( 1 ) BY this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners seek a direction against the respondent, Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Anand not to insist that the petitioners should secure licences under the provisions of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Market Committee Act, 1963 (the Act) and the Rules framed thereunder as a sine qua non for dealing in the business of agricultural produce. The petitioners also seek a direction against the respondents not to insist on payment of market fees from the petitioners in respect of agricultural produce, being mango, imported by the petitioners within the market area falling under the jurisdiction of the respondent. ( 2 ) THE petitioners are engaged in the business of dealing in apples and mangoes, as vendors thereof, within the territorial limits of Anand Municipality. The subject matter of the present petition is confined to the business of dealing in mangoes. The petitioners purchase mangoes from the southern States of India and import the same within the market area falling within the purview of the respondent Market Committee for the purpose of effecting sale thereof. As the petitioners are traders within the meaning of ? trader? as defined under the Act, the petitioners had secured licences under the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder from the respondent Market Committee in or about the year 1975, and thereafter, regularly got their licences renewed from year to year till 1993. In the year 1994, except for the petitioner No. 3, none of the petitioners got their respective licences renewed. ( 3 ) IT is the case of the petitioners that they had been paying market fees to the respondent Market Committee since 1975 under a misconception of the provisions of the Act and under the bona fide belief that, as assured by the respondent Market Committee, they would be provided some benefit or service by the respondent, which would, ultimately, facilitate their business. It is the case of the petitioners that, till the date of filing of this petition, the petitioners had not received any kind of benefit or service from the respondent, which would have the slightest effect of facilitating their business activities as vendors of mangoes; that they have not been provided with any kind of place, much less a shop; either in the principal market yard or in the market proper constructed by the respondent Market Committee, and that the said respondent has been collecting the market fees from them on the solitary footing that the petitioners carry on business activities within the Market area falling under the control of the respondent ? Market Committee. It is the case of the petitioners that the only premise on which market fees have been collected from the petitioners is that the petitioners hold the licences under the Act and carry on the business of dealing in mangoes within the market area. ( 4 ) IT is the case of the petitioners that, the petitioners have refused to pay market fees to the respondent Market Committee in respect of the mangoes imported by them within the market area on the ground that they had not been receiving any kind of benefit or service from the respondent Market Committee in relation to the business carried on by them as well as on the ground that the petitioners were simply marketing mangoes procured from the southern States of India and hence, were not required to pay any market fees under the provisions of the Act. However, as the respondent Market Committee has not accepted the aforesaid contentions of the petitioners, the petitioners have approached this Court by way of the present petition, raising the followings issues for consideration and determination by this Court:[a] Can a person, who, inter alia, deals in the business of agricultural produce, to which the provisions of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 and the Rules framed thereunder stand attracted, be compelled to secure a licence under the provisions of the aforesaid Act and the Rules framed thereunder as a sine qua non for dealing in the business of agricultural produce within the specified market area despite the fact that such person, as opposed to other persons, holding such licence, is not receiving any kind of service or benefit from the Market Committee, which would facilitate his business in the agricultural produce within the specified market area?[b] In the alternative, if such a person can legitimately be compelled to secure a licence as a sine qua non for dealing in the business of agricultural produce within the specified market area, can such a person be compelled to pay market fees in respect of agricultural produce, which he imports within the market area for the purpose of effecting a sale thereof, particularly when such person is required to pay the market fees under the provisions of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 and the Rules framed thereunder?[c] Do the provisions embodied in the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 and the Rules framed thereunder lead to the construction that the market fees envisaged by the provisions of the said Act and the Rules framed thereunder have an element of quid pro quo and, therefore, the market fees would be required to be paid by a person provided such a person is receiving some service or benefit from the Market Committee in lieu of the Market Fees, which he is required to pay?