V. M. SAHAI, SABHAJEET YADAV, JJ. ( 1 ) THE short question that arises for our consideration in this appeal is, where an insured has not preferred an appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against an award given by the Motor Accidents CLalms tribunal, is it open to the insurer to prefer an appeal against the award by the Tribunal questioning the quantum of compensation, as well as finding as regards negligence of the offending vehicle in absence of permission under section 170 of the Act granted by the Tribunal? ( 2 ) THIS appeal is preferred by insurance company/insurer of the offending vehicle under section 173 of the Act against the award dated 5. 5. 1999 passed by the Motor accidents CLalms Tribunal/special Judge, essential Commodities Act, Bareilly in the m. A. C. T. No. 340 of 1993 whereby Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 10,80,000 (rupees ten lakh eighty thousand) as the compensation along with 8 per cent interest thereon from the date of filing of clalm petition before the Tribunal to clalmants-respondents. No appeal appears to have been filed by the insured-owner of the offending motor vehicle. ( 3 ) THE facts leading to this appeal are that on 13. 8. 1993 Amod Lal and Sunil kumar Jain were travelling in Maruti van no. DNJ 194 from Bareilly to Nainital when an accident took place at about 5. 15 p. m. due to head-on collision between a maruti van and minibus No. UP 25-6493. In the accident Amod Lal died. The heirs of the deceased filed a clalm petition which was numbered as M. A. C. T. No. 340 of 1993 before the Motor Accidents CLalms tribunal clalming Rs. 30,00,000 as compensation on the ground that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of minibus No. UP 25-6493. It was clalmed that Amod Lal was serving in Western electronics, Okhla Industrial Area, New delhi and his salary was Rs. 8,000 per month and Rs. 4,000 was given to him as house Rent Allowance and other perks like car, telephone, bonus, etc. , were also provided. Owner of the minibus, respondent no. 5, filed written statement alleging that the vehicle was being driven by a driver, who was having a valid driving licence and the vehicle was insured with National Insurance Co. 4,000 was given to him as house Rent Allowance and other perks like car, telephone, bonus, etc. , were also provided. Owner of the minibus, respondent no. 5, filed written statement alleging that the vehicle was being driven by a driver, who was having a valid driving licence and the vehicle was insured with National Insurance Co. Ltd. from 7. 7. 1993 to 6. 7. 1994 as per cover note No. 704436 and liability, if any, to pay compensation was of the insurance company. National Insurance Co. Ltd. contested the clalm on the ground that the vehicle was not driven by a driver who was having valid driving licence and details of insurance policy had not been given. The clalmants are not legal representatives of the deceased and they are not entitled to any compensation. The accident took place due to negligent driving of the vehicle in which the deceased was travelling and the insurance company was not liable to pay any compensation. However, the Motor accidents CLalms Tribunal by its award dated 5. 5. 1999 awarded Rs. 10,80,000 as compensation to the clalmants for the death of deceased Amod Lal. While awarding aforesaid compensation the Tribunal has held that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of Mahindra minibus No. UP 25-6493 due to which Amod lal who was travelling in Maruti van had died. Tribunal has further held that on the date of accident the vehicle was insured by national Insurance Co. Ltd. and awarded rs. 10,80,000 compensation to be paid by the insurance company to the clalmants. ( 4 ) WE have heard Mr. M. S. Haq, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Shashi nandan, learned senior counsel assisted by ms. Awantika Banerji for the respondents. The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that quantum of compensation was excessive as dependency and multiplier had wrongly been worked out. There was contributory negligence of drivers of both the vehicles but this had not been considered by CLalms Tribunal in correct perspective though it was argued. On the other hand, learned counsel for the clalmants has urged that this appeal on quantum of compensation on merits including negligence or contributory negligence is not maintainable as no permission had been granted by the tribunal under section 170 of the Act. On the other hand, learned counsel for the clalmants has urged that this appeal on quantum of compensation on merits including negligence or contributory negligence is not maintainable as no permission had been granted by the tribunal under section 170 of the Act. ( 5 ) HONble Supreme Court has occasion to consider similar question in National insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nicolletta Rohtagi, 2002 ACJ 1950 (SC), wherein after analysing the relevant provisions of sections 147, 149, 170 and 173 of the Act in para 18 of the decision, Honble Apex Court held as under: " (18) The aforesaid provisions show two aspects. Firstly, that the insurer has only statutory defences available as provided in sub-section (2) of section 149 of the 1988 Act and, secondly, where the tribunal is of the view that there is a collusion between the clalmant and the insured, or the insured does not contest the clalm, the insurer can be made a party and on such