Judgment : In this writ petition, the petitioner is seeking to quash the order of sanction dated 23.6.2004 granted by the first respondent on the ground that it was passed without any application of mind. When questioned as to how the writ petition is being filed after a period of two years, AR.L. Sundaresan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that his client came to possess a copy of the order only when P.W.1 was examined before the trial Court (XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet) in C.C. No. 4791 of 2004. The said prosecution was launched against the writ petitioner under Sections 14(2-A), 14 A (1-B) and 14 A (2) of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1952 (for short, ‘PF Act‘). 2. Section 14A(2) of the PF Act provides the offence for which prosecution can be launched. Section 14A(2) reads as follows : “Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under the Act the Scheme or the Pension Scheme or the Insurance Scheme has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance, of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director or manager, secretary or any other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.” 3. However, Section 14(a)(c)(1) of the PF Act provides for previous sanction as a must for taking cognizance of any offence punishable under the PF Act. It is seen from the records filed by the petitioner, a copy of the compliant is found in pages 77 to 79 of the typed set and paragraph 9 of the complaint reads as follows : “The sanction for the above prosecution has been granted by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner - II (Exem). The sanction order Number C4/TN/17459/Exem/Regl./2004 dated 23.6.2004 is produced herewith.” 4. This complaint was lodged as early as 2004 and a copy of the same was served to the petitioner. Therefore, even at the time of receipt of the copy of the complaint, the petitioner must be aware of the legal provisions of the PF Act as well as its factual position. The sanction order has been field along with the complaint in CC.No.4791 of 2004. Therefore, even at the time of receipt of the copy of the complaint, the petitioner must be aware of the legal provisions of the PF Act as well as its factual position. The sanction order has been field along with the complaint in CC.No.4791 of 2004. He could have very well applied for a copy of the same and could have taken legal steps two years earlier. The conduct of the petitioner to wait eternally and taking a copy of the sanction as and when it was marked at the time of examination of P.W.1 and coming to this Court and claiming that he came to possess the same only in the year 2006 cannot be believed and the petitioner is guilty of latches. At this advance stage of trial, it is not proper to entertain this writ petition. 5. However, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner was that in identical circumstances, this Court had granted an interim stay in W.P.No.589 of 2005, and therefore, he must also be entitled for a similar order. The said contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the said order is an exparte order and also no reason has been mentioned for the grant of stay. Hence, it cannot be cited as a precedent. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that once it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the order of the first respondent is without application of mind, then this Court, notwithstanding the fact of delay, should go into the question and save the petitioner from an unnecessary harassment by the respondent Department. 6. In viewof the aforesaid submission, this Court considered the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel was that the first respondent while passing the impugned sanction order dated 23.6.2004, had stated in page 2 of the order that the petitioner was earlier convicted for similar failures as per the particulars mentioned in Schedule II provided therein and, therefore, he is liable for punishment under Section 14AA of the PF Act. he drew the attention of this Court to the following portion found in the sanction order : “AND WHEREAS I am further satisfied that the employer of the said Alacrity Foundations Private Limited, T. Nagar,Chennai- 600 017 had been convicted earlier for the similar failures as per the particulars mentioned in Schedule II below and are, therefore, liable to be punishable under Section 14AA of the Act. But, however, the Schedule II appended below this passage reads as follows : SCHEDULE II Particulars of Previous Convictions Nature of Offence Period Case Number & Name of the Court Provisions of the Act and Scheme under which convicted Penalty imposed Date of judgment NIL. 7. Because of the preamble to Schedule II portion of the order, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that there is non-application of mind. However, the learned Senior Counsel failed to note that it is not the case of the Department that any wrong particulars are given in Schedule II. Then only, it will become a non-application of mind and the preamble portion found above the Schedule II has been done in a mechanical fashion. In any event, as found in the preamble to Schedule I, sanction has been granted and that