[d] In any view of the matter, can it not be said that the action of the Market Committee is discriminatory, inasmuch as it has the effect of putting at par the persons, who are not receiving any kind of service or benefit from the Market Committee, but required to pay the market fees, with the persons who are being provided with the services and, thereupon, required to pay the market fees in lieu thereof?[e] Can a person be compelled to pay market fees under the provisions of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 and the Rules framed thereunder on the footing that such person has imported agricultural produce within the market area situated in the State of Gujarat, particularly when such person has imported such agricultural produce from the southern States of India and the preamble to the aforesaid Act clearly states that the aforesaid Act has been, inter alia enacted for the purpose of regulating the buying and selling of agricultural produce in the State of Gujarat?? ( 5 ) HEARD Mr. Shivang Shukla, learned advocate appearing for Mr. D. C. Dave on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. S. R. Patel, learned advocate appearing for Mr. A. J. Patel for the respondent ? Market Committee and Mr. Siraj Gori, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondents No. 2 and 3. ( 6 ) THE learned advocate for the petitioners submitted that the respondent ? Market Committee was not justified in insisting that the petitioners should secure licences under the provisions of the Act as a since qua non for dealing in the business of specified agricultural produce within the market area, falling within the jurisdiction of the respondent. It was submitted that the petitioners are not receiving any kind of service or benefit from the respondent which would have the effect of facilitating their dealings in the business of agricultural produce within the market area. It was submitted that the respondents have not even been provided a place, much less a shop either in the principal market yard or in the market proper constructed by the respondents. That, under the circumstances, if the respondent Market Committee is permitted to compel the petitioners to secure licences under the provisions of the Act, it would lead to the construction that the petitioners are simply required to secure licences under the provisions of the Act on the solitary premise that they deal in the business of notified agricultural produce within the market area. ( 7 ) IT was further submitted that assuming without admitting that it was legitimate on the part of the respondent Market Committee to insist that the petitioners should secure licences as a condition precedent for dealing in the business of agricultural produce within the market area, it was highly unjust on the part of the respondent Market Committee to compel the petitioners to pay market fees in respect of the agricultural produce imported by them within the market area. ( 8 ) THE main thrust of the arguments of the learned advocate for the petitioners was that the market fees contemplated under the provisions of the Act have an element of quid pro quo, in the sense that they are required to be paid by the concerned person dealing in the business of agricultural produce in lieu of the service such person receives from the respondent as a Market Committee. That the petitioners cannot be compelled to pay market fees, inasmuch as they are not receiving any kind of service or benefit from the respondent Market Committee which would facilitate their dealings in the business of agricultural produce within the market area falling under the jurisdiction of the said respondent. It was submitted that if an element of quid pro quo is not read into the expression `market fees under the Act, it would amount to permitting the respondent Market Committee to levy a tax under the provisions of the Act in respect of agricultural produce, which is akin to sales tax, which is not contemplated under the provisions of the Act. That, reading the expression ?market fees? without an element of quid pro quo would tantamount to acting dehors the Scheme of the Act. ( 9 ) THE learned advocate for the petitioners has placed strong reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1008 , for the proposition that the element of quid pro quo may not be possible, or even necessary, to be established with arithmetical exactitude, but even broadly and reasonably it must be established by the authorities who charge the fees that the amount is being spent for rendering services to those on whom the burden of the fee falls. Accordingly, it was submitted that the respondents were not rendering any services to the petitioners in respect of the business of mango carried on by them and hence, the respondent Market Committee was not entitled to recover market fees from the petitioners. ( 10 ) THE learned advocate for the petitioners urged that discriminatory treatment has been meted out to them at the hands of the Market Committee, inasmuch as, all other persons holding licences under the Act, have been provided with a place of business within the principal market yard or in the market proper, whereas the petitioners have not been provided any kind of place by the respondent. That such persons, as opposed to the petitioners, receive service and benefit from the respondent in lieu of the market fees they pay to the respondent. ( 11 ) THE learned Advocate for the petitioners also submitted that the petitioners are importing an agricultural produce viz. That such persons, as opposed to the petitioners, receive service and benefit from the respondent in lieu of the market fees they pay to the respondent. ( 11 ) THE learned