impleadment the insurer shall have all defences available to it. Then comes the provision of section 173 which provides for an appeal against the award given by the Tribunal. Under section 173, any person aggrieved by an award is entitled to prefer an appeal to the High Court. Very often the question has arisen as to whether an insurer is entitled to file an appeal on the grounds available to the insured when either there is a collusion between the clalmants and the insured or when the insured has not filed an appeal before the High Court questioning the quantum of compensation. The consistent view of this court had been that the insurer has no right to file an appeal to challenge the quantum of compensation or finding of the Tribunal as regards negligence or contributory negligence of offending vehicle. " ( 6 ) FOR better understanding of the controversy, it would be useful to refer to the cases considered by Honble Apex Court in paras 19 to 23 of the aforesaid decision as under: " (19) In Shankarayya v. United India insurance Co. " ( 6 ) FOR better understanding of the controversy, it would be useful to refer to the cases considered by Honble Apex Court in paras 19 to 23 of the aforesaid decision as under: " (19) In Shankarayya v. United India insurance Co. Ltd. , 1998 ACJ 513 (SC), it was held that an insurance company when impleaded as a party by the court can be permitted to contest the proceedings on merits only if the conditions precedent mentioned in section 170 are found to be satisfied and for that purpose the insurance company has to obtain an order in writing from Tribunal and which should be a reasoned order by the Tribunal. Unless this procedure is followed, the insurance company cannot have a wider defence on merits than what is available to it by way of statutory defences. In absence of the existence of the conditions precedent mentioned in section 170, the insurance company was not entitled to file an appeal on merits questioning the quantum of compensation. (20) In Narendra Kumar v. Yarenissa, 1998 ACJ 244 (SC), question arose whether there can be a joint appeal by an insurer and owner of the offending vehicle. It was held that even in the case of a joint appeal by the insurer and the owner of an offending vehicle, if an award has been made against the tortfeasors as well as the insurer, even though an appeal filed by the insurer is not competent, it may not be dismissed as such. The tort-feasor can proceed with the appeal after the cause-title is suitably amended by deleting the name of the insurer. In the said case, it also held thus: the grounds on which the insurer can defend the action commenced against the tortfeasors are limited and unless one or more of those grounds is/are available, the insurance company is not and cannot be treated as a party to the proceedings. That is the reason why the courts have consistently taken the view that insurance company has no right to prefer an appeal under section 110-D of the Act unless it has been impleaded and allowed to defend on one or more of the grounds set out in sub-section (2) of section 96 or in the situation envisaged by sub-section (2-A) of section 110-C of the Act. (21) In Chinnama George v. N. K. Raju, 2000 ACJ 777 (SC), it was held that if none of the conditions as contained in sub-section (2) of section 149 exists for the insurer to avoid the liability, the insurer is legally bound to satisfy the award and the insurer cannot be a person aggrieved by the award. In such a case, the insurer will be barred from filing an appeal against the award of the Tribunal. It was also held that the insurer cannot maintain a joint appeal along with the owner or driver if defence of any ground under section 149 (2) is not available to it. (22) In Rita Devi v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. , 2000 ACJ 801 (SC), it was held that the insurer having not obtained permission under section 170 of the 1988 Act, is not entitled to prefer any appeal to the High Court against the award given by the Tribunal on merits. (23) However, in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bhushan Sachdeva, 2002 ACJ 333 (SC), it was held that where the insured fails to file an appeal to the High Court against the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the insurer is entitled to file an appeal as the insured has failed to contest the clalm and in that view of the matter, the insurer could be a person aggrieved. This is the only decision which has taken a contrary view to the consistent view of this court in regard to maintainability of appeal at the instance of an insurer. In our view, the decision in United India Insurance co. Ltd. v. Bhushan Sachdeva (supra), does not lay down the correct view of law for the reasons stated hereinafter. " ( 7 ) THEREAFTER Honble Supreme Court in paras 26, 27, 30, 31 and 32 of the decision held as under: " (26) For the aforesaid reasons, an insurer if aggrieved against an award, may file an appeal only on those grounds and no other. " ( 7 ) THEREAFTER Honble Supreme Court in paras 26, 27, 30, 31 and 32 of the decision held as under: " (26) For the aforesaid reasons, an insurer if aggrieved against an award, may file an appeal only on those grounds and no other. However, by virtue of section 170 of the 1988 Act, where in course of an inquiry the CLalms Tribunal is satisfied that (a) there is a collusion between the person making a clalm and the person against whom the clalm