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2006 DIGILAW 2922 (MAD)

Sekhar v. State, rep. By The Inspector of Police, Viralimalai Police Station, Pudukottai District

2006-10-31

A.SELVAM

body2006
Judgment :- The appellant calls in question the legality of the conviction and sentence passed in Sessions Case No.17 of 2000 dated 31/12/2001 by The Additional District Court-cum-Fast Track Court, Pudukottai. 2. The epitome of the prosecution case can be stated like thus:- P.W.1 Arivikannu is a resident of Poiyamaniseethapatti and her husband by name Palaniappan is doing coolie work and he used to go to outside for doing the same. P.W.1 is having three children (two daughters and one son). The name of the eldest daughter is Meenakshi. On 29/9/1997, at about 3.00 p.m., the victim was playing near School. The accused had taken the victim to his house. After sometime, the accused had thrusted his private part into the private part of victim. The victim had raised hue and cry. P.W.1 had gone there and the accused had scampered from the place of occurrence. Next day, at about 9.00 a.m., P.W.1 had given a complaint to the Police Station and the same had been marked as Ex.P.1. 3. P.W.11 the Inspector of Police attached to Viralimalai Police Station had stated that the Inspector by name Natesan who conducted investigation in the present case had already passed away. P.W.11 knows the signature of the deceased Inspector Natesan. On 1/10/1997, P.W.1 had given a complaint in Viralimalai Police Station and the same had been registered in Crime No.536 of 1997 under Section 376 r/w. 511 of The Indian Penal Code. The First Information Report had been marked as Ex.P.8. The victim had been sent to medical examination. The Investigating Officer had examined all the connected witnesses. After completing investigation, he laid a final report against the accused on the file of the District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court, Keeranur. 4. The case had been committed to the Court of Sessions, Pudukottai and subsequently, transferred to the Additional District and Sessions Court-cum-Fast Track Court, Pudukottai. Necessary charge had been framed against the accused and the same had been read over and explained to him. The accused had denied the charge and claimed to be tried. On the side of the prosecution, P.Ws.1 to 11 had been examined. Exs.P.1 to P.14 and M.O.1 had been marked. 5. When the accused had been questioned under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as respects the incriminating circumstances appearing in evidence against him, he denied his complicity in the crime. On the side of the prosecution, P.Ws.1 to 11 had been examined. Exs.P.1 to P.14 and M.O.1 had been marked. 5. When the accused had been questioned under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as respects the incriminating circumstances appearing in evidence against him, he denied his complicity in the crime. No oral and documentary evidence had been adduced on the side of the accused. 6. The trial Court after pondering the evidence available on record had found the accused guilty under Section 376 (f) of The Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo ten years rigorous imprisonment and also imposed a fine of Rs.30,000/-with default clause. Further, it had been directed to give the entire fine amount as compensation to the victim. The conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court are being challenged in the present Criminal Appeal. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant had strenuously contended that no occurrence had taken place as pleaded on the side of the prosecution and the evidence of P.W.1 and the victim had not been corroborated by the medical evidence and due to previous animosity, the accused had been falsely roped in and the trial Court without considering the infirmities and contradictions found in the case of the prosecution had erroneously found the accused guilty under Section 376 (f) of The Indian Penal Code and therefore, the conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court are liable to be set aside. 8. For analysing the argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, the Court has to look into the evidence of P.W.1, P.W.5 the victim and other connected medical witnesses. 9. The victim had been examined as P.W.5. She had clearly stated in her evidence that prior to occurrence, she was playing near School and the accused had called her under the pretext of giving sugar and subsequently, the accused had taken her to his house and nobody was there and thereafter, the accused had thrusted his private part into her private part and she raised hue and cry and her mother had come there. 10. P.W.1 the mother of the victim had also clearly stated in her evidence that in the place of occurrence, the accused had thrusted his private part into the private part of the victim. 10. P.W.1 the mother of the victim had also clearly stated in her evidence that in the place of occurrence, the accused had thrusted his private part into the private part of the victim. P.W.6 the Doctor who had seen the victim first had stated in her evidence that she found injuries on the private part of the victim. P.W.7 the another Doctor had also stated in her evidence that she found injuries on the private part of the victim. P.W.8 the Doctor who examined the accused had clearly stated that the accused is fit to have sexual intercourse. Therefore, from the cumulative effect of evidence given by the witnesses referred to supra, it is pellucid that in the place of occurrence, the accused had thrusted his private part into the private part of the victim and thereby caused injuries. 