K. M. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) CIVIL Application No. 12410 of 2005 has been filed by Union of India and other applicants, original appellants, seeking condonation of delay of 49 days in filing the restoration application being Misc. Civil application Stamp No. 2879 of 2005. The first Appeal came to be dismissed for want of prosecution on 31st August 2005 by a division Bench of this Court (Coram: r. S. Garg and K. M. Mehta, JJ ). At the time of hearing the Civil Application for condonation of delay of which rule has been issued and duly served on the respondents, learned advocate Shri s. M. Shah appearing for the respondents with learned advocate Shri M. A. Parekh submitted that both the applications, i. e. Civil Application lor condonation of delay as well as the Misc. Civil Application for restoration of the First Appeal be heard together. He submitted that since the grounds available to the respondents to oppose condonation of delay and restoration of appeal are common, both the applications be heard simultaneously. At his request, therefore, Civil Application for condonation of delay as well as Misc. Civil application for restoration were heard together. "to complete the formalities, therefore, Office shall give regular number to the Misc. Civil Application in which rale is hereby issued which is waived by learned advocate Shri M. A. Parekh for the respondents. " ( 2 ) WE have heard Mr. Jitendra Malkan, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India for Union of India and on behalf of the opponent we have heard Mr. S. M. Shah, learned advocate with Mr. M. A. Parekh, learned advocate. (1 ). Mr. Jitendra Malkan, learned Asst. Solicitor General of India, for the applicant states that the appellant originally filed the aforesaid First Appeal before this Court challenging the judgement and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior division), Anand, in Special Civil Suit No. 67 of 1989 on 3. 12. 1997 whereby the suit filed by Shri Somabhai Ranchhodbhai patel, original respondent herein, was partly allowed and decree in favour of the original respondent was passed for a sum of Rs. 9,33,378/- along with interest at the rate of 6% from the dale of suit, i. e. 16. 3. 1982 together with costs. (2 ). The aforesaid appeal was admitted by the Division Bench of this Court by order dated 3. 11. 1989. 9,33,378/- along with interest at the rate of 6% from the dale of suit, i. e. 16. 3. 1982 together with costs. (2 ). The aforesaid appeal was admitted by the Division Bench of this Court by order dated 3. 11. 1989. The aforesaid matter was placed for hearing before this Court (Coram: R. S. Garg and K. M. Mehta, JJ) on 30. 8. 2005. On that day nobody appeared on behalf of the appellant. So the Division bench kept the matter on 31. 8. 2005. On 31. 8. 2005 also as nobody appeared for the appellant, the Court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. ( 3 ) MR. Malkan, learned Asst. Solicitor general of India, states that when the aforesaid appeal was admitted on 3. 11. 1989 and when the matter was actually heard on 30. 8. 2005, the learned central Government Standing Counsel appearing at the relevant point of time had been changed. The Department could not apprise the newly appointed Assistant solicitor General as the Department was not aware about the listing of the matter before the Court. Thereafter, the department came to know about the dismissal of the matter only on 27. 10. 2005 when the appellant received copy of the order passed by this Court from the learned civil Judge (S. D.), Anand, on that day. (1 ). Thereafter, the appellant had taken immediate steps for filing an application for restoration of the matter and the same is filed on 16. 11. 2005. Mr. Malkan has stated that the appellant before this Court is central Government and when the appeal was pending since 1989 till 2005 several standing Counsel have been changed. The present Asst. Solicitor General of India who normally appears on behalf of the union of India was not aware of this fact and ultimately the Court has dismissed the matter for want of prosecution. He states that the appeal involves question of large amount and if the present order would continue then the respondent will receive the said amount without any proper adjudication from this Court. He has stated that the Hon ble Supreme Court has taken a view that when the appellant is the government and when the delay condonation application is filed, the Court should take a liberal view. (2 ). On behalf of the opponent Mr. S. M. Shah, learned Advocate with Mr. M. A. Parekh, Id. He has stated that the Hon ble Supreme Court has taken a view that when the appellant is the government and when the delay condonation application is filed, the Court should take a liberal view. (2 ). On behalf of the opponent Mr. S. M. Shah, learned Advocate with Mr. M. A. Parekh, Id. Advocate, appears. He has filed affidavit of one Navin Somabhai Patel on behalf of the opponent. He has also invited our attention to several facts. He has raised the contention that the affidavit filed by the appellant where it has been stated that facts stated in para 1 to 9 are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. The same is not a proper affidavit. Therefore, the delay should not be condoned. He has relied on the provisions of Order XIX of the Code of Civil Procedure and also relied on the judgement of the Hon ble Apex court in the case of A. K. K. Nambiar v. Union of India reported in AIR 1970 SC 652 whereunder Order XIX Rule 1 affidavit has to be filed after due verification and if the affidavit is not properly verified it cannot be admitted in evidence. As far as the restoration is concerned, the Union of india has stated that they have come to know about the order only on 27. 10. 2005. The said averment is not proper and limitation starts from the date of dismissal of the appeal, i. e. from 31. 8. 2005 and in support of the same, he has relied on the provisions of Order 21 Rule 106 (3) of the code of Civil Procedure and the judgement of the Hon ble Apex Court in the case of damodaran Pillai v. South Indian Bank ltd. (reported in AIR 2005 SC 3460 ). He has further stated that when there is gross delay and the same has not been properly explained even in the affidavit, the Court must not condone the delay. (reported in AIR 2005 SC 3460 ). He has further stated that when there is gross delay and the same has not been properly explained even in the affidavit, the Court must not condone the delay. He has further stated that even if the Court is inclined to condone the delay then at least some condition may be imposed that whatever amount which has been deposited by the union of India in which the Hon ble supreme Court has stated that the respondent is allowed to withdraw the amount after satisfaction of the Trial Court, then the same may be allowed to be withdrawn by the respondent on furnishing security without insisting on giving Bank guarantee. (3 ). On the other hand Mr. Jitendra malkan in rejoinder has stated that even if it has been staled that the Appeal has been dismissed from 31. 8. 2005 then thirty days period from the date of the order would be completed on 29. 