32. The next witness examined is P.W.10 Pundlik Sontakke who acted as a panch in respect of the spot shown by the approver. This witness claimed to have accompanied the police as per the directions given by the approver up to Hoshangabad and returned to Akola and again proceeded to Aurangabad and returned back. According to this witness, the approver showed Faujdar Petrol Pump at Hoshangabad and Chamunda Petrol Pump before Gudgaon from where petrol was filled in maruti car. He further deposed that approver has also shown the S.T.D. Booth at Itarsi from where Yadav had telephoned and also S.T.D. in Aurangabad from where he telephoned the neighbourhood of Yadav Navkar. According to this witness, at Faujdar Petrol Pump one register was seized. The witness identified Exh.84 as seizure memo. The witness also identified his signatures on the seizure panchanama (Exh.68) by which the clothes and chit were seized from the house of the approver. The witness further deposed that on 29-10-2000 he was again called to act as a panch at Civil Lines Police Station and along with the police party and other pancha they started for Aurangabad at 10 p.m. and after reaching Aurangabad the approver showed the place wherefrom he telephoned as also the garden. The bill was seized from the Telephone Booth i.e. Bhartiya Nigam and seizure panchanama was drawn. He identified his signature on the seizure panchanama (Exh.57). The bill was seized from the Telephone Booth i.e. Bhartiya Nigam and seizure panchanama was drawn. He identified his signature on the seizure panchanama (Exh.57). He also identified his signature on panchanama Exh.88 dated 20-11-2000 by which Articles like spectacles, chappal, pieces of burnt clothes, bristol cigarette, currency notes brought by one Jamadar from Bhaisdehi Police Station were seized. In the cross-examination it has been brought on record that Exhs.52 and 53 were not signed by the witnesses as he and other panchas were in hurry to go and, therefore, he did not sign Exhs.52 and 53. Although there are certain contradictions brought on record vis-a-vis panchanama is respect of which the witness has deposed, the fact remains that the evidence of this witness inspires confidence and the same is corroborated by documentary evidence on record. We have no reason to disbelieve this witness and, therefore, we find that the trial court was justified in placing reliance on the testimony of this witness. 33. The next witness examined by the prosecution is P.W.11 Ramraj Tiwari who was serving at Faujdar Petrol Pump, Hoshangabad. He has identified the bill no.71 in respect of 15 liu'es of petrol supplied to Vehicle MH-30-F832 for the price of Rs.410.10/-. The bill (Exh.90) is dated 3-9-2000. In the cross-examination he stated that there are four persons working at the Petrol Pump. The witness when was shown certain receipts in which only the incomplete vehicle numbers were written he admitted that the numbers of vehicle were incomplete. The witness stated that he used to write the numbers told by the customers and has said that incomplete numbers were written. This witness was shown the Bill dated 19-7-2000 of the same Petrol Pump in respect of 20 litres of petrol in which vehicle number written was MH30-F-832. The witness was also shown another receipt no.125 dated 20-1-2002 which the witness admitted to be in his hand writing. Another receipt Exh.93 by which five litres petrol was supplied to Vehicle No.MH-30-F832 was shown to the witness. The witness stated that since the vehicle had come to the petrol pump on that day the bill was issued. Relying on the testimony of this witness in the cross-examination it has been argued on behalf of the accused no. Another receipt Exh.93 by which five litres petrol was supplied to Vehicle No.MH-30-F832 was shown to the witness. The witness stated that since the vehicle had come to the petrol pump on that day the bill was issued. Relying on the testimony of this witness in the cross-examination it has been argued on behalf of the accused no. 1 that since on 20-10-2002 admittedly the maruti car bearing MH-30-F-832 was seized by the police the same could not have been at Faujdar Petrol Pump. Therefore, the bill dated 3-9-2000 which (sic) supply of 15 litres of petrol to Vehicle No.MH-30-F-832 is fabricated. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel. No doubt this witness has stated that the bill dated 20-102002 was issued in respect of vehicle no.MH30-F-832 since the vehicle came to the petrol pump. The receipt which was produced in the cross-examination on behalf of the accused has been obtained from this witness on 20-10-2002 with a view to use the same in evidence to demolish the prosecution case that the bill dated 3-9-2000 which is a carbon copy from the bill book by which 15 litres of petrol was sold to the vehicle No.MH-30-F-832. Having scrutinised the evidence of this witness, we find it difficult to accept the submission of the counsel for accused no. 1 that carbon copy of the bill dated 3-9-2000 has been manipulated. Upon close scrutiny of the evidence of this witness we find no reason to disbelieve this witness and, therefore, the prosecution has been able to prove that on 3-9-2000 fifteen litres of petrol was supplied to vehicle no.MH-30-F-832 at Faujdar Petrol Pump. 34. The next witness examined by the prosecution is P.W.13 Laxmanrao Athawale who is the neighbour of Yadav Navkar. He deposed that Yadav was residing at the distance of about 30 to 40 ft. from his house. On 3-9-2000 in the evening time when he was in the house he received a phone call. The person talking on the phone said that he was Yadav Navkar and he told him to give message to Gita that he was going to Shegaon. He had received the phone call at about 5.30 p.m. He then went to the house of Gita where Gita and her mother Kaushalaya were present. He gave call to Gita and gave the message to her and returned back. He had received the phone call at about 5.30 p.m. He then went to the house of Gita where Gita and her mother Kaushalaya were present. He gave call to Gita and gave the message to her and returned back. He has given his telephone no. as 450692. In the cross-examination he stated that he had no occasion to talk on phone with Yadav Navkar earlier to the incident and that as the person talking on phone from the other side told him that he was Yadav, he gave the message. Nothing has been brought in the cross-examination of this witness to discredit him. In our opinion, the evidence of this witness inspires confidence. 35. The next witness examined by the prosecution is P.W.18 Gita Navkar, daughter of the deceased. She deposed that she knew accused no.1 Ajay since he was residing in their neighbourhood. Accused no.1 also used to come to their vegetable shop. On 3-9-2000 in the evening when she and her mother were thrashing mung nuts, Athawale Abaji who resides in their neighbourhood came and called her and told her that there was a phone call from her father and that her father had given a call from Pandhari and told him to inform them that he was going to Shegaon. After Athawale Aba left she gave this message to her mother. On 4-9-2000 her mother sent her to the house of accused no.1 to inquire about her father. She met the wife of accused no.1 who told her that her father had come and he and accused no.1 had gone in the big vehicle on 3-9-2000. The witness then narrated this fact to her mother. The witness further deposed that on 11-9-2000 she received a post card (Exh.54). The witness identified the same as the post card received by her. The witness could not identify the hand writing in that post card but stated that the same was not in the hand writing of her father. In cross-examination she has stated that at the time her police statement was recorded neither she stated that she was sent to the house of accused no.1 by her mother on 4-9-2000 nor she came to know from the wife of accused no.1 that her father and accused no.1 had gone in a big vehicle. In cross-examination she has stated that at the time her police statement was recorded neither she stated that she was sent to the house of accused no.1 by her mother on 4-9-2000 nor she came to know from the wife of accused no.1 that her father and accused no.1 had gone in a big vehicle. The witness further deposed that when the post card was given by the postman she was present in the house and that her mother is educated up to fourth standard and she did not know to write and read fluently. She told her mother immediately on reading the letter that it was not in the hand writing of her father and some body had signed it. The witness also admitted that she did not tell police about the receipt of this letter but her mother had told it to the police in her presence. According to this witness, she did not remember to tell about the post card to police. The evidence of this witness which has not been shaken in the cross-examination also inspires confidence as nothing has been brought on record to discredit her. 36. The next witness examined is P.W.27 Arun Mehato, Incharge of Telephone Exchange, Itarsi. He deposed that police from Akola had been to the Exchange on 7-11-2000 and collected information regarding telephone calls made from the S.T.D. booth at Itarsi to Akola on telephone no.30939 during the period from 1-9-2000 to 15-9-2000. This witness proved the letter (Exh.157) given to him by P.I. Sk. Sultan as well as letter Exh.158 by which he had given reply. From perusal ofExh.158 it is clear that on 3-9-2000 at 5.19 p.m. a telephone call was made from the said booth to Akola on telephone no.450692 which is the telephone number of P.W.13 Laxmanrao Athawale as deposed by him. Nothing tangible has been brought in the cross-examination of this witness to discredit him. The evidence of this witness clearly proves that on 3-9-2000 at 5.19 p.m. telephone call was made from the Telephone booth at Itarsi to Akola on telephone no.450692. 