the petitioner is liable to be prosecuted for an offence punishable under Section 14 (2)(A) of the PF Act. Therefore, there is no non-application of mind by the first respondent as contended by the learned Senior Counsel. Perhaps, since the petitioner is facing as many as 13 prosecutions (C.C. Nos. 4787 to 4791 of 2004 and C.C. Nos. 8298 to 8305 of 2004), the authority might have indicated in this fashion. The question of application of Section 14AA of the PF Act will arise only for enhancing punishment and that is a factor to be considered by the trial Court at the time of imposing punishment and no trial Court will be carried away by the sanction order as it is not a proof to show that the person had been previously convicted. Unless and otherwise the Departmental officials, who are prosecuting the petitioner, produce proof for previous convictions as a matter of fact and introduce evidence towards that effect, the trial Court will not be carried away by any statement found in the sanction order. Therefore, the petitioner need not have any apprehension about his not getting any fair trial in a matter of this nature. Therefore, the petitioner need not have any apprehension about his not getting any fair trial in a matter of this nature. 8. In this context, it is relevant to quote Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 465. Finding or sentence when reversibly by reason of error, omission or irregularity.- (1) Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence, or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a Court of appeal, confirmation or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution, unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.” (Emphasis added) 9. Therefore, for the above section, is an embargo on the appellate Court to go into the question of irregularity in a sanction order unless the trial Court records a finding to that effect. In the present case, such a situation has not arisen because there is no opinion by the trial Court and in any event, this Court has found that there are no error or irregularity in the order of sanction for prosecution. 10. While dealing with the amendment made to the provisions of the PF Act and making the imposition of penalty as stringent, the Supreme Court vide its decision reported in N. K. Jain and Others v. C. K. Shan and Others N. K. Jain and Others v. C. K. Shan and Others N. K. Jain and Others v. C. K. Shan and Others , AIR 1991 SC 1289 : 1995-III-LLJ-300: (1991) 2 SCC 495 has observed in paragraph 11 as follows at pp. 309 & 310 of LLJ: “ 11. The penalties mentioned in this connection would indicate that the legislature envisaged that a penalty should necessarily mean imprisonment or at least imposition of fine. We find from the reports that the National Commission of Labour having found that the working of the Employees‘ Provident Fund and Family Pension Fund Act, 1952 are not effective and that in order to check the growth of arrears penalties for defaults in payment of provident fund dues should be made more stringent and the default should be made cognizable. Accordingly, it was proposed to amend the Act so as to render penal provisions more stringent and to make defaults cognizable offences and provisions were also made for compulsory imprisonment in case of non-payment of contributions and administrative and inspection charges. The provisions of the Act thereafter are suitably amended. We must bear this object and reasons in mind in examining.” ( Emphasis added). 11. A Full Bench of this Court in its decision reported in Gowri Spinning Mills (P) Ltd. v. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner and Another Gowri Spinning Mills (P) Ltd. v. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner and Another Gowri Spinning Mills (P) Ltd. v. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner and Another (2006) 4 MLJ 1261 (FB): 2006 (5) CTC 1 in paragraph 14, dealing with the special nature of the PF Act, held as follows at p. 1270 of MLJ : “ 15. Provident Fund is the foundation of an important measure of social security provided to employees of those establishments to whom the Act applies. Int‘he aforesaid situation, an employer cannot refuse to comply with the statutory mandate to pay the contribution made by the employees as also his share, which was by way of social security scheme.” 12. If the object as mentioned above is taken note of, then the Court dealing with the writ petition seeking to quash the prosecution under the PF Act, will have to slowly and only in an extraordinary case, can entertain a petition of this nature to quash the Criminal proceedings. In fact, the question with reference to the power to quash the criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has come up for consideration by the Supreme Court in several matters. Even while exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the criminal proceedings, this Court can have only that much discretion. Therefore, the relevant decisions in this regard may be quoted usefully. 12.1 In the decision reported in Radhey Shyam Khemka and Another v. State of Bihar Radhey Shyam Khemka and Another v. State of Bihar Radhey Shyam Khemka and Another v. State of Bihar (1993) 3 SCC 54 in Paragraph 8, the Supreme Court struck a note of caution, which reads as follows : “ 8. …. 