9. 2005. Therefore, the delay has to be considered from 29. 9. 2005 and he has filed the present application on 16. 11. 2005. In-between from 29. 10. 2005 to 13. 11. 2005 there were Diwali holidays and therefore there is delay in filing the application. (4 ). We have to consider delay application filed by the Union of India for condoning the delay in filing the restoration application which is filed with 49 days delay. It is settled law that the legislature has conferred power to condone delay by enacting S. 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on "merits". "the expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. Jt is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. (Re: AIR 1987 SC 1353 Collector. Land Acquisition, anantnag v. Katiji) (5 ). In litigations to which Government (either State or Central) is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. (Re: AIR 1987 SC 1353 Collector. Land Acquisition, anantnag v. Katiji) (5 ). In litigations to which Government (either State or Central) is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. However, when government is there, a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where government makes out a case where public interest is shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith. XXXXXXXXX implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process. And therefore somewhat different approach is to have taken when the Government is party in the limitation. (See: AIR 1988 SC 897 g. Ramegowda v. Special Land Acquisition officer. Bangalore) (6 ). Similar view has been taken by the hon ble Apex Court in the case of Special tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Keral v. K. V. Ayisuma (reported in AIR 1996 SC 2750 )and also in the case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani ( AIR 1996 SC 1623 ). (7 ). Similar view was taken by the hon ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, AIR 2000 SC 2306 . While condoning the delay caused in filing the petition by the State of bihar, the Hon ble Supreme Court observed that with the object of doing substantial justice and sufficient cause having been made out, the petitioners have persuaded the Court to condone the delay in filing the petitions. It was further observed that dismissing the appeal on technical ground of limitation would not in any way advance the interests of justice but admittedly result in failure of justice. (8 ). It was further observed that dismissing the appeal on technical ground of limitation would not in any way advance the interests of justice but admittedly result in failure of justice. (8 ). In the decision of State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO, 2005 AIR SCW 1748, the hon ble Supreme Court in para 15 observed that experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal)and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. In para 16 of the judgment, it was further observed that it would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process. In para 17, it was further observed that it is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or otherwise -is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. (9 ). All these decisions show "sufficient cause" has been liberally construed particularly when Government is a party. In view of the same, delay is condoned. ( 4 ) EVEN otherwise having considered the rival submissions we find that the delay is required to be condoned. It is no doubt true that the matter has been dismissed for want of prosecution on 31. 8. 2005 when nobody appeared on behalf of the appellants. In view of the same, delay is condoned. ( 4 ) EVEN otherwise having considered the rival submissions we find that the delay is required to be condoned. It is no doubt true that the matter has been dismissed for want of prosecution on 31. 8. 2005 when nobody appeared on behalf of the appellants. However, we see considerable force in explanation offered by the learned Assistant solicitor General of India that there were changes in the set up of Standing Counsel of the Union of India from 1989 to 2005. The present Asst. Solicitor General of India was not aware about the listing of the matter for final hearing and therefore mere is a bona fide error on their part. The department was not aware about the same because normally in the High Court the Department was represented through Standing Counsel of the central Government. So in our view the Central Government has been able to show "sufficient cause" and therefore delay in filing this application is required to be condoned and is accordingly condoned. ( 5 ) LEARNED advocate Shri S. M. Shall, as noted earlier, has objected to the form of affidavit filed by the deponent on the Civil application for condonation of delay. We do not find sufficient reason to discard the civil Application solely on such a technical contention particularly so when the explanation rendered for late filing of the restoration application is borne out from the record. Primarily, it is the case of the applicants that on account of change in the set-up of the Counsel for the Central government, the counsel was not aware about listing of the matter nor was the department conscious about the same, due to which no representation could be made on behalf of the applicants. The respondents have not controverted these aspects of the matter. Considering all these aspects of the matter, we do not find it appropriate to reject the application only on the ground that the deponent has not separately stated as to which paragraph of the application is on the basis of his knowledge and which is borne out from the information collected by him. The prayer of the respondents that the decretal amount be permitted to be withdrawn by them without insisting on a Bank guarantee and only upon furnishing a security cannot be gone into in these proceedings. The prayer of the respondents that the decretal amount be permitted to be withdrawn by them without insisting on a Bank guarantee and only upon furnishing a security cannot be gone into in these proceedings. The same is the subject matter of a separate petition being special Civil Application No. 2034 of 2006. It would neither be possible nor proper on our part to make any observation or to give any direction which is the subject-matter of the said petition and which petition is not assigned to this Court. ( 6 ) WE also find that there is sufficient explanation given for non-appearance of the counsel on the day when the appeal was dismissed for default. The restoration application is also, therefore, required to be allowed. ( 7 ) HENCE Civil Application No. 12410 of 2005 seeking condonation of delay in filing restoration application, i. e. Misc. Civil application (St) No. 2879 of 2005 is allowed. Misc. Civil Application (St)No. 2879 of 2005 seeking restoration of the first Appeal is also allowed. The First appeal is restored to file. First Appeal upon restoration to be placed before the appropriate Bench as per roster. Both these applications stand disposed of accordingly. Rule is made absolute accordingly in both the applications with no order as to costs.