37. The next witness examined by the prosecution is P.W.39 Prakash Choudhari who was the Sub-Divisional Engineer serving in Telephone Exchange, Aurangabad. He had supplied information regarding telephone calls from S.T.D. Booth having telephone no.359237. 37. The next witness examined by the prosecution is P.W.39 Prakash Choudhari who was the Sub-Divisional Engineer serving in Telephone Exchange, Aurangabad. He had supplied information regarding telephone calls from S.T.D. Booth having telephone no.359237. He deposed that the telephone call was from Anantha S.T.D. P.C.O. and it was located in front of the public garden near S.T. Stand at Aurangabad. He produced the print out of the telephone calls made from the said booth of Aurangabad which is at Exh.249. From the said exhibit it is clear that on 4-9-2000 there was a telephone call made from the said booth to telephone no.450692 at Akola. The evidence of this witness also has not been shaken in the cross-examination and we find no reason to disbelieve this witness. The evidence of this witness also clearly proves that the telephone call was made from Ajantha S.T.D. Booth and P.C.O. at Aurangabad to telephone no.450692 of Akola on 4-9-2000. Another witness examined to corroborate the testimony of the approver is P.W.16 Anil Pimpalkar who had acted as a panch for the discovery panchanama made pursuant to the information given by accused no. 1 after his arrest. He deposed that on 6-11-2000 he acted as pancha along with Sunil. In their presence accused no.1 made discovery statement to produce jack from the spot where he had thrown it. Memorandum was prepared of his statement and then he proceeded towards Paratwada and at about 8 p.m. in the valley accused no. 1 showed the spot but the jack was not found as it was dark. Therefore, on the next day morning they again went to the spot shown by the accused no. 1 and the jack was traced out lying under the heap of dry leaves. The jack which was seized has been identified by the witness. The witness also identified the panchanama Exh.124. In the cross-examination the witness has stated that they were not knowing that the jack was hidden in bahiram ghat when they left the police station. The witness admitted that in the portion marked 'A' in memorandum Exh.123 it has been mentioned that the accused no. 1 stated that he had kept the jack concealed at forest in bahiram ghat near Paratwada and he will take it out and produce the same. The witness admitted that in the portion marked 'A' in memorandum Exh.123 it has been mentioned that the accused no. 1 stated that he had kept the jack concealed at forest in bahiram ghat near Paratwada and he will take it out and produce the same. The witness has been confronted with the memorandum (Exh.123) as well as panchanama (Exh.124) and the witness clearly admitted that the number of statements made in the panchanama are not correct. Upon a close scrutiny of the evidence we are unable to place reliance on his testimony to hold that the jack was recovered at the instance of the accused no.1. 38. Another witness examined by the prosecution is P.W.29 Jayant Ghatol who is a panch to the seizure memo of post card (Exh.54). He deposed that on 18-11-2001 in his presence Kaushalyabai gave a post card to police and the same was seized and seizure memo was prepared which was signed by the police officer, Kaushalaya and both the panchas. The witness confirmed the contents of the seizure memo Exh.211 as true. The witness also identified the post card (Exh.54) as the card which was seized by the seizure memo. In the cross-examination the witness admitted that there is a case pending against him in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Akola. The witness also admitted that a fine of Rs.500/- was imposed on him for illegal cutting of tree. The witness further voluntarily stated that he filed an appeal against that order. The witness denied the suggestion that nothing was seized in his presence and he signed the panchanama at the instance of police. The evidence of this witness also establishes that the post card Exh.54 was seized from Kaushalyabai at her residence on 18-11-2000. There appears to be a mistake in the date i.e. 18-11-2001 mentioned by this witness since in seizure memo it is mentioned as 18"11-2000 which is the case of the prosecution itself. In our opinion, this is a minor lapse and the evidence of this witness cannot be discarded for this minor lapse on the part of the witness in his deposition. 39. The prosecution also relied upon the spot panchanama Exh.65 prepared by A.S.I. Herald Johnson of Bhaisdehi Police Station. In our opinion, this is a minor lapse and the evidence of this witness cannot be discarded for this minor lapse on the part of the witness in his deposition. 39. The prosecution also relied upon the spot panchanama Exh.65 prepared by A.S.I. Herald Johnson of Bhaisdehi Police Station. The spot panchanama which was prepared much before the offence was registered in the present case establishes that on the spot which was near the main road blood was lying in large quantity. On the main road where the blood was lying there was a dead body in partly burnt condition. It also establishes that chappals and spectacles were lying near the dead body. The prosecution also examined P.W.37 Shripad Wadekar - The Deputy R.T.O. Akola who deposed that maruti car bearing No.MH-30-F-832 was registered at R.T.O. Akola on 10-7-2000 in the name of Ajay Raghunath Dhabekar (Gal at). The evidence of this witness establishes that in September, 2000 Ajay Galat accused no.1 was the owner of Maruti car bearing No.MH-30-F-832. 40. Since it is the case of the prosecution that the evidence of the approver Sunil has been corroborated by oral and documentary evidence, before dealing with this aspect it would be appropriate to consider as to what is the law laid down by the Apex court with regard to the evidence of the approver. In Sarwan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 Supreme Court 637 the Apex Court held that an approver's evidence has to satisfy a double test; firstly that the approver is a sufficiently reliable witness and secondly his evidence is sufficiently corroborated in material particulars. In the State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao and another (AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1850) the Apex Court held that it was not essential for the prosecution to prove that the approver to be considered reliable is a "penitent witness". The decision of the Apex Court in Sarwan Singh's case (supra) was interpreted by the Apex Court in the case of Major A. G. Barse Vs. State of Bombay (AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1762). The decision of the Apex Court in Sarwan Singh's case (supra) was interpreted by the Apex Court in the case of Major A. G. Barse Vs. State of Bombay (AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1762). In Major Barse's case, the Apex Court observed that the "Apex Court could not have intended to lay down in Sarwan Singh's case that the evidence of the approver and the corroborating piece of evidence should be treated in two different compartments, i.e. to say, the Court shall have to first consider the evidence of the approver dehors the corroborated pieces of evidence and reject it if it comes to the conclusion that his evidence is unreliable, but if it comes to the conclusion that it is reliable then it will have to consider whether that evidence is corroborated by any other evidence." The Apex Court further held that it did not lay down any such proposition in Sarwan Singh's case. The Apex court further observed that in most of the cases the said two aspects would be so inter-connected that it would not be possible to give a separate treatment, for as often as not, the reliability of an approver's evidence, though not exclusively, would mostly depend upon the corroborative support it derives from other unimpeachable pieces of evidence. 