Advocate for the petitioners also submitted that the petitioners are importing an agricultural produce viz. Mango, within the market area situated in the State of Gujarat from the southern States of India and such agricultural produce is neither cultivated nor processed in the State of Gujarat. It was contended that the preamble to the Act states that the Act has been enacted inter alia, for the purpose of regulating, buying and selling agricultural produce in the State of Gujarat; that the market fees are sought to be recovered from the petitioners on the sole ground that the petitioners import agricultural produce within the market area, which means that it is the buying activity of the petitioners on which market fees are sought to be imposed. It was vehemently urged that it was only if the activity of buying agricultural produce had taken place within the State of Gujarat that the said activity would be amenable to the provisions of the Act, hence, the business activities of the petitioners which involved the purchase of agricultural produce from States other than the State of Gujarat would not fall within the purview of the Act and as such, no market fees are payable in respect of the same. It was submitted that, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the action of the respondents of insisting upon the petitioners to secure licences under the Act and to pay market fees in respect of their business in dealing with mangoes is illegal, unjust and contrary to the provisions of the Act and as such, is required to be struck down by this Court. ( 12 ) MR. ( 12 ) MR. SHITAL Patel, learned advocate for the respondent Market Committee has submitted that, in view of the ratio of the decisions of the Hon ble Apex Court in the case of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti v. Orient Paper and Industries Ltd. , (1995)1 SCC 655 = 1994 JT (7) SC 414] as well as in the case of Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [ air 1983 SC 1246 ], the petition was required to be rejected inasmuch as it has been held in the aforesaid decisions that a person selling agricultural produce within the market area notified under the Act, is liable to pay market fees. ( 13 ) IT was submitted that the services rendered by the Market Committee had to be seen in the general context, namely, on the one hand, it affords protection to the purchasers against exploitation and victimization and eliminates the middle men, and on the other hand, it facilitates an easy and regulated market for the purchase or sale at a centralized place, which is itself a service rendered to the persons in the business of purchase or sale of the notified agricultural produce. It was submitted that the Hon ble Apex Court has held that rendering of service to an individual is not a quid pro quo for charging market fees. It was submitted that Rule 48 of Agricultural Produce Market Rules, 1965 (the Rules) empowers the Market Committee to levy and collect fees on agricultural produce bought and sold in the market area as may be specified in the bye-laws, subject to the prescribed minima and maxima rates. That the petitioners were carrying on the business of dealing in mangoes as vendors thereof, and as such, were required to pay market fees in respect of agricultural produce sold in the market area. ( 14 ) ATTENTION was drawn to the provisions of Section 8 of the Act, which provide that no person shall operate in the market area or any part thereof except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence granted under the Act. It was submitted that, in view of the aforesaid provisions, it was obligatory on all persons dealing in notified agricultural produce to secure a licence under the Act. It was submitted that, in view of the aforesaid provisions, it was obligatory on all persons dealing in notified agricultural produce to secure a licence under the Act. That initially, the petitioners had obtained licences under the Act, however, from the year 1995, the petitioners have stopped taking licences, and as such, have committed offence punishable under Section 36 of the Act. It was submitted that it is incumbent upon a person operating in the market area to obtain a licence, and that the same has got no connection with the principle of quid pro quo, as sought to be contended by the petitioners. It was contended that the petitioners may not be direct beneficiaries of any one or some of the facilities provided by the Market Committee, however, that would not absolve them from payment of market fees. It was pointed out that the Market Committee at the relevant time was attempting to acquire land for establishment of a separate market yard for dealing in fruits and for that purpose, the process of acquisition of land was going on and the establishment of a separate market yard for fruits was under active consideration of the respondent. It was submitted that, from April 2003, a separate market yard for fruits has been established. It was submitted that the benefits and services contemplated under the Act cannot be simultaneously provided and that, for the purpose of providing such facilities and benefits, some time would be necessary; however, that would not mean that the liability to pay fees or contribution would not be operative till then. It was submitted that all amounts collected by way of market fees have been spent only in accordance with Section 32 of the Act for the purposes for which it is permissible for the Market Committee to spend the market fees. In conclusion, it was submitted that the petition is totally bereft