has been made or (b) the person against whom the clalm has been made has failed to contest the clalm, the Tribunal may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, implead the insurer and in that case it is permissible for the insurer to contest the clalm also on the grounds which are available to the insured or to the person against whom the clalm has been made. Thus, unless an order is passed by Tribunal permitting the insurer to avail the grounds available to an insured or any other person against whom a clalm has been made on being satisfied of the two conditions specified in section 170 of the Act, it is not permissible to the insurer to contest the clalm on the grounds which are available to the insured or to a person against whom a clalm has been made. Thus where conditions precedent embodied in section 170 are satisfied and the award is adverse to the interest of the insurer, the insurer has a right to file an appeal challenging the quantum of compensation or negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle even if the insured has not filed any appeal against the quantum of compensation. Sections 149, 170 and 173 are part of one scheme and if we give any different interpretation to section 170 of the 1988 Act, the same would go contrary to the scheme and object of the act. (27) This matter may be examined from another angle. The right of appeal is not an inherent right or common law right, but it is a statutory right. If the law provides that an appeal can be filed on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged on the premises that the insured or the persons against whom a clalm has been made, has not filed any appeal. The right of appeal is not an inherent right or common law right, but it is a statutory right. If the law provides that an appeal can be filed on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged on the premises that the insured or the persons against whom a clalm has been made, has not filed any appeal. Section 149 (2) of 1988 Act limits the insurers appeal on those enumerated grounds and the appeal being a product of the statute, it is not open to an insurer to take any plea other than those provided in section 149 (2) of 1988 Act. The view taken in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bhushan Sachdeva, 2002 ACJ 333 (SC), that a right to contest would also include the right to file an appeal is contrary to \vell established law that creation of a right to appeal is an act which requires legislative authority and no court or Tribunal can confer such right, it being one oflimitation or extension of jurisdiction. Further, the view taken in United india Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bhushan sachdeva (supra) that since the insurance companies are nationalised and are dealing with public money/funds and to deny them the right of appeal when there is a collusion between the clalmants and the insured would mean draining out or abuse of public fund is contrary to the object and intention of Parliament behind enacting Chapter XI of 1988 Act. The main object of enacting Chapter XI of 1988 Act was to protect the interest of the victims of motor vehicle accidents and it is for that reason the insurance of all motor vehicles has been made statu-torily compulsory. Compulsory insurance of motor vehicle was not to promote the business interest of insurer engaged in the business of insurance. Provisions embodied either in 1939 or 1988 Act have been purposely enacted to protect the interest of travelling public or those using road from the risk attendant upon the user of motor vehicles on the roads. If law would have provided for compensation to dependants of victims of motor vehicle accident, that would not have been sufficient unless there is a guarantee that compensation awarded to an injured or dependant of the victims of motor accident will be recoverable from person held liable for the consequences of the accident. In Skandia Insurance Co. If law would have provided for compensation to dependants of victims of motor vehicle accident, that would not have been sufficient unless there is a guarantee that compensation awarded to an injured or dependant of the victims of motor accident will be recoverable from person held liable for the consequences of the accident. In Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan, 1987 ACJ 411 (SC), it was observed thus: in other words, the legislature has insisted and made it incumbent on the user of a motor vehicle to be armed with an insurance policy covering third party risks which is in conformity with the provisions enacted by the legislature. It is so provided in order to ensure that the injured victims of automobile accidents or the dependants of the victims of fatal accidents are really compensated in terms of money and not in terms of promise. Such a benign provision enacted by the legislature having regard to the fact that in the modern age the use of motor vehicles notwithstanding the attendant hazards, has become an inescapable fact of life, has to be interpreted in a meaningful manner which serves rather than defeats the purpose of the legislation. The provision has, therefore, to be interpreted in the twilight of the aforesaid perspective. (30) It was then urged that if there is a collusion between the clalmants and the insured or the insured does not contest the clalm and the Tribunal does not im-plead the insurance company to contest the clalm on