41. In the light of the above principles laid down by the Apex Court and upon close scrutiny of the evidence of the approver and several witnesses examined by the prosecution to corroborate his testimony we find that the testimony of the approver has been corroborated in material particulars. Although the evidence of P.W.5 Govind Ghatol and P.W.6 Vijay Giri to corroborate the testimony of the approver is difficult to be accepted for the reasons already stated above but that by itself is not sufficient to hold that the evidence of the approver is unreliable. Similar is the case regarding the evidence of P.W.9 Rajesh Dhanokar who claims to have his shop near Hotel Anand at Railway Station Chowk, Akola. Although we find it difficult to accept his evidence about the visit of the accused, the approver and the third person (deceased) to Gujrati Sweet Mart on 3-9-2000 to corroborate the testimony of the approver for the reasons stated above we are unable to hold that the version of the approver regarding the visit to Gujrati Hotel is not a true version. The evidence of P.W.10 Pundlik Sontakke who acted as a panch in respect of the spot shown by the approver corroborates the version of the approver about the visit to Faujdar Petrol Pump and Chamanda Petrol where petrol was filled in the car. His evidence also corroborates the testimony of the approver about the visit to the S.T.D. Booth at Itarsi and also the visit to STD. Booth in Aurangabad from where the approver had telephoned the neighbourer of Yadav Navkar. The evidence of the approver about filling of IS liters of petrol in his Maruti Vehicle at Faujdar Petrol Pump is corroborated by P.W.II Ramraj Tiwari who has identified his signature on the bill no.71 in respect of IS liters of petrol supplied to the said vehicle. The evidence of the approver regarding the telephone call given from Itarsi in the evening on 3-9-2000 at about 5.30 p.m. by which a message was asked to be conveyed to Geeta that Yadav Navkar was going to Shegaon is also corroborated by P.W.13 Laxmanrao Aathawle, P.W.18 Ku. Geeta Navkar daughter of the deceased as well as P.W.38 Kaushalyabai wife of the deceased. The version about telephone call is also corroborated by P.W.27 Arun Mehato who was Incharge of the Telephone Exchange, Itarsi at the relevant time who produced letter Exh.157 and his reply Exh.158. Moreover the version of the approver that on 49-2000 he gave a telephone call to Laxmanrao Athawale having no.450692 at Akola also stands corroborated by the evidence ofP.W.39 Prakash Chaudhary, Sub Divisional Engineer serving in Telephone Exchange, Aurangabad who produced the print out of the telephone calls made from the S. T. Booth at Aurangabad having telephone number 359237 on 4-9-2000. In so far as the seizure of the post card Exh.54 on 18-11-2000 is concerned although there appears to be delay in seizure, we are unable to hold that the delay by itself is fatal or that the document was fabricated to corroborate the testimony of the approver since we find it extremely difficult to believe that such a post card was prepared after the statement of the approver was recorded by police to corroborate his version that such a post card was posted from Aurangabad. The evidence of the approver also stands corroborated by the spot panchanama Exh.65 which proves that on the main road there was blood in large quantity as well as a dead body of a person in partly burnt condition. The evidence of P.W.37 Shripad Wadekar proves that the vehicle Maruti car bearing No.MH-30F-832 was belonging to Ajay Dhabekar accused no. 1 and thus corroborates the version of the approver that he had accompanied the accused no. 1 in his car along with deceased on 3-9-2000. 42. Thus, after careful scrutiny of the evidence of the approver and the witness examined by the prosecution to corroborate the testimony of the approver it is evident that the evidence of the approver has been corroborated in material particulars on several aspects as deposed by the approver. It is also pertinent to note that the corroboration is not only by oral evidence but also by documentary evidence which has been already referred to above. We find it difficult to hold that all this evidence, more particularly documentary evidence, has been fabricated by the prosecution to falsely implicate the accused. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission made on behalf of the accused that the evidence of the approver has been falsified by the evidence of some of the witnesses examined by the prosecution itself. In the light of the above discussion, we have no hesitation to hold that it was accused no.1 who caused the death of the deceased Yadav Navkar by assaulting him with jack and with a bottle of coca cola causing him injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 43. Since it is the case of the prosecution that the offences of forgery, cheating and murder were committed pursuant to the conspiracy entered into between the accused it would be necessary to analyse the prosecution evidence to find out whether there has been a conspiracy as alleged by the prosecution. 43. Since it is the case of the prosecution that the offences of forgery, cheating and murder were committed pursuant to the conspiracy entered into between the accused it would be necessary to analyse the prosecution evidence to find out whether there has been a conspiracy as alleged by the prosecution. Section 120-A of the Indian Penal Code defines conspiracy as under: "Section 120-A: When two or more persons agreed to do, or cause to be done— 1) an illegal act, or 2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy: Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof." Thus, the ingredients of the offence of conspiracy are that there must be an agreement between the persons who are alleged to have conspired and the said agreement should be for doing an illegal act or for doing by illegal means the act which itself may not be illegal. Such an agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both. It is a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available. Therefore, the circumstances during and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused in the commission of the crime. Ordinarily, no direct evidence is available in the case of conspiracy because of privacy and secrecy are the characteristics of a conspiracy. It is not always possible for the prosecution to give positive evidence about the date of formation of criminal conspiracy; about the persons who took part in form of conspiracy; about the object which the objector sought before themselves the object of conspiracy and about the manner in which the object of conspiracy is to be carried out and all this is necessarily the matter of inference. The conspiracy by its very nature is not hatched in the open but it is secretly planned and it can be proved even by circumstantial evidence. In Shivanarayan Laxminarayan Joshi Vs. State of Maharashtra (1980 SCC (Cri) 493) the Apex Court held that; "in some, cases conspiracy can be inferred from the acts and conduct of the parties". The conspiracy by its very nature is not hatched in the open but it is secretly planned and it can be proved even by circumstantial evidence. In Shivanarayan Laxminarayan Joshi Vs. State of Maharashtra (1980 SCC (Cri) 493) the Apex Court held that; "in some, cases conspiracy can be inferred from the acts and conduct of the parties". Having regard to the various principles laid down by the Apex Court in so far as the aspect of conspiracy is concerned, we shall now find out whether the prosecution has been successful to establish the offence of conspiracy in so far as the offence of forgery, cheating and murder are concerned. It is the case of the prosecution that there was an agreement of sale dated 16-5-2000 in respect of the property of deceased Yadav Navkar with the accused nos.2, 3 and 4 for a consideration of Rs.15 lacs and to get out of the said agreement the accused entered into conspiracy and pursuant to forged power of attorney the sale deed dated 8-8-2000 was executed by accused no. 1 in favour of the accused nos.2, 3 and 4 for a consideration ofRs.9Iacs. It is the case of the accused that there was no prior agreement between them and Yadav Navkar in respect of his property and they executed the sale-deed for a consideration in respect of the property of Yadav Navkar for Rs.9 lacs in good faith believing that the power of attorney dated 30th June, 2000 was genuine. We have already held that the evidence of P.W.25 Suresh Deshmukh and P.W.38 Kaushalayabai clearly establishes that there was an agreement