11. In view of the discussion made earlier, it is very clear that the prosecution had clearly established the guilt of the accused for the offence under Section 376 (f) of The Indian Penal Code. Under the said circumstances, the argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is sans merit. 12. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant had also argued that at the time of commission of offence, the accused was only a juvenile and at the most, the Court can pass conviction and he cannot be sentenced to imprisonment. But the trial Court without looking into the age of the accused had found him guilty under Section 376 (f) of The Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo ten years rigorous imprisonment and also imposed a fine of Rs.30,000/-. Therefore, the sentence passed by the trial Court against the accused is totally erroneous and the same is liable to be set aside. 13. For analysing the argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, the Court has to look into the evidence of P.W.9 the Doctor who determined the age of the accused. P.W.9 had clearly stated in his evidence that on 7/10/1997, X-ray had been taken with a view to determine the age of the accused and ultimately found that the accused is aged 17 and not reached 18. 14. At this juncture, it would be suitable to look into the decision reported in 2005 SUPREME COURT CASES (Cri.) - 742 (PRATAP SINGH Vs. 14. At this juncture, it would be suitable to look into the decision reported in 2005 SUPREME COURT CASES (Cri.) - 742 (PRATAP SINGH Vs. STATE OF JHARKHAND AND ANOTHER), wherein it had been clearly stated that "As per Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, the person who has not completed 18 years of age, would come within the purview of the said Act." 15. Further, it had also been clearly stated that "The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 is applicable to the pending cases and also having retrospective effect." 16. Further, in para 90, it had been stated like thus:- "In terms of the 1986 Act, a person who was not juvenile could be tried in any court. Section 20 of the Act of 2000 takes care of such a situation stating that despite the same, the trial shall continue in that court as if that Act has not been passed and in the event, he is found to be guilty of commission of an offence, a finding to that effect shall be recorded in the judgment of conviction, if any, but instead of passing any sentence in relation to the juvenile, he would be forwarded to the Board which shall pass orders in accordance with the provisions of the Act as if he has been satisfied on inquiry that a juvenile has committed the offence." 17. In 2004 M.L.J. (Crl.) - 960 (S.RAJKUMAR Vs. STATE REPRESENTED BY ITS INSPECTOR OF POLICE, THORAIPAKKAM POLICE STATION, CHENNAI), this Court had occasion to deal with a similar case, wherein this Court had held that "In view of Section 20 of the Act 56 of 2000, the juvenile accused should be referred to the Juvenile Board for passing appropriate orders." 18. From the close reading of the decisions referred to earlier, the Court can deduce the following aspects. a. As per Act 56 of 2000, the person who has not completed 18 years of age would come within the purview of the said Act. b. If any juvenile is found guilty for any offence, he cannot be sentenced and for passing appropriate orders, he should be referred to the Juvenile Justice Board. c. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 is having retrospective effect and applicable to all pending cases. 19. In the instant case, the occurrence had taken place on 29/9/1997. c. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 is having retrospective effect and applicable to all pending cases. 19. In the instant case, the occurrence had taken place on 29/9/1997. The trial Court had passed the conviction and sentence against the accused on 31/12/2001. Against the conviction and sentence, the present Criminal Appeal had been filed. 20. Further, as adverted to earlier, as per the evidence of P.W.9, on the date of commission of offence, the accused had not attained the age of 18 and therefore, on the date of commission of offence, the accused is nothing but a juvenile. Even though the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 had come into existence on the date of passing of the judgment in Sessions Case No.17 of 2000, the trial Court had failed to consider the same. After passing conviction, the trial Court ought to have referred the accused to the Juvenile Justice Board for passing appropriate orders. But the trial Court had erroneously sentenced the accused to a term of 10 years rigorous imprisonment. Therefore, as per the dictum given by the Apex Court as well as this Court, the sentence imposed by the trial Court against the accused is totally erroneous and the same is liable to be set aside. 21. In the light of the discussion made earlier, the conviction passed by the trial Court is confirmed and the sentence passed by the trial Court against the accused is set aside and for passing appropriate orders, the accused is referred to the Juvenile Justice Board. 22. With the above direction, this Criminal Appeal is disposed of.