JUDGMENT Honble Vinod Prasad, J.—The revisionist was tried by C.J.M. Rampur in Crl. Appeal No. 05 of 2006, Ram Avtar v. Preetam Singh and another, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1981, P.S. Civil Lines, District Rampur. 2. The complaint-allegations against the revisionist as were levelled by Preetam Singh Badhwa were that the revisionist had taken a loan of a total amount of Rs. 2,80,000/- from the complainant on various dates 22-11-1999, 26-11-1999 and 30-11-2000. On the demand being made for return of the said loan amount, the accused issued an account payee cheque No. 090667 dated 5-2-2002 of Punjab and Sindh Bank, Bheet, Rampur on 1-3-2002 at 9.00 a.m. at the house of the complainant of an amount of Rs. 1,80,000/- which was deposited on the same day by the complainant in his account in the same Bank for encashment. However, the said cheque was dishonoured by the bank on 5-3-2002 because it exceed arrangement. Since the cheque amount remained unpaid, a notice as is contemplated under Section 138 of the N.I. Act was sent by the complainant to the revisionist on 15-3-2002. The complainant also sent another notice on 18-3-2002 to the revisionist through registered post asking for payment of cheque amount. Inspite of receipt of said notices the revisionist accused did not pay the money demanded and consequently the complainant lodged a complaint in Court on 30-4-2002 under Section 138 of N. I. Act. 3. In support of his complaint, the complainant Preetam Singh Badhwa examined himself as P.W. 1, Paramjeet Singh, Manager, Punjab and Sindh Bank, Bheet, District Rampur as P.W. 2 to establish his case. 4. Under Section 313, Cr.P.C. the accused took the defence of false implication and pleaded that he had taken a loan of Rs. 1,00,000/- only and the two cheques were given by him by way of security. One of those two cheques is the cheque in dispute, the other cheque was Cheque No. 090668. In his defence the accused-revisionist Ram Avtar Gupta examined himself as D.W. 1. 5. 1,00,000/- only and the two cheques were given by him by way of security. One of those two cheques is the cheque in dispute, the other cheque was Cheque No. 090668. In his defence the accused-revisionist Ram Avtar Gupta examined himself as D.W. 1. 5. The trial Court after appreciation of the evidences lead in the trial came to the conclusion that the complaint had proved his case beyond all reasonable doubt and consequently it convicted the revisionist vide its impugned judgment dated 31-1-2006 for offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and on 2-2-2006, the trial Court sentenced him to two years simple imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 2,00,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further six months simple imprisonment. It further ordered that out of the amount of fine Rs. 2,000/- shall be forfeited in favour of the Government and rest of the amount shall be handed over to the complainant. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence recorded by C.J.M. Rampur on 31-1-2006/2-2-2006, the revisionist preferred Crl. Appeal No. 05 of 2006 before the Sessions Judge, Rampur, which was transferred to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 3 Rampur for disposal. The aforesaid appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed by the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Rampur vide its impugned order dated 28-9-2006 on the grounds that the appellant accused had not complied with the order of depositing Rs. 2,00,000/- within the period of 20 days and that he had also not appeared to argue the appeal. Hence this revision challenging the lower appellate Courts order as well as conviction and sentences mentioned above. 7. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the appeal preferred by the appellant could not have been dismissed on the ground that the interim order passed at the time of admission of the appeal was not complied with by him. He further submitted that the appeal could have been decided on its merit and the criminal appeal could not have been dismissed in default in the absence of the appellant. 8. The learned A.G.A. also could not support the impugned judgment passed by the lower appellate Court on 28-9-2006. 9. I have gone through the two impugned judgments. Negotiable Instrument Act is not a self contained code. 8. The learned A.G.A. also could not support the impugned judgment passed by the lower appellate Court on 28-9-2006. 9. I have gone through the two impugned judgments. Negotiable Instrument Act is not a self contained code. For appellate Court procedure it has to follow the procedure as is laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’). There is no procedure for dismissing the appeal in default under Section 386, Cr.P.C. Section 385 of the code provides for the “Procedure for hearing appeals not dismissed summarily”. It is provided that if the appeal is not dismissed at the admission stage summarily, then the appellate Court will fix date for hearing of the appeal and will give a notice of the same to the appellant or his pleader, to the Government officer/State Counsel and to the complainant in case the appeal is filed against conviction in a complaint case and on the date, so fixed, it will hear the Counsel for the appellant or the appellants, State Counsel and if need be to the complainant or his Counsel and then decide the appeal on its merit. This procedure is engrafted under Sections 385, 386 and 387 of the Code, which cannot be eschewed by the appellate Court while hearing an appeal. 10. In the instant case, neither the appellant nor his Counsel appeared in the lower appellate Court to argue the appeal. The appellate Court under such circumstances should have issued notices to the appellant and should have heard him in person. He could not have dismissed the appeal in absence of appellant or at least he should have decided the appeal on its merit with help of the Additional District Government Counsel. Further the appeal preferred by an accused against his conviction and sentence, could not have been dismissed on the ground that the appellant had not abided by the interim order passed by the appellate Court at the time of admission of the appeal. The Code does not provide such an eventuality. A novel procedure was adopted by the lower appellate Court, which is not countenanced by the Code. Where the procedure of hearing of appeals is prescribed the appeal should be heard in the manner/procedure so prescribed. The Court cannot deviate from such a prescribed procedure. The Code does not provide such an eventuality. A novel procedure was adopted by the lower appellate Court, which is not countenanced by the Code. Where the procedure of hearing of appeals is prescribed the appeal should be heard in the manner/procedure so prescribed. The Court cannot deviate from such a prescribed procedure. Thus the lower appellate Court has committed a manifest error of law in passing the impugned order. The said order dated 28-9-2006 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 3 Rampur, in Appeal No. 5 of 2006, therefore, cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside. The matter is remanded back to the lower appellate Court to rehear Appeal No. 5 of 2006 again and decide the same in accordance with law. The appellant will have all the rights, which he has got under the Code to argue the matter before the lower appellate Court. The complainant will also have all the rights before the lower appellate Court and the lower appellate Court is directed to hear the complainant or his Counsel in accordance with Section 385 (i) and (iii), Cr.P.C. Since the lower appellate Court has committed a procedural illegality and also because the matter is being remanded back for rehearing the appeal with all the rights to both the parties intact that I had not issued notices to the complainant in this revision as that would have further delayed the disposal of this revision for months. Since I am remanding the matter back to the lower appellate Court to decide the appeal afresh, I consider it appropriate to direct the lower appellate Court not to be prejudiced by this order or his earlier order which has been set aside. The lower appellate Court is directed to decide the appeal within one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order by it positively by noticing to all the three parties. In view of what I have stated above, this revision is allowed with the above observations. ————