of sale in respect of the property of Yadav Navkar between him and accused 2 and 3 prior to his death but the prosecution has not been able to prove the details of the said agreement since 'Article L' is inadmissible for the reasons stated above. That being the position, the defence of the accused 2, 3 and 4 that they were the purchasers of the said property for a valuable consideration of Rs.9 lacs in good faith pursuant to the advertisement published in Daily Deshonnati dated 26-7-2000 on the face of it has to be rejected as patently false. That being the position, the defence of the accused 2, 3 and 4 that they were the purchasers of the said property for a valuable consideration of Rs.9 lacs in good faith pursuant to the advertisement published in Daily Deshonnati dated 26-7-2000 on the face of it has to be rejected as patently false. Once it is held that there was an agreement of sale between deceased Yadav Navkar and accused nos.2, 3 and 4 the defence of the accused 2, 3 and 4 that they were the purchasers of the said property of Yadav Navkar in good faith has to be rejected. Once it is held that there was an agreement of sale between the deceased and the accused no.2, 3 and 4 in respect of the property of the deceased, the mere fact that the prosecution has not been able to produce the agreement cannot be taken as a factor to disbelieve the entire prosecution case more particularly having regard to the fact that Yadav Navkar who had executed the agreement was dead and as such could not have been examined by the prosecution to prove the agreement. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that the prosecution claims that pursuant to seizure memo which has been admitted by the accused several documents including an agreement of sale were seized from the house of the accused no.2. The said agreement has not been produced on record notwithstanding the fact that the seizure memo was admitted by the accused. We specifically called upon the learned Special Public Prosecutor to give explanation for not producing the said agreement on record as mentioned in the said seizure memo. However, the learned Special Public Prosecutor could not offer any explanation for the same. It is really surprising that such an important document which is not even disputed by the accused is not traceable in the records of the trial Court and in the absence of any material on record it would not be proper for us to make any observation about the reasons for not producing the said agreement on record. It is really surprising that such an important document which is not even disputed by the accused is not traceable in the records of the trial Court and in the absence of any material on record it would not be proper for us to make any observation about the reasons for not producing the said agreement on record. In view of the fact that the said agreement is not available on the record, the learned counsel appearing for the accused submitted, and in our opinion, rightly that it cannot be inferred that the said agreement was in respect of the same property which was purchased by accused 2, 3 and 4 by the sale-deed dated 8-8-2000. But, this fact by itself would not come to the defence of the accused because the prosecution has been successful in establishing that there was an agreement in respect of the property of Yadav Navkar between him and accused 2, 3 and 4 prior to the death of Yadav Navkar. Therefore, the only inference which can be drawn is that the accused nos.2, 3 and 4 wanted to get out of the earlier agreement executed between them and the deceased Yadav Navkar and that no achieve this object the accused nos.2, 3 and 4 entered into the conspiracy with accused no.1 pursuant to which forged power of attorney dated 30th June, 2000 was got executed by the accused no. 1 from accused no.5. At this stage, it would be appropriate to consider what the accused have stated in their written statement filed after their statements were recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C. In paragraph no.4 of his written statement accused no.2 stated accused 2, 3,4 do not know as to whether or not deceased Yadav Navkar had really executed the General Power of Attorney in the name of accused no.1 Ajay Galat on or about 30-6-2000 because they were not concerned with it. However, in the issue of 26th July, 2000 of "Daily Deshonnati" published from Akola an advertisement under the heading 'agricultural land for sale' was published. On reading the said advertisement they came to know that the person Ajay Dhabekar wanted to sell the said agricultural land. Thereafter, the said Ajay Dhabekar contacted them and proposed to sell the said agricultural land to them. At this stage, it would be pertinent to mention that accused no. On reading the said advertisement they came to know that the person Ajay Dhabekar wanted to sell the said agricultural land. Thereafter, the said Ajay Dhabekar contacted them and proposed to sell the said agricultural land to them. At this stage, it would be pertinent to mention that accused no. 1 when asked in his statement under section 313 of Cr.P.C. that P.W.20 Vijay had deposed that the accused no.1 had told him that he wanted to sell his land and advertisement was given in the Daily Deshonnati in respect of the field survey no.45 of Umrai and P.W.20 Vijay prepared the advertisement at his instruction, the accused no. 1 stated that "it was false and that the person (Vijay) was the accountant with Subhash Chope". It is not the case of the accused no.1 that he contacted accused 2, 3 and 4 or anyone of them and proposed to sell the said land of them. It is very difficult to believe the defence version of accused nos.2 to 4 that accused no.1 after getting executed the forged power of attorney in his favour would himself contact accused 2, 3 and 4 as stated by accused no.2. Nothing has been brought on record by accused 2, 3 and 4 to justify the reason for the accused no.1 to contact accused 2, 3 and 4 with a proposal to sell the said land to them. It is not even the case of the accused 2, 3 and 4 that they knew accused no.1 prior to 26th July, 2000 i.e. the date of publication of advertisement in "Daily Deshonnati". Thus, once it is established by the prosecution that there was an earlier agreement between deceased Yadav Navkar in respect of his property and accused 2 to 4 the only inference which can be drawn in the absence of any explanation coming from accused 2, 3 and 4 as to the circumstances which led to cancellation of the said agreement and having regard to the defence taken by accused 2, 3 and 4 that in order to get out of the earlier agreement accused nos.2 to 4 entered into conspiracy with accused no.1 and the above forged power of attorney was got executed through accused no.5 for the purpose of cheating Yadav Navkar. Thus, the prosecution has been able to establish the conspiracy for the purpose of forgery and cheating. Thus, the prosecution has been able to establish the conspiracy for the purpose of forgery and cheating. One more circumstance which lends assurance to the theory of conspiracy between the accused in respect of the offences of forgery and cheating is that the consideration amount of Rs.9 lacs was paid in cash by the accused 2, 3 and 4 to accused no.1. When the consideration involved in the said transaction is quite substantial as in the present case which is to the tune of Rs.9 lacs it was expected of any prudent buyer to pay the amount by cheque in favour of the seller and more particularly when the sale deed is executed by duly constituted attorney on behalf of the principal. We are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Manohar that there is nothing unusual in the payment of the consideration amount of Rs.9 lacs by cash to accused no.1 by accused 2, 3 and 4. Mr. Manohar has invited our attention to the tact that deceased Yadav Navkar himself had purchased the said property by paying consideration amount in cash. It is to be noted that Yadav Navkar appears to be an agriculturalist and the fact remains that the consideration paid by him was not huge and, therefore, on the mere ground that deceased himself had paid consideration in cash, it cannot be said that there is nothing unusual about payment of consideration in cash by accused no.2, 3 and 4 to accused no.1. It is to be noted that accused 2; 3 and 4 were dealing in real estate and they were paying consideration of substantial sum of Rs.9lacs and, therefore, it was expected of them to make the payment by cheque more particularly having regard to the fact that they were not paying the amount to the seller but they were making payment to the power of attorney holder. All these facts clearly lead to only one conclusion that accused 1 to 4 had entered into conspiracy to cheat the deceased Yadav Navkar by getting the sale deed dated 8-8-2000 executed in favour of accused no.2 to 4 through accused no.5. 