12.1 In the decision reported in Radhey Shyam Khemka and Another v. State of Bihar Radhey Shyam Khemka and Another v. State of Bihar Radhey Shyam Khemka and Another v. State of Bihar (1993) 3 SCC 54 in Paragraph 8, the Supreme Court struck a note of caution, which reads as follows : “ 8. …. This Court has repeatedly pointed out that the High Court should not, while exercising power under Section 482 of the Code, usurp the jurisdiction of the trial Court. The power under Section 482 of the Court had been vested in the High Court to quash a prosecution which amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. But that power cannot be exercised by the High Court to hold a parallel trial.” 12.2 Similarly, in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, and Another State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, and Another State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, and Another , AIR 2002 SC 671 : (2002) 1 SCR 275 : (2002) 3 SCC 89 the Supreme Court in paragraph 8, observed as follows : “ 8 .. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SC 335). A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows : (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” (Emphasis added) 12.3 The Supreme Court reiterated a similar view in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa , (supra) and in paragraph 9, it was held as follows : “ 9. …. the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. ….. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. ….. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. ….. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court.” 13. In the present case, no attack is made on the complaint. What is argued as non-application of mind as found in the sanction order is at the maximum is a proforma statement used by the first respondent in a matter of this nature. Because in Schedule II, no detail about his previous conviction is given and, therefore, it cannot be said that the authority has applied his mind on wrong information or had erroneously come to any conclusion. Perhaps the Department is using Schedule II for the purpose of impressing the trial Magistrates the need to give enhanced punishment as provided under Section 14AA of the PF Act. Therefore, the petitioner has not made out any case and he has to stand the trial and prove their innocence before the trial Court. 14. Perhaps the Department is using Schedule II for the purpose of impressing the trial Magistrates the need to give enhanced punishment as provided under Section 14AA of the PF Act. Therefore, the petitioner has not made out any case and he has to stand the trial and prove their innocence before the trial Court. 14. Before concluding, it will be worth referring to the warning given by the Supreme Court to all the trial Courts including the High Court vide its decision reported in Peoples Union for Democratic Rights and Others v. Union of India and Others Peoples Union for Democratic Rights and Others v. Union of India and Others Peoples Union for Democratic Rights and Others v. Union of India and Others AIR 1982 SC 1473 : (1982) 3 SCC 235 : 1982-II-LLJ-454, which is found in paragraph 7 of the judgment and which reads as follows at pp. 461 & 462 of LLJ : “ 7.…….. We do not propose to go into the details of these prosecutions launched against the contractors but we are shocked to find that in cases of violations of labour laws enacted for the benefit of workmen, the Magistrates have been imposing only small fines of Rs.200 thereabouts. The Magistrates seem to view the violations of labour laws with great indifference and unconcern as if they are trifling offences under serving of judicial severity. They seem to overlook the fact that labour laws are enacted for improving the conditions of workers and the employers cannot be allowed to buy immunity against violations of labour laws by paying a paltry fine which they would not mind paying, because by violating the labour laws they would be making profit which would far exceed the amount of the fine. If violations of labour laws are going to be punished only be meagre fines, it would be impossible to ensure observance of the labour laws and the labour laws would be reduced to nullity. They would remain merely paper tigers without any teeth or claws. We would like to impress upon the Magistrates and Judges in the Country that violations of labour laws must be viewed with strictness and whenever any violations of labour laws are established before them they should punish the errant employers by imposing adequate punishment.” (Emphasis added) 15. They would remain merely paper tigers without any teeth or claws. We would like to impress upon the Magistrates and Judges in the Country that violations of labour laws must be viewed with strictness and whenever any violations of labour laws are established before them they should punish the errant employers by imposing adequate punishment.” (Emphasis added) 15. In the light of the binding precedents quoted above, the writ petition fails and the same shall stand dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected M.P.Nos. 1 and 2 of 2006 shall also stand closed.