grounds available to the insured or the persons against whom clalm has been made, or in such a situation when the insurer files an application for permission to contest the clalm on merit and the same is rejected or where clalmant has obtained an award by playing fraud, in such cases the insurer has a right of appeal to contest the award on merits and the appeal would be maintainable. (31) We have already held that unless the conditions precedent specified in section 170 of 1988 Act are satisfied, an insurance company has no right of appeal to challenge the award on merits. (31) We have already held that unless the conditions precedent specified in section 170 of 1988 Act are satisfied, an insurance company has no right of appeal to challenge the award on merits. However, in a situation where there is a collusion between the clalmants and the insured or the insured does not contest the clalm and, further, the Tribunal does not implead the insurance company to contest the clalm, in such cases it is open to an insurer to seek permission of Tribunal to contest the clalm on the grounds available to the insured or to a person against whom a clalm has been made. If permission is granted and the insurer is allowed to contest the clalm on merits, in that case it is open to the insurer to file an appeal against an award on merits, if aggrieved. In any case, where an application for permission is erroneously rejected the insurer can challenge only that part of the order while filing an appeal on grounds specified in sub-section (2)of section 149 of 1988 Act. But such application for permission has to be bona fide and filed at the stage when the insured is required to lead his evidence. So far as obtaining compensation by fraud by the clalmant is concerned, it is no longer res Integra that fraud vitiates the entire proceeding and in such cases it is open to an insurer to apply to the Tribunal for rectification of award. (32) For the aforesaid reasons, our answer to the question is that even if no appeal is preferred under section 173 of 1988 Act by an insured against the award of a Tribunal, it is not permissible for an insurer to file an appeal questioning the quantum of compensation as well as findings as regards negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle. " ( 8 ) IN view of the aforesaid legal position as explalned by the Apex Court, it is clear that in absence of any permission granted by the Tribunal under section 170 of the motor Vehicles Act the insurer/insurance company can file appeal challenging the award only on the limited grounds available to the insurer under section 149 (2) of the act. In our opinion, it is not open for the insurer appellant to challenge the quantum of compensation fixed by Tribunal on merits including the ground of negligence and/or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle. ( 9 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that if an insured has not filed any appeal, it means he has failed to contest the clalm and that the right to contest includes the right to contest by filing an appeal against the award of Tribunal as well and in such situation an appeal by insurer questioning the quantum of compensation including negligence or contributory negligence would be maintainable or in a situation when the insurer files an application for permission to contest the clalm on merits and the same is rejected or where the liability of payment of compensation is fastened upon the insurer and the insured does not prefer appeal against the award of Motor accidents CLalms Tribunal in that situation the award made by Motor Accidents CLalms tribunal on the question of quantum of compensation as much as on the question of negligence or contributory negligence howsoever erroneous it may be, would attain the finality and if the insurer cannot be permitted to challenge the same by filing appeal under section 173 of the Act on the quantum of compensation on merits including negligence of offending vehicle, in that situation it would cause serious mischief and miscarriage of justice, cannot be accepted for the simple reason that Honble supreme Court has dealt with the issue in quite detail and has also repelled somewhat similar contention raised by appellant in the aforesaid case, therefore, this court cannot take different view in the matter as the law declared by Honble Apex Court is binding upon us. ( 10 ) FROM the records, we do not find that any ground had been taken by the insurance company that there was any breach of insurance policy. We have also examined the records. We do not find that any permission had been applied by the insurance company under section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the same was either refused or granted by the CLalms tribunal. We have also examined the records. We do not find that any permission had been applied by the insurance company under section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the same was either refused or granted by the CLalms tribunal. ( 11 ) IN view of our findings the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the accident took place due to contributory negligence of drivers of both the vehicles had not been considered by the Tribunal cannot be accepted. Thus, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Office is directed to send back the records of the court below expeditiously. Parties shall bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed. .