44. Another circumstance upon which the prosecution has relied is the deposit of an amount of Rs.8 lacs by accused no.1 in his account in Akola Co-operative Bank on 9-8-2000. The deposit of the said amount is not disputed by the accused no. 44. Another circumstance upon which the prosecution has relied is the deposit of an amount of Rs.8 lacs by accused no.1 in his account in Akola Co-operative Bank on 9-8-2000. The deposit of the said amount is not disputed by the accused no. I but it is the defence of the accused no. 1 that the said amount was from the sale of his plot, the house owned by his mother and Maruti car owned by his father. The accused no.1 has not placed any material in support of his defence and, therefore, it is very difficult for us to believe that the said amount was deposited by the accused no.1 after he sold his plot and property of his mother and vehicle of his father. It is also pertinent to note that the sale deed was executed on 8-8-2000 for a consideration of Rs.9 lacs and the amount of Rs.8 lacs was deposited in the said Bank on 98-2000 i.e. just one day after the said transaction. The only conclusion which can be drawn is that the said amount of Rs.8 lacs deposited in the Bank was out of the consideration of Rs.9 lacs which was paid in cash to accused no.1 by accused nos.2 to 4, being the consideration in terms of the sale deed dated 8-8-2000. 45. Now we shall consider whether there was conspiracy between the accused for the purpose of committing murder of deceased Yadav Navkar. We have already held that the prosecution has been able to establish that it was the accused no. 1 who committed the murder of Yadav Navkar. Therefore, the next question which arises for consideration is whether the murder of Yadav Navkar was committed by the accused no. I pursuant to the conspiracy entered between him and accused 2, 3 and 4. In this connection the approver Sunil deposed that after he returned to Akola, accused no. 1 asked him as to why he returned back to Akola and he had told him that he had no job and, therefore, he had returned whereupon he told him that he will pay some amount to him and he should go to Khandwa. Sunil has further deposed that on 8th or 9th October, 2000 accused no. 1 asked him as to why he returned back to Akola and he had told him that he had no job and, therefore, he had returned whereupon he told him that he will pay some amount to him and he should go to Khandwa. Sunil has further deposed that on 8th or 9th October, 2000 accused no. 1 brought him to Dreamland hotel in a cabin where accused no.2 was sitting and accused no.1 asked accused no.2 to give some amount to him since he was present at the time of murder. The witness further stated that the accused no.2 told him that he will not give any money and who had asked him to murder the deceased. The witness further clarified that accused no.2 had asked accused no.1 that he was asked to be alone and why he had taken the witness with him and further that he had given money to accused no. 1 and he will not pay anything to the witness. This part of the evidence of the approver has been assailed by the defence on the ground that he has not disclosed this in his first statement to the police but such a disclosure was made late when his statement was recorded by the Magistrate. This part of the evidence has also been assailed on the ground that such a statement has been made with a view to falsely implicate accused no.2 and that too without corroboration from any other source. No doubt the approver had not made such a disclosure in his statement to the police soon after his surrender but the fact remains that such a disclosure was made after he was granted pardon under section 306(4) of Cr.P.C.. We found considerable merit in the submission of Mr. Nikam the Special Public Prosecutor that the statement of the approver cannot be rejected on the sole ground of delay in disclosure since the approver who was reluctant to disclose the entire facts initially disclosed this only after he was granted pardon in terms of section 306(4) of Cr.P.C.. We are also unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the defence that this portion of the evidence deserves to be rejected for want of corroboration. We are also unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the defence that this portion of the evidence deserves to be rejected for want of corroboration. We have already held that the evidence of the approver inspires confidence and, therefore, we have no reason to disbelieve this part of evidence of the approver even in the absence of any corroboration. It-is not the law that the evidence of the approver has to be corroborated on all the aspects but the law is well settled that the evidence of the approver has to be corroborated in material particulars. It is also to be borne in mind that the prosecution is expected to lead evidence by way of corroboration provided such evidence is available. It is the case of the approver that he was taken along with the accused no.1 to Hotel dreamland by accused no.1 where they met accused no.2. Thus, the only evidence available to corroborate the version of the approver is that of the accused no.1 and 2. We are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Manohar that the prosecution could have examined somebody from the Hotel Dreamland who must have seen accused no.1 entering the cabin of accused no.2. It is needless to mention that even if any person from the Hotel Dreamland had seen accused 1 and 2 entering the cabin of accused no.2 it could not be expected of such person to remember the incident as well as the date inasmuch as it is quite natural that several persons must have been entering the cabin of accused no.2 day in and day out and in the absence of any special reason any person even if he was to see the accused no.1 and the approver entering the cabin of accused no.2 would not remember the incident and date. 46. It is well settled that the offence of conspiracy can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence and the court can draw inferences based on proved facts. In the present case, we have already held that accused nos. 1 to 4 had entered into the conspiracy for the purpose of forgery and cheating. They got executed the forged power of attorney and the sale-deed pursuant to the said power of attorney for the purpose of cheating deceased Yadav Navkar. In the present case, we have already held that accused nos. 1 to 4 had entered into the conspiracy for the purpose of forgery and cheating. They got executed the forged power of attorney and the sale-deed pursuant to the said power of attorney for the purpose of cheating deceased Yadav Navkar. It is, therefore, clear that after getting the sale deed executed in their favour pursuant to which accused nos.2 to 4 would naturally be interested in developing the property and such development of the property would have been objected by deceased Yadav Navkar if he were alive since he had not executed the power of attorney pursuant to which the sale-deed was executed. The execution of forged power of attorney and the execution of the sale-deed pursuant to the said forged power of attorney would have been exposed by deceased Yadav Navkar after he comes to know that his property is being developed without any valid transfer by him in favour of the accused nos.2 to 4. Therefore, primarily it is only the accused nos.2 to 4 who could be interested in getting rid of deceased Yadav Navkar. Therefore: a legitimate inference which can be drawn from the proved facts is that the accused no. 1 committed murder of deceased Yadav pursuant to criminal conspiracy entered into between him and accused nos.2 to 4. As stated above, there is no reason to disbelieve the version of the approver Sunil about the meeting of accused no. 1 with accused no.2 in Hotel Dreamland on 8/9th October, 2000. This circumstance also lends assurance to the fact that there was a conspiracy to commit murder of Yadav Navkar between accused no.1 and accused nos.2, 3 and 4. We do not find any merit in the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the accused that there is absolutely no evidence in support of the proof of conspiracy for committing murder of Yadav Navkar. As discussed above, the Apex Court has repeatedly held that normally the conspiracies are hatched in secrecy and it is very difficult to get direct evidence to prove conspiracy. Having regard to the prosecution evidence brought on record we have no hesitation to hold that there was a conspiracy between the accused 1 to 4 to commit murder of Yadav Navkar and the same was executed by accused no. 1. 47. Having regard to the prosecution evidence brought on record we have no hesitation to hold that there was a conspiracy between the accused 1 to 4 to commit murder of Yadav Navkar and the same was executed by accused no. 1. 