of any merit and is required to be rejected. ( 15 ) MR. GORI, learned Assistant Government Pleader has supported the case of the respondent Market Committee and submitted that, in view of the statutory provisions, it was incumbent upon the petitioners to secure licences under the Act and to pay market fees in respect of the business in the notified agricultural produce carried out by them within the limits of the market area. Section 2 (xxiii) of the Act defines ?trader? Section 2 (xxiii) of the Act defines ?trader? to mean any person, who carries on the business of buying or selling of agricultural produce or of processing of agricultural produce for sale and includes a co-operative society, joint family or an association of persons, whether incorporated or not, which carries on such business. As can be seen from the facts of the case, the petitioners are admittedly carrying on the business of dealing in mangoes, as vendors, within the market area so as to fall within the purview of ?trader? as defined under the Act. The Apex Court in the case of G. Giridhar Prabhu v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee, AIR 2001 SC 1363 has held that the definition of the term ?trader? is not a restrictive definition. It is not restricted to a person who only buys. The term ?trader? embraces not just the purchase transaction but the entire transaction of purchase, processing, manufacturing and selling. In the circumstances, the petitioners though they purchase mangoes from the southern States of India are carrying on the business of selling them within the market area and are, hence, amenable to the provisions of the Act, as they fall within the definition of ?trader? as defined under the Act. Issue [e] stands answered accordingly. Section 2 (i) of the Act defines ?agricultural produce? to mean all produce, whether processed or not, of agriculture, horticulture and animal husbandry, specified in the Schedule. Mango, falls within the heading ?fruits under Part VII of the Schedule?, and as such, is undisputedly a specified agricultural produce within the meaning of the Act. ( 16 ) THE term ?market area? is defined under Section 2 (xiii) of the Act, to mean any area declared or deemed to be declared to be a market area under the Act. It is an admitted position, as stated in the petition, that the Director, in exercise of powers under Section 5 read with Section 6 of the Act, has declared the area, inter alia, falling within the territorial limits of Anand Municipality to be the ?market area? for the purposes of the Act. It is also an admitted position that the petitioners are carrying on their business of dealing in notified agricultural produce viz. Mango, within the limits of the market area. for the purposes of the Act. It is also an admitted position that the petitioners are carrying on their business of dealing in notified agricultural produce viz. Mango, within the limits of the market area. Section 8 of the Act, which deals with ?operation in market under licence?, provides that no person shall operate in the market area or any part thereof except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence granted under the Act. Thus, there is an express prohibition under the Act from operating in the market area except in accordance with the conditions of the licence granted under the Act. Section 27 of the Act, deals with the licences, their issue, renewal, suspension or cancellation etc. and appeals against refusal, suspension etc. of licence. Sub-section (1) of Section 27 thereof, which would be relevant for the purpose of this petition, reads as under : ? 27[1] On the establishment of a market, the Market Committee may, subject to rules made in that behalf, grant or renew a general licence or a special licence for the purpose of any specific transaction or transactions to a trader, general commission agent, broker, weighman, surveyor, warehouseman or any person to operate in the market area or part thereof, or after recording its reasons therefor, refuse to grant or renew any such licence. ? ( 17 ) IN view of the aforesaid provisions of the Act, it is apparent that it is mandatory for traders carrying on business in specified agricultural produce within the market area to obtain licences under the provisions of the Act. Obtaining a licence under the Act is a sine qua non for dealing in specified agricultural produce within the market area and contravention of the provisions of Section 8 of the Act renders such person liable to be visited with penalty under Section 36 of the Act. Issue [a] is answered accordingly. ( 18 ) AS regards the principal contention raised by the petitioners namely, that recovery of market fees contemplates an element of quid pro quo, it would be pertinent to refer to the various decisions of the Apex Court in this regard. Issue [a] is answered accordingly. ( 18 ) AS regards the principal contention raised by the petitioners namely, that recovery of market fees contemplates an element of quid pro quo, it would be pertinent to refer to the various decisions of the Apex Court in this regard. In the case of Kewal Krishan Puri (supra), on which heavy reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioner, the Apex Court has, inter alia, laid down the following principle for satisfying the tests for valid levy of market fees on the agricultural produce bought or sold by licences in a notified market area: ? (6) That the element of quid pro quo may not be possible, or even necessary, to be established with arithmetical exactitude but even broadly and reasonably it must be