JUDGMENT Hon’ble A.N. Varma, J.—Through the instant writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the order dated 2.5.2004 passed by the opposite party No. 2, as contained in Annexure-7 to the writ petition, whereby the application preferred by the opposite party No. 1 for supply of certain documents has been allowed and the objections raised by the petitioners to the said application has been rejected. 2. It appears that as there was a dispute inter se between the petitioner as well as opposite party No 1, as such, an application was preferred by opposite party No. 1 under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter to be referred to as an ‘Act’) for appointment of an Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the dispute so raised by the parties. 3. Hon’ble the Chief Justice vide its order dated 5.9.2003 allowed the application preferred by the opposite party No. 1 and appointed opposite party No. 2 as sole Arbitrator. During the course of the proceedings an application was preferred on 1.1.2004 by the opposite party No. 1 for supply of certain documents. To the said application the petitioner preferred objections. The opposite party No. 2 vide its order dated 2.5.2004 allowed the application preferred by the opposite party No. 1 and rejected the objections raised by the petitioner and directed him to furnish the papers mentioned in the application within the time stipulated in the said order. It is against the said order that the petitioner had approached this Court through the instant petition. 4. I have heard Sri Subodh Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as Sri Utpal Chatterjee, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1. 5. Sri Subodh Kumar submitted that as documents said to be in possession of the petitioner were asked for, for preparation of the claim, therefore, it is apparent that there was no claim, as such the Arbitrator ought to have dropped the proceedings on the ground that the opposite party No. 1 had nothing to agitate before the arbitrator. In this connection he referred to Section 32 of the Act, which postulates the termination of proceedings before the Arbitrator. Sub­section (c) of said Section contemplates that in case the Arbitral Tribunal finds that the continuation of proceedings are unnecessary or impossible, it should terminate the proceedings pending before it. In this connection he referred to Section 32 of the Act, which postulates the termination of proceedings before the Arbitrator. Sub­section (c) of said Section contemplates that in case the Arbitral Tribunal finds that the continuation of proceedings are unnecessary or impossible, it should terminate the proceedings pending before it. On the basis of the said provision learned Counsel emphasized that in view of the fact that there was no claim before the Arbitrator, therefore, in exercise of power under the aforesaid provision the opposite party No. 2 ought to have terminated the proceedings. Next submission made by the learned Counsel is that Arbitrator is misconducting himself in the, proceedings and therefore, also the same deserve to be dropped. It was further asserted that even otherwise there being no claim this Court should direct the proceedings before the opposite party NO.1 to be dropped. 6. Sri Chatterji in opposition argued that the petition itself is not maintainable as such no interference is called for by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In this connection he referred to a Constitution Bench decision rendered by the Apex Court in case of SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. and another, (2005) 8 SCC 618 . He further submitted that in view of the fact that there being a dispute inter se between the parties and the Arbitrator having been appointed under the orders passed by the Hon. Chief Justice in exercise of powers under Section 11 the proceedings cannot be terminated by this Court. As per his submission on the question of misconduct, the petitioner has a remedy by approaching appropriate forum for removal of the Arbitrator. 7. Sri Chatterji also stated that it is incorrect to say that claim petition had not been filed before the Tribunal. It was on 4.7.2004 that the opposite party No. 1 filed his claim petition whereas the instant petition was preferred on 19.7.2004, therefore, the fact that there was no claim before the Tribunal on the date when the petition was filed, on the face of it is incorrect and the same has been concealed by the petitioner. This fact has, however, been disputed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. According to him by that time he had not received copy of the claim petition. 8. In SBP & Co. This fact has, however, been disputed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. According to him by that time he had not received copy of the claim petition. 8. In SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd and another (supra) the Apex Court observed that any order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is not amenable to writ jurisdiction and intervention by High Courts is not permissible. In para 45 of the said report the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows : “45. It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the basis that any order passed by an Arbitral Tribunal during arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. We see no warrant for such an approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the Arbitral Tribunal appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue for ventilating its grievances against the award including any in-between orders that might have been passed by the Arbitral Tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. The party aggrieved by any order of the Arbitral Tribunal, unless has a right of appeal under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until the award is passed by the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The Arbitral Tribunal is, after all, a creature of a contract between the parties, the arbitration agreement, even though, if the occasion arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract between the parties. But that would not alter the status of the Arbitral Tribunal. It will still be a forum chosen by the parties by agreement. We, therefore, disapprove of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts that any order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. Such an intervention by the High Courts is not permissible.” 9. As would appear on the question of maintainability of the petition Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision has deprecated the practise of the High Courts in entertaining petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the arbitral proceedings. Even otherwise the claim petition having been filed on 4.7.2004 before the Arbitrator, the argument that there being no claim, therefore, the proceedings may be thrown out at the thresh-hold cannot be sustained 10. Even otherwise the claim petition having been filed on 4.7.2004 before the Arbitrator, the argument that there being no claim, therefore, the proceedings may be thrown out at the thresh-hold cannot be sustained 10. The writ petition as such is not maintainable. In view of what has been said hereinabove, the writ petition thus is dismissed. 11. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 12. The stay order, if any, is discharged. Petition Dismissed. ———