47. Having held that the prosecution has been able to prove the offence of forgery, cheating, murder and conspiracy to commit the said offences, we shall deal with other submissions made by the learned counsel for the accused. The learned counsel appearing for the accused no.1 submitted that the trial Court has not passed appropriate orders for disposing of the property which was seized during investigation. The learned counsel invited our attention to the fact that the trial court has not passed any order regarding the amount of Rs.8 lacs which was deposited in the account of the accused no.1 in Akola Co-operative Bank at Akola which was seized during the investigation. Mr. Manohar, the learned senior counsel appearing for accused no.2 submitted that the amount of Rs.8 lacs has to be returned to the accused nos.2 to 4 since they had purchased the said property in good faith and the amount of total consideration of Rs.9 lacs having been paid in cash to the accused no.1 the only conclusion which can be drawn is that the amount of Rs.8 lacs deposited by the accused no.1 in his account was out of the total consideration of Rs.9 lacs paid by the accused nos.2 to 4 to accused no.1. According to Mr. Manohar, accused nos.2 to 4 are entitled to get the said amount from the Bank since no title in respect of the said property has passed to accused nos.2 to 4. Whereas Mr. Gupta submitted that the said amount has to be paid to the accused no.1 since the same was deposited by the accused no.1 from sale of his plot, the house owned by his mother and van owned by his father. In operative part of the order dtd.30th September, 2004 the trial Court has ordered that except the property- remote control, excide battery, car tape, spanners, stepny tyre, maruti car bearing No.MH-3-F-832, Yammah Motorcycle bearing No.MH-3-G-2962, be destroyed after the confirmation of death sentence against the accused no.1 and disposal of appeal, if any. In operative part of the order dtd.30th September, 2004 the trial Court has ordered that except the property- remote control, excide battery, car tape, spanners, stepny tyre, maruti car bearing No.MH-3-F-832, Yammah Motorcycle bearing No.MH-3-G-2962, be destroyed after the confirmation of death sentence against the accused no.1 and disposal of appeal, if any. We do not find any infirmity or illegality in the order passed by the learned trial Court in so far as the order of disposal of the properties mentioned therein is concerned except that the trial court has not passed any order regarding the amount of Rs.8 lacs deposited in the account of accused no.1 in Akola Co-operative Bank, Akola. The trial court has ordered that the properties which are not specified to be destroyed be auctioned and sale-proceeds be credited to the Government. We do not find any infirmity or illegality since the vehicles were used in the commission of the offence and, therefore, the trial court was justified in ordering the same to be auctioned and further directing that the sale proceeds be credited to the Government. In so far as the said amount of Rs.8lacs deposited in the account of the accused no.1 is concerned, the same being fruits of the crime, also deserves to be credited to the Government since the said amount was part of the consideration in respect of the sale deed dtd. 8-8-2000 which was executed pursuant to the conspiracy entered into between the accused no.1 to 4 in order to cheat deceased Yadav Navkar. In our opinion, therefore, neither accused no.1 nor accused 2 to 4 are entitled to the said amount of Rs.8 lacs. Therefore, the amount ofRs.8lacs deposited in the account of the accused no.1 in the Akola Co-operative Bank is ordered to be credited to the Government after a period of 60 days. 48. The learned counsel appearing for the accused have attacked investigation on several grounds as dishonest. No doubt there are several lapses on the part of the investigating officer in the investigation of the crime but we are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the accused that investigation has been carried out dishonestly with a view to falsely implicate the accused in the commission of various offences for which accused were charged. No doubt there are several lapses on the part of the investigating officer in the investigation of the crime but we are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the accused that investigation has been carried out dishonestly with a view to falsely implicate the accused in the commission of various offences for which accused were charged. No doubt the investigating officer investigating the crime is expected to carry out the investigation honestly with a view to find out real perpetrators of the crime but unless the court is satisfied that the investigating officer has fabricated the evidence with a view to falsely implicate the accused, it would be difficult to give benefit of doubt to the accused solely on the ground that there are several lapses in the investigation of the crime. The trial Court was justified in placing reliance upon the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Jagdeo (2003 S.C.C. (Criminal) 351) in which the Apex Court observed thus; "Mere faulty investigation can not be a ground for acquittal of the accused. For fault of the prosecution perpetrators of ghastly crime can not be allowed to go scot-free". The Apex court in several Judgments has held that the faulty or dishonest investigation cannot be the sale ground to give benefit of doubt to the accused and the evidence of the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution has to be judged and appreciated dehors such lapses. At this stage, it would be appropriate to deal with the submissions of Mr. Manohar that even on 18-1-2000 i.e. just few days prior to the filing of the charge-sheet, it was the case of the investigating officer as evident from his application for remand of accused no.1 that the investigating officer suspected involvement of Suresh Deshmukh in the crime. We are unable to hold that this fact by itself is sufficient to raise doubt about the involvement of Suresh Deshmukh in the crime or that the accused have been falsely implicated in the commission of the crime. We have appreciated the evidence laid by the prosecution on its own merit having regard to all the probabilities and, therefore, we are unable to give any benefit of this fact in favour of the accused. 49. We have appreciated the evidence laid by the prosecution on its own merit having regard to all the probabilities and, therefore, we are unable to give any benefit of this fact in favour of the accused. 49. At this stage we shall consider whether the submission made on behalf of the accused that the statement made by accused no.5 in his answer to question no.80 put to him his statement under section 313 of Cr.P.C. which implicates other accused cannot be taken into consideration since the same is not admissible either under section 10 or section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act. In reply to question no.30, accused no.5 stated as under:' "The land of father of Ajay Galat of village Dhaba was in my cultivation 15 years back about 8 acres from 23 acres. Ajay Galat is from Dhaba. About eight years back there was atrocity case against Ajay and his father. That time I remained surety for them. About 3 to 4 years back Ajay was arrested in petrol and scooter theft. That time I remained surety to him. About 6 years back I took loan from Ajay at the rate of 5% p.m. In the next year I took Rs.7,000/- and in the year 2000 I took Rs.10,000/- from him. I repaid that loan tram time to time. No writing was made about loan. The accused no.1 signed in English as introducer while opening my account in Janata Bank in 1998. On 30-6-00 the accused No.1 came to Dhaba. He met me in field where I was working. He told me that he has some work and asked me to come to Akola. I came to Akola on his Yama and went to his house. He showed a stamp paper already written. He showed me the name Yadav Shankar Navkar on stamp paper. He (Accused no.1) told me that I should make signature and thumb impression in the i1Clme of Yadav Shankar Navkar in office on coming with him. As I was indebted to him I could not refuse. Accused No.1 told me that we will go to the owner Shri. Zope of Dreamland Hotel. Accused no.1 took with him stamp paper already written and pad. We went to the office of Shri. Zope. In that office three persons were sitting. As I was indebted to him I could not refuse. Accused No.1 told me that we will go to the owner Shri. Zope of Dreamland Hotel. Accused no.1 took with him stamp paper already written and pad. We went to the office of Shri. Zope. In that office three persons were sitting. Accused No.1 told to