established by the authorities who charge the fees that the amount is being spent for rendering services to those on whom falls the burden of the fee. ? in Sreenivasa General Traders (supra), it was held as under : ( 19 ) THERE is a fallacy underlying the argument that since the services are rendered by the market committees within the market proper, there is no liability to pay a market fee on purchase or sale taking place in the notified market area but outside the market. The contention does not take note of the fact that establishment of a regulated market for the purchase or sale of notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock is itself a service rendered to persons engaged in the business of purchase or sale of such commodities. . . . . . . ? ?30. . . . However, correlationship between the levy and the services rendered expected is one of general character and not of mathematical exactitude. All that is necessary is that there should be a ?reasonable relationship? between the levy of the fee and the services rendered. . . . . ? ?31. . . . . A levy in the nature of a fee does not cease to be of that character merely because there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness present in it, nor is it a postulate of a fee that it must have direct relation to the actual service rendered by the authority to each individual who obtains the benefit of the service. It is now increasingly realized that merely because the collections for the services rendered or grant of a privilege or licence are taken to the consolidated fund of the State and not separately appropriated towards the expenditure for rendering the service is not by itself decisive. . . . . ? ( 20 ) THE Court found that there are certain observations to be found in the judgement of Kewal Krishan Puri (supra), which were really not necessary for the purposes of the decision and go beyond the occasion and therefore, they have no binding authority though they may have persuasive value. The Court was of the view that the observation made therein seeking to quantify the extent of correlation between the amount of fee collected and the cost of rendition of service, namely: ?at least a good and substantial portion of the amount collected on account of fees, may be in the neighbourhood of two-thirds or three-fourths, must be shown with reasonable certainty as being spent for rendering services in the market to the payer of fee?, appears to be an obiter. ( 21 ) IN Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti v. Orient Paper and Industries Ltd. (supra), it was held as follows : ?28. It will be obvious from the above purposes for which the market fee is to be utilized that the said purposes are in furtherance of the object of the Act. , viz. , to regulate the buying and selling of agricultural produce and the establishment and proper administration of market for agricultural produce for the benefit of the agriculturists who are the primary producers of the said produce. The machinery and the facilities for which the market fees are being expended are all necessary to provide the necessary infrastructure to further the object of the Act. But for such infrastructure, the objects of the Act cannot be properly and adequately implemented. The fact that the respondent-Mills may not be the direct beneficiary of anyone or some of the said facilities or does not make use of them does not absolve it from payment of the market fees. The said machinery and the facilities are meant for the benefit of all the buyers and sellers of all the agricultural produce within the market area and it cannot be denied that they are so. ? The said machinery and the facilities are meant for the benefit of all the buyers and sellers of all the agricultural produce within the market area and it cannot be denied that they are so. ? ( 22 ) IN Agriculture Market Committee, Rajam v. Rajam Jute and Oil Millers Association, (2003)4 SCC 187 , the Apex Court endorsed the view taken in Sreenivasa Traders (supra ). The Court noted that most of the relevant statutes have provision for creation of Market Committee Funds. All market fee which is collected goes into the fund. The statutes also contain provisions as to how the fund is to be utilized. The powers of market committees to utilize the funds are thus circumscribed by the statutes. The funds are utilized only for the facilities in the markets and for the benefit of the members, producers, growers and traders. When the funds are in any case to be utilized for specified purposes, the observation in Puri case to the effect that a good and substantial portion of it must be shown to be expended, does not have much significance. In the facts of the said case, the Court noted from the evidence on record that the Market Committee had made provision for certain services and facilities in the notified market area and efforts were being made for extending those services; the Market Committee had recently come into existence and completion of all the intended services and facilities takes time. The Court held that the law is well settled that though quid pro quo is required in relation to a fee which is charged and collected by a market committee, the quid pro quo cannot be in exact proportion to the fee levied and that mathematical proportions are not possible in such matters. The Court had accepted that some services and amenities were already provided for in the notified market area which fully justified the levy of market fees. ( 23 ) THUS, what emerges from a conspectus of the aforesaid decisions is as follows : while quid pro quo between levy of fee and facilities provided in the notified market area is necessary, exactitude in such matters is neither required nor possible. The traditional view about actual quid pro quo has undergone a sea change. The extent of service / amenities cannot have correlation with the fee levied. The traditional view about actual quid pro quo has undergone a sea change. The extent of service / amenities cannot have correlation with the fee levied. ( 24 ) A levy in the nature of a fee does not cease to be of that character merely because there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness present in it, nor is it a postulate of a fee that it must have direct relation to the actual service rendered by the authority to each individual who obtains the benefit of the service. ( 25 ) THE establishment of regulated market for the purchase and sale of notified agricultural produce is itself a service rendered to persons engaged in the business of purchase and sale of such commodities. ( 26 ) THE Market Committee can continue their efforts for providing the amenities depending on availability of funds with them. It is not that all the required services must be in place before a fee can be levied. ( 27 ) IN the facts of the present case, it is the grievance of the petitioners that they have not received any kind of benefit or service from the respondent Market Committee which would have the effect of facilitating their dealing in the business of mango as vendors thereof. That, the petitioners have not been provided a place in the principal market yard or the market proper constructed by the Market Committee, and that the place of business of each of the petitioners is located at a distant place from the principal market yard and the market proper and as such, the petitioners are not in a position to avail of any kind of service or benefit from the respondent Market Committee. However, it is not the case of the petitioners that no services or facilities as contemplated under the Act are provided in the market area or that the funds are not utilized for the purposes provided for under the statute. However, it is not the case of the petitioners that no services or facilities as contemplated under the Act are provided in the market area or that the funds are not utilized for the purposes provided for under the statute. In fact, in its rejoinder to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent Market Committee, the petitioners have categorically averred that, at no point of time, it has been disputed by the petitioners that the respondent is not utilizing the market fees in the manner contemplated by the provisions embodied in the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, and that the grievance of the petitioners is that they are not receiving any kind of service or benefit from the respondent since long and that, therefore, the petitioners are not liable to pay market fees to the respondent. ( 28 ) IN the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Market Committee, the details of the expenditure incurred by the Market Committee for the year 1988-89 have been set out. The balance sheets for the year 1989-90, 1990-91, 1992-93 and 1993-94 have been annexed to show that all amounts expended by the Market Committee are for the purposes provided under Section 33 of the Act. Moreover, it has been stated that the respondent Market Committee is contemplating a separate market yard and is actively trying to acquire appropriate land within a short and reasonable time for establishing a separate market yard for fruits. It is averred that, merely because an individual is not getting any particular benefit from the Market Committee as he is operating from his own premises, it cannot be said that he is not in a position to avail of the general benefits provided by the Market Committee, as operating within the Market area itself, is also one of the benefits envisaged under the Act. As on today, as stated by the learned advocate on behalf of the respondent Market Committee, a separate market yard for fruits has already been established, hence, the grievance of the petitioners as regards non-availability of any facilities in respect of the business carried on by them may not survive. As on today, as stated by the learned advocate on behalf of the respondent Market Committee, a separate market yard for fruits has already been established, hence, the grievance of the petitioners as regards non-availability of any facilities in respect of the business carried on by them may not survive. ( 29 ) IN the light of the aforesaid facts, it is clear that the funds of the Market Committee are being utilized for the purposes provided under Section 33 of the Act; and that, a market yard had already been established to regulate the purchase and sale of notified products even at the relevant time when the petition was filed. It may be that the petitioners in particular were not directly provided with any services, but it is not even the case of the petitioners that no services as contemplated under the Act were being provided in the market area. Hence, applying the principles laid down in the decisions cited above, it cannot, in any manner, be said that the Market Committee was not justified in levying and collecting the market fees from those operating within the market area, including the petitioners. Issues [b], [c] and [d] stand answered accordingly. For the reasons stated above, the petition fails and is accordingly, rejected. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated.