Judgment 1. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and considered the facts and circumstances narrated in the application for condonation of delay of 130 days in filing the Letters Patent Appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge. We find that there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Hence, the delay is condoned and the application (I.A. No. 5454 of 2005) shall stand allowed. 2. We have also heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties on the merits of the case and examined the entire records and the relevant proposition of law. We have also considered threadbare the text and context and the ultimate conclusion recorded by the learned Single Judge on 6.5.2005 in C.W.J.C. No. 9670 of 2000 and noticed that the rejection of the petition is based on a technical ground for not joining the heirs and legal representatives of respondent no. 6 in the writ petition, who died during the pendency of the petition. 3. Let it be mentioned at this stage that ordinarily no meritorious matter should be thrown over board on technical grounds This proposition has been extensively explored and expounded by catena of judicial pronouncements. The ultimate anxiety of the court of law is to see that justice is rendered substantively and it is not impeded by process of law as far as possible. 4. Again in these context we are tempted to refer to the amended provisions. incorporated in Rule 10A in Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which, in clear terms, prescribes a duty of. a pleader that whenever a pleader appearing for a party to the suit comes to know of the death of that party, he shall inform the court about it, and upon such information, the Court will take cognizance and thereupon give notice of such death to the other party. It will be also very interesting to note at this stage that by statutory fiction the Parliament in its wisdom has inserted a deeming fiction, whereby it has been provided that the contract between the advocate and the deceased party shall be deemed to subsist. It is, therefore, very clear that a technical plea of contract having ended, that may not be raised to create an impediment to justice being rendered on substantive ground. It is, therefore, very clear that a technical plea of contract having ended, that may not be raised to create an impediment to justice being rendered on substantive ground. Such a deeming fiction has been incorporated in the said provision of the C.P.C. Probably, the attention of the Court was not invited to such an amended provision. 5. Secondly, it appears that only on the argument, the Court was made to believe that since both the parties were residents of the same village" presumption can be drawn about the factum of death having been within the knowledge of the other party. In our opinion, such a presumption is unwarranted. 6. In the light of the aforesaid discussions and the peculiar facts and circumstances obtainable from the records of the case, we find that the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. We do hereby allow the appeal and by allowing the appeal specially as a necessary corollary C.W.J.C. No. 9670 of 2000 shall stand restored to its original number and shall be placed before the Bench taking up such matters for further consideration from the stage where it was discontinued because of its rejection. 7. With these observations, the Letters Patent Appeal is allowed, quashing and setting aside the impugned order. There shall be no order as to costs.