Shri. Zope that they will get done the P/A of Yadav Navkar and pointed out to me by finger that it will be get done from me. Shri. Zope asked Accused No.1 who was me. I told my name as Bajirao Rathod. Accused No.1 asked to put thumb impression on stamp paper and asked me to write the name below thumb impression as Yadav Shankar Navkar. Accused No.1 and myself came out of the house of Shri. Zope. Accused No.1 told me that we will go to Sub-Registrar's office. I asked Accused No.1 about two other persons sitting in the office of Shri. Zope. Accused no.1 told me that those were the partners of Shri. Zope named Subhash Ladda and Suresh Maheswari. We then went to Sub-Registrar's office. Accused No.1 gave the written stamp paper already prepared to officer. Accused No.1 also called two other persons. Accused No.1 gave to that office Rs. about 700-800 having currency notes of Rs.50. The officer asked me affix thumb impression and name in the register. I affixed thumb impression "and wrote the name as Yadav Shankar Navkar as stated by Accused No.1. The two persons attested the stamp paper and put their signatures. On completing the work in Sub Registrar's office, I was dropped at bus stand by Accused No.1 and he gave me Rs.250. I went by bus to Dhaba. Accused no. 1 came to Dhaba after 2 to 2 1/2 months with Maruti car. He told me that his work is done. He told me that my loan is fulfilled. I am deceived." According to the learned counsel appearing for the accused, the statement made by accused no.5 which implicates accused nos.1 to 4 cannot be taken into consideration since the statement made by accused no.5 is neither evidence nor it is admissible either under section 10 or 30 of the Indian Evidence Act. I am deceived." According to the learned counsel appearing for the accused, the statement made by accused no.5 which implicates accused nos.1 to 4 cannot be taken into consideration since the statement made by accused no.5 is neither evidence nor it is admissible either under section 10 or 30 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is well settled that the statement made by the accused in his statement under section 313 of Cr.P.C. is not evidence but the same can be taken into consideration in case such a statement corroborates either the prosecution or the defence evidence. After considering all prosecution witnesses we have already held that it was accused no.1 who got the forged power of attorney executed through accused no.5. Therefore, in so far as accused no.1 is concerned, the statement made by accused no.5 which implicates the accused no.1 can definitely be taken into consideration since the same lends assurance to the prosecution case which is supported by several witnesses. No doubt the statement made by the accused no.5 implicating accused no.1 cannot be treated as evidence but nonetheless the same can definitely be used if it lends assurance to the version given by the prosecution witnesses. However, in so far as the accused no.2 to 4 are concerned we hold that the same cannot be taken into consideration in the absence of any evidence, direct or circumstantial, having been led by the prosecution in support of the facts stated by accused no.5 implicating accused nos.2 to 4. Moreover, the version given by the accused no.5 which implicates accused nos.2 to 4 is not the version of the prosecution itself inasmuch as it is not the case of the prosecution that the accused no.1 put his thumb impression or wrote his name below the thumb impression as Yadav Navkar in the office of accused no.2. Therefore, we hold that the statement made by the accused no.5 in so far as he implicates accused no.1 can be used not only against accused no.5 but also against accused no.1 in view of the fact that the said statement lends corroboration to the prosecution evidence but in so far as accused nos.2 to 4 are concerned we are unable to place any reliance on the said statement in the absence of any substantive evidence having been led by the prosecution to prove the facts stated by the accused no.5. 50. 50. In the light of the above discussion, we have no hesitation to hold that the trial court was justified in convicting the accused no.1 for the offences under sections 364, 302, 467, 468 and 471 read with 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and accused nos.2 to 4 for the offences under sections 364, 302, 467, 468, 471 read with 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and accordingly the conviction of the accused no.1 is maintained for the said offence. 51. Having arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution has been successful in proving the offence of forgery, cheating and murder pursuant to the conspiracy entered between the accused, we shall now consider whether the sentences imposed on the accused for committing the offences are adequate. We find considerable merit in the submission of Mr. Manohar, learned Senior Counsel that the trial Court has imposed sentence on accused no.1 of imprisonment for 10 years and a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to suffer S.L for one year for the offence under section 364 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence of 7 (seven) years and a fine of Rs.3,000/- (Rs. Three thousand) in default to suffer S.I. for 18 (eighteen) months for the offence under sections 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code but the trial Court has sentenced the accused nos.2 to 4 for the same offence to undergo imprisonment for life each and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- (Rs. Five thousand) in default to suffer R.I. for two years without any cogent reason for awarding different sentences. In our opinion, there is no reason to award different sentences to accused no. 1 for the said offence and accused no. 1 is also liable to be awarded same sentence as awarded to accused nos.2 to 4 in respect of the offences under sections 364, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. In our opinion, there is no reason to award different sentences to accused no. 1 for the said offence and accused no. 1 is also liable to be awarded same sentence as awarded to accused nos.2 to 4 in respect of the offences under sections 364, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. Accordingly, in so far as the sentence under section 364 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned the accused no.2 to 4 are sentenced to suffer R.I. for 10 (ten) years each and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- each and in default to suffer S.I. for one year and in respect of the offence under sections 468 and 471 the accused no.2 to 4 are sentenced to undergo R.I. for seven years each and to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/- each in default to suffer S.I. for 18 months. We accordingly modify and reduce the sentence for the offences under sections 364, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code in respect of the accused nos.2 to 4. The sentences imposed on accused nos.2 to 4 by the trial Court for the offence under sections 302, 467 read with section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code are maintained. 52. We shall now consider whether the death sentence awarded by the trial Court to accused no.1 for the offence under section 302 deserves to be confirmed or not. In order to award the death sentence to accused no.1 for the offence of murder, the trial Court held that there are several circumstances which justify the death sentence. The trial Court after referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in Bachan Singh and Machi Singh held that the accused no.1 has committed murder of Yadav Navkar who was his friend with depravity and brutality. The trial Court further observed that the murder was a planned and cold blooded. Another circumstance considered by the trial Court is that the accused no.1 was absconding after committing murder till 2-11-2000 and further he is neither young or old person. The trial Court has also expressed that there is every probability that he may again repeat the similar offence and there is no possibility of reforming the accused no.1 and he is beyond reformation. In Ram Pal Vs. The trial Court has also expressed that there is every probability that he may again repeat the similar offence and there is no possibility of reforming the accused no.1 and he is beyond reformation. In Ram Pal Vs. State of U.P., AIR 2003 Supreme Court 4168 the Apex court has observed thus: "One thing however stands clear that for making the choice of punishment or for ascertaining the existence or absence of special reasons in that context, the Court must pay due regard both to the crime and the criminal. What is the relative weight to be given to the aggravating and mitigating factors, depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. More often than not, these two aspects are so intertwined that it is difficult to give a separate treatment to each of them." In para no.6 of the said Judgment the Apex Court has reproduced the list of aggravating circumstances as laid down by in Bachan Singh Vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1980 Supreme Court 898); they are as follows: (a) The murder has been committed after previous planning and involves extreme brutality; or (b) The murder involves exceptional depravity; or (c) The murder is of a member of any of the armed forces of the Union or of a member of any police force or of any public servant and was committed i) while such member or public servant was on duty; or ii) in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such member or public servant in the lawful discharge of his duty. (d) The murder is of a person who had acted in the lawful discharge of his duty..." In paragraph 7 of the Judgment in Bachan Singh's case list of mitigating circumstances have been mentioned and they are as follows: 1) The offence was committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 2) The age of the accused. If the accused is young or old, he shall not be sentenced to death. 3) The probability that the accused would not commit criminal acts of violence as would constitute a continuing threat to society. 4) The probability that the accused can be reformed and rehabilitated. The State shall by evidence prove that the accused does not satisfy the conditions (3) and (4) above. 3) The probability that the accused would not commit criminal acts of violence as would constitute a continuing threat to society. 4) The probability that the accused can be reformed and rehabilitated. The State shall by evidence prove that the accused does not satisfy the conditions (3) and (4) above. 5) That in the facts and circumstances of the case the accused believed that he was morally justified in committing the offence. 6) That the accused acted under the duress or domination of another person. 7) That the condition of the accused showed that he was mentally defective and that the said defect impaired his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct." In Machisingh Vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1983 Supreme Court 957) the Apex Court observed thus; "The following questions may be asked and answered as a test to determine the "rarest of rare" case in which death sentence can be inflicted a) Is there something uncommon about the crime which renders the sentence of imprisonment for life inadequate and calls for a death sentence? b) Are the circumstances of the Crime such that, there is no alternative but to impose death sentence even after according maximum weightage to the mitigating circumstances which speak in favour of the offender?" In paragraph 38 of the judgment, the Supreme Court also indicated as to what propositions emerge from Bachan Singh's case, in following words:" 38. In this background, the guidelines indicated in Bachan Singh case will have to be culled out and applied to the facts of each individual case where the question of imposing of death sentence arises. The following propositions emerge from Bachan Singh case. i) the extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted except in gravest cases of extreme culpability. ii) Before opting for the death penalty, the circumstances of offender also require to be taken into consideration along with the circumstances of crime. iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. In other words, death sentence must be imposed, only when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether inadequate punishment, having regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only provided, the option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all the relevant circumstances. iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so, the mitigating circumstances have to be-accorded full weightage and a just balance has to be struck between the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before the option is exercised." In Sushil Murma Vs. State of Zarkhand (2004 Cr.L.J. 658) while reiterating the guidelines mentioned in the above two cases, the Apex Court held that the Court itself should consider that when collective conscience of community is so shocked that it will expect the holders of Judicial Power Centre to inflict death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as regards their desirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty, the death penalty can be awarded. 53. In the light of the principles laid down by the Apex court in above cases, we shall now consider whether this is a fit case in which accused no.1 deserves to be awarded death sentence. The evidence on record establishes that at the time of the commission of the offence accused was about 32 years old and the murder was committed with a view to cheat the deceased and to make a wrongful gain. No doubt the murder appears to be planned one. However, at the same time it is to be noted that the prosecution has not even led any evidence to prove that the accused in all probabilities would commit criminal acts of violence as would constitute a continuing threat to the society or that there is no probability that accused can be reformed and rehabilitated. In our opinion, the findings of the trial Court that there is every probability that the accused no.1 would again repeat the similar offence or that there is no possibility of reforming accused no.1 are not based on any material on record. We are unable to hold that there is something uncommon about the crime committed by the accused which renders the sentence for imprisonment of life inadequate calling for the extreme penalty of death. We are also unable to hold that there is no alternative but to impose death sentence even after recording maximum weightage to the mitigating circumstances in favour of the accused no.1. We are also unable to hold that there is no alternative but to impose death sentence even after recording maximum weightage to the mitigating circumstances in favour of the accused no.1. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and also having regard to the circumstances of the offender i.e. accused no.1 and after balancing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances we are unab1e to hold that this is rarest of rare case which deserves death sentence to accused no.1. This is not a case in which extreme pena1ty of death is warranted. No doubt the offence committed by the accused no.1 exhibits depravity and greed. Considering the circumstances of the case in the light of the princip1es laid down by the Apex Court in Machhi Singh and Bachan Singh's case, we are unable to uphold the findings of the trial court that the accused no.1 deserves death sentence. 54. For the reasons stated above, we are unable to concur with the view of the learned trial Court that this case is rarest of rare case justifying death penalty. The Criminal Confirmation Case No.1 of 2004, therefore, will have to be rejected and hence the Reference under section 366 of Cr.P.C. is rejected and the accused no.1 is sentenced to imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to suffer S.I. for one year. The Criminal Appeal No.738 of 2004 preferred by the appellant/ accused no.1 is partly allowed. The conviction and sentence of the appellant no.1 for the offences under sections 364, 467, 468 and 471 as awarded by the trial court and the sentences imposed are maintained. The conviction of the appellants/accused nos.2 to 4 for the offence under sections 364, 302,467,468,471 read with 120-B of the Indian Penal Code is maintained and the sentences imposed on accused nos.2 to 4 for the offences under sections 364, 302,467 read with 120-B of the Indian Penal Code are maintained. However, the sentences awarded in respect of sections 364, 468 and 471 are reduced and each of them is awarded same sentence as imposed on accused no.1 in respect of the said offences as stated above. The substantive sentences imposed on the accused shall run concurrently. The order of the trial court ordering compensation of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) to Kaushalyabai wife of deceased Yadav Navkar from the fine amount is maintained. The substantive sentences imposed on the accused shall run concurrently. The order of the trial court ordering compensation of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) to Kaushalyabai wife of deceased Yadav Navkar from the fine amount is maintained. The Criminal Appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms. 55. The Registrar (1) shall ensure that the certified copy of the Judgment is supplied free of cost to the appellant/accused no. 1 in Criminal Appeal No.738/